DocketNumber: 736
Judges: Montemuro, Tamilia, Brosky
Filed Date: 11/7/1991
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
Appellant, David Elliott, takes this appeal from his summary conviction for underage drinking,
Viewed in this light, the evidence establishes that shortly after midnight on February 10, 1990, Officer Donald Schwab of the Bensalem Township Police Department arrived at the scene of a two-car automobile accident. At that time, appellant identified himself to Officer Schwab as the driver of one of the vehicles, producing a vehicle registration and a driver’s license indicating his date of birth as March 10, 1973. Officer Schwab detected the odor of an alcoholic beverage on appellant’s breath and gave him a roadside prearrest breath test, which resulted in a reading of .04 per cent blood alcohol content (BAC). Appellant was taken into custody and transported to police headquarters, where, with appellant’s consent, an Intoximeter 3000 breath test was administered twice to appellant, with both tests resulting in a BAC reading of .04 per cent. Following this finding, a citation was issued to appellant charging him with underage drinking. Appellant stipulated at trial to the calibration of the Intoximeter 3000 and the accuracy of the results derived therefrom.
Appellant now argues the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for underage drinking because a summary offense such as underage drinking must be committed in the presence of a police officer, circumstances not present in this case. We do not agree.
The section of the Crimes Code under which appellant was charged states, in pertinent part: “A person commits a summary offense if he, being less than 21 years of age, attempts to purchase, purchases, consumes, possesses or knowingly and intentionally transports any liquor or malt or brewed beverages____” 18 Pa.C.S. § 6308.
An Act of Assembly which imposes penal sanctions for violations of its provisions must be strictly construed. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928; Commonwealth v. Hill, 481 Pa.
For his part, appellant relies upon Commonwealth v. Pincavitch, 206 Pa.Super. 539, 214 A.2d 280 (1965), a case which applied the precursor of section 6308, 18 P.S. § 4675.1 (repealed). In Pincavitch, this Court found “no authority that justifies an arrest without a warrant for a ... summary offense committed beyond the presence of the arresting officer in the absence of a statute giving that right.” Id., 206 Pa.Superior Ct. at 544, 214 A.2d at 282 (emphasis added).
§ 8952. Primary municipal police jurisdiction
Any duly employed municipal police officer shall have the power and authority to enforce the laws of this Commonwealth or otherwise perform the functions of that office anywhere within his primary jurisdiction as to:
(1) Any offense which the officer views or otherwise has probable cause to believe was committed within his jurisdiction.
*359 (2) Any other event that occurs within his primary jurisdiction and which reasonably requires action on the part of the police in order to preserve, protect or defend persons or property or to otherwise maintain the peace and dignity of this Commonwealth.
42 Pa.C.S. § 8952 (emphasis added), 1982, June 15, P.L. 512, No. 141, § 4, effective in 60 days. Appellant does not dispute Bensalem Township is a municipality or that Officer Schwab was a duly employed municipal police officer. Clearly, then, Pincavitch offers no guidance on this issue, and instead section 8952 controls.
*360 A law enforcement officer may issue a citation based upon information that the defendant has committed a summary violation, which information may be received from a personal observation of the commission of the offense; a witness; another police officer; investigation; or speed-timing equipment, including radar.
(Emphasis added.) Comments to Rule 70, Arrest Without Warrant, provide as follows:
It is intended that these proceedings will be instituted by arrest only in exceptional circumstances such as those involving violence, or the imminent threat of violence, or those involving danger that the defendant will flee.
The Vehicle Code provides the procedures for arresting a defendant without a warrant for a summary offense under that Code.
Therefore, having made the determination Officer Schwab had the authority to cite appellant for a summary offense not committed in the officer’s presence, we only need determine whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a finding of guilt.
The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proof by means of wholly circumstantial evidence, so long as the inferred facts flow, beyond a reasonable doubt, from the proven facts to establish the accused’s guilt or elements of the crime. Commonwealth v. Ramos, 392 Pa.Super. 583, 573 A.2d 1027 (1990).
Although appellant argues the Commonwealth was required to offer formal proof appellant was under the age of 21 at the time of the offense, we find no support for this position. Officer Schwab presented uncontradicted testimony that the driver’s license produced by appellant at the scene of the accident indicated his date of birth as March 10, 1973, making him sixteen years of age. We agree with the trial court’s finding that the “mere fact that the Commonwealth failed to present a certified copy of the defendant’s birth certificate or driver’s license does not mean that it has failed to meet its burden.” (Slip Op., Rufe, J.,
Finally, appellant argues the trial court erred in allowing the admission into evidence of breathalyzer results, which are of no relevance to sustain a charge of underage drinking and are only admissible to prove a charge under the Vehicle Code. The Vehicle Code allows for the admission of blood alcohol tests in “any summary proceeding or criminal proceeding in which the defendant is charged with a violation of section 3731 or any other violation of this title arising out of the same action----” 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(c). While appellant would have the language of section 1547 bar the admission of appellant’s two .04 per cent blood alcohol tests in this case, we find section 1547 far more inclusive. We find the first conjunction “or” used in section 1547(c) to have been used as a function word to indicate an alternative. Summary proceedings, then, are differentiated from criminal proceedings in which the defendant is charged under section 3731, dealing with driving under the influence, and the words of section 1547 are not given their narrowest meaning. We believe such a construction of the language of the statute best comports with the reasonable intent of the legislature and the promotion of justice. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928, supra. Thus, section 1547 authorizes the admission into evidence the results of a breathalyzer in any proceeding, summary or criminal, which in any way related to the use of alcohol. In addition, a unique aspect of this case is the fact that the appellant is a minor. 18 Pa.C.S. § 6810.4, Restriction of operating privileges, provides:
(a) General rule. — Whenever a person is convicted or is adjudicated delinquent or is admitted to any preadjudication program for a violation of section 6307 (relating to misrepresentation of age to secure liquor or malt or*362 brewed beverages), 6308 (relating to purchase, consumption, possession or transportation of liquor or malt or brewed beverages) or 6310.3 (relating to carrying a false identification card), the court, including a court not of record if it is exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S. § 1515(a) (relating to jurisdiction and venue), shall order the operating privilege of the person suspended. A copy of the order shall be transmitted to the Department of Transportation.
(b) Duration of suspension. — When the department suspends the operating privilege of a person under subsection (a), the duration of the suspension shall be as follows:
(1) For a first offense, a period of 90 days from the date of suspension.
(2) For a second offense, a period of one year from the date of suspension.
(3) For a third offense, and any offenses thereafter, a period of two years from the date of suspension. Any multiple sentences imposed shall be served consecutively-
Reinstatement of operating privilege shall be governed by 75 Pa.C.S. § 1545 (relating to restoration of operating privilege).
It necessarily follows that an underage drinking violation and conviction implicates the Motor Vehicle Code requiring suspension of the license, if the defendant has one, and restoration pursuant to the Code. Section 1547, therefore, clearly applies to proceedings and convictions under section 6308.
For the foregoing reasons, we find appellant’s claim without merit. The Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to sustain appellant’s conviction for the summary offense of underage drinking, and we affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
. 18 Pa.C.S. § 6308.
. Appellant's citations to Commonwealth v. Pincavitch, 206 Pa.Super. 539, 214 A.2d 280 (1965), and Commonwealth v. Shillingford, 231 Pa.Super. 407, 332 A.2d 824 (1975), are misplaced to the extent that in those cases action was instituted by arrest whereas here, after permissible investigation of DUI charges which includes conducting a breathalyzer test, a citation was issued. There was initial probable cause to take appellant into custody for DUI which is permissible without a warrant under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731, Driving under the Influence of alcohol or controlled substance.
. Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 70, Part IV. Procedures in Summary Cases When Defendant is Arrested Without Warrant, provides:
Rule 70. Arrest Without Warrant
When an arrest without a warrant in a summary case is authorized by law, a police officer who exhibits some sign of authority may institute proceedings by such an arrest.
Thus, whether this case originated pursuant to arrest without a warrant or citation, the sections of the Motor Vehicle Code and Criminal Code cited above permit such a proceeding. This is also supported by the Rules of Criminal Procedure cited infra.