Com. v. Holt, S.

J-A25029-21
2022 PA Super 29COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
SHERRY HOLT :
:
Appellant : No. 669 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 5, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0000138-2018
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*
OPINION BY KING, J.: FILED: February 17, 2022
Appellant, Sherry Holt, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, following her bench trial
conviction for hindering apprehension or prosecution.1 We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows.
The Commonwealth charged Appellant with hindering apprehension or
prosecution related to false statements she gave to law enforcement officers
in connection with their search for Appellant’s son, Rahmael Holt, who was a
suspect in the November 17, 2017 murder of New Kensington Police Officer
Brian Shaw.
On January 30, 2020, Appellant proceeded to a bench trial. At trial,
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5105(a)(5).
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three different officers testified about their interactions with Appellant on the
days following the murder when they were searching for Appellant’s son. First,
Deputy U.S. Marshal Derek Berger testified that he was a part of the Western
Pennsylvania Fugitive Task Force that was attempting to apprehend Mr. Holt.
He came into contact with Appellant around 1:00 p.m. on November 19, 2017,
and asked her “when was the last time she had seen Rahmael Holt?” (N.T.
Trial, 1/30/20, at 11). Appellant replied that “she hadn’t seen him in weeks.”
(Id.) Deputy Marshal Berger passed this information on to the other law
enforcement agencies that were working to apprehend Mr. Holt.
Second, Detective Ray Dutilka, who worked with the Westmoreland
County District Attorney’s Office, testified that he also was investigating the
death of Officer Shaw. Detective Dutilka explained that shortly after midnight
on November 20, 2017, after Mr. Holt was developed as a suspect in the
murder, he spoke to Appellant at the police department at the detective’s
request. During the interview, Appellant admitted to Detective Dutilka that
Mr. Holt had come to her residence around 10:30 p.m. on November 17, 2017,
which was approximately two hours after Officer Shaw’s murder. Appellant
stated that Mr. Holt arrived at her residence with a shorter, heavy-set black
female named Vanessa (last name unknown), her niece, and two dogs. They
stayed at Appellant’s residence for about 30 to 45 minutes and then left. The
detective explained the severity of the charges against Mr. Holt to Appellant.
Appellant was also aware of the allegations against her son due to the media
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attention the murder had drawn. Appellant also told the detective that she
had informed her son on the night he showed up at her house, that she did
not want him “to bring his shit to her house.” (Id. at 21). Appellant did not
elaborate on that statement. Mr. Holt was ultimately apprehended on
November 21, 2017, around 4:30 or 5:00 a.m., approximately 24 hours after
the interview with Appellant.
Third, the Commonwealth called Detective Richard Manning with the
Allegheny County Sheriff’s Office. Detective Manning testified that he was
involved with the fugitive task force attempting to apprehend Mr. Holt.
Detective Manning explained that he also spoke with Appellant on November
20, 2017, and he asked Appellant if she had any knowledge of Mr. Holt’s
whereabouts. Detective Manning testified that Appellant told him that “she
had seen her son but…she hadn’t spoken with him.” (Id. at 24). Detective
Manning then asked Appellant why she previously told law enforcement that
she had not seen her son at all, and she claimed that “they didn’t ask her if
she had seen him, … they asked if she had spoken with him. And she stated
I never spoke with him.” (Id.) Detective Manning explained that it was not
until the end of the interview that Appellant admitted to having seen (but not
spoken to) Mr. Holt; initially, she denied having seen or spoken with him.
Detective Manning indicated that Appellant “had specific information regarding
the vehicle that Vanessa was operating, information that was very important
to our fugitive investigation that she didn’t provide to the Marshals or us,
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initially.” (Id. at 25-26). Detective Manning said it took several hours before
Appellant ultimately disclosed this information.
After the testimony of these three officers, the Commonwealth rested.
Appellant exercised her constitutional right not to present any testimony or
evidence. Thereafter, the court convicted Appellant of hindering apprehension
or prosecution. On June 5, 2020, the court sentenced Appellant to 12 months’
probation. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on July 2, 2020. On July
22, 2020, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant timely complied.
Appellant now raises one issue for our review:
Was the evidence insufficient in proving beyond a
reasonable [doubt] to support a guilty verdict for hindering
apprehension or prosecution?
(Appellant’s Brief at 4).
Appellant argues the Commonwealth failed to establish that she
intended to hinder law enforcement in the apprehension of her son, Rahmael
Holt. Appellant claims that although she provided conflicting answers to law
enforcement as to whether she had seen Mr. Holt, her answers did not hinder
law enforcement efforts in finding him. Appellant maintains that she did not
lie to Detective Manning about the vehicle that her son and Vanessa had driven
to her house, but simply failed to disclose the information. Appellant
concludes the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction, and this
Court must vacate her judgment of sentence. We disagree.
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When examining a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, our standard
of review is as follows:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at
trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there
is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence
and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition,
we note that the facts and circumstances established by the
Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may
be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of
fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The
Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means
of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the
above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all
evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
[trier] of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses
and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe
all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 215 A.3d 972, 980 (Pa.Super. 2019) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 416 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal
denied, 613 Pa. 642, 32 A.3d 1275 (2011)).
The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines hindering apprehension or
prosecution, in relevant part, as follows:
§ 5105. Hindering apprehension or prosecution
(a) Offense defined.—A person commits an offense
if, with intent to hinder the apprehension, prosecution,
conviction or punishment of another for crime or violation of
the terms of probation, parole, intermediate punishment or
Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition, [s]he:
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* * *
(5) provides false information to a law enforcement
officer.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5105(a)(5) (as amended Dec. 18, 1996, effective in 60 days).
There is scant Pennsylvania case law interpreting the current version of
Section 5105(a)(5). We note that this law was amended in 1996, after our
Supreme Court decided a similar case where police were searching for a
suspect in a criminal investigation. See Commonwealth v. Gettemy, 591
A.2d 320 (Pa.Super. 1991), appeal denied, 529 Pa. 645, 602 A.2d 856 (1992).
In that case, police were investigating the disappearance of Mrs. Ada Groomes
and her motorhome. During the investigation, Trooper Robert Hill interviewed
Linda Gettemy and her boyfriend, John Neckerauer, Jr. Both denied any
knowledge of the disappearance of either Mrs. Groomes or her motorhome,
but they both suggested that Mrs. Groomes might be in possession of the
motorhome in Arizona, where she had allegedly joined a cult. Id. at 322.
Several months later, police learned that Mrs. Groomes’ motorhome had
been stored in Tampa, Florida, and had been brought there by Mr. Neckerauer.
Mr. Neckerauer then told police that Mrs. Groomes had given him the
motorhome just prior to her disappearance. The Commonwealth charged Ms.
Gettemy and Mr. Neckerauer with, inter alia, hindering apprehension or
prosecution. Ms. Gettemy subsequently filed a motion to quash for failure to
make out a prima facie case, which the trial court granted. The
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Commonwealth appealed. See id.
On appeal, the Commonwealth asked whether providing false answers
in response to questions by law enforcement constituted the offense of
hindering apprehension or prosecution. Significantly, at that time, Section
5105(a)(5) criminalized someone who, with the intent to hinder the
apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment of another for a crime,
volunteers false information to a law enforcement officer. Id. (citing version
of Section 5105(a)(5) effective June 6, 1973). Ms. Gettemy argued the
statute did not “apply to her because she did not volunteer false information
to the police as proscribed by the statute.” Gettemy, supra at 322 (emphasis
in original).
This Court agreed with Ms. Gettemy and affirmed the order dismissing
the charge against her. In so holding, this Court initially looked to the
definition of the verb “to volunteer,” which means “to offer (oneself or one’s
services) for some undertaking or purpose; … to give, bestow, or perform
without being asked …; to say, tell, or communicate voluntarily…” Id. at
322-23 (emphasis in original) (citing The Random House Dictionary of the
English Language, copyright 1981).
In consideration of the definition of “volunteers,” this Court reasoned
that the statute applied only to those persons who take the initiative in
supplying false information to law enforcement officials. Id. at 323. This
Court explained that “[t]he facts of the instant case make it clear that [Ms.
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Gettemy] did not take the initiative in supplying false information to the law
enforcement officers. Her answers, misleading as they were, were given in
response to the officers’ questions.” Id. at 323.
Further, this Court looked to the Official Comment to Section 5105,
which stated that this section was derived from Section 242.3 of the Model
Penal Code (“MPC”). The comment to that section of the MPC stated:
Paragraph (5) prohibits volunteering false information to the
law enforcement authorities. Mere failure to report a crime
is not proscribed by the section. Neither is giving misleading
or even false answers to inquiries initiated by the police…
This provision is intended to reach those who take the
initiative in throwing the police off track.
Gettemy, supra at 323. Therefore, this Court held that under the version of
Section 5105 in effect at that time, “providing false answers in response to
questions initiated by law enforcement officers does not constitute hindering
apprehension or prosecution.” Id. See also Commonwealth v.
Neckerauer, 617 A.2d 1281 (Pa.Super. 1992) (relying on Gettemy to hold
that Mr. Neckerauer’s false information in response to police questioning
regarding Mrs. Groomes’ motorhome did not make out prima facie case for
hindering apprehension or prosecution under version of Section 5105(a)(5) in
effect at that time).
As noted, the legislature amended Section 5105(a)(5). It changed
“volunteers false information to a law enforcement officer” to “provides
false information to a law enforcement officer.” See 1996, Dec. 18, P.L. 1074,
No. 160, § 1, effective in 60 days (emphasis added). Consequently, we must
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decide whether the change in statutory language compels a different result in
this case than the result reached in Gettemy.
As our Supreme Court has explained:
The purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain and
effectuate the intent of the legislature. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a).
In this respect, the language of the statute is the best
indication of this intent; accordingly, where the words of the
statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter is
not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.
Id., § 1921(b). Only in the event of an ambiguity may we
consider other aspects of the statute and the statutory
process, and may we discern the General Assembly’s intent
by considering, inter alia, the various factors listed in the
Statutory Construction Act, Id., § 1921(c). See
Commonwealth v. Walls, 592 Pa. 557, [566,] 926 A.2d
957, 962 (2007).
Commonwealth v. Lynn, 631 Pa. 541, 577, 114 A.3d 796, 818 (2015). See
also 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(c) (explaining that when words of statute are not
explicit, intention of General Assembly may be ascertained by considering,
among other matters: occasion and necessity for statute, circumstances under
which it was enacted, mischief to be remedied, object to be attained, former
law (if any) including other statutes upon same or similar subjects,
consequences of particular interpretation, contemporaneous legislative
history, and legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute).
Although there is no legislative history from which we may glean the
legislature’s intent in changing the statutory language, we can infer from the
fact that the General Assembly deleted the word “volunteers” within a few
years of the Gettemy decision and replaced it with “provides,” that the
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legislature sought to change the legal effect and application of Section
5105(a)(5). See Commonwealth v. Pierce, 579 A.2d 963, 965 (Pa.Super.
1990), appeal denied, 527 Pa. 609, 590 A.2d 296 (1991) (explaining: “A
change in the language of a statute ordinarily indicates a change in the
legislative intent”). The new language of the amendment would be rendered
superfluous if it has the same meaning as the pre-amended statute. See id.The common and ordinary meaning of the word “provides” supports this
position. The term “provides,” unlike “volunteers,” has no suggestion of a lack
of compulsion and does not include the notion that one freely initiated the act
of making a false statement. It also does not exclude false statements made
in response to police questioning. Compare Merriam-Webster dictionary
definition of “provides” (defining “provides” as “to supply or make available”
or “to make something available to”) with Merriam-Webster dictionary
definition of “volunteer” (defining “volunteer” as “to offer oneself as a
volunteer” or “to offer or bestow voluntarily”). See Merriam-Webster.com,
Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/provides (Last Accessed February 9, 2022); Merriam-
Webster.com, Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/volunteer (Last Accessed February 9, 2022).
Thus, under the customary and ordinary meaning of the word, one who
makes false statements in response to a police inquiry “provides” false
statements, and the legislature’s amendment of the statutory language was
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designed to include such statements within the ambit of Section 5105(a)(5).2
Applying this interpretation to the facts before us, Appellant told Deputy
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2 We recognize that this Court reached a different result on similar facts in
Commonwealth v. Mason, 861 WDA 2019, 2021 WL 2288091 (Pa.Super.
June 4, 2021) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 265
A.3d 205 (2021). In Mason, this Court addressed the sufficiency of the
evidence surrounding the appellant’s conviction for hindering apprehension or
prosecution, where the appellant had given a false statement to law
enforcement in the same investigation of Rahmael Holt. There, the appellant,
who was Mr. Holt’s cousin, claimed that he had not seen Mr. Holt in weeks and
that Mr. Holt was not welcome in his home. In a split decision, this Court
reversed the appellant’s conviction for hindering apprehension and vacated
that judgment of sentence. The majority concluded that Section 5105(a)(5)
“was not intended to criminalize the giving of false or misleading answers to
questions initiated by police.” Id. at *6. The majority explained that its
review of the legislative history revealed no basis to conclude that the 1996
amendment to the statute was intended to broaden the scope of criminal
behavior under the statute. Id. Rather, it held that the Commonwealth was
required to prove the appellant intended to hinder or “throw police off track”
in their investigation to apprehend Mr. Holt. Further, the majority indicated
that Section 5105(a)(5) requires a causal connection between the conduct of
the person alleged to have hindered apprehension and the actual
apprehension of the suspect. Id. According to the majority, no such causal
connection existed in this case and the appellant’s single false statement
denying having seen Mr. Holt was insufficient to demonstrate that he
intended to “throw police off track” or hinder the apprehension of Mr. Holt.
Id.
In a dissenting memorandum, Judge Bowes took the same position we
espouse in this opinion. See id. at *10-13.
As the Mason decision was not published, we are not bound by its holding.
See Commonwealth v. Phinn, 761 A.2d 176, 180 (Pa.Super. 2000), appeal
denied, 567 Pa. 712, 785 A.2d 89 (2001) (explaining that unpublished
memoranda of this Court have no precedential value beyond law of case as to
parties directly involved in that appeal). See also Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating
unpublished memorandum from this Court filed after May 1, 2019 may be
cited only for persuasive value).
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Marshal Berger that she had not seen or spoken with her son in weeks. Deputy
Marshal Berger passed this information on to law enforcement agencies
involved in the search for Mr. Holt. Appellant later admitted to Detective
Dutilka that she had, in fact, seen Mr. Holt on the night of the murder, but
Appellant claimed she had not spoken with him. Thereafter, Appellant
conceded that she had told Mr. Holt not “to bring his shit to her house,” but
did not elaborate on that statement. (See N.T. Trial at 21). Finally, Appellant
told Detective Manning that she had not seen Mr. Holt, but later admitted to
having seen him, but not spoken with him. Despite her statements to the
contrary, not only did Appellant see her son on the night of the murder, but
she also withheld specific information about the vehicle that Vanessa was
operating, which was very important to the investigation.
On this record, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence that
Appellant “provided” false statements to law enforcement. Appellant knew
the severity of the charges against her son at the time she was questioned by
law enforcement, and admitted to telling her son she did not want “his shit”
in her house on the night of the murder.3 The trial court, as fact-finder, was
free to infer that Appellant provided the various false statements to law
enforcement with the intent to hinder her son’s capture. To the extent
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3Defense counsel argued that Appellant’s statement could have referred to
Appellant not wanting Vanessa, her niece, or the dogs in Appellant’s house.
Nevertheless, it was for the court as fact-finder to decide the meaning of
Appellant’s statement. See Jackson, supra.
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Appellant argues the evidence was insufficient because her statements did not
impair the efforts by law enforcement to apprehend Mr. Holt, the statute
requires only the intent to hinder apprehension, not proof of actual
hindrance.4 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5105(a)(5). Here, Appellant’s intent to delay
or interfere with her son’s apprehension can be readily inferred from her
conduct. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict-
winner, the evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction for
hindering apprehension or prosecution under the current version of the
statute. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5105(a)(5); Jackson, supra. Accordingly, we
affirm.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge Kunselman joins this opinion.
Judge Colins concurs in the result.
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4 The Commonwealth maintains that Appellant’s false statements did hinder
their apprehension of Mr. Holt because “[o]nce in possession of the
information [A]ppellant had initially denied having any knowledge of, police
located and arrested Mr. Holt.” (Commonwealth’s Brief at 11). Nevertheless,
we do not read the statute as requiring any such causal connection, as we do
not deem actual hindrance as an element of the crime.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/17/2022
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