Stemmerich, B. v. Massung, G.

J-A09022-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
BARBARA STEMMERICH : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
GLENN MASSUNG, III AND : No. 1151 WDA 2017
PITTSBURGH MOBILE TELEVISION, :
INC. :
Appeal from the Judgment entered July 25, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Civil Division at
No(s): GD 15-023133
BEFORE: BOWES, J., DUBOW, J., and MURRAY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED JULY 10, 2018
Appellant, Barbara Stemmerich, appeals from the July 25, 2017 entry
of Judgment on the jury’s verdict in this personal injury matter. She contends
that the evidence did not support the jury’s relatively low non-economic
damages award. After careful review, we affirm.
The facts and procedural history, as gleaned from the record, are as
follows. On January 31, 2014, Appellee, George Massung, while employed by
Appellee Pittsburgh Mobile Television, Inc., was driving at a low rate of speed
when he rear-ended Appellant’s vehicle causing her car to hit the car in front
of her. As a result of the accident, Appellant’s chest struck her steering wheel
and her knees struck the dashboard before she was thrust backwards, the
J-A09022-18
force of the thrust breaking her seat. Appellant was 68 years old at the time
of the accident, and suffered from numerous pre-existing medical conditions.1
Following the accident, paramedics took Appellant to the emergency
room. Appellant complained of pain in her right knee from it hitting the
dashboard and of pain in her chest from the pressure of her seatbelt. An x-
ray showed no fracture or other obvious injury to her artificial right knee joint,2
and there was bruising visible on the left side of her chest. The hospital
discharged Appellant the same day after diagnosing her with no serious injury.
Due to her pre-existing medical conditions, Appellant already had a
regular appointment with her pain management specialist, Dr. Till Conerman,
scheduled for three days after the accident. At that visit, she complained to
Dr. Conerman of pain in her low back and mid back radiating down her leg.
Dr. Conerman treated Appellant by continuing previously prescribed physical
therapy, muscle relaxers, and Vicodin. During subsequent appointments, Dr.
Conerman injected steroids into the most painful areas of Appellant’s back.
Three days after the accident, Appellant also saw her treating orthopedic
surgeon, Dr. Yram Groff. She reported to Dr. Groff that she had increased
pain in her right shoulder. Dr. Groff treated Appellant with continued physical
____________________________________________
1 Appellant’s pre-existing conditions included reconstructive right foot and
ankle surgery; reflex sympathetic dystrophy/complex regional pain syndrome
of the right leg; low back pain caused by sacroiliitis; fibromyalgia; right knee
replacement surgery; right shoulder rotator cuff tendinitis; left knee bone-on-
bone arthritis; severe stenosis of the lumbar spine; and right shoulder bone
spur and arthritis. See Trial Ct. Op., 9/28/17, at 2.
2 Appellant had had her right knee joint replaced in May 2011.
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therapy, pain medication, and steroid injections. Appellant underwent an MRI
test of her right shoulder on August 20, 2014, which showed a partial tear of
her rotator cuff. On October 31, 2014, Dr. Groff performed arthroscopic
surgery on Appellant’s right shoulder, debriding the partial tear of the rotator
cuff, decompressing the area around the rotator cuff, removing a pre-existing
bone spur, and removing the end of the clavicle bone to treat pre-existing
arthritis.
On March 22, 2016, Appellant filed a Complaint to recover damages for
the injuries that she alleged she had sustained as a result of Appellee’s
negligence.
A two-day trial commenced on April 3, 2017. Following the close of
evidence, the trial court entered a directed verdict on liability in Appellant’s
favor. Thus, the only issue before the jury was Appellant’s damages.
In support of her damages claim, Appellant presented the live testimony
of her husband and daughter, and the video deposition testimony Dr.
Conerman and Dr. Groff. Appellee presented the deposition testimony of Dr.
James Cosgrove, an expert witness specializing in pain management, who
conducted an independent medical examination of Appellant for purposes of
this litigation.
Relevant to the instant appeal, Dr. Groff and Dr. Conerman testified
extensively about Appellant’s pre-existing medical conditions, the injuries that
she had sustained in the instant accident, and her prognosis. Appellant’s
witnesses concluded that the accident had aggravated Appellant’s pre-existing
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conditions, and caused some additional medical issues including a partial tear
of her rotator cuff and low back pain. See N.T. Groff, 3/28/17, at 55; N.T.
Conerman, 3/23/27, at 32-33. Dr. Conerman testified that, although
Appellant’s condition has improved since the accident, it was likely that
Appellant’s pain would be a chronic ongoing condition. N.T. Conerman at 36-
37, 80.
Appellee’s expert witness, Dr. Cosgrove, also testified about Appellant’s
numerous pre-existing conditions. He stated that, by the time of his
independent medical examination of Appellant for purposes of this litigation,
he “could find no residual impairment that I would ascribe – or attribute to
the motor vehicle accident in question[.]” N.T. Cosgrove, 3/17/17, at 44. Dr.
Cosgrove also testified that the appearance of post-accident degenerative
changes to Appellant’s low back spine was not related to the instant accident;
rather, it was attributable to age-related degeneration. Id. at 35-37. He
opined that Appellant’s right shoulder injury that resulted in surgery was not
related to the car accident. Id. at 39-40. However, Dr. Cosgrove also stated
that because of the extent of Appellant’s chronic and slowly progressing pre-
existing conditions, he had difficulty in “trying to determine whether [the
accident] was a . . . cause or significant contributing factor[]” of Appellant’s
post-accident complaints. Id. at 16.
In sum, while the parties’ witnesses largely agreed that Appellant
suffered a multitude of pre-existing conditions, they disagreed on the impact
of the accident on Appellant’s post-accident health and her prognosis.
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J-A09022-18
On April 4, 2017, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellant,
awarding her $1,170 for her past medical expenses and $600 for pain and
suffering.
On April 6, 2017, Appellant filed a Post-Trial Motion requesting a new
trial on damages, or, in the alternative, additur. The court held a hearing,
after which it denied the Motion. The court entered Judgment on the verdict
on July 25, 2017.
This appeal followed. Appellant and the trial court complied with
Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:
1. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err as a matter of law in denying
[Appellant’s] Motion for Post-Trial Relief for a new trial on
damages when the damage award was so contrary to the
evidence that it shocked one’s sense of justice?
2. Was the jury’s award for non-economic damages so low, by
contemporary economic damages, it was nothing more than
inadequate?
Appellant’s Brief at 2.
We address Appellant’s interrelated issues together. In her first issue,
Appellant challenges the weight the jury gave to the evidence. She disputes
what she characterizes as the trial court’s “speculat[ion] that the jury might
have found that the opinions of Dr. Cosgrove were more credible than [her]
treating physicians, despite the fact that Dr. Cosgrove conceded that
[Appellant’s] treating physicians were in a better position to assess [her]
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injuries.” Id. at 22. She avers that Dr. Cosgrove conceded that she had
suffered significant injuries. Id.
In her second issue, Appellant claims that the trial court abused its
discretion in not granting her request for a new trial because the jury’s non-
economic damages award of $600 did not adequately compensate her for the
losses caused by Appellee’s negligence. Id. at 21, 36-37. She posits that the
jury’s award was “for all practical purposes a non-award, equivalent to a $0
award.” Id. at 23. We conclude that Appellant is not entitled to relief on
either issue.
Our standard of review of an order denying a Motion for a New Trial is
well-settled. We consider “whether the trial court clearly and palpably
committed an error of law that controlled the outcome of the case or
constituted an abuse of discretion.” Schmidt v. Boardman Co., 958 A.2d
498, 516 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). We examine the evidence in
the light most favorable to the verdict-winner and, “to reverse the trial court,
we must conclude that the verdict would change if another trial were granted.”
Id. (citation omitted).
Where a jury has made credibility determinations regarding the
testimony and evidence presented, those determinations are rarely
overturned. Armbruster v. Horowitz, 744 A.2d 285, 287 (Pa. Super. 1999).
In order to prevail on a challenge to the weight of the evidence, the verdict
must be so “contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice[.]”
Lanning v. West, 803 A.2d 753, 765 (Pa. Super. 2002) (quotation and
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citation omitted). A new trial “will not be granted on the ground that the
verdict was against the weight of the evidence where the evidence is
conflicting and the fact-finder could have decided in favor of either party.” Id.
at 766 (citation omitted).
When considering challenges to the weight of the evidence, we note
that, “[i]t is well-settled in Pennsylvania that the weight of the evidence and
the credibility of witnesses are issues for the jury who is free to believe some,
all, or none of the evidence presented.” Odato v. Fullen, 848 A.2d 964, 966
(Pa. Super. 2004).
With respect to a claim for additur, we note the following principles. “A
verdict is set aside as inadequate when it is so inadequate as to indicate
passion, prejudice, partiality, or corruption, or where it clearly appears from
uncontradicted evidence that the amount of the verdict bears no reasonable
relation to the loss suffered by the plaintiff.” Dranzo v. Winterhalter, 577
A.2d 1349, 1352 (Pa. Super. 1990) (citation and quotation omitted). Further,
“[i]f the verdict bears a reasonable resemblance to the damages proved, the
appellate court will not disturb the verdict merely because the damages are
less than the reviewing court might have awarded.” Id. “To support the grant
of a new trial for inadequacy of the damage award, the injustice of the verdict
should stand forth like a beacon.” Id. (citation and quotation omitted).
Following our review of the evidence and the relevant case law, we find
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s Post-
Trial Motion or her request for additur. The Honorable Alan Hertzberg, who
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presided at trial, has authored a comprehensive, thorough, and well-reasoned
Opinion, citing to the record and relevant case law in addressing Appellant’s
issues. After careful review of the parties’ arguments and the record, we
affirm on the basis of the trial court’s Opinion. See Trial Ct. Op., 9/28/17, at
4-8 (concluding that: (1) the jury had a basis for finding many of Appellant’s
complaints were not credible or were caused by a pre-existing condition,
including the testimony of her own witnesses; (2) the jury was not required
to find that the instant accident caused the pain complained of by Appellant;
(3) the parties presented contradictory evidence, which the jury was free to
find credible or not credible; and (4) the non-economic damages award did
not “shine forth like a beacon of injustice”).
The parties are instructed to attach a copy of the trial court’s September
28, 2017 Opinion to all future filings.
Judgment affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/10/2018
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Allegheny County - Department of Court Records
Civil Division - Filings Information
County caselD:GD-15-023133
Case Description:Stemmerich vs Massung III etal
Official Docket Entry, Sort By Document Number Ascending
Document Filed Date Title/Entry Entry Classification Filed By
Number
1 09/28/2017 Opinion Official Docket Entry Alan D.Hertzberg
(Index Page -1)
1 -Opinion
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL DIVISION
BARBARA STEMMERICH,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. GD 15-23133
vs.
Superior Court Docket
GLENN MASSUNG, III and No. 1151 WDA 2017
PITTSBURGH MOBILE TELEVISION, INC,
Defendants.
OPINION
JUDGE ALAN HERTZBERG
COPIES SENT To:
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF:
TIMOTHY CONBOY, ESQUIRE.
733 WASHINGTON ROAD
SUITE 201
CJ PITTSBURGH, PA 15228
L.4-e cL_
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT:
1
MICHAEL LANG, ESQUIRE
983 THIRD STREET
BEAVER, PA 15009
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL DIVISION
BARBARA STEMMERICH,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. GD 15-23133
vs.
Superior Court Docket No. 1151 WDA 2017
GLENN MASSUNG, III and
PITTSBURGH MOBILE TELEVISION, INC.,
Defendants.
OPINION
Alan Hertzberg, Judge Date Filed: September. 28, 2017
The issue addressed in this. Opinion is whether a jury verdict for pain and
suffering of $600 is adequate compensation for Plaintiff Barbara Stemmerich's injuries. I
find this jury verdict of $600 for pain and suffering is adequate, and my reasons for this
decision are'set forth below.
On January 31, 2014, Defendant Glenn Massung, while employed by Defendant
Pittsburgh Mobile Television, Inc., was driving a tractor trailer on Butler Street in the
City of Pittsburgh. The trailer component of the vehicle consisted of a tank used to haul
recycled oil, but the tank was empty. It was 5:00 p.m., hence it was rush hour, traffic was
heavy and Mr. Massung was moving slowly towards an intersection controlled by a
traffic light. The traffic in front of him stopped, requiring him to stop by pressing both
the cl'itch and brake pedals. Mr. Massung had oil on his boots, and his foot slipped off
the cliitch pedal, which caused the truck to lunge forward and collide with the rear of a
car being driven by Mrs. Stemmerich. At impact, Mr. Massung did not think his truck
was moving very fast, and if he had to guess, less than twenty miles per hour. While the
collision crushed a portion of the Ounk of Mrs. Sternmerich's trunk, the air bag inside of
her vehicle did not deploy. Mrs.. Stemmerich's car seat back broke during the collision
and she collapsed backwards in the car and could not control the continuing movement of
the car or see where it was going. Her car ultimately stopped due to lack of momentum,
but she then needed assistance from paramedics to exit her car. This experience severely
upset Mrs.. Stemmerich.
Mrs. Stemmerich, then 68 years old, had multiple pre-existing medical conditions.
In June of 2006, she had reconstructive surgery of her right foot and ankle followed by
reflex sympathetic dystrophy/complex regional pain syndrome of her right leg. In 2009,
Mrs. Stemmerich developed sacroiliitis that caused low back pain, which was treated
with injections into the sacroiliac joint. She also was diagnosed with fibromyalgia
(overactive nerves that magnify the aches and pains over her entire body). In May of
2011,. Mrs. Stemmerich had right knee replacement surgery. In December of 2013, she
developed right shoulder rotator cuff tendonitis after reaching behind herself to grab
something. It was being treated with, physical therapy, anti-inflammatories, pain
meditation and steroid injections. Before the collision, Mrs. Stemmerich also had "bone
on bOne arthritis of her left knee (another knee replacement surgery was contemplated),
severe stenosis, of the lumbar spine and a bone spur and arthritis in her right shoulder.
joint.
Paramedics took Mts. Stemmerich from her vehicle to the emergency room of
West Penn Hospital. Mrs. Stemmerich complained Of pain in her right knee from it
hitting the dashboard and of pain in her chest from the pressure of her seatbelt. An x-ray
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showed no fracture, or other obvious injury to her artificial right knee joint, and there was
ecchymosis (bruising below the surface of the skin) visible on the left side of her chest.
After diagnosing no serious injury, West Penn Hospital discharged Mrs. Stemmerich on
the same day as the collision.
Due to her pre-existing medical conditions, Mrs. Stemmerich had a regular
appointment with her pain management specialist, Dr. Conerman, three days later. She
complained of pain in her low back, and mid back radiating down the,leg. Dr. Conerman
treated Mrs. Stemmerich by continuing previously prescribed physical =therapy, musele
relaxants and Vicodin, with the prescribed amount of Vicodin increased. During
additional appointments, he also injected steroids into the most painful areas of her back.
Three days after the collision Mrs. Stemmerich also was able to see the orthopedic
surgeon who had been, regularly treating her, Dr. Groff. She reported that her right
shoulder felt much worse due to the collision. Dr. Groff treated Mrs. Stemmerich with
continued physical therapy, pain medication and steroid injections. Mrs. Stemmerich,
however, did not seem to be improving, and on August 20, 2014 an MRI test was done on
her right shoulder that showed a partial tear ,of the rotator cuff. Then, on October 31,
2014, Dr. Groff performed arthroscopic surgery on her right shoulder, debriding the
partial tear of her rotator cuff, decompressing the area around the rotator cuff, removing
the pre-existing bone spur and removing, the end of the clavicle bone to treat the pre-
existing arthritis.
Mrs. Stemmerich filed 'a lawsuit against Mr. Massung and his employer on
December 30, 2015 by means of a writ of, summons, and she filed a complaint on March
22, 2p16. On March 31 and April 3-4, 2017 I presided over a jury trial of the parties'
dispnte. Mr. Massung testified as the plaintiff's first witness and admitted that his
negligence caused the collision, which left Mrs. Stemmerich's money damages as the
only' dispute for the Jury to resolve. Mrs. Stemmerich's treating physicians, Dr.
Conerman and Dr. Groff, testified by videotaped deposition, as did a pain management
physician hired by the Defendants, Dr. Cosgrove. Dr. Conerman opined that the collision
caused injuries to Mrs. Stemmerich's back and that her treatment would extend into the
future. Dr. Groff opined that the collision caused the partial tear of Mrs. Stemmerich's
right rotator cuff and the arthroscopic surgery he performed to repair it. Dr. Cosgrove,
however, opined that the only injuries caused by the collision were, the bruises from the
seatbelt and aggravation of her pre-existing back problems, which resolved in a. few
months. The Jury also received an itemized list of past medical expenses in the total
amount of $9,936.57.
The written Jury Verdict that I prepared classified damage amounts into three
separate categories: (1) past medical expenses; (2) future medical expenses; and (3) pain
and suffering. The Jury returned a verdict of $1,170 for past medical expenses, $0 for,
fUture medical expenses and $600 for pain and suffering. Mrs. Stemmerich appealed the
verdict to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania following my denial of her Motion for.
Post -Trial Relief. In her appeal Mrs. Stemmerich argues that the Jury Verdict of $600 for
pain and suffering must be set aside because it is inadequate and shocks one's sense of
justice. I disagree and set forth below why I disagree.
"Generally, a verdict will not be disturbed, merely on account of the smallness of
the damages awarded or because the reviewing court would have awarded more." 22
Am'. Jur. 2d, Damages,,§1029 (1988). Furthermore, "[i]t is the exclusive province of the
4
jury, as factfinder, to hear evidence on damages and decide what amount fairly and
completely compensates the plaintiffs." Matheny v. West Shore Country Club, 436 Pa.
Super. 406, 407, 648 A.2d 24, 24 (1994). A jury verdict is not to be set aside on the basis
of inadequacy unless the injustice of the verdict shines "forth like a beacon" and "where
it clearly appears from uncontradicted evidence that the amount of the verdict bears no
reasonable relation to the loss suffered by the plaintiff." Kiser v. Schulte, 538 Pa. 219,
648 A.2d 1, 4 (1994) (citing Elza v. Chovan, 396 Pa. 112, 152 A.2d 238 (1959)).
Under this standard Mrs. 'Stemmerich is able to reference instances from other
cases where the test for setting aside a jury verdict is met. For example, in. Yacabonis v.
Gilvickas (376 Pa. 247, 101 A.2d 690 (1954)) the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld
the trial court's grant of a new trial. Following an automobile accident,, a passenger was
hospitalized for nineteen days with eight fractured ribs, caught pneumonia in the hospital
and was in an oxygen tent for twelve days and then went home where she stayed in bed
for four months. The Pennsylvania Supreme. Court determined that the jury's award to
the passenger of medical expenses but nothing for pain and suffering was, totally
inadequate and affirmed the trial judge's, decision to grant a new trial.
In Davis v. Mullen (565 Pa. 386, 773 A.2d 764 (2001)), the Pennsylvania
Supteme Court explained the existence of two seemingly inconsistent lines of its cases.
In the first line of cases the trial court correctly granted a new trial when a jury awarded
medical expenses but no pain and suffering. ,See, Yacabonis above. The plaintiffs'
injuries were too severe for the jury to have a reasonable basis for awarding medical,
expenses but no pain and suffering. In the second line of cases, the granting of a new
trial when a_ jury awarded medical expenses but no pain and suffering was incorrect. See,
e.g., Boggavarapo v. Ponist, 518 Pa. 162, 542 A.2d 516 (1988) and Catalano v. Bujak,
537 Pa. 155, 642 A.2d 448 (1994). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained that the
second line of cases differed because the jury either had a basis to find a plaintiff's pain
and uffering complaints were not credible or were caused by a pre-existing injury.
Hence, in Davis v. Mullen the trial judge was correct to deny Mr. Davis a new trial when
the jury awarded;him medical expenses but no pain and suffering because Mr. Davis
missed no work, waited twenty days after the accident to be treated by a chiropractor for
neck and back pain and the chiropractor was uncertain about whether the injuries could
have been caused by three prior automobile accidents. The Pennsylvania. Supreme Court
also attributed the appropriateness of the jury verdict of no, pain and suffering by Mr.
Davis to "the power of the jury as the ultimate finder of fact and the need for the judiciary
to guard against usurping the role of the jury." 565 Pa. 386, 393, 773 A.2d 764, 768.
While the Jury did award Mrs. Stemmerich .a small amount for pain and suffering,
the principles set forth in Davis v. Mullen when a jury awards no pain and suffering are
applicable. Mrs. Stemmerich's injuries undoubtedly place her in the second line of cases
because the Jury had a basis for finding many of her pain and suffering complaints were
not credible or were caused by pre-existing injuries. Since she complained of only:knee
and chest pain at the Emergency Room (see Jury Trial transcript, p. 148), the Jury may
have found her later complaints of back and shoulder pain were not credible. Both of.
Mrs. Stemmerich's physicians acknOwledged it was very difficult to tell whether her pain
was caused by the collision or her pre-existing medical conditions. Dr. Conerman was
unable to state the percentage of her pain that was caused by the collision (see
Videotaped Deposition Transcript of Dr. Conerman, p. 74), while Dr. Groff
6
A
acknowledged there was no way to definitively know whether her rotator cuff had been
torn before the collision because no MRI study was done until after the collision (see.
Videptaped Deposition Transcript of Dr. Groff, pp. 55-56). Dr. Groff relied on Mrs.
Stemmerich saying her shoulder pain increased after the collision for his opinion that the
collision caused the rotator cuff tear (see Dr. Groff Transcript, p. 39), but the Jury may
not have believed. Mrs. Stemmerich was being honest with Dr. Groff. Dr. Conerman also
acknowledged Mrs. Stemmerich's pre-existing and ongoing back pain was due to chronic
ankle and knee problems that made her gait uneven (see Dr. Conerman Transcript, p. 57)
as well as her severe lumbar spine stenosis (see Dr. Conerman Transcript, pp. 64-65 and
68-69).
Dr. Cosgrove, the physician hired by Mr. Massung, disagreed with both of Mrs.
Stemmerich's physicians and attributed only the aggravation of Mrs. Stemmerich's pre-
existing low back and neck pain, "primarily during the early months of 2014," to the
collision. Videotape Deposition Transcript of Dr. Cosgrove, p. 66. Dr. Conerman
additionally stated that Mrs. Stemmerich had pain on a 1-10 scale of 2 before the
collision, 6 just after the collision, but the pain decreased to &level of 2 by April 2, 2014.
See Dr. Conerman Transcript, pp. 54 and 80. Therefore, the Jury may have found this
testimony by Dr. Conerman, to be the most objective test of her pain from the collision,
which in duration lasted no more than the 61 days from January 31 to April 2. Finally, to
the extent photographs showing bruising from the seatbelt are an indication of pain, Dr.
Cosgrove explained that Mrs. Stemmerich was more ,susceptible to the bruises because
she Was. taking a blood thinner called Playix. See Dr. Cosgrove Transcript, pp. 28.-29.
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Ms. Stemmerich, her husband and her daughter all testified that the collision,
which had a significant emotional impact, was a life changing experience that prevented
her from continuing to care, for her grandchildren and doing many activities of daily
living'she used to db. With her physicians opining that her shoulder surgery and ongoing
backpain were caused by the collision; Mrs. Stemmerich appeared convinced of this and
therefore was very disappointed by the Jury's verdict of only $600 for her pain and
suffe'ring and other non -economic losses. However, a jury is "not obliged to believe that
every injury causes pain or the pain alleged." Boggavarapu v. Ponist, 518 Pa. 162, 542
A.2d 516, 518. Mrs. Stemmerich's. Jurors may have found her collision related pain was
minimal, or it may have placed a lower value on her pain than she expected. But, "there
is no mathematical formula to arrive at a figure for the intangible damages of pain and
suffering." Kaufman v. Campos, 2003 Pa. Super. 229, 827 A.2d 1209, 1212. In
summary, the $600 pain and suffering Verdict does not shine forth like a beacon of
injusfice, and there is contradictory evidence of the losses sustained in the collision. See
Elza v. Chovan, 396.Pa. 112, 152 A.2d 238. Therefore, granting a new trial wouldusurp
the proper role of the Jury. Accordingly, I was correct in denying Mrs. Steinmerich's
request for a new trial.
BY THE COURT:
?J.
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