Com. v. Walls, E.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
EDWARD WALLS, : No. 2001 WDA 2013
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the PCRA Order, December 11, 2013
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No. CP-02-CR-0008331-1996
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., WECHT AND STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 10, 2014
Edward Walls appeals from the order of December 11, 2013,
dismissing his serial PCRA1 petition. We affirm.
On March 6, 1997, following a jury trial, appellant was found guilty of
one count of criminal homicide, two counts of criminal attempt, two counts
of aggravated assault, two counts of criminal conspiracy, one count of
receiving stolen property, and one count of violating the Uniform Firearms
Act. The charges related to a May 25, 1996 drive-by shooting in which the
victim, Torie Jones, sustained a fatal gunshot wound to the head. Appellant,
who was 15 years old at the time of the incident, was sentenced to the
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
Post-Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on the
criminal homicide charge, and an aggregate of 10 years, 9 months to
45 years’ imprisonment on the remaining counts.
On August 11, 1999, this court affirmed the judgment of sentence.
Commonwealth v. Walls, 1121 Pittsburgh 1997, unpublished
memorandum (Pa.Super. filed August 11, 1999). Appellant did not file a
petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
Appellant filed two PCRA petitions which were dismissed. The instant
petition, his third, was filed on July 5, 2012. In his petition, appellant
alleged that the after-recognized constitutional right exception to the PCRA’s
one-year statutory time-bar applied, invoking the United States Supreme
Court’s June 2012 decision in Miller v. Alabama, U.S. , 132 S. Ct.
2455, 2469 (2012) (holding that mandatory life-without-parole sentences,
as applied to those under age 18, offend the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment by preventing sentencing authorities
from considering juveniles’ “diminished culpability and heightened capacity
for change”).
Counsel was appointed, and he filed a motion for stay pending the
outcome of our supreme court’s decision in Commonwealth v.
Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied, U.S. , 134 S. Ct.
2724 (U.S.Pa. Jun. 09, 2014). The motion for stay was granted. On
October 30, 2013, Cunningham was handed down, wherein our supreme
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court determined that Miller did not apply retroactively to cases on
collateral appeal. On December 11, 2013, following appropriate Rule 9072
notice, appellant’s petition was dismissed. This timely appeal followed.
Appellant complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and the PCRA court filed an
opinion.
Appellant has raised the following issues for this court’s review:
I. Whether the United States Supreme Court
decision in Miller v. Alabama applies
retroactively on collateral review under either
federal law or broader principles of
retroactivity under state law[?] And, whether
the appellant’s PCRA petition raising these
claims therefore was timely under the
[PCRA][?]
II. Whether a mandatory juvenile sentence of life
without parole violates Article 1, §§ 1, 9 and
13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution, where two classes
of prisoners sentenced to life without parole
are treated differently and where their
respective sentences are disproportionate[?]
Appellant’s brief at 4.
“The PCRA’s time restrictions are jurisdictional in
nature. Thus, [i]f a PCRA petition is untimely,
neither this Court nor the trial court has jurisdiction
over the petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do
not have the legal authority to address the
substantive claims.” Commonwealth v. Albrecht,
606 Pa. 64, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (2010) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Chester, 586 Pa. 468, 895 A.2d
520, 522 (2006)). Statutory time limitations “are
mandatory and interpreted literally; thus, a court has
2
Pa.R.Crim.P., Rule 907, 42 Pa.C.S.A.
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no authority to extend filing periods except as the
statute permits.” [Commonwealth v.] Fahy, 737
A.2d [214] at 222 [Pa. 1999].
Commonwealth v. Seskey, 86 A.3d 237, 241 (Pa.Super. 2014).
In Commonwealth v. Jackson, we
articulated the timeliness standards under the PCRA
as follows:
The PCRA “provides for an action by
which persons convicted of crimes they
did not commit and persons serving
illegal sentences may obtain collateral
relief.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542. When an
action is cognizable under the PCRA, the
PCRA is the “sole means of obtaining
collateral relief and encompasses all
other common law and statutory
remedies for the same purpose[.]”
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542.
In order for a court to entertain a PCRA
petition, a petitioner must comply with
the PCRA filing deadline. See
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 575 Pa.
500, 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (2003). The
time for filing a petition is set forth in
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b), which provides
in relevant part:
(b) Time for filing petition.--
(1) Any petition under this
subchapter, including a second
or subsequent petition, shall
be filed within one year of the
date the judgment becomes
final, unless the petition
alleges and the petitioner
proves that:
(i) the failure to raise
the claim previously was
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the result of interference
by government officials
with the presentation of
the claim in violation of
the Constitution or laws
of this Commonwealth or
the Constitution or laws
of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which
the claim is predicated
were unknown to the
petitioner and could not
have been ascertained
by the exercise of due
diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is
a constitutional right
that was recognized by
the Supreme Court of
the United States or the
Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania after the
time period provided in
this section and has
been held by that court
to apply retroactively.
***
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b).
“[T]he time limitations pursuant to . . .
the PCRA are jurisdictional.” [Fahy, 737
A.2d at 222]. “[Jurisdictional time]
limitations are mandatory and
interpreted literally; thus, a court has no
authority to extend filing periods except
as the statute permits.” Id. “If the
petition is determined to be untimely,
and no exception has been pled and
proven, the petition must be dismissed
without a hearing because Pennsylvania
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courts are without jurisdiction to consider
the merits of the petition.”
Commonwealth v. Perrin, 947 A.2d
1284, 1285 (Pa.Super.2008).
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 518-19
(Pa.Super.2011).
Id. at 242.
Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on September 10,
1999, thirty days after this court affirmed the judgment of sentence and the
time for filing a petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court expired. Commonwealth v. Rojas, 874 A.2d 638, 643-644
(Pa.Super. 2005); Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a). Thus, the instant petition, filed July 5,
2012, is facially untimely.
Appellant attempted to invoke the after-recognized constitutional right
exception to the PCRA’s time-bar under Subsection 9545(b)(1)(iii),
predicated upon the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller.
However, in Cunningham, our supreme court held that the constitutional
right announced by the court in Miller does not apply retroactively to
prisoners, such as appellant, whose judgments of sentence were already
final at the time of the Miller decision. Therefore, appellant cannot rely on
Miller or subsection 9545(b)(1)(iii) to establish jurisdiction over his untimely
PCRA petition. Seskey, 86 A.3d at 243.
Appellant argues that Cunningham was wrongly decided and that
Miller is retroactive on its face. (Appellant’s brief at 17.) Appellant sets
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forth other jurisdictions which have found Miller to apply retroactively on
collateral review. (Id. at 15-16.) However, appellant acknowledges that the
United States Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in Cunningham,
and we are bound by our supreme court’s decision. Commonwealth v.
Shaffer, 734 A.2d 840, 844 n.6 (Pa. 1999) (reminding the Pennsylvania
Superior Court of its duty and obligation to follow the decisional law of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court).
Appellant also argues for a broader retroactivity analysis under
Pennsylvania law, claiming that the non-retroactive application of Miller
creates two classes of juvenile offenders in Pennsylvania who are treated
differently based solely on when their convictions became final. (Appellant’s
brief at 24.) Appellant contends that his mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment without parole is unconstitutional because the creation of two
classes of juvenile offenders, one eligible for relief under Miller and one
ineligible, based solely and arbitrarily on when their convictions became
final, violates the Pennsylvania Constitution’s guarantees of due process and
equal protection. (Id. at 32.) Appellant also argues that his sentence
constitutes cruel punishment under Article 1, § 13 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution. (Id. at 27.) This court addressed similar claims in Seskey,
supra:
Throughout his brief, Appellant attempts to
circumvent the effect that Cunningham has upon
our jurisdiction by arguing, inter alia: that he is
entitled to relief under Article 1, § 13 of the
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Pennsylvania Constitution (“Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
punishments inflicted.”), independently of the Eighth
Amendment []; that Miller should be applied
retroactively based upon Pennsylvania’s broader
retroactivity principles []; and that the inequitable
result that Miller created violates Pennsylvania’s due
process and equal protection principles []. While
these arguments someday may require consideration
by our courts, today cannot be that day. Before a
court may address Appellant’s arguments, or similar
contentions, that court must have jurisdiction. We
cannot manufacture jurisdiction based upon the
substantive claims raised by the parties. Presently,
we are confined by the express terms of subsection
9545(b)(1)(iii) and our Supreme Court’s decision in
Cunningham. Combined, those two elements
require us to conclude that we lack jurisdiction. No
substantive claim can overcome this conclusion.
Seskey, 86 A.3d at 243 (citations to the appellant’s brief omitted). See
also Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 781 A.2d 94, 100-101 (Pa. 2001),
citing Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d 201, 202 (Pa. 2000) (“[T]he
nature of the constitutional violation alleged in a PCRA petition has no
bearing on the applicability of the PCRA’s timeliness requirements.”). Even
claims of a constitutional dimension are subject to the PCRA’s timeliness
requirements. Breakiron; Commonwealth v. Kutnyak, 781 A.2d 1259,
1261 (Pa.Super. 2001) (no alternative basis for relief outside the framework
of the PCRA) (citations omitted).
For these reasons, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to consider
appellant’s substantive claims as his third PCRA petition was untimely, with
no applicable exceptions.
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Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/10/2014
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