Smith, J. v. Yan, H.

J-S63023-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
JULIAN SMITH IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
HUIJUN YAN
Appellee No. 998 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered March 17, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No(s): January Term, 2015 No. 3545
BEFORE: DONOHUE, J., MUNDY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 06, 2015
Appellant, Julian Smith, appeals from the trial court’s March 17, 2015
order denying Appellant’s petition to appeal nunc pro tunc from the January
31, 2014 judgment of default entered in the Philadelphia Municipal Court.
After careful review, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s well-reasoned
and comprehensive opinion.
This case arose as a result of an automobile accident that occurred on
March 31, 2013, between Appellant and Appellee, Huijun Yan (Yan). Lower
Merion Police Officer Jeffrey Calabrese investigated the accident, and issued
a report in which he opined that “this crash was caused by [Appellant]
entering his vehicle into a roadway without yielding the right of way to a
vehicle already in the roadway.” Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Police
J-S63023-15
Crash Reporting Form, 3/31/13. Officer Calabrese issued a traffic citation to
Appellant for vehicles entering a roadway. Id.
Less than two weeks later, on June 12, 2013, Yan filed a Statement of
Claim with the Philadelphia Municipal Court, which listed Appellant’s address
as 5100 Lebanon Avenue, Apartment A1002, Philadelphia, PA 19131. This
was the same address Appellant provided at the accident scene, and which
Officer Calabrese listed in the accident report. Thereafter, in a succession of
filings, Yan attempted service on Appellant. See Trial Court Opinion,
5/21/15, at 1-3 (detailing Yan’s attempts at service). On January 31, 2014,
default judgment in favor of Yan and against Appellant was entered in the
amount of $12,182.60. Appellant did not appear during the Municipal Court
proceedings. On January 28, 2015, he filed his petition to appeal nunc pro
tunc from the January 31, 2014 entry of default judgment with the trial
court in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. On March 17, 2015, the
trial court entered its order denying Appellant’s petition to appeal nunc pro
tunc. Appellant filed this timely appeal on April 1, 2015.1
On appeal, Appellant presents the following issue.
Did the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia
County err i[n] refusing to allow Appellant[’]s
Petition for Allowance of Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc when
the dockets of the original Municipal Court litigation
clearly show a “breakdown in the administrative
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Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure 1925.
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process”, where Appellant[’]s failure to timely file
was due to excusable neglect, where Appellant did
appeal within a short time after becoming aware of
the Municipal Court judgment, where Appellant had a
valid defense to the underlying claim and where, as
a result of the above, Appellant clearly was denied
his day in Court?
Appellant’s Brief at 2.
“Allowance of an appeal nunc pro tunc lies at the sound discretion of
the [t]rial [j]udge.” Nagy v. Best Home Servs., Inc., 829 A.2d 1166,
1167 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted). The timeliness of an appeal,
whether it is an appeal to an appellate court or a de novo appeal in common
pleas court, is a jurisdictional question. Lee v. Guerin, 735 A.2d 1280,
1281 (Pa. Super. 1999) (citation omitted). Where a statute fixes the time
within which an appeal may be taken, the time may not be extended as a
matter of indulgence or grace. Id.
Here, it is undisputed that the trial court had jurisdiction pursuant to
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 932. Furthermore, Philadelphia Municipal Court Rule of Civil
Procedure 124 provides as follows.
A party aggrieved by a judgment for money … may
appeal therefrom within 30 days after the date of the
entry of the judgment by filing with the prothonotary
of the Court of Common Pleas a notice of appeal
together with a copy of the Municipal Court
disposition sheet. The prothonotary shall not accept
an appeal from an aggrieved party which is
presented for filing more than 30 days after the date
of judgment without leave of the Court of Common
Pleas and upon good cause shown.
Phila. M.C.R. Civ.P. 124.
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After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s petition to appeal nunc pro
tunc. Moreover, the Honorable Nina Wright Padilla, sitting as the trial court,
has authored a cogent opinion, citing both the record and applicable legal
authority, such that further commentary by this Court is not warranted, and
would be redundant. Judge Wright Padilla, inter alia, concluded that “[f]rom
the record, it appears that any failure to serve was due to Appellant’s own
interference.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/21/15, at 5. Judge Wright Padilla
additionally observed as follows.
Appellant cannot claim that he “promptly filed” his
appeal. Even assuming he did not have notice of the
municipal court action at the time of its filing, the
notice from PENNDOT regarding his license
suspension was sent to him May 7, 2014. He
appealed that notice May 29, 2014. The notice
included the court term and number of the action
resulting in [default] judgment. Consequently,
Appellant was aware of said action at the very least
as of May 29, 2014, though he did not file a petition
to appeal nunc pro tunc until January 28, 2015,
seven (7) months and thirty (30) days later.
Id. at 5-6.
Based on the foregoing, we find that Judge Wright Padilla has properly
addressed and disposed of Appellant’s issue on appeal in her May 21, 2015
opinion. We therefore adopt Judge Wright Padilla’s opinion as our own in
affirming the March 17, 2015 order.
Order affirmed.
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J-S63023-15
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/6/2015
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
:.·.
JULIAN SMITH SUPERIOR COURTNo.
998 EDA 2015
v.
Civil Division .
January Term 2015, No. 3545
HUUUN YAN '·
c
-,.
OPINION ~::•
Appeltant, Julian Smith, appeals from this Court's decision denying his petition to appeal nunc
pro tune from judgment entered by the Municipal Court of Philadelphia in favor of Appellee, Huijun
Yan. Smith Vs Yan-OPFLO
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 111111111 IIUI 11111111111111
15010354500013
The underlying case is the result of a car accident that occurred on March 31, 2013 on Belmont
Avenue in 1the township of Lower Merion. A police report was taken and Appellant gave his address as
5100 Leba~on Avenue A1002, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 19131. See Exhibit "A" to this Court's
.
Opinion.
On:June 12, 2013, Appellee filed a Statement of Claims in the Philadelphia Municipal Court.
On/June 27, 2013, Appellee filed an ''Affidavit of Service Not Made" upon Appellant. Said
Affidavit stated that the process server attempted to make service upon Appellant at 5100 Lebanon
Avenue, Apartment Al002 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 19131. A black male approximately forty-five
(45) yearsiold, 5' 10" and approximately one hundred ninety (190) pounds, stated that Appellant was
"unknown'( to him. See Exhibit "B" to this Court's Opinion.
OnJuly 29, 2013, the case was dismissed without prejudice due to failure to serve. Appellee
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appeared at the hearing; Appellant did not. See Exhibit "A" to this Court's Opinion.
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On\ October 29, 2013, Appellee filed an "Affidavit of Postal Verification" of Appellant's new
address, listed as 1101 S. Divinity Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 19143. See Exhibit ''C" to this
Court's Opinion.
On! November 1, 2013, the case was relisted.
!
On; November 25, 2013, Appellee filed an "Affidavit of Service Not Made" upon Appellant. The
Affidavit stated that the process server attempted to make service upon Appellant at 1101 S. Divinity
Street, Philadelphia, PA 19143. There were four (4) apartments with mailboxes with different names. A
black female approximately thirty (30) years old, 5' 6", and one hundred fifty (150) pounds stated that
Appellant was unknown to her. See Exhibit "D" to this Court's Opinion.
oru December 16, 2013, the case was dismissed without prejudice due to failure to serve.
Appellee appeared at the hearing; Appellant did not. See Exhibit "A" to this Court's Opinion.
OniDecember 17, 2013, Appellee submitted a letter providing Appellant's new address as 3900
Haverford Avenue 302, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 19104. That same day, the matter was relisted.
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On.January 6, 2014, Appellee filed an Affidavit of Service upon Appellant. The Affidavit stated
that the process server made service on Joe Walker, an adult in charge of 3900 Haverford Avenue, on
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December127, 2013. Joe Walker was described as a black male, approximately fifty-five (55) years old,
5' 10", and one hundred ninety (190) pounds. See Exhibit "F" to this Court's Opinion.
OnJanuary 31, 2014, judgment was entered by default in favor of Appellee for $12,000.00,
plus $182.pO costs, for a total of $12, 182.60. See Exhibit "A" to this Court's Opinion.
On February 21, 2014, Appellee filed a Praecipe for Writ of Execution. See Exhibit "A'' to this
Court's Opinion.
On :April 4, 2014, Appellee filed a Petition to Break and Enter. A hearing was scheduled for April
24, 2014. fee Exhibit "A" to this Court's Opinion.
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oniApril 17, 2014, Appellee filed an "Affidavit of Service Not Made" upon defendant at 3900
Haverford jAvenue, Apartment 302. The process server was unable to make service on Appellant on
April 11, 2914, but swore that he was informed by a "Miss Holland" that Appellant resided in Apartment
302. Miss ~olland was described as a black female of approximately twenty five (25) years old, 5' 6",
and one hundred fifty (150) pounds. See Exhibit "G" to this Court's Opinion.
oniApril 24, 2014, following a hearing, Appellee's Petition to Break and Enter was withdrawn
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without prejudce due to lack of service and insufficient proof that Appellant lived at that address. See
Exhibit "A'! to this Court's Opinion.
On'May 7, 2014, PENNDOTsuspended Appellant's commercial driver's license.1 The notice
stated tha~ his driving privilege was being revoked due to a judgment resulting from a motor vehicle
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accident op March 31, 2013 docketed at Court No. 3979, term 2013.
onpanuary 28, 2015, Appellant commenced the instant case by petition to file an appeal nunc
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pro tune. He averred that the accident was not his fault and that he had an eyewitness, Desiree
Holland, to back up his version of the events. He averred that service was "never attempted" at the
5100 Lebanon Avenue address, and that he has never resided at 3900 Haverford Avenue. Appellant
also averred that the December 11, 2014 hearing for his statutory appeal from his license suspension
was "the first time" that the suspension was explained to him and he received copies of the Small
Claims documentation.
On :March 17, 2015, this Court denied Appellant's Motion.
On iApril 1, 2015, Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court.
OnApril 8, 2015, this Court issued its Order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), directing Appellant
to file his ~oncise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal within twenty-one (21) days.
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Appellant's statutory appeal from the decision of PENNDOTrevoking his license is docketed at May Term 2014,
,. No. 3539, and was filed May 29, 2014. See Exhibits ''H" and "I" to this Court's Opinion.
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on· April 14, 2015, Appellant filed a timely Statement of Matters Complained on Appeal, arguing
that this Court erred as: Appellant has a valid defense to the underlying automobile accident; Appellant
was denied his day in court; Appellant was never served with the small claims complaint; service was
faulty as ~ppellant never lived at the addresses where service was effectuated; that Appellant timely
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filed his a~peal; and that this amounted to a ''breakdown in the Court's operation."
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DISCUSSION
Appellant contests this Court's denial of his Petition to Appeal Nunc Pro Tune from a Judgment
in the Municipal Court of Philadelphia.
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This Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals from final orders of the minor judiciary
established within the judicial district. 42 Pa.C.S. § 932. Pursuant to the Philadelphia Municipal Court
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Rules of cjvil Procedure, a party aggrieved by a money judgment may appeal therefrom within thirty
(30) day~ after the date of the entry of the judgment, and the prothonotary may not accept an appeal
.
more than!thirty (30) days after the date of judgment without leave of the Court of Common Pleas and
upon g~ cause shown. Phila. M.C.R. Civ.P. No. 124.
W~ere an act of assembly fixes the time within an appeal from minor judiciary must be
perfected, jthe court has no power to extend it; there must be fraud or its equivalent to permit an
.
appeal nuryc pro tune. W. W. Grainger, Inc. v. W. C Ruth & Son, 192 Pa. Super. 446, 449, 161 A.2d
644, 646 (~960). Mere lack of notice or knowledge of the entry of judgment is not a sufficient reason
to strike said judgment. Id. Allowance of an appeal nunc pro tune is within the sound discretion of the
trial court anc will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. See McKeown v. Bailey, 731 A.2d
628, 630 (pa. Super. Ct. 1999); Rothstein v. Potvsdences, Inc; 2004 Pa. Super. 249, 853 A.2d 1072,
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1075 (Pa. ?uper. Ct. 2004). An abuse of discretion is "not merely an error of judgment but is found
where the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or
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the result bf partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will as shown by the evidence or the record." Fischer v.
UPMC Nw./ 2011 Pa. Super. 247, 34 A.3d 115, 120 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011).
Where a party requests permission to file an appeal nunc pro tune it is because counsel for the
appealing partv has not timely filed an appeal. Amicone v. Rok, 2003 Pa. Super. 500, 839 A.2d 1109,
113 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (where prothonotary's failure to time-stamp or docket notice of appeal on
receipt resulted in breakdown). More than mere hardship must be shown; a trial court may grant an
appeal only if the delay is "caused by extraordinary circumstances involving 'fraud or some breakdown
in the court's operation through a default of its officers." Id. Such cases may involve failure of the
prothonotary to file dispositions or other relevant information on the docket, or give notice of those
dispositions to interested parties. Rothstein, 853 A.2d at 1075.
Aniappeal may be permitted where "1) the appellant's notice of appeal was fried late as a result
of non-negligent circumstances, either as they relate to the appellant or the appellant's counsel; 3) the
appellant filed the notice of appeal shortly after the expiration date; and 3) the appellee was not
prejudiced by the delay.'' Americone, 839 A.2d at 113. Non-negligent reasons include illness and
nospttatizations. Id.
In the instant case, Appellant has not shown that non-negligent circumstances resulted in this
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delay. Service was attempted at the 5100 Lebanon Avenue address, however, the process server was
informed 9y a person in the apartment Appellant gave as his address that Appellant was unknown to
him. Service was then attempted at two separate addresses, one with a postal verification, and the
other where a woman bearing the same name as Appellant's eye witness informed the process server
that Appellant lived in 3900 Haverford Avenue, Apt. 302. From the record, it appears that any failure to
serve was jdue to Appellant's own interference.
Additionally, Appellant cannot claim that he "promptly filed" his appeal. Even assuming he did
not have notice of the municipal court action at the time of its filing, the notice from PENNDOT
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regarding his license suspension was sent to him May 7, 2014. He appealed that notice May 29, 2014.
The notice included the court term and number of the action resulting in judgment. Consequently,
Appellant was aware of said action at the very least as of May 29, 2014, though he did not file a
petition to! appeal nune pro tune until January 28, 2015, seven (7) months and thirty (30) days later.
None of ~e facts listed above amount to fraud, or a breakdown of this Court's operations.
Consequently, Appellant has not shown good cause why his Petition to Appeal none pro tune
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should have been granted and this Court did not abuse its discretion in denying said Petition.
CONCLUSION
For. all of the reasons stated above, this Court's decision should be affirmed and Appellant's
appeal dis,:nissed.
BY THE COURT:
DATE: JV\`` `` J._Q/'?
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