Citation Numbers: 77 Pa. Super. 570
Judges: Head, Henderson, Keller, Linn, Orlady, Porter, Trexler
Filed Date: 11/21/1921
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 2/18/2022
Opinion by
The plaintiff, a baking company doing business in the City of Philadelphia, was the owner of a large auto-truck used in the transportation and delivery of its product. Early in the morning of July 31, 1919, this truck in the charge of the plaintiff’s chauffeur and an assistant had discharged the last of its load in the City of Camden, New Jersey, and started homeward. This journey of course involved the transportation of the truck and those in charge of it across the Delaware River by ferry. The truck was driven on the deck of the ferry boat and stopped at a point directed by some boat employee there in charge. The driver, as he and his assistant declared, shut down the engine, put on the emergency brake, left the car standing there and passed into the cabin where they were engaged in reading the morning paper. As the boat was entering the slip on the Philadelphia side there came the bump or jar, to use the language of the witnesses, against the piling that marks and protects thé slip. The witness declared it was a heavy jar but it does not appear it caused them to give
The suit was brought against “Director General of Railroads Operating Philadelphia and Reading Railway.” Manifestly, the reason why the action was thus brought is to be found in the following extract from the statement of claim. We deem it important to quote it. “Defendant is Director General of Railroads of the United States under the United States Railroad Administration controlling the operation of the Philadelphia and'Reading Railway, a corporation created and existing under the laws of the State of Pennsylvania engaged in the business of the common carriage for hire operating a system of steam railroads and tracks in and about the State of Pennsylvania and elsewhere and controlling and’ operating a connecting line of ferry boats between the City of Philadelphia and Camden, New Jersey.” This declaration of the plaintiff in the action makes it of vital importance to inquire in the outstart what relation existed between the employees of the baking company in charge of the truck and the operators of the railway system which included the ferry boat upon which they were riding. The evidence of the plaintiff’s witnesses íeaves no doubt on this subject. They were not employees of the railway company nor engaged in its service in the operation of the ferry boat. They were the employees of the plaintiff baking company, a private corporation engaged in the transaction of its own business. The testimony also shows without dispute that on the way over to Camden the plaintiff’s employees had de
This situation, developed by the pleadings and evidence, brings the present case directly within the sweep of the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and its amendment by the later Act of 1906. At least since the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Co. v. Hudson Co., 227 U. S. 248, there can be no doubt of the correctness of the statement we have just made. The opinion of Chief Justice White most elaborately and carefully reviews all of the earlier decisions on the subject and thus approaches the conclusion of the case.. “We say simple question because its decision is we think free from difficulty in view of the express provision of the first section of the act to regulate commerce (Act of February 4,1887, c. 104,24 Stat. 879) subjecting railroads as therein defined to the authority of Congress and expressly declaring that ‘the term railroad as used in this act shall include all bridges and ferries used or operated in connection with any railroad and also all the roads in use by any corporation operating a railroad, etc/ The inclusion of railroad ferries within the text is so certain and so direct as to require nothing but a consideration of the text itself.” The
We are also of opinion that the evidence clearly showed that plaintiff’s employees were guilty of contributory negligence. Even had they been regular passengers the law did not justify them in abandoning their property or any care or oversight towards it the moment they deposited it upon the deck of the ferry boat. The evidence of any negligence on the part of the defendant was of a slight and precarious character. The mere fact there was some contact between the bow of the boat and the piling marking the way into the slip could scarcely be called a scintilla of evidence of negligence upon the part of those operating the boat. All the record discloses in addition to that is the statement of the chauffeur that what he had called “bump” was a “heavy jar.” But passing that question and dealing only with the conduct of the plaintiff’s agents in relation to their property we ought to say that even a passenger, on a train or a ferry boat, is obliged to exercise some reasonable care himself over his personal property which he brings upon the train or the boat. To hold otherwise would be to at once shift to the carrier all of the responsibilities of the ownership of personal property, of which the owner still retained, to a large extent, the possession and control. We are not prepared to accept such a doctrine as sound. Just exactly what caused the truck to move is not by any means clear nor does the testimony make plain whether
Judgment reversed.