Adoption of: P.A.R., Appeal of: H.J.S.

J-S38003-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
OF P.A.R. : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: H.J.S., MOTHER :
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:
:
: No. 950 WDA 2021
Appeal from the Decree Entered July 15, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Orphans’ Court at No(s):
20A In Adoption 2021
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
OF M.H.R. : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: H.J.S., MOTHER :
:
:
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: No. 951 WDA 2021
Appeal from the Decree Entered July 15, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Orphans’ Court at No(s):
20 IN ADOPTION 2021
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 7, 2022
H.J.S. (“Mother”) appeals from the final decrees entered in these cases
on July 15, 2021, which involuntarily terminated her parental rights to her
minor children, M.H.R. (born in November of 2018) and P.A.R. (born in
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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October of 2020) (“Child” or “Children”).1 Additionally, Mother’s counsel filed
a petition to withdraw and a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).
After review, we grant counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the
termination decrees.
The permanency goals for each Child were previously changed to
adoption. See In the Interest of M.R. and P.R., 308 WDA 2021 and 309
WDA 2021, unpublished memorandum (Pa. Super. filed Sept. 16, 2021) (M.R.
and P.R. I). We rely in part on this Court’s rendition of the facts set forth in
the M.R. and P.R. I memorandum opinion, which states as follows:
M.R. came into the care of [Erie County Children and Youth
Services Agency (“Agency”)] by emergency protective order dated
December 10, 2019, based on allegations related to parental
substance abuse. A shelter care hearing was held on December
12, 2019. Mother did not appear at the hearing; Father appeared
and stipulated to [a] continuation of shelter care pending the
adjudication hearing.
A dependency petition was filed December 13, 2019….
***
An adjudication and disposition hearing was held before the
juvenile court hearing officer on December 19, 2019. Both
parents were present, though Mother arrived late. Father was
represented by counsel. The hearing officer found in favor of
adjudication. The hearing officer’s recommendation was adopted
by court order dated January 8, 2020. By virtue of that order,
Mother’s dispositional permanency plan required her to:
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1These matters were consolidated sua sponte by this Court by order dated
September 9, 2021. Moreover, we note that the Children’s Father is not a
party to this appeal.
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1. Refrain from the use of drugs and alcohol and participate
in random urinalysis testing at the Esper Treatment Center
as requested by the [A]gency. If a positive urine screen is
received, [Mother] will be referred to the random urinalysis
color code program through Esper Treatment Center;
2. Participate in a drug and alcohol assessment and follow
through with any recommendations;
3. Participate in a mental health evaluation and follow
through with any recommendations;
4. Obtain and/or maintain safe and stable housing and
provide the [A]gency with a signed lease to show that she
is able to provide stability for [M.R.];
5. Obtain and/or maintain gainful employment and provide
the Agency with documentation that she is employed and
receives an income;
6. Participate in a parenting education program and
demonstrate the ability to provide for [M.R.’s] needs during
visitation;
7. Demonstrate the ability to provide for the safety and well-
being of the [C]hild[,] to include attending medical, dental,
and other needed appointments; and
8. Sign any and all releases requested by the Agency.
Mother’s treatment plan was revised a few weeks later to require
participation in family dependency drug treatment court.
For the first two review periods (January—May 2020), Mother
demonstrated moderate compliance with her permanency plan,
except she continued to test positive for marijuana, and on one
occasion in January 2020, [she] tested positive for
amphetamine/methamphetamine. She underwent the requisite
drug and alcohol and mental health assessments and was
admitted to family dependency drug court. Her permanency plans
were updated accordingly.
Drug testing was unavailable during the second review period due
to [the] Covid-19-related shutdown of the Esper Medical Center
testing facility. When Mother was tested on two occasions in May
and June of 2020, she tested positive for marijuana.
Urinalysis drug testing resumed during the third review period
(July—October 2020), but Mother failed to attend screenings after
mid-September 2020. When she last appeared for testing, she
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tested positive for amphetamines, methamphetamines, and
marijuana on September 8, 2020, positive-failure to produce on
September 9, 2020, and negative on September 10, 2020. She
has not submitted to testing since September 10, 2020. Visitation
with M.R. was contingent on clean urines [and], therefore, Mother
had no visits with M.R. during the third and fourth review periods.
Mother was discharged from family dependency treatment court
by order ... dated October 1, 2020, for “consistent failure to attend
court, failure to submit to drug testing and non-compliance with
treatment recommendations.” Criminal docket searches during
the third and fourth review periods revealed that Mother was
charged with possession of drug paraphernalia in August of 2020
and pled guilty to the charge in December of 2020.
Mother gave birth to P.R. [in] October [of] 2020. The child was
taken into protective custody from the hospital based on Mother’s
ongoing substance abuse and the [C]hild’s purportedly having
tested positive for amphetamines and opiates at birth.
After the third permanency review hearing on November 2, 2020,
the court found there had been no compliance with the
permanency plan, and no progress toward alleviating the
circumstances that led to [the] original placement, and [it]
granted OCY’s motion to change the permanency goal for M.R.
from reunification to reunification concurrent with adoption. An
adjudication and dispositional hearing for P.R. was also held on
November 2, 2020. P.R. was placed in the same kinship home as
M.R. and assigned the same concurrent permanency goals.
OCY moved to change the permanency goal to adoption after the
fourth permanency review period, in January of 2021, alleging
parents’ noncompliance with their permanency plans. The motion
was heard at the time of the fourth permanency review hearing
on February 1, 2021. Both parents appeared at the hearing by
telephone and were represented by counsel.
Id. at 1-3 (quoting the trial court opinion, April 1, 2021, at 1-5).
On March 11, 2021, the Agency filed petitions to terminate Mother’s
parental rights to both Children. The termination hearing was held on July
13, 2021, and was attended by Mother via telephone due to vehicle problems.
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The trial court’s opinion sets forth an extensive discussion of the testimony
provided by the Agency’s witnesses, as well as a lengthy recitation of Mother’s
testimony. See Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 9/10/2021, at 20-33. The court
then discussed the grounds for termination, concluding that the facts
presented by the Agency supported the termination of Mother’s parental rights
to the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b). On
July 15, 2021, the trial court entered the decrees, terminating Mother’s
parental rights to both Children.
Mother’s counsel filed a timely appeal on her behalf, but also submitted
a “Statement of Intention to File an Anders Brief” in lieu of a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal. This is an acceptable procedure.
See In re J.T., 983 A.2d 771 (Pa. Super. 2009). Specifically, the J.T. opinion
explains:
Recently adopted Rule 1925(c)(4) creates an exception to the
general rule of waiver in criminal cases when counsel files a brief
pursuant to Anders. In such an instance[,] a concise statement
of errors complained of is not required. Rather, counsel “may file
of record and serve on the judge a statement of intent to file” an
Anders brief “in lieu of filing a Statement.” If upon review of the
advocate’s brief required by Anders, the appellate court believes
that there are arguably meritorious issues for review, those issues
are not waived. Instead[,] the appellate court may remand for
filing a concise statement of errors complained of, an opinion
pursuant to Rule 1925(a), or both.
Because the Anders procedure has been engrafted onto
parental termination cases by In Re: V.E. and J.E., … 611 A.2d
1267, 1275 (Pa. Super. 1992), counsel’s decision to follow the
Rule 1925(c)(4) procedure in this parental termination case was
proper. In so holding, we ensure symmetry of Anders procedure
in both the criminal and parental termination contexts.
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Id. at 773-74. Based upon this explanation in J.T., we conclude that Mother’s
counsel followed the proper procedure.
Additionally, we recognize that before reaching the merits of Mother’s
appeal, we must address counsel’s request to withdraw. See
Commonwealth v. Rojas, 874 A.2d 638, 639 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“‘When
faced with a purported Anders brief, this Court may not review the merits of
the underlying issues without first passing on the request to withdraw.’”)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 700 A.2d 1301, 1303 (Pa. Super.
1997)). “In In re V.E., … this Court extended the Anders principles to
appeals involving the termination of parental rights.” In re X.J., 105 A.3d 1,
3 (Pa. Super. 2014). To withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel must:
1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after
making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has
determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy
of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and 3) advise the
[appellant] that he or she has the right to retain private counsel
or raise additional arguments that the [appellant] deems worthy
of the court’s attention.
Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en
banc) (citing Commonwealth v. Lilley, 978 A.2d 995, 997 (Pa. Super.
2009)). With respect to the third requirement of Anders, that counsel inform
the appellant of his or her rights in light of counsel’s withdrawal, this Court
has held that counsel must “attach to their petition to withdraw a copy of the
letter sent to their client advising him or her of their rights.” Commonwealth
v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005).
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Additionally, an Anders brief must comply with the following
requirements:
(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
citations to the record;
(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably
supports the appeal;
(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and
(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record,
controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the
conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.
In the instant matter, counsel has filed a petition to withdraw, certifying
that she has reviewed the case and determined that Mother’s appeal is wholly
frivolous. Counsel also has filed a brief that includes a summary of the history
and facts of the case, issues raised by Mother, and counsel’s assessment of
why those issues are frivolous, with citations to relevant legal authority.
Counsel has included a copy of her letter to Mother, advising Mother that she
may obtain new counsel or raise additional issues pro se. Accordingly, counsel
has substantially complied with the requirements of Anders and Santiago.
See Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 781 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(observing that substantial compliance with the Anders requirements is
sufficient). We, therefore, may proceed to review the issues outlined in the
Anders brief. In addition, we must “conduct an independent review of the
record to discern if there are any additional, non-frivolous issues overlooked
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by counsel.” Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1250 (Pa. Super.
2015) (footnote omitted).
Counsel’s Anders brief lists the following in the section entitled
statement of the questions presented:
A. Whether the orphans’ court committed an error of law and/or abused its
discretion when it concluded that termination of parental rights was
supported by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
§[]2511(a)(1), (2), (5), [and] (8)?
B. Whether the orphans’ court committed an error of law and/or abused its
discretion when it concluded that termination of parental rights was
supported by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
§[]2511(b)?
Anders brief at 3.
We consider these issues mindful of our well-settled standard of review:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result. We have previously
emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
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Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
In this case as noted above, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental
rights pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We need only
agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well
as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.
Super. 2004) (en banc). Here, we analyze the court’s decision to terminate
under Sections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
***
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
***
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(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by
terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] §
2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1)
repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2)
such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to
be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation
omitted)). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that
cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the
contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to
perform parental duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002)
(citations omitted).
Here, with regard to Section (a)(2), the trial court found:
As to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) in the instant case, on February 1,
2021, Minor Child M.H.R.’s Fourth Permanency Review Hearing
was held as well as Minor Child P.A.R.’s first Permanency Hearing.
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Mother had “no compliance with the permanency plan” and “no
progress toward alleviating the circumstances which necessitated
the original placement.”
Mother had “a need for [help with] housing, drug and alcohol and
also mental health and parenting.” Ms. DiCola confirmed [that,]
when she ended her services, Mother was “still working on the
same issues.” Ms. DiCola clarified even though during the thirteen
months Ms. DiCola provided services for Mother, Mother was[n’t]
really making any progress. Mother was not doing enough.
Mother failed to pay her rent and owed landlord $4,553.00.
Mother and/or Father received $10,000 from pandemic
unemployment but did follow through with Section 8 housing at
that time.
Mother was to participate in 36 urines but had: 26 no shows; 4
negatives; 3 failure to produce; … 1 positive for marijuana and 1
for methamphetamine, and 1 for amphetamines, meth, and
marijuana. Mother “was pretty argumentative” with providers and
“wouldn’t take responsibility for any of her actions.” Mother
blamed [the Agency] and other service providers or would make
excuses as to why she wasn’t doing what she needed to do on the
court order.
Caseworker Rash confirmed services were offered to Mother after
April 20, 2020, through Zoom and by telephone. For the following
review period in July of 2020, and as the Covid restrictions began
to change, Caseworker Rash had not seen any change in how
Mother was interacting. On May 29, … 2020[,] and June 11[,] …
2020, Mother tested positive for marijuana. Between April to July
1, 2020, Mother continued visitation with Minor Child M.H.R.
through Zoom video chat lasting for fifteen minutes. Caseworker
Rash confirmed discussing with Mother … [her] being pregnant
and still using drugs, but Mother continued to use. The newly born
Minor Child P.A.R. was found to be drug exposed for
[m]ethamphetamine. Since Minor Child P.A.R. was discharged
from the hospital, Caseworker Rash confirmed Mother did not
have any visits with Minor Child P.A.R.
Caseworker Rash confirmed between July of 2020 and November
of 2020, Mother went from having “moderate compliance” to “no
compliance.” In particular, between July 1st of 2020 and October
13th of 2020, Mother was to participate in thirty-six (36) urine
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screens. Mother had twenty-six (26) no shows; four (4)
negatives; three (3) failure to produce; one (1) positive for
marijuana and one (1) [positive] for methamphetamine, and one
(1) [positive] for amphetamines, meth[,] and marijuana. On
October 1, 2020, Mother was discharged from treatment court due
to her consistent failure to attend court, her failure to submit to
drug testing, and her non-compliance with treatment
recommendations. When providers started seeing Mother face-
to-face, Mother “was pretty argumentative” and “wouldn’t take
responsibility for any of her actions.” Mother would blame [the
Agency] and/or other service providers for her own shortcomings
or Mother would make excuses as to why she was not doing what
she needed to do in the Court Order. Caseworker Rash also
reported about an “unpleasant interaction” with Mother during a
team meeting at Mother’s residence in Girard. Mother
communicated to Caseworker Rash “she was going to go to the
State of Ohio to have her baby so Erie County wouldn’t be involved
with that child as well.”
Caseworker Rash confirmed she also had conversations explaining
to Mother as to “how difficult that would make things to move to
Ohio.” Also Ms. DiCola and Ms. DuShole, as well as the
[d]ependency judge at the November 2nd hearing, made it very
clear to Mother that if she decided to live in the State of Ohio, it
was Mother’s responsibility from that point on to seek out her own
services that she needed. Mother was cautioned that she would
still be responsible to do her urine screens at the Esper Treatment
Center.
On October 1, 2020, the Erie County Family Dependency
Treatment Court discharged Mother “for consistent failure to
attend court, failure to submit to drug testing and non-compliance
with treatment recommendations.”
In November, when Adoption was established as the concurrent
goal with reunification, Mother reported to Caseworker Rash that
she was staying in a tent and then in a camper and their vehicle.
Mother also said she was staying with other family members in
Ohio and at the Geneva Motel in Ohio. As to transportation
assistance when Mother was living in Girard, Mother was offered
gas cards[,] which Mother accepted, but Caseworker Rash
confirmed Mother’s ability to transport herself did not improve.
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Mother dropped out of services January of 2021, and Mother was
still claiming to be a resident in Ohio at that time. As to visitation
with either of her children, May of 2020 was the actual last[,] in[-
]person visit. When asked how Minor Child M.H.R. is doing since
he has been in care, Caseworker Rash stated Minor Child M.H.R.
“has been doing great.” He is “meeting all his milestones.” The
pre-adoptive home of paternal uncle was “meeting all of his
needs.” A “very strong, healthy bond” exists between Minor Child
M.H.R. … in his pre-adoptive home with his paternal uncle and his
wife. [Caseworker] Rash stated Minor Child M.H.R. has
experienced no negative or detrimental effect after not seeing his
Mother since the May 2020 in-person visit or virtually since June
of 2020. He has had no negative effects by not seeing his Mother
for over a year, and he will be three in November. And Minor Child
P.A.R. “hasn’t seen her parents since she was born” and her
paternal uncle and his wife in her pre-adoptive home “are the only
parents that she’s known.” Mother has done nothing to remedy
the conditions that led to the placement of her children.
Caseworker Rash confirmed it would be in both of these Minor
Children’s best interest if the Mother’s parental rights were
involuntarily terminated since “the [M]other has not made any
progress on her court[-]ordered treatment plan.” Minor Child
M.H.R. has been in care with his paternal uncle and his wife “for
19 months[,] which is over half of his life....” Minor child P.A.R.
“has been in care for her entire life, which is approximately nine
months.” In fact, neither Minor Child M.H.R. nor Minor Child
P.A.R. … even recognize Mother as their mother. Caseworker
Rash stated “it would be more detrimental to not terminate
[Mother’s] parental rights.”
During the instant IVT [(involuntary termination)] trial, Mother
confirmed she understands [the Agency] is petitioning the [c]ourt
to terminate her rights which would mean the law would no longer
identify her as the Mother to either Minor Child M.H.R. and Minor
Child P.A.R. However, Mother claimed she is able to take care of
Minor Child M.H.R. or Minor Child P.A.R. “because [she] has a
place to take them to” and “[she] loves [her] children and [she]
was a good mom; [she] does not think what happened was fair.”
Mother is living in a house where she only has a room, but also
has a camper. Her friend, Tiffany, is the owner of this house, and
lives there too, with her husband. Mother does not necessarily
pay rent, but if Mother has money and her friend needs it, Mother
will “help her.” Mother admitted using marijuana when asked
about her positive test results, but failed to blame herself for not
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seeing her son. Mother testified she is bipolar and has PTSD,
depression, ADD[,] and ADHD.
Minor Child M.H.R. and Minor Child P.A.R. “are doing very well in
their current placement” and the paternal uncle and his wife as
Kinship Care is an adoptive resource for them. Caseworker
Vicander maintained [that] terminating Mother’s parental rights is
in “the best interest of these children” because neither Minor Child
M.H.R. nor Minor Child P.A.R. have seen Mother in person since
June of 2020. In addition, he stated, “parents weren’t able to
rectify the situation that led to their placement.” Caseworker
Vicander confirmed there would be “no negative effect” on either
Minor Child if Mother’s rights would be terminated.
Therefore, under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), [the Agency] has
proven by clear and convincing evidence that Mother’s incapacity
and neglect have caused Minor Child M.H.R. and Minor Child P.A.R.
to be without essential parental care and control. Mother cannot
and has not remedied the causes of her incapacity and neglect as
to each of these Minor Children, specifically Minor Child M.H.R.
and Minor Child P.A.R. Mother has demonstrated a continued
inability to conduct her life in a fashion that would provide a safe
environment for either or both of these Minor Children, whether
that child was living with that parent or not, and her behavior is
irremediable as supported by clear and competent evidence
thereby justifying granting [the Agency] both Petitions to
terminate Mother’s parental rights in the instant case.
TCO at 46-50 (citations to the record omitted).
After a thorough review of the record in this matter, we conclude that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by terminating Mother’s parental
rights pursuant to Section 2511(a). The court’s findings, stated above, are
based upon the testimony provided at the termination hearing and support
the court’s finding that Mother is incapable of providing Children with the
essential parental care, control, and subsistence necessary for their mental
and physical well-being, and that Mother is unable to remedy the causes of
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her parental incapacity. At the time the court entered its termination decrees,
M.H.R. had been in foster care for 19 months and P.A.R. had been in care
since birth, and Mother had failed to successfully accomplish any of her goals.
It is clear that Mother simply will not, and apparently cannot, become a
capable parent for Children at any point in the foreseeable future. Thus,
Mother is not entitled to relief as to Section 2511(a)(2).
We next consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by
terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). We analyze
Section 2511(b) as follows:
Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental
rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884
A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, “Intangibles
such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the
inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we
instructed that the trial court must also discern the nature and
status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect
on the child of permanently severing that bond. However, in cases
where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and child,
it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. Accordingly, the
extent of the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the
circumstances of the particular case.
In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations
omitted).
Notably, in regard to Section 2511(b), the trial court stated in its opinion
that:
Mother “dropped out of services January of 2021” and the parents
were “still claiming to be residing in Ohio at that time.” As to
visitation with either of their [C]hildren, May of 2020 was the
actual last in-person visit. When asked how Minor Child M.H.R. is
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doing since he has been in care, Caseworker Rash answered he
“has been doing great.” The Kinship paternal uncle and his wife
“are meeting all of his needs” and there is a “healthy bond
between them.” Caseworker Rash responded Minor Child M.H.R.
has not … suffered a “detrimental effect by not seeing his parents
since the May 2020 in-person visit or the virtual visit in June of
2020. Minor Child P.A.R. “hasn’t seen her parents since she was
born” and her Kinship paternal uncle and his wife are the only
parents she has known. Caseworker Rash confirmed “it would be
in these [C]hildren’s best interest if the [M]other’s parental rights
were to be involuntarily terminated” since “[M]other has not made
any progress on her court[-]ordered treatment plan.” Neither
Minor Child M.H.R, nor Minor Child P.A.R. “…even recognize
[Mother] as their mother.” Caseworker Rash stated [that] “it
would be more detrimental to not terminate Mother’s parental
rights.” Indeed, the parent-child bond with each Minor Child is a
“healthy one” with the paternal uncle and his wife, not with the
Mother.
Caseworker Vicander credibly stated Minor Child M.H.R. and Minor
Child P.A.R. “are doing very well in their current placement” and
confirmed “this would be an adoptive resource.” Caseworker
Vicander maintained that termination of parental rights is in “the
best interest of these [C]hildren” because Minor Child M.H.R. and
Minor Child P.A.R. have not seen their Mother “in person since
June 2020.” In addition, “[P]arents weren’t able to rectify the
situation that led to their placement.” As confirmed by
Caseworker Vicander, there would be “no negative effect” on
either Minor Child if Mother’s rights were terminated.
***
This IVT [c]ourt finds and concludes that indeed nothing has
changed with Mother. Minor [C]hild[ren] M.H.R. and P.A.R. need
to move onto permanency, and in fact, these Minor Children
deserve permanency. The testimony reflects these Minor Children
will suffer no irreparable harm with Mother’s parental rights being
involuntarily terminated. This IVT [c]ourt has also considered the
importance of the continuity of Minor Children’s relationship with
the paternal uncle and his wife who are meeting the
developmental, physical[,] and emotional needs of these Minor
Children in their best interests. For all of the above reasons, [the
Agency] has met its burden of proof by clear and convincing
evidence under 23 Pa.C.S. §2511(b).
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J-S38003-21
TCO at 55-56, 57-58 (citations to the record omitted).
Again, our review of the record reveals that it supports the trial court’s
conclusion that terminating Mother’s parental rights would best serve
Children’s needs and welfare. Children have spent nearly their entire lives
with their paternal uncle and his wife and, thus, it is clear that Children should
not be removed from their care. Children will not suffer irreparable harm if
Mother’s parental rights are terminated.
Accordingly, our independent review of Mother’s claims demonstrates
that they do not entitle her to relief. Moreover, our review of the record does
not reveal any non-frivolous issues overlooked by counsel. See Flowers, 113
A.3d at 1250. Therefore, we grant counsel’s petition to withdraw, and affirm
the trial court’s decrees.
Decrees affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/7/2022
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