DocketNumber: Appeal, No. 947
Citation Numbers: 233 Pa. Super. 175
Judges: Cercone, Hoffman, Jacobs, Price, Spaeth, Voort, Watkins
Filed Date: 3/31/1975
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 2/18/2022
Opinion by
The appellant contends that the trial court erroneously granted the appellee’s motion for summary judgment under Rule 1035, Pa. R.C.P. The lower court ruled that appellant’s cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations.
In June, 1963, appellee, Vincent G. Kling, a noted Philadelphia-based architect
Thereafter, a dispute arose between the Authority and the Corporation over a clause in the construction contract concerning the amount of the interior of the building that was to be finished with brick instead of cinder block. The Corporation completed construction consistent with the Authority’s reading of the contract, but subsequently, on October 5, 1965, submitted its claim to arbitration as
The arbitrators denied the Corporation’s claim against the Authority. The Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas set aside the judgment of the arbitrators and the Authority appealed to this Court. We reversed and reinstated the original award of the arbitrators. Framlau Corporation v. Upper Dublin School Authority Board, 219 Pa. Superior Ct. 369, 281 A. 2d 464 (1971).
On June 12, 1972, the present suit was brought by the Corporation against the Architect in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. The Corporation’s complaint alleges several counts of negligence on the part of the Architect. The gravamen of the complaint is that the Architect’s drawings prepared after the Corporation’s bid was accepted were inconsistent with the original plans.
On January 3, 1974, the Architect filed a motion for a summary judgment on the theory that the Corporation’s suit was barred by the statute of limitations. The motion was granted on April 22, 1974, by Judge McDevitt.
The Corporation concedes that the applicable statute of limitations is six years and that it was aware of all the alleged acts of negligence more than six years prior to June 12, 1972, the date on which this action was brought. See Limitations of Actions, Act of March 27, 1713, 1 Sm. L. 76, §1; 12 P.S. §31. The Corporation contends, however, that the statute of limitations was tolled during the pendency of its action against the Authority. See 54 C.J.S. “Limitations of Actions” §247: “Where a
Unquestionably, “arbitration, a matter of contract, should not be compelled of a party unless such party, by contract, has agreed to such arbitration ...” Schoellhammer’s Hatboro Manor, Inc. v. Local Joint Executive Bd. of Philadelphia, 426 Pa. 53, 62, 231 A. 2d 160, 164 (1967). Even assuming that the Architect were an employee of the Authority, rather than an independent contractor, he was not a party to the contract. Therefore, he could not have been brought into the arbitration as a party. The Corporation’s only remedy against the Architect personally, either as an employee or as an independent contractor, would have been a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction. We do not read Article 31 as preventing the Corporation from pursuing remedies against third parties not bound by its contract with the Authority. Article 31 required that the Corporation go to arbitration initially only if the cause of action was against the Authority.
The Corporation argues that the statute of limitations was tolled during the pendency of the arbitration pro
In the instant case, the Corporation does not contend that in fact the Architect was a party to the arbitration. At most, the arbitration involved an issue tangentially related to the present litigation. The issue before the arbitrators was the proper interpretation of a section of the contract between the Corporation and the Authority. During the entire pendency of that litigation, the Architect was never on notice that the Corporation would seek to hold him liable for negligent preparation of the architectural plans. The policy underlying statutes of limitations is one of repose intended to prevent “stale claims from springing up at great distances of time and surprising the parties or their representatives when . . . the facts have become obscure ...” 52 C.J.S. “Limitations of Actions” §1 (b). We see no reason in the instant case to hold that the statute of limitations was tolled against a third person not a party to the litigation.
Judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
Van der Voort, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
. The Corporation also sued Kling’s partners despite the fact that the Architect did not enter into a partnership agreement with the other defendant-appellees until January 1, 1971, according to the Corporation’s complaint.