DocketNumber: Appeal, No. 148
Citation Numbers: 47 Pa. Super. 248
Judges: Beaver, Head, Henderson, Orlady, Porter, Rice
Filed Date: 7/13/1911
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 2/18/2022
Opinion bt
The plaintiff brought suit to recover $105.25 for household and kitchen furniture furnished by him for the use of the board of health of the defendant city, under the following circumstances. On July 3, 1907, a traveling salesman developed smallpox while sojourning in one of the hotels of the city. The physician in charge of this patient promptly notified the board of health, and a special meeting of that board was called to consider the case at 2:30 p. M. of that day and remained in session until 7: 30 p. m. and again convened at 7:45 and continued in session until 12:30 a. m. of July 4. The gravity of the situation was fully appreciated and many suggestions were offered in relief thereof. An effort was made to secure the admission of the sick man to the contagious ward of the Oil City hospital for isolation and treatment, but this was refused by the management of the hospital.
The minutes of the board of health show that, “After discussing the situation at some length, the health officer was instructed to secure a house in some convenient location to which the patient could be moved and cared for, and the secretary was instructed to secure a nurse, to nurse the patient.” About midnight the board visited a house on the outskirts of the city and decided to purchase
Following this another case of smallpox developed, and on July 13, the board convened in special session, when, as shown by the minutes, “it was ordered that a tent be erected on the city’s lot on Hasson Heights, for the care and isolation of the patient.” The health officer was instructed to secure and have erected on the above property a tent, and to remove the patient to the tent, and also “to make any necessary arrangements for the care and isolation of the patient, and also to remove the other patient (the one involved in this case) from Culvert avenue to the tent, so as to avoid the necessity of another nurse.”
On the trial of the case, payment of this claim was resisted on the technical ground that there had not been a formal order given for the goods to the plaintiff by the health officer. At the conclusion of the trial the jury was directed to find a verdict in favor of the defendant, and the plaintiff appeals.
E. S. Laughlin had been the health officer of the borough for a number of years, and was the first witness called on behalf of the plaintiff, when, to expedite the trial, counsel for the defendant, admitted of record as follows, viz.: That on July 1,1907, notice was given to the health officer that a man by the name of Clark, quarantined at the Arlington Hotel, was suffering with smallpox, or a form of that disease. That on July 3, at a meeting of the board of health, convened to consider this case, efforts were made to procure a temporary pest house, and that the health officer (the witness on the stand) had the matter in charge for the board. That about midnight of July 3, arrangements were effected, after an inspection of a property by the members of the board of health, to secure a building in the outskirts of the city, for the temporary use of this infected case.
It is conceded that every item furnished by the plaintiff was necessary for this emergency hospital; that the price charged for each is a reasonable one; that it was delivered to the house selected by the board of health, and used there in the care of this isolated patient; that additional supplies were furnished by the health officer for his maintenance at that place, and subsequently, when a tent was established as a more desirable hospital, this patient, and a part of the supplies furnished by the plaintiff were removed from this house to the tent. It was not necessary that the hand of the health officer should be applied to every separate item of this transaction. He was the mere agent of the board of health, and under the undisputed evidence these necessary supplies were furnished on the order of some one who assumed to act for the board, and whether rightly or wrongly, that authority was exercised in the interest of the city. The fact is undisputed that the property was received and used by the city in the discharge of the duty imposed by the law on the board of health. Under the Act of May 23, 1874, P. L. 230, and the Act of May 23, 1889, P. L. 277, and all other legislation on the subject of the powers and duties of the board of health, the very purpose of their creation is to safeguard human life and health throughout the commonwealth by proper regulations for the control of communicable diseases, and the prevention of infection therefrom. When complaint is made, or reasonable belief exists that an infectious or contagious disease prevails in any locality or house, it is the duty of the board of
The narrow question in this case, as contended for by the defendant, is whether sufficient proof was adduced to warrant a jury in finding that there was an implied promise on the part of the city to pay for these necessary supplies. The case does not depend on any such technical or narrow interpretation of a rule of law.
Where a person, without authority previously delegated, purchases goods for another, and the latter receives the goods, although in ignorance of the act of assumed agency, he must either disaffirm the act of the agent, and return the goods or pay the seller the market value of the same: Carlisle & Finch Co. v. Sand Co., 20 Pa. Superior Ct. 378. See also Wojciechowski v. Johnkowski, 16 Pa. Superior Ct. 444.
It is not contended in this case that the board of health exceeded its authority, or that the case was not an emergent necessity, or that the city did not receive the full equivalent for the price asked, or that the city would not be bound had the board of health by resolution directed the purchase of these articles. The authority given to the health officer by the board of health at a regular meeting, to make all necessary arrangements for the "transportation, care and isolation of this patient at the Koose house,” followed by what was admittedly the proper
The case of Borger v. Alliance Borough, 28 Pa. Superior Ct. 407, is so radically different in its facts from the one now before us, that what was so well said in that case by our Brother Porter does not in any way affect the law applicable to a case such as is here presented. The case should have been submitted to the jury, and if no more appears than is developed in this record, it presents a case for binding instructions to find for the plaintiff.
The judgment is reversed and a venire de facias de novo awarded.