DocketNumber: Appeals, Nos. 91 and 92
Judges: Ervin, Flood, Montgomery, Rhodes, Watkins, Woodside, Wright
Filed Date: 6/15/1961
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/13/2024
Opinion by
These two appeals by Lina G. and Eugene Yardaro, two of the defendants, are from the order of the lower court refusing them a new trial or judgment n.o.v. and entering judgment on the verdict in favor of plaintiffs. The verdict was in favor of the third defendant, Bruno Yardaro, presumedly because he was not an owner.
The action is based on a mechanic’s lien filed against property in the City of Philadelphia owned by the two appellants. The lien was filed for a 10% commission claimed by plaintiffs for preparing plans etc., and supervising the construction of a home on appellants’ land under an oral contract, allegedly entered into between plaintiffs and all the defendants on or about July 26, 1956. Defendants denied such contract, but admitted that they had discussed the construction of the home with Leonard Piccari, one of the plaintiffs, but only as a long time friend, and not for the purpose-of hiring him or his partnership as a general contractor or superintendent. However, at that time the plaintiffs were engaged in the general contracting business, and this was known to the defendants. It is defendants’ contention that whatever plaintiff did by way of preparing plans and specifications, staking out the house, advising the defendants on the making of contracts and purchases etc., was done solely for the privilege of getting the contract to supply the lumber and carpentry labor necessary in the completion of that house, but without bidding against other suppliers of
The lower court permitted oral testimony to be offered into the record over the objection of the defendants as to the existence of the oral contract of July 26, 1956, and the jury found that such contract had been made. The correctness of that ruling is the major issue in these appeals. It is appellants’ contention that the lower court violated the parol evidence rule in admitting such oral testimony and that it thereby permitted the written contracts of August 1956 to be varied without proof of fraud, accident or mistake; citing Gianni v. R. Russell & Co., Inc., 281 Pa. 320, 126 A. 791. The important consideration in the present case is not the rule, but its application. When it is to be applied and followed is stated in the Gianni case as follows (p. 323): “The writing must be the entire contract between the parties if parol evidence is to be excluded and to determine whether it is or not the writing will be looked at and if it appears to be a contract complete within itself ‘couched in such terms as import a complete legal obligation without any uncertainty as to the object or extent of the engagement, it is conclusively presumed that the whole engagement of the parties, and the extent and manner of their undertaking, were reduced to writing’: Seitz v. Brewers’ Refrigerating Machine Co., 141 U. S. 510, 517.
“When does the oral agreement come within the field embraced by the written one? This can be answered by comparing the two, and determining whether parties, situated as were the ones to the contract,
The lower court resolved the matter in the following language: “It is true, as argued by the defendants, that both contracts deal with the construction of the building for the defendants. However, such unity of object is a bar to the introduction of oral evidence only where the later written agreement purports to be a completely integrated contract covering the entire subject matter. Here it is manifest that the parties in contracting for lumber and carpentry work on the house had no intention of fully setting forth a comprehensive agreement covering the construction of the entire house. . . . Obviously, the contracts cover entirely different matters.”
We are not prepared to say that the trial judge erred in his conclusion. Although the contracts, both oral and written, related to the same house, under the evidence in this case it clearly appears that there were many contracts relating to that house made by the defendants which all had to do with the construction of same. Apparently the defendants acted as their own general contractors and let separate contracts for the various services and the materials needed in the construction of their new home. Even in the case of plaintiffs, separate written contracts were let for the carpentry work and the lumber, aside from the oral contract let originally for plans, advice and supervision. This is not an unusual situation. The services of one experienced in general contracting of this nature may be procured for preliminary plans, coordinating and supervising the actual work without that person as
The appellants contend also that the lower court erred in stating that there was no presumption of a contract or agreement between the parties. Since the lower court refused to charge as to this presumption, the plaintiffs had the burden of proving to the jury that such a contract existed and that the terms of said contract were as alleged. This statement clearly refers only to the oral contract and not to the written contracts which the court properly charged had been admitted by both parties. Hence the defendants have no basis for complaint. Their cause was helped and not prejudiced by the statement of the court. The issue of whether there was or was not an oral contract made by the parties on or about July 26, 1956 for preliminary plans, supervision etc., was clearly and properly submitted to the jury under proper instructions imposing upon the plaintiffs the burden of proving such contract.
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.