Com. v. Jackson, F.

J-S05005-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
FRANKLIN LUTHER JACKSON,
Appellant No. 370 MDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 11, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0005374-2006
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED JANUARY 12, 2016
Appellant, Franklin Luther Jackson, appeals pro se from the post-
conviction court’s February 11, 2015 order denying his petition for relief filed
under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9545.
After careful review, we affirm.
The facts of this case were set forth by the trial court, and quoted by
this Court in a published opinion affirming Appellant’s judgment of sentence,
as follows:
Members of [Appellant's] group got into a verbal dispute
with the members of another group. The next day someone fired
a shotgun through the front door of the residence where
[Appellant] and co-defendant lived on South Queen Street.
[Appellant] suspected that the members of the other group with
whom they had a dispute were the perpetrators of this shooting.
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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The following morning, co-defendant Troy Gellespie went
out looking for the members of the other group. Gellispie located
a member of the other group at a residence located several
blocks away on South Queen Street. Gellispie called back to the
residence he shared with [Appellant] to arrange for [Appellant]
and others who were present at [Appellant's] home to come to
this location with guns to get revenge for the previous night's
shooting through their door. [Appellant] directed the other
occupants of the home to obtain their weapons, and proceeded
to drive them to a location back in an alley half a block from
where co-defendant Gellispie had indicated the other group
would be. [Appellant] gave guns to the other occupants of the
vehicle, and directed them to go down the alley to meet with
Gellispie.
[Appellant and his co-defendant] believed that an
individual called M–Dot was the one who fired the shotgun
through their door. M–Dot was not present with the other group
which had been located by co-defendant.... However, his
brother, Deo Garcia, was seated on the front porch of a
residence on South Queen Street. Also present was his sister's
husband, who everyone agrees had no involvement in the
previous conflicts between the two groups.
When the individuals who were brought to the scene by
[Appellant] met co-defendant ..., they began shooting at Deo
Garcia. Deo Garcia pulled out his own gun and returned the fire.
Chris Butler, Deo's sister's husband, attempted to duck behind a
parked vehicle. Unfortunately, he was hit right between the eyes
by one of the shots and died. The shooters then fled back to the
vehicle were [Appellant] was waiting for them, and [Appellant]
drove them back to his residence. On the way back, one of
[Appellant's] group discarded his weapon. When [Appellant and
his co-defendant] arrived back at their residence[,] the shooters
attempted to conceal their involvement in the shooting by
washing their persons, wiping off weapons, etc. Members of the
group went back and picked up the weapon which had been
discarded and returned to the house where efforts were made to
remove any indication that [the gun] was [used] in the shooting.
The trial was somewhat complicated by the fact that many
of the Commonwealth witnesses gave testimony that was
contradictory to their previous statements to the police. The
Commonwealth called two individuals who happened to be
present at the time of the shooting because they were
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attempting to buy drugs from Deo Garcia. Because their
testimony differed from their earlier statements[,] they did not
[aid] the Commonwealth's case. The Commonwealth also called
at least one witness who was probably one of the individuals
who was in [Appellant's] car and took part in the shooting.
However, the Commonwealth could not prove that at the time of
his testimony, and his actual testimony was again detrimental to
the Commonwealth's case.
The Commonwealth did have the testimony of Desiree
Garcia, the wife of the murder victim, Chris Butler. However, her
initial report of the crime attempted to conceal her brother, Deo
Garcia's, role in the shooting. Therefore, she described another
individual to the police. The police subsequently found the
individual she described, but were able to establish that [the]
individual was in jail in Philadelphia at the time of the
shooting.... Therefore, Desiree Garcia's testimony was flawed by
this misdirection of the truth.
Fortunately for the Commonwealth, two witnesses that the
Commonwealth originally did not intend to call saved their case.
The Commonwealth had not intended to call Deo Garcia because
of his extensive criminal record, his probable involvement in the
shooting into the co-defendants' residence the night before, and
his lack of cooperation with the police investigation. However,
when the Commonwealth's other witnesses “went south,” the
Commonwealth was essentially forced to call Deo Garcia. To the
Commonwealth's surprise, he turned out to be an excellent
witness, particularly at describing what happened at the scene of
the crime when the shooting was [occurring.] However, even
Deo Garcia didn't really involve [Appellant] in the crime since he
was not one of the shooters, but had instead remained at a
location a half block away where he was not visible to the
victims of the shooting.
Shannon Stuart was also charged with Homicide in this
case. However, he had fled to Georgia prior to the charges being
filed, and therefore, [he] had never been arrested. Fortunately
for the Commonwealth, he was picked up in Georgia on the first
day of trial. The Commonwealth sent people to interview him in
Georgia, and he confessed [to] his involvement, agreed to testify
for the Commonwealth, waived extradition, and was immediately
brought back to Pennsylvania. The court then appointed counsel
for Shannon Stuart. Counsel worked out a plea agreement with
the District Attorney, whereby the charge of First Degree
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Murder[, which was lodged] against him was dropped, and he
agreed to testify for the Commonwealth.
It is noted that [both Appellant and Gillespie] objected to
Shannon Stuart's testimony on the basis that they hadn't
received notice prior to trial. However, it is obvious the
Commonwealth couldn't [have given] the defense notice before
trial when the Commonwealth itself didn't know that Stuart
would testify prior to trial.
It is noted that the Commonwealth did inform the defense
as soon as it became known that Stuart had been arrested and
agreed to cooperate. It is further noted that prior to Stuart's
testimony defense counsel [was] given the opportunity to review
the statement that Stuart had given to the police at the time of
his arrest. Therefore, [the trial court ruled] there was no
discovery violation as the defense argued.
Stuart then provided the testimony that proved
[Appellant's] involvement in the crime. Stuart testified that he
was one of the people present at the residence of [Appellant]
and [co-defendant] Gellispie when Gellispie called and said that
he had located the group that had messed with them. Stuart
described [Appellant] as the one who directed the gathering of
weapons by the rest of the group and drove them to the alley a
half block from where the victim was shot. Stuart also stated
that [Appellant] directed the passengers in the car to take the
weapons, proceed down the alley to meet up with Gellispie, and
do what they came for. Stuart also described how the shooters
fled back to [Appellant's] car where he was waiting for them.
Stuart further described the efforts made to conceal evidence,
which he said was directed by [Appellant].
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 947 A.2d 1260, 1261-63 (Pa. Super. 2008)
(quoting Trial Court Opinion, 9/17/07, at 1-5).
Based on this evidence, the jury convicted Appellant of third-degree
murder. He was sentenced on April 30, 2007, to an aggregate term of 20 to
40 years’ incarceration. This Court affirmed his judgment of sentence on
April 30, 2008. See id. Appellant did not file a petition for permission to
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appeal to our Supreme Court and, thus, his judgment of sentence became
final on May 30, 2008. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3) (stating that judgment
of sentence becomes final at the conclusion of direct review or the expiration
of the time for seeking the review); Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a) (directing that “a
petition for allowance of appeal shall be filed with the Prothonotary of the
Supreme Court within 30 days of the entry of the order of the Superior Court
sought to be reviewed”).
The PCRA court detailed the subsequent procedural history of
Appellant’s case, as follows:
On April 8, 2009, [Appellant] filed a Petition for Post
Conviction Relief. The Court appointed counsel, and after a
hearing, denied [Appellant’s] PCRA petition on June 30, 2009.
[Appellant] filed [a] Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court on
July 27, 2009, and the Superior Court affirmed on March 12,
2010…. [Commonwealth v. Jackson, 996 A.2d 545 (Pa.
Super. 2010) (unpublished memorandum)]. [Appellant] filed a
Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court on November 17, 2010. That petition was denied on April
7, 2011…. [Commonwealth v. Jackson, 20 A.3d 1210 (Pa.
2011)].
On February 16, 2012, [Appellant] filed a Writ of Habeas
Corpus. The Court, considering [Appellant’s] writ to be a PCRA
petition, denied relief on March 5, 2012.
[Appellant] filed [the instant] PCRA petition on August 19,
2013. The case was reassigned to the undersigned Judge on
August 20, 2013.
PCRA Court Order & Opinion Denying Petition (PCO I), 2/11/15, at 1-2.
The PCRA court appointed three successive attorneys to represent
Appellant in litigating the instant petition, two of whom withdrew due to
conflicts with Appellant. Appellant’s third attorney withdrew after Appellant
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indicated his unhappiness with counsel’s representation and expressed a
desire to proceed pro se. See id. at 2. At a hearing in August of 2014, the
court granted Appellant’s request to proceed pro se and scheduled the PCRA
hearing for October 21, 2014.1 On that date, the court assessed the
timeliness of Appellant’s petition, ultimately concluding that he had pled and
proven the applicability of the after-discovered fact exception of 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(1)(ii), discussed in more detail infra. See N.T. Hearing, 10/21/14,
at 16. On December 15, 2014, the court scheduled a hearing to assess the
merits of that after-discovered evidence claim.
The general gist of the testimony at the hearing was that
Shannon Stuart’s … girlfriend [at the time of the murder and
Appellant’s trial], Mandy Keiser, would provide testimony [at a
new trial] showing Shannon Stuart lied on the witness stand at
Appellant’s trial. At trial, Mr. Stuart testified that he attempted
to fire his gun [at the scene of the murder], but that it jammed,
so he never actually fired a shot. N.T. 12/15/2014 at 14.
However, at the PCRA hearing, Ms. Keiser testified that Mr.
Stuart told her that his gun did not jam and that he fired the
shot that killed the victim. Id. at 15. Ms. Keiser’s testimony was
not very consistent and was rather confusing at times. She
indicated that Mr. Stuart had told her numerous stories about
what happened on the night of the homicide, but she was
adamant that she told a private investigator, before trial, that
Mr. Stuart fired his weapon. Id. The private investigator’s
report indicates that he did speak with Ms. Keiser, but she stated
that Mr. Stuart “would never commit to actually shooting a
weapon during the incident.” Id. at 33.
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1
The hearing was a combined proceeding to address both Appellant’s
petition, and a similar petition filed by his co-defendant, Troy Gellispie.
Gellispie was represented by counsel during the PCRA proceedings.
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PCRA Court Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion (PCO II), 4/6/15, at 2-3. Appellant
also argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for not calling Ms. Keiser as
a witness, when counsel knew about Ms. Keiser’s statement to the private
investigator that Mr. Stuart admitted to firing his gun at the murder scene.
On February 11, 2015, the PCRA court issued an order and opinion
denying Appellant’s petition. Appellant filed a timely pro se notice of appeal,
and also timely complied with the court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Therein, he preserved
the following claims for our review:
1.) This Honorable Court erred in not granting [Appellant’s]
request of a new trial based upon after discovered evidence
relating to Mandy Keiser, the girlfriend of Shannon Stuart, a
material witness for the Commonwealth who told her about the
events that took place the day of the incident.
2.) This Honorable Court erred in denying [Appellant’s]
ineffective [assistance] of counsel claim [based] on a statement
he withheld for over seven and one half years.
3.) This Honorable Court erred in disregarding [Appellant’s]
claim of actual innocence due to the testimony of Mandy Keiser.
Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, 3/27/15, at 1.
This Court’s standard of review regarding an order denying a petition
under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported
by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. Commonwealth v.
Ragan, 923 A.2d 1169, 1170 (Pa. 2007). The PCRA court’s findings will not
be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified
record. Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 1166 (Pa. Super. 2001).
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Initially, we must assess the timeliness of Appellant’s petition, as it is
well-settled that “[t]he time requirements established by the PCRA are
jurisdictional in nature; consequently, the Pennsylvania courts may not
entertain untimely petitions.” Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339,
346 (Pa. 2013) (citing Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980 (Pa. 2011);
Commonwealth v. Brown, 943 A.2d 264, 267 (Pa. 2008);
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (Pa. 2003)). Under
the PCRA, any petition for post-conviction relief, including a second or
subsequent one, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment of
sentence becomes final, unless one of the exceptions set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) applies. That section states, in relevant part:
(b) Time for filing petition.--
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second
or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the
date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition
alleges and the petitioner proves that:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the
result of interference by government officials with
the presentation of the claim in violation of the
Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the
Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that
was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United
States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after
the time period provided in this section and has been
held by that court to apply retroactively.
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42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Any petition attempting to invoke one of
these exceptions “shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could
have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).
Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on May 30, 2008;
thus, he had until May 30, 2009, to file a timely petition. Consequently, his
petition filed in August of 2013, is facially untimely and, for this Court to
have jurisdiction to review the merits of his after-discovered evidence or IAC
claims, Appellant has to prove that he meets one of the exceptions to the
timeliness requirements set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b).
In his brief to this Court, Appellant does not argue, let alone prove, the
applicability of any timeliness exception set forth supra.2 Instead, he
attempts to argue the merits of his after-discovered evidence claim, which is
not appropriate when attempting to satisfy the timeliness exception of
section 9545(b)(1)(ii). See Bennett, 930 A.2d at 1270–72. Additionally,
Appellant’s after-discovered evidence argument on appeal substantially
differs from that which he presented in his PCRA petition, or from any
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2
We also note that even if Appellant had asserted an exception herein, we
would conclude that he waived any such claim by not specifically setting it
forth in his Rule 1925(b) statement. See Commonwealth v. Butler, 812
A.2d 631, 633-634 (Pa. 2002) (“PCRA appellants, in order to preserve their
claims for appellate review, must comply whenever the PCRA court orders
them to file a Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal under Rule
1925). Accordingly, any issues not raised in a Rule 1925(b) statement are
waived.”) (citing Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998)).
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argument asserted at the PCRA hearing. Specifically, Appellant presents the
novel argument that he is entitled to a new trial because Ms. Keiser testified
at the hearing that “Mr. Stuart told [her Appellant] had nothing to do [the
murder] at all[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 10.
Curiously, this testimony is not contained in the transcript of the PCRA
hearing. Appellant explains this omission by alleging that the record was
“tampered with on purpose” and he asks this Court to remand for the PCRA
court to recreate the record and include that ostensibly omitted portion of
Ms. Keiser’s testimony.3 However, he offers no explanation of when he first
realized this purported error in the transcripts, or why he could not have
raised this transcription error before the PCRA court, at the very least in his
Rule 1925(b) statement, to allow the court to comment on this claim in its
opinion.4 Appellant also did not assert in his Rule 1925(b) statement that
Ms. Keiser’s purported testimony, as he now claims to recall it, satisfies a
timeliness exception, or even that it warrants a new trial. Based on these
circumstances, we conclude that Appellant has not proven the applicability of
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3
On December 2, 2015, Appellant filed with this Court a separate motion
asking us to remand his case to permit the PCRA court to correct this
ostensible error in the transcript. Based on our discussion herein, we deny
that motion.
4
The record demonstrates that Appellant filed a motion for transcripts on
February 26, 2015, which was granted on March 4, 2015. His Rule 1925(b)
statement was filed on March 27, 2015. Appellant does not claim that he
received the transcripts after he filed his Rule 1925(b) statement.
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any timeliness exception, nor convinced us that he timely raised the issue of
the alleged transcription error to warrant our remanding his case.
Nevertheless, we note that even if we accepted Appellant’s claim that
Ms. Keiser testified at the PCRA hearing that Mr. Stuart told her that
Appellant had no involvement in the shooting, and we concluded that that
claim satisfied the after-discovered fact exception of section 9545(b)(1)(ii),
we would not grant Appellant the relief of a new trial. As Appellant
acknowledges,
[t]o obtain relief based on after-discovered evidence, [an]
appellant must demonstrate that the evidence: (1) could not
have been obtained prior to the conclusion of the trial by the
exercise of reasonable diligence; (2) is not merely corroborative
or cumulative; (3) will not be used solely to impeach the
credibility of a witness; and (4) would likely result in a different
verdict if a new trial were granted.
Commonwealth v. Pagan, 950 A.2d 270, 292 (2008) (citations omitted).
Here, it is clear that Ms. Keiser’s purported PCRA hearing testimony
would be used solely to impeach Mr. Stuart’s credibility. While Appellant
disagrees, and relies on Commonwealth v. McCracken, 659 A.2d 541 (Pa.
1995), we find that case distinguishable. There, McCracken was convicted of
murder and robbery based on circumstantial evidence, the most compelling
of which was the testimony of Michael Aldridge, who was the only witness
that identified Appellant as being the perpetrator of those crimes. See id. at
542-543. After McCracken was convicted, however, Aldridge recanted his
testimony, stating that he lied at trial and identified Appellant because
“detectives kept repeating [McCracken’s] name to him and suggesting
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[McCracken] was the perpetrator to the extent that he began to believe
[McCracken] was the perpetrator.” Id. at 544. Our Supreme Court
ultimately held “that the recantation of Michael Aldridge fits squarely within
the test for after-discovered evidence.” Id. at 545. The Court explained, in
pertinent part, that
Aldridge's recantation is not merely cumulative or corroborative
given the tenuous nature of the circumstantial evidence
connecting Appellant to the crime and the inability of any other
witness to make a positive identification of the perpetrator. In
this case, where the only Commonwealth witness who identified
the perpetrator has recanted his testimony, such evidence
cannot be considered cumulative or corroborative because the
defendant claimed that he did not commit the crime in question.
This was the essence of [McCracken’s] defense and the ultimate
question in [McCracken’s] trial. Thus, Aldridge's recantation is
neither cumulative, corroborative, nor for impeachment
purposes.
Id.
In this case, we acknowledge that Appellant was convicted based on
circumstantial evidence, the strongest of which was Mr. Stuart’s testimony
explaining Appellant’s involvement in the crime. However, Mandy Keiser’s
proposed testimony that Mr. Stuart told her that Appellant was not involved
in the crime is not recantation evidence; it is evidence by a third-party that
would simply be used to impeach Mr. Stuart, who presumably would again
testify to Appellant’s involvement. Because Mr. Stuart has not, himself,
recanted his testimony, McCracken would not compel us to grant Appellant
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a new trial, even had he satisfied a timeliness exception based on Ms.
Keiser’s purported PCRA hearing testimony.5
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/12/2016
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5
We reiterate that Appellant contends that Ms. Keiser stated at the PCRA
hearing that “Stuart told [Ms. Keiser that] Appellant had no involvement
with [the] incident.” Appellant’s Brief at 14. In support of this claim, he
attaches to his brief affidavits from several individuals who claim they were
at the hearing and heard Ms. Keiser testify in this regard. One of those
affidavits is from Ms. Keiser herself, and actually calls into question
Appellant’s characterization of her allegedly omitted PCRA hearing
testimony. Namely, Ms. Keiser attests that she stated at the PCRA hearing
that, “[i]n [Mr. Stuart’s] story of the incident[,] he did not include
[Appellant’s] name[] or state that [Appellant] had any involvement.” See
Appellant’s Brief at “Exhibit D.” Mr. Stuart’s not mentioning Appellant’s
name to Ms. Keiser when discussing the shooting is very different from Mr.
Stuart’s expressly stating that Appellant was not involved. Thus, Ms.
Keiser’s affidavit indicates that her proposed testimony would offer even
weaker impeachment evidence than Appellant suggests herein.
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