Commonwealth v. Sattazahn

J-A18020-15
2015 Pa. Super. 239
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
DAVID ALLEN SATTAZAHN
Appellee No. 490 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Order dated March 4, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
Criminal Division at No: CP-06-CR-0002194-1989
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., STABILE, and MUSMANNO, JJ.
OPINION BY STABILE, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 20, 2015
The Commonwealth appeals from an order1 of the Court of Common
Pleas of Berks County (“trial court”), granting Appellee David Allen
Sattazahn’s motion in limine. Upon review, we reverse.
The facts and procedural history underlying this case are undisputed
and have been detailed fully in prior appellate decisions.2 Briefly, in 1991,
Appellee was convicted of first-degree murder for the April 12, 1987
shooting death of Richard Boyer during a robbery. Appellee was sentenced
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1
Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 311(d), the
Commonwealth certified in its notice of appeal “that the order will terminate
or substantially handicap the prosecution.” Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).
2
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 631 A.2d 597 (Pa. Super.
1993), Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d 359 (Pa. 2000);
Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 952 A.2d 640 (Pa. 2008).
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to life imprisonment because of a sentencing jury impasse. Subsequently,
this Court reversed Appellee’s first-degree murder conviction and remanded
for a new trial.
On retrial, Appellee once again was convicted of first-degree murder.
At the penalty phase, the Commonwealth sought to prove, inter alia, the
aggravating circumstance set forth in Section 9711(d)(9) of the Sentencing
Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(d)(9). Section 9711(d), relating to aggravating
circumstances, provides in part:
Aggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following:
....
(9) The defendant has a significant history of felony
convictions involving the use or threat of violence to
the person.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(d)(9). A jury recommended a sentence of death based
upon its finding that aggravating circumstances, beyond a reasonable doubt,
outweighed mitigating circumstances. The trial court formally sentenced
Appellant to death on February 16, 1999. Our Supreme Court upheld the
sentence. See Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d 359, 369 (Pa.
2000). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and, eventually,
affirmed the judgment of sentence. See Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537
U.S. 101, 116 (2003).
Appellee petitioned for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act
(PCRA), alleging that his trial counsel failed to explore adequately all
mitigating circumstances. The PCRA court agreed, awarding Appellee only
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another penalty phase. Our Supreme Court affirmed the PCRA court’s
decision. See Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 952 A.2d 640, 657 (Pa.
2008).
During jury selection for the new penalty phase, the Commonwealth
again sought to introduce, inter alia, the aggravating circumstance of a
significant history of felony convictions under Section 9711(d)(9). To
establish this, the Commonwealth indicated to the trial court that it would
introduce evidence that Appellee was convicted of third-degree murder for a
killing that occurred on December 26, 1987. In response, Appellee made an
oral motion in limine, asserting that, under Section 9711(d)(11), the
Commonwealth was prohibited from introducing evidence that Appellee was
convicted of third-degree murder for the December 26, 1987 killing, because
the killing had occurred after the Boyer murder sub judice.3 Section
9711(d)(11) of the Sentencing Code provides that aggravating
circumstances include whether “[t]he defendant has been convicted of
another murder committed in any jurisdiction and committed either before
or at the time of the offense at issue.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(d)(11). Thus,
Appellee argued that, because the December 26, 1987 killing occurred after
the Boyer murder, the Commonwealth was precluded from relying on the
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3
The record reveals that the killing for which Appellee was convicted of
third-degree murder occurred almost 9 months after the murder of Richard
Boyer.
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third-degree murder conviction to establish the Section 9711(d)(9)
aggravator. In other words, Appellee argued that Section 9711(d)(11)
limited the Commonwealth’s ability to introduce, under Section 9711(d)(9),
a conviction for a murder that occurred after the murder at issue here. The
trial court agreed, granting Appellee’s in limine motion. The Commonwealth
timely appealed to this Court under Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).
On appeal, the Commonwealth raises a single issue for our review:
Did the trial court err when it ruled that, for purposes of proving
the aggravating circumstance set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9711(d)(9), the Commonwealth may not submit evidence that
[Appellee] was convicted of third[-]degree murder for a killing
that occurred after the murder of which he was convicted in this
case.
Appellant’s Brief at 4. Subsumed within the Commonwealth’s issue is its
argument that the trial court erred in concluding that Section 9711(d)(11)
imposes a limitation on the use of a subsequent murder conviction to
establish the Section 9711(d)(9) aggravator.4 Id. at 16.
The Commonwealth presents the issue here as “one of statutory
interpretation, which, as a question of law, requires that we apply a de novo
standard of review.” Commonwealth v. Segida, 985 A.2d 871, 874 (Pa.
2009) (citation omitted). When interpreting a statute, this Court is guided
by the Statutory Construction Act (Act) of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1501-1991,
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4
To the extent Appellee argues that the phrase “threat of violence” as
contained in Section 9711(d)(9) is ambiguous and uncertain, we reject this
argument as waived. Appellee failed to raise this argument before the trial
court. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
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which provides that “[t]he object of all interpretation and construction of
statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General
Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a). “The clearest indication of legislative
intent is generally the plain language of a statute.” Commonwealth. v.
Coto, 932 A.2d 933, 935 (Pa. Super 2007) (citation omitted), appeal
denied, 948 A.2d 802 (Pa. 2008). “[W]hen the words of a statute are clear
and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under
the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” Commonwealth. v. Fedorek, 946 A.2d
93, 99 (Pa. 2008) (citing, inter alia, Section 1921(b) of the Act, 1 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 1921(b)). Only “[w]hen the words of the statute are not explicit” may this
Court resort to statutory construction. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(c). Indeed,
“[e]very statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its
provisions.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a). It is presumed “[t]hat the General
Assembly intends the entire statute to be effective and certain.” 1 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 1922(2). Thus, no provision of a statute shall be “reduced to mere
surplusage.” Walker v. Eleby, 842 A.2d 389, 400 (Pa. 2004). It is
presumed “[t]hat the General Assembly does not intend a result that is
absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1922(1).
Finally, “we construe our sentencing statutes or parts of those statutes in
pari materia.” Commonwealth. v. Stultz, 114 A.3d 865, 885 (Pa. Super.
2015) (citing Section 1932 of the Act, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1932).
The question of whether Section 9711(d)(9) permits the
Commonwealth to submit evidence of a felony, including murder, that was
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committed subsequent to the crime for which the Commonwealth seeks the
death penalty was addressed conclusively by our Supreme Court in a prior
appeal in the case sub judice. In Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d
359 (Pa. 2000), wherein Appellant challenged evidence under Section
9711(d)(9), our Supreme Court reasoned:
The criminal history of [Appellee] changed since the original trial
in May 1991. At the time of the retrial, he had a significant
history of felony convictions that involve the threat of violence to
the person. The fact that the offenses occurred after the instant
murder is irrelevant under the law.
Sattazahn, 763 A.2d at 369 (emphasis added); see also Commonwealth
v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915, 927 (Pa. 2009) (“[T]he fact that the offenses
offered to establish [a]ppellant’s history of prior violent felony convictions
occurred after [the victim’s] murder is irrelevant [under Section
9711(d)(9)].”).
Given the clear status of the law, as explained by our Supreme Court
in Sattazahn, we must conclude that the trial court erred in prohibiting the
Commonwealth from introducing evidence of Appellee’s third-degree murder
conviction for a crime that occurred after the Boyer murder in this case for
purposes of establishing the Section 9711(d)(9) aggravator.
We next address the Commonwealth’s argument that the trial court
erred in concluding that Section 9711(d)(11) imposes a limitation on the
Commonwealth’s ability to use Appellee’s subsequent third-degree murder
conviction to establish the Section 9711(d)(9) aggravator.
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At the outset, we note that the parties appear to agree that
subsections 9711(d)(9) and (11) are clear and unambiguous. See
Appellee’s Brief at 7 (“The words of [Section] 9711(d)(11) are clear and
unambiguous and must not be ignored or circumvented[.]”); see also
Appellant’s Brief at 17. Because the words of subsections 9711(d)(9) and
(11) are clear and free from all ambiguity, we must apply the subsections
according to their plain language.
As noted, Section 9711(d), relating to aggravating circumstances,
provides in part:
(9) The defendant has a significant history of felony convictions
involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
....
(11) The defendant has been convicted of another murder
committed in any jurisdiction and committed either before or at
the time of the offense at issue.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(d)(9), (11).
To understand Section 9711(d)(11)’s limitations, if any, we must
examine its origins. As our Supreme Court noted in Commonwealth v.
Moran, 636 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1993), the legislature added Section 9711(d)(11)
as a specific response to the Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Goins,
495 A.2d 527 (Pa. 1985). Moran, 636 A.2d at 613 n.1. In Goins, a jury
imposed a capital sentence upon the appellant because the Commonwealth
established the Section 9711(d)(9) aggravator by submitting only evidence
of the appellant’s prior conviction for second-degree murder. Goins, 495
A.2d at 533, n.1. On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the death
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sentence, holding that a single felony conviction for a crime of violence is
insufficient to establish a significant history under Section 9711(d)(9). Id.
at 532-34. After the sentencing verdict in Goins, our legislature amended
Section 9711(d) to include as an aggravating circumstance a single prior
murder conviction. See Moran, supra.
As the foregoing illustrates, the legislature did not include Section
9711(d)(11) to limit the effectiveness or application of Section 9711(d)(9). 5
Rather, the legislature included the Section 9711(d)(11) aggravator to allow
the Commonwealth to introduce a single prior murder conviction as an
aggravating circumstance at the penalty phase. Thus, subsections
9711(d)(9) and (11) are distinct aggravating circumstances that are self-
contained and self-sustaining. Under Section 9711(d)(9), the
Commonwealth is permitted to introduce a defendant’s significant history
of felony convictions so long as the defendant has more than two such
convictions. See Goins, supra. Section 9711(d)(11), on the other hand, is
triggered when a defendant has a single murder conviction for a murder
that occurred before, or at the same time as, the murder for which a death
sentence is sought. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in
determining that Section 9711(d)(11) limits the application of Section
9711(d)(9) by prohibiting the Commonwealth from presenting evidence of
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5
Section 9711(d)(11) contains no language limiting the application of
Section 9711(d)(9).
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Appellee’s third-degree murder conviction for a crime that occurred after the
murder sub judice.
Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/20/2015
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