Estate of: Richard Chennisi, Appeal of: Newman, L.

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2022 PA Super 31ESTATE OF: RICHARD A. CHENNISI, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
DECEASED : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
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APPEAL OF: LAUREN E. NEWMAN : No. 362 EDA 2021
Appeal from the Order Entered January 12, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Orphans’ Court at
No(s): No. 1516-2003
BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINION BY McCAFFERY, J.:
FILED FEBRUARY 18, 2022
I agree with the Majority’s disposition of Appellant Lauren E. Newman’s
third issue — that the September 11th Victim’s Compensation Fund (VCF)
award is subject to administration by the estate. However, with respect to
Ms. Newman’s first two issues, I would conclude we are bound by the holding
in Ambrosia v. Yerage, 572 A.2d 777 (Pa. Super. 1990), that the term
“statute,” when used in a Pennsylvania statute, refers only to a Pennsylvania
statute, and thus not to a federal statute. To this end, I would affirm the
holdings of the trial court that: (1) under 20 Pa.C.S. § 2102(2),1 the VCF
1 Section 2102(2) provides:
The intestate share of a decedent’s surviving spouse is:
* * *
(2) If there is no surviving issue of the decedent but he is
survived by a parent or parents, the first $ 30,000 plus one-half
of the balance of the intestate estate. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, in the case of a decedent who died as a result of the
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award was not “paid pursuant to the Air Transportation Safety and System
Stabilization Act”2 (ATSSSA); and thus (2) the VCF award should be allocated
to the estate (Estate) of Richard A. Chennisi (Decedent), and not distributed
in full to Ms. Newman. Accordingly, I concur in part and dissent in part.
I agree with the Majority that in order to determine whether the
reference, in 20 Pa.C.S. § 2102(2), to the federal ATSSSA includes
amendments to the ATSSSA, we must consider 1 Pa.C.S. § 1937(a),3 as well
as the term “statute.” I further agree with the Majority’s apt summary of
these statutes, as well as the Pennsylvania Statutory Construction Act,4 the
decision of our sister Court in Charter Hospital of Bucks County, Inc. v.
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a surviving spouse shall
be entitled to 100% of any compensation award paid
pursuant to the Air Transportation Safety and System
Stabilization Act (Public Law 107-42, 115 Stat. 230).
20 Pa.C.S. § 2102(2) (emphasis added).
2 See 107 P.L. 42, 115 Stat. 230.
3 Section 1937(a) provides:
A reference in a statute to a statute . . . includes the statute . . . with
all amendments and supplements thereto and any new statute . . .
substituted for such statute . . . , as in force at the time of application
of the provision of the statute in which such reference is made, unless
the specific language or the context of the reference in the provision
clearly includes only the statute . . . as in force on the effective date of
the statute in which such reference is made.
1 Pa.C.S. § 1937(1).
4 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1501-3103.
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Commonwealth, Dep’t of Health, 534 A.2d 1125 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987)
(Charter Hospital), and the federal Western District of Pennsylvania Court’s
decision in Cerutti v. Frito Lay, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 2d 920 (W.D.Pa. 2011).
However, I respectfully disagree with the Majority’s determination that
this Court’s 1990 opinion in Ambrosia is not binding on this panel or
applicable to the issue before us. In Ambrosia, the plaintiff won a $14,950
judgment against the husband-and-wife defendants, which became a lien
against the defendants’ home. Ambrosia, 572 A.2d at 778. The defendants
subsequently filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy in federal court. Id. Their home,
however, was not included in the bankruptcy estate, but instead permitted by
the bankruptcy court to be “abandon[ed]” from the estate, due to its lack of
“equity for the general creditors.” Id.After the bankruptcy matter concluded, the defendants’ home was
subject to Pennsylvania execution proceedings, and was accordingly sold at
sheriff’s sale for $21,200. The Ambrosia trial court denied the defendants’
claim for a $15,000 exemption, under federal bankruptcy laws, for the
proceeds of the sale. Ambrosia, 572 A.2d at 778. Instead, the trial court
granted the defendants a $300 exemption pursuant to Pennsylvania statute
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8123(a) (“General monetary exemption.”). Id.
On appeal, the defendants argued the trial court erred in not allowing
them to claim the $15,000 federal exemption in addition to the $300
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Pennsylvania exemption. Ambrosia, 572 A.2d at 779. They relied on 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 8121, which provided in part:
(a) General Rule.— . . . [T]he exemptions from execution
specified in this subchapter are in addition to any other
exemptions from execution granted by any other statute.
Ambrosia, 572 A.2d at 779, quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 8121(a) (emphasis added).
The defendants argued the phrase, “any other statute,” indicated the
legislature’s intent “to expressly authorize all of the Pennsylvania exemptions
in addition to any other exemptions from execution.” Ambrosia, 572 A.2d at
779.
This Court disagreed, first reasoning, “The decision in this case turns on
the construction to be given the phrase ‘any other statute,’ contained in 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 8121.” Ambrosia, 572 A.2d at 779. The Court referred to the
definitional section of our Statutory Construction Act, Section 1991, which
defined the term “statute” as “[a]n act of the General Assembly, whether
under the authority of the Commonwealth or of the late Proprietaries of the
Province of Pennsylvania.” Id. at 780, quoting 1 Pa.C.S. § 1991. We held
the term “statute,” “whenever” used in a Pennsylvania statute, means a
Pennsylvania statute:
When the legislature has so defined a word or phrase, we are
bound by its definition. . . . Thus, as a matter of statutory
construction, whenever a statute, such as 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8121,
employs the term “statute”, it cannot be construed to refer to
anything other than statutes enacted by the Pennsylvania
legislature.
From this, we must conclude that the legislative intent in
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§ 8121 was to allow Pennsylvania residents additional exemptions
from execution granted by any other Pennsylvania statute
exclusive of Chapter 81, subchapter B. There is no support, as a
matter of statutory construction, for [the defendants’] suggestion
that the Pennsylvania legislature intended that the federal
exemptions contained in 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d) are to be made
available to a debtor in a state execution proceeding.
Ambrosia, 572 A.2d at 779-80 (emphases added). This Court thus
“conclude[d] the trial court did not err in holding that § 8121 does not
authorize the use of federal bankruptcy exemptions in an execution
proceeding at the state level.” Id. at 780 (footnote omitted).
The Ambrosia opinion was issued in 1990, 31 years ago, and remains
good law as it has not been criticized or reversed. It is well settled that “panel
opinions of this Court are binding precedent and we must follow them until
overruled by either this Court sitting en banc or by a higher court.”
Commonwealth v. Spease, 911 A.2d 952, 959 (Pa. Super. 2006).
Ambrosia was positively relied upon in this Court’s 2002 decision in
Equitable Gas Co. v. Wade, 812 A.2d 715 (Pa. Super. 2002). In that case,
a public utility/gas company sued a customer for overdue gas bills. Id. at
716. The gas company also sought post-judgment interest at the rate of 18%,
citing both: (1) a tariff it received, from the Pennsylvania Public Utility
Commission, which permitted “up to 18% annual interest on delinquent
accounts;” and (2) a Public Utility Commission regulation “governing late
payments of utility bills.” Id. at 716, 717. The trial court entered a verdict
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in the gas company’s favor, but awarded post-judgment interest at the rate
of 6%, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 8101. Equitable Gas Co., 812 A.2d at 716.
On appeal by the gas company, this Court considered 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 8101, which governed post-judgment interest and stated:
Except as otherwise provided by another statute, a
judgment for a specific sum of money shall bear interest at the
lawful rate from the date of the verdict, or from the date of the
judgment, if the judgment is not entered upon a verdict or award.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8101 (emphasis added). The legal rate is 6% per
year. 41 P.S. § 202.
Equitable Gas Co., 812 A.2d at 717. This Court rejected the gas company’s
reliance on the tariff and the regulation for seeking an 18% rate. Id. In so
holding, we relied on Section 1991’s definition of “statute” and the Ambrosia
decision, finding
the simple reason that neither [the tariff nor the regulation] is a
“statute,” as that term is defined by statutory and case law. “The
term ‘statute’ specifically is defined in 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1991 as ‘[a]n
act of the General Assembly whether under the authority of the
Commonwealth or of the late Proprietaries of the province of
Pennsylvania.’” Ambrosia[, 572 A.2d at 780] (emphasis added).
Equitable Gas Co., 812 A.2d at 717.
In the instant appeal, the Majority correctly points out that, unlike
Charter Hospital and Cerutti, the Ambrosia decision did not address
Section 1937. To reiterate, that section states, “A reference in a statute to a
statute . . . includes the statute . . . with all amendments and supplements
thereto and any new statute . . . substituted for such statute . . . .”. 1 Pa.C.S.
§ 1937(a). The Majority reasons that because Section 1937 was not at issue
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in either Ambrosia or Equitable Gas, those decisions offer “little guidance
in the instant appeal beyond demonstrating the applicability of § 1991. [ ]”
Majority Op. at 16 & n.8. The Majority further opines that Ambrosia’s “broad
pronouncement about the construction of statutes other than the one before
it . . .is non-binding dicta.” Id. at 17.
I respectfully disagree with the Majority’s reasoning that Ambrosia’s
lack of discussion of Section 1937(a) renders Ambrosia’s holding irrelevant
or inapplicable on this panel. While the question presented in this appeal
relates to amendments to the ATSSSA, the ultimate issue we must resolve is
whether the term “statute,” when used in a Pennsylvania statute: (1) refers
only to other Pennsylvania statutes; or (2) includes federal statutes.
In reviewing the relevant statutory language, we may decide this
question without Section 1937, by looking simply to the definition of “statute”
within our Statutory Construction Act. Statutory interpretation of Section
1937 likewise would ultimately direct us to the statutory definition of “statute.”
See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1937(a) (“A reference in a statute to a statute . . . includes
the statute . . . with all amendments and supplements thereto and any new
statute . . . substituted for such statute . . . .”).
Ambrosia has resolved that question, albeit in the context of another
statute and area of law. Ambrosia concluded the term “statute,” as defined
in Section 1991, refers only to other Pennsylvania statutes. See Ambrosia,
572 A.2d at 780 (“[A]s a matter of statutory construction, whenever a statute
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. . . employs the term ‘statute’, it cannot be construed to refer to anything
other than statutes enacted by the Pennsylvania legislature.”). The opinion in
Equitable Gas likewise applied the Ambrosia holding to another statute and
area of law — 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8101. See Equitable Gas Co., 812 A.2d at
717.
The Majority also addresses the following emphasized portion of Section
1991, “The following words and phrases, when used in any statute . . . ,
unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, shall have the meanings
given to them in this section[.]” Majority Op. at 16, quoting 1 Pa.C.S. § 1991
(emphasis in Majority Op.). The Majority opines Section 1937 does include
such “context” that indicates the legislature’s intent for Section 1937 “to apply
to statutes and regulations other than those of the General Assembly.”
Majority Op. at 17. For ease of discussion, I set forth the provisions of Section
1937(a) in full:
A reference in a statute to a statute or to a regulation issued
by a public body or public officer includes the statute or
regulation with all amendments and supplements thereto and any
new statute or regulation substituted for such statute or
regulation, as in force at the time of application of the provision
of the statute in which such reference is made, unless the specific
language or the context of the reference in the provision clearly
includes only the statute or regulation as in force on the effective
date of the statute in which such reference is made.
See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1937(a) (emphasis added). Based on the emphasized
language above, the Majority opines the General Assembly intended that a
statute’s “reference to a law” includes not only the General Assembly’s own
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amendments, supplements, and replacements, “but also the laws of ‘any
public body or officer.” Majority Op. at 17 (emphasis added).
I am not convinced by the Majority’s interpretation that a “public body
or officer” may also enact a statute.5 See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1937(a). As stated
above, in Equitable Gas, this Court rejected an argument that a regulation,
by the Public Utility Commission, was a “statute” within the definition of
Section 1991. See Equitable Gas Co. v. Wade, 812 A.2d at 717.
In any event, as stated above, I agree with the Majority’s summaries of
the Commonwealth Court’s decision in Charter Hospital and the federal
district court’s decision in Cerutti. Notwithstanding the Majority’s opinion that
Ambrosia’s discussion, of the Section 1991 definition of “statute,” is dicta,
Majority Op. at 17, I believe we are bound by Ambrosia. Absent any reversal
of or pronouncement against Ambrosia by the Pennsylvania or United States
Supreme Court, or the Superior Court sitting en banc, that decision remains
binding authority on this panel. See Spease, 911 A.2d at 959. Furthermore,
to the extent that the language of Sections 1937 or 2102(2) — which are clear
on their face — could or should be phrased differently, I note the courts “may
not amend the statute but instead must examine the statute as drafted by the
legislature.” See Holland v. Marcy, 883 A.2d 449, 456-57 (Pa. 2005).
5 To this end, while the Majority would apply the phrase, “issued by a public
body or public officer,” to both a statute and a regulation, I would interpret
that phrase (“issued by a public body or public officer”) to modify only the
word “regulation.” See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1937(a).
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Accordingly, I would hold that the phrase “statute,” as it appears in
Section 1937(a), refers only to a Pennsylvania statute, and not a federal
statute, such as the ATSSSA. See 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1991, 1937(a); Ambrosia,
572 A.2d at 780. Thus, I would conclude the trial court did not err in finding:
(1) the VCF award in this matter was not “paid pursuant to the” ATSSSA,
under Section 2102(2); (2) the award is thus properly included as an asset in
Decedent’s Estate; and (3) Ms. Newman is not entitled to 100% of the award.
See Trial Ct. Op. at 8.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur and dissent.
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