Com. v. Figueroa, J., Jr.

J-A07044-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
v. :
:
:
JOSE FIGUEROA, JR. :
: No. 1084 MDA 2017
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 23, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-22-CR-0003340-2017,
CP-22-CR-0003341-2017
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.
DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 22, 2018
The issue of whether Appellant Jose Figueroa, Jr., is entitled to credit
for time he spent in a juvenile detention facility prior to the transferring of his
cases to the adult criminal division and entry of his guilty plea is a matter of
statutory interpretation.
The right to credit for time served is statutory in nature and arises from
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9760. Statutory interpretation of Section 9760 is “a question
of law, and our review, as an appellate court, is plenary.” In re L.C., II, 900
A.2d 378, 380 (Pa.Super. 2006). “The object of all interpretation and
construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the
General Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a).
Section 9760 provides, in relevant part, the following:
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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(1) Credit against the maximum term and any
minimum term shall be given to the defendant for all
time spent in custody as a result of the criminal charge
for which a prison sentence is imposed or as a result
of the conduct on which such a charge is based.
Credit shall include credit for time spent in custody
prior to trial, during trial, pending sentence, and
pending the resolution of an appeal.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9760(1).
Thus, “credit for time served is generally reserved for situations where
the defendant is ‘in custody.’” Commonwealth v. Martz, 42 A.3d 1142,
1145 (Pa.Super. 2012) (quotation omitted). This Court has recognized that
“[t]he principle underlying [Section 9760] is that a defendant should be given
credit for time spent in custody prior to sentencing for a particular offense.”
Commonwealth v. Fowler, 930 A.2d 586, 595 (Pa.Super. 2007).
“The easiest application of Section 9760(1) is when an individual is held
in [an adult] prison pending trial, or pending appeal, and faces a sentence of
incarceration: in such a case, credit clearly would be awarded.”
Commonwealth v. Shull, 148 A.3d 820, 847 (Pa.Super. 2016) (internal
quotation omitted). However, the statute provides little explicit guidance in
resolving the issue where the defendant spent time somewhere other than in
an adult prison. See id. “This difficulty results in part from the fact that
neither Section 9760, nor any other provision of the Sentencing Code, defines
the phrase ‘time spent in custody.’” Shull, 148 A.3d at 847 (quotations
omitted).
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However, this Court has recognized that the Legislature used the
broader term “custody” instead of “imprisonment” in Section 9760.
Commonwealth v. Druce, 868 A.2d 1232 (Pa.Super. 2005). Accordingly,
this Court has held that under Section 9760 “custody includes forms of
restraint other than imprisonment.” Id. at 1236 (citation omitted).
Specifically, we have held that “time spent in custody” includes time “served
in a court-ordered inpatient [adult] rehabilitation program[.]”
Commonwealth v. Lee, 182 A.3d 481, 485 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citation
omitted).
On the other hand, this Court has held that “custody” does not include
time spent in a voluntary inpatient alcohol treatment facility, at home on
electronic monitoring, or in a halfway house. See Lee, supra;
Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 932 A.2d 941 (Pa.Super. 2007). The reasoning
underlying our appellate decisions is that, where the nature of the time served
satisfies the later imposed adult prison sentence, the defendant should receive
credit against that prison sentence; however, where the time served does not
satisfy the later imposed adult prison sentence, the defendant should not
receive such credit. See id.
In the case sub judice, the time for which Appellant requests credit
constitutes the time he spent in a juvenile facility in relation to the
Commonwealth’s filing of delinquency petitions under the Juvenile Act and
prior to his waiver of his charges to adult court. As the learned trial court
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aptly notes in its opinion, our Legislature treats the detention of children under
the Juvenile Act differently from confinement of adults in prison.
In In re J.M., 42 A.3d 348 (Pa.Super. 2012), we recognized this
distinction, thus holding that delinquent juveniles may not be detained in a
facility used primarily for the detention of adults serving criminal sentences as
the latter does not fulfill the “Legislature’s clear intent to protect the
community while rehabilitating and reforming juvenile[s].” Id. at 351. The
logical corollary of our holding in In re J.M. is that juveniles held in juvenile
detention facilities are not entitled, as of right, to credit for time served against
their adult prison sentences.
Having so concluded, however, our case law indicates that, even where
a defendant is not entitled to credit as of right under Section 9760, the
approval of such credit is within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Commonwealth v. Toland, 995 A.2d 1242 (Pa.Super. 2010) (holding trial
court may exercise its discretion in determining whether to grant a defendant
credit towards his sentence of imprisonment for time voluntarily spent in
institutionalized rehabilitation facility).
Here, Appellant sought credit on the basis that he had “waived both
[cases] into adult court” and “accept[ed] responsibility for the[ ] charges.”
N.T., 6/26/17, at 7. In denying credit, the trial court noted that Appellant’s
statements that he had accepted responsibility were belied by his actions in
that, soon after he was detained at the juvenile facility, he participated in an
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attack upon staff members. Trial Court Opinion, filed 8/24/17 at 5. As the
trial court stated, “This behavior does not sound like an individual who accepts
the responsibility for their charges.” Id.
Further, the trial court indicated that it was denying credit because, in
accepting the negotiated plea agreement, the trial court took into
consideration the time Appellant spent in the juvenile facility prior to
sentencing. Id. at 7. That is, the trial court indicated that it believed
“Appellant was given the deal of a lifetime-three (3) charges [were] dropped
and approximately twenty-three (23) to twenty-five (25) years of
incarceration [was] shaved off the total maximum penalty for the two (2)
charges in which he was sentenced.” Id. The trial court noted that the
“sentence as it currently stands allows the Commonwealth Department of
Corrections and the Parole Board to address Appellant’s rehabilitative needs.”
Id.
Accordingly, the trial court indicated that if it was required to give credit
for the time Appellant spent in the juvenile facility it would not have accepted
the negotiated plea agreement as the resulting “sentence would not have
allowed enough time to meet the rehabilitative needs of Appellant.” Id. There
is no abuse of discretion in this regard. See Toland, supra.
Appellant received “the deal of a lifetime,” according to the learned trial
court. The Majority decision, respectfully, seals that deal.
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I would find that Appellant is not entitled to credit for the time he served
in a juvenile facility in the case sub judice. Accordingly, as I would affirm
Appellant’s judgment of sentence, I respectfully dissent.
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