Com. v. Charles, M.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
MARKLEY CHARLES
Appellant No. 2367 EDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order July 22, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0003589-2012
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED AUGUST 19, 2016
Markley Charles appeals from the order entered in the Court of
Common Pleas of Montgomery County denying his petition under the Post
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. Upon careful
review, we affirm.
In February 2012, Markley Charles, then 24 years old, allegedly
received oral sex from a then-15-year-old girl, the victim, who had become
highly intoxicated at a party at an apartment complex in Upper Moreland
Township, Montgomery County. Police investigating a missing persons
report from the girl’s mother found the minor alone and unconscious in a
vacant apartment unit with her underwear and pants inside out. A
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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subsequent medical examination of the minor revealed the presence of a
vaginal abrasion. During police questioning, defendant admitted that he had
been told the minor was 15-years-old, knew that she was highly intoxicated,
and had received oral sex from her in the vacant apartment.
The victim reported consuming at least 4 cups of an alcoholic beverage
at a party in apartment 240P. She recalled falling down the steps at the
party. She also remembered being in a different apartment with an
unknown male. The male told her “he needed to leave because he did not
want to get in trouble as a result of being older than her.” N.T. Trial,
2/28/2012, at 9. She reported to the police that she did not consent to
sexual contact with anyone at the party.
Dana Harding, who was also a guest at the party, admitted that she
found the victim extremely intoxicated in apartment 240P. Harding
explained that she, Mike Charles, and a third unknown male carried the
victim from the scene and transported her to a vacant apartment located at
220G, where another party was being held. They carried the victim to an
unfurnished bedroom in that apartment, placed her on the floor and covered
her with a sweater. When Harding subsequently returned to the bedroom,
she found the victim naked from the waist down. Harding then left the
party.
Another partygoer, Tyray Moss, testified that he was at a party at
220G, where he saw the victim unconscious on a bedroom floor. Later he
found that same bedroom door closed. After opening the door, he observed
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a black male, later identified as Markley Charles, lying on the floor next to
the victim, who was still unconscious. Moss said that Charles had his pants
down and that the victim’s head was in Charles’s crotch. Moss said that
Charles came out of the room, and the victim was still lying unconscious on
the floor, not moving.
During police questioning, Charles admitted that he and his brother
Roubins Charles (“Roubins”) purchased Bacardi 151 Rum and Colt .45 Blast,
which was furnished to both minors and adults at the party. Roubins met
the victim at the party in 240P. He also admitted that he knew that the
victim was fifteen years old and that she was highly intoxicated. Roubins
told the police that the victim was “pissy drunk. . . scared, paranoid, and did
not know what to do.” N.T. Trial, 2/28/2012, at 9-10. He also witnessed
the victim fall down a set of approximately twelve stairs, two separate times.
Robins admitted that he helped Harding and his brother, Charles, carry the
victim to a vehicle and transport her to the vacant apartment at 220G.
Roubins told police that he later found the victim alone in a rear bedroom.
Charles went into the bedroom with the victim and closed the door. He
admitted that he did lie down with the victim and that her “pants and
drawers were off.” Charles at first told the police that the victim
aggressively requested sex from him, but he resisted. Charles then changed
his story and admitted that he had received oral sex from the victim.
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Following a stipulated bench trial, Charles was convicted of rape,1
statutory sexual assault,2 involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child
under sixteen (16),3 sexual assault,4 and corruption of minors.5 The court
sentenced Charles to the agreed aggregate sentence, eight to sixteen years.
Charles did not file a direct appeal. On July 24, 2014, he filed a timely pro
se PCRA petition. The court appointed the Public Defender’s Office to serve
as PCRA counsel, which filed an amended petition asserting trial counsel was
ineffective. Following a hearing, the court denied Charles’ PCRA petition on
July 22, 2015. Counsel for Charles filed a court-ordered Rule 1925(b)
statement on August 31, 2015.6
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1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(a)(3).
2
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3122.1.
3
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(a)(3), (7).
4
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3124.1.
5
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301 (a)(1).
6
Charles filed his Rule 1925(b) statement three days late. Accompanying
the Rule 1925(b) statement was a “Nunc Pro Tunc Request for Extension of
Time to File Concise Statement.” Despite the fact that the certificate of
service was attached to the concise statement and nunc pro tunc request,
the trial court had no record of receiving these documents.
Effective July 25, 2007, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted
significant amendments to Rule 1925, including a provision to remedy
criminal defense counsel’s failure to file a Rule 1925(b) statement as
ordered. That provision, contained in Rule 1925(c)(3), states:
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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On appeal, Charles raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the PCRA court committed an error of law and/or
abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s claim that his trial
counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and/or call
witnesses in support of his claim at suppression that the
petitioner could not understand and appreciate his rights as
provided to him by police at the time of questioning?
2. Whether the PCRA court committed an error of law and/or
abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s claim that his trial
counsel was ineffective in proceeding to a stipulated bench trial,
thereby waiving all of the petitioner’s rights to confront the
witnesses against him, utilizing only the Commonwealth’s
statements which possessed little, if any, indicia of reliability?
3. Whether the PCRA court committed an error of law and/or
abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s claim that his trial
counsel was ineffective in advising petitioner to proceed to a
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
(c) Remand. –
(3) If an appellant in a criminal case was ordered to file a
Statement and failed to do so, such that the appellate court is
convinced that counsel had been per se ineffective, the appellate
court shall remand for the filing of a Statement nunc pro tunc
and for the preparation and filing of an opinion by the judge.
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(3).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted Rule 1925(c)(3) to avoid
unnecessary delay in the disposition on the merits in cases of per se
ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. See Commonwealth v. Burton, 973
A.2d 428, 433 (Pa. 2009) (under amended rule, if there has been untimely
filing of concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, appellate court
may decide appeal on merits if trial court had adequate opportunity to
prepare opinion addressing issues raised on appeal; if trial court did not
have adequate opportunity to do so, remand is proper). Here, remand is
not necessary because appellant’s counsel has filed a Rule 1925(b)
statement setting forth the alleged errors, and the trial court has filed an
opinion addressing the issue presented. Thus, we will consider the merits of
the issues presented on appeal. Burton, supra.
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stipulated bench trial which included the statement of the
petitioner, despite the fact that all of the evidence from the
remaining witnesses failed to establish that a crime had been
committed in violation of the corpus delicti rule, particularly
where, at the PCRA hearing, trial counsel conceded that he was
not aware of the rule?
In reviewing an order dismissing a petition under PCRA, this Court’s
standard of review is whether the determination of the PCRA court is
supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error. Commonwealth
v. Rivera, 10 A.3d 1276, 1278 (Pa. Super. 2010). In evaluating a PCRA
court’s decision, our scope of review is limited to the findings of the PCRA
court and the evidence on record, viewed in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party at the trial level. Id. We may affirm a PCRA court’s
decision on any grounds if it is supported by the record. Id.In his first issue, Charles claims that the PCRA Court erred in denying
his request for a new trial based on trial counsel’s ineffective assistance.
Charles claims his attorney failed to conduct any investigation or call any
witnesses to support his claim that the statement he made after the police
issued him Miranda warnings was involuntary due to his learning disability
and his prior consumption of alcohol.
To be eligible for relief on a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, a PCRA
petitioner must prove that the alleged ineffectiveness “so undermined the
truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence
could have taken place.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). Counsel is presumed
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effective; the petitioner has the burden to prove otherwise.
Commonwealth v. Payne, 794 A.2d 902, 906 (Pa. Super. 2002).
In order to prove that counsel was ineffective, the petitioner must
show that: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel had no
reasonable basis for his action or inaction; and (3) the petitioner suffered
prejudice as a result. Commonwealth v. Jones, 71 A.3d 1061, 1063 (Pa.
Super. 2013). Prejudice occurs when, but for counsel’s conduct, a
reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceeding would have
been different. Id. In other words, a defendant must demonstrate how the
testimony of an uncalled witness would have benefited him under the
circumstances of a given case. Commonwealth v. Auker, 681 A.2d 1305,
1319 (Pa. 1996) (citing Commonwealth v. Sneed, 899 A.2d 1067, 1076
(Pa. 2006)). Generally, however, the decision whether to call a witness is
not per se ineffectiveness, rather it is a matter of trial strategy. Auker, 681
A.2d at 1319.
If a claimant does not satisfy any of the three prongs, then the court
must reject the claim. Commonwealth v. Cook, 952 A.2d 594, 614 (Pa.
2008). The reviewing court should not weigh the evidence and thus
substitute its judgment for the finder of fact and this includes assessing the
credibility of witnesses. Commonwealth v. Penrose, 645 A.2d 189, 198
(Pa. 1994).
Here, Charles claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to call two
witnesses (his mother and his brother) who could have testified at the
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suppression hearing as to Charles’s learning disability and his intoxication at
the time he gave his statement to police. This claim is meritless. First, the
suppression court found credible the testimony of Upper Moreland Police
Sergeant James Kelly, who was present when Charles’ statement was taken.
Sgt. Kelly testified that he neither smelled alcohol on Charles’ breath nor
noticed any indications that he was under the influence of alcohol. N.T.
Suppression Hearing, 2/25/13, at 73-74. Moreover, although Charles’
mother and brother both accompanied Charles to the police station to give
his statement, neither was called to testify at the PCRA hearing to
corroborate Charles’ claims of intoxication or learning disabilities. Charles’
claim, therefore is meritless. See Auker, supra (counsel will not be found
ineffective for failing to present evidence absent showing witness was
available and helpful to defense).
In his second issue, Charles claims counsel was ineffective for waiving
his right to a jury trial. The record, however, belies this claim.
According to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 620, a trial judge
must determine whether a defendant’s waiver is made knowingly. The
waiver shall be in writing, made part of the record and signed by the
defendant, the attorney for the Commonwealth, the judge, and the
defendant’s attorney as a witness. Pa.R.Crim.P. 620. Additionally,
statements made during a colloquy bind a defendant, and thus the
defendant may not contradict those statements he previously made.
Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d 378, 384 (Pa. Super. 2002).
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Here, Charles executed a written waiver of jury trial. Additionally, the
court conducted an on-the-record colloquy as follows:
BY THE COURT:
Q. I have a document marked Waiver of Jury Trial, which I will
mark as D-1 for identification, and ask you is this the document
that you reviewed with your counsel, Mr. Diamond, that is titled
Waiver of Jury Trial?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: And is that your signature on the bottom of the page?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: All right. Have you reviewed this with your counsel?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: And is this your decision to be tried by me?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: Instead of a jury, is that correct?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: Do you understand the important rights that you are going to
be giving up by not proceeding with a jury?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: The jury would be chosen from members of the community;
thereby producing a jury of your peers. You are giving up that
right?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: Any verdict rendered by a jury must be unanimous. Do you
understand that?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: And you understand all the words?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
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Q: Their meaning?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: And you would be permitted to participate in the selection of
a jury panel. And you are giving up that right, obviously?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: Okay. Is there any words on this documents marked D-1 that
you do not understand?
A: No, Your Honor.
Q: And you feel comfortable that this is the way you want to
proceed, with a bench trial?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: And you are satisfied with your counsel’s advice in this
matter?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. The Court finds that the defendant,
Markley Charles, has made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary
waiver of a jury trial.
N.T. Stipulated Bench Trial, 2/26/13, at 4; Exhibit D-1). As indicated,
Charles responded affirmatively to each question. The record indicates that
Charles’ waiver of a jury trial was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. Thus,
this claim of ineffectiveness is also meritless.
Finally, Charles claims that trial counsel was ineffective for violating
the corpus delicti rule. Specifically, Charles claims counsel’s advice to
proceed to a bench trial that included admission of his incriminating
statement violated the corpus delicti rule because no other evidence
established that a crime had been committed. This claim is meritless.
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The corpus delicti rule requires that the prosecution establish a crime
before a court may admit a defendant’s confession into evidence against
him. Commonwealth v. Rivera, 828 A.2d 1094, 1103 (Pa. Super. 2003).
This rule prohibits a conviction that is based only on a confession where the
Commonwealth presents no other evidence demonstrating that a defendant
committed a crime. Id. The rule may be satisfied by circumstantial
evidence. Id. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient when it is consistent with
a crime. Commonwealth v. Gockley, 192 A.2d 693, 702 (Pa. 1963).
The record contains considerable circumstantial evidence to prove that
Charles committed the crimes. One of the witnesses, Tyray Moss, testified
that he saw the victim’s head in Charles’s crotch. In addition, when the
police found the victim, her pants and her underwear were inside out.
Finally, examination revealed that the minor victim had a vaginal abrasion.
Even absent Charles’s confession, the evidence presented by the
Commonwealth was consistent and demonstrated that the crimes had been
committed. Counsel, therefore, was not ineffective in advising Charles to
proceed with a stipulated bench trial. The PCRA court’s decision is supported
by the record.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/19/2016
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