Com. v. Bazhutin, R.

J. S83002/16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
ROMAN BAZHUTIN, : No. 1338 WDA 2015
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, July 30, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at Nos. CP-02-CR-0008005-2014,
CP-02-CR-0011237-2014
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN AND STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 30, 2016
Roman Bazhutin appeals from the July 30, 2015 aggregate judgment
of sentence of 11½ to 23 months’ imprisonment, followed by 2 years’
probation, imposed following a revocation of his probation. 1 For the reasons
that follow, we vacate appellant’s sentence and remand this matter so that
the trial court can conduct a limited evidentiary hearing to determine
whether he should receive an additional 33 days’ credit for time-served. In
all other respects, we affirm appellant’s convictions.
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
The trial court granted appellant 114 days’ credit for time-served for the
period he spent in custody from April 8 to July 30, 2015. (See notes of
testimony, 7/30/15 at 4; trial court order, 7/30/15; No. CP-02-CR-0011237-
2014.)
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A prior panel of this court summarized the relevant facts of this case
as follows:
On May 18, 2014, Officer James Fleckenstein,
Jr. of the Castle Shannon Police Department
responded to a 911 call to [appellant’s] residence for
a domestic assault. Upon arriving at the home,
Officer Fleckenstein observed a bleeding laceration
on the back of [appellant’s girlfriend, Tracey]
Ondek’s head. Ms. Ondek told the Officer that
[appellant] pushed her against the wall and her head
hit a corner, causing the laceration. Although
Ms. Ondek did appear to be intoxicated, she was
aware of what she was describing.
Officer Fleckenstein watched Ms. Ondek write and
sign a statement and took pictures of her injury.
Thereafter, on July 27, 2014, Officer William
Kress of the Castle Shannon Police Department
responded to another 911 call to [appellant’s]
residence for a domestic assault. Upon arriving at
the home, Officer Kress observed that Ms. Ondek’s
cheek and both of her eyes were swollen and she
was shaking. Ms. Ondek told Officer Kress that
[appellant] “beat her up.” Again, although
Officer Kress did smell alcohol on Ms. Ondek’s
breath, she was aware of and understood his
questions. Officer Kress then watched Ms. Ondek
write and sign a statement.
Ms. Ondek testified that on both occasions she
was intoxicated and remembered neither the events
nor preparing the written statements for the police.
Commonwealth v. Bazhutin, 144 A.3d 188 (Pa.Super. 2016) (unpublished
memorandum at 2), citing trial court opinion, 7/21/15 at 3-4.
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Appellant was subsequently charged with two counts of simple assault
and one count of harassment2 in connection with these incidents. Appellant
waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded to a bench trial on January 28,
2015. Following a one-day trial, appellant was found guilty of all charges.
Appellant was sentenced that same day to an aggregate term of 4 years’
probation. (Notes of testimony, 1/28/15 at 30; see also trial court orders,
1/28/15, Nos. CP-02-CR-0008005-2014 and CP-02-CR-0011237-2014.) On
February 6, 2015, appellant filed a post-sentence motion for a new trial that
was denied on February 13, 2015. On March 13, 2015, appellant filed a
timely notice of appeal. A panel of this court affirmed appellant’s judgment
of sentence on March 3, 2016. Bazhutin, 144 A.3d 188. Appellant did not
seek allowance of appeal with our supreme court.
On April 23, 2015, the trial court conducted a Gagnon I hearing,3
wherein it was revealed that appellant had been arrested and charged in
connection with a third assault of Ondek that had occurred on March 24,
2015. (Notes of testimony, 4/23/15 at 2.) Thereafter, on June 23, 2015,
the trial court commenced a Gagnon II hearing, which was continued so
that a presentence investigation report (“PSI”) could be prepared. (Notes of
2
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2701 and 2709, respectively.
3
See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (holding that a defendant
accused of violating probation is entitled to two hearings: 1) a
pre-revocation hearing to determine probable cause of a violation
(Gagnon I); and 2) a more comprehensive revocation hearing to establish a
violation and determine whether revocation is warranted (Gagnon II).)
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testimony, 6/23/15 at 3-4.) Following the preparation of a PSI report, the
trial court conducted a full Gagnon II hearing on July 30, 2015. Thereafter,
that same day, the trial court revoked appellant’s probation and resentenced
him to an aggregate term of 11½ to 23 months’ imprisonment, followed by
2 years’ probation. (Notes of testimony, 7/30/15 at 4.) As noted, the trial
court also granted appellant 114 days’ credit for time-served. (Id; see also
trial court order, 7/30/15; No. CP-02-CR-0011237-2014.)
On August 6, 2015, appellant filed a post-sentence motion for
reconsideration of his sentence, which was denied by the trial court on
August 13, 2015. On August 28, 2015, appellant filed a timely notice of
appeal. On September 4, 2015, the trial court ordered appellant to file a
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal in accordance with
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Following several extensions, appellant filed a timely
Rule 1925(b) statement on February 5, 2016. Thereafter, on March 7, 2016,
the trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
I. WHETHER THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE PRESENTED ESTABLISHING THAT
[APPELLANT] WAS IN VIOLATION OF HIS
PROBATION AT BOTH CC 201408005 AND
CC 201411237?
II. IS THE REVOCATION SENTENCE IMPOSED AT
CC 201411237 ILLEGAL IN THAT IT FAILS TO
GIVE APPROPRIATE TIME CREDIT?
III. IN REVOKING [APPELLANT’S] PROBATIONS
AND RESENTENCING HIM TO A SENTENCE OF
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TOTAL CONFINEMENT OF 11½-23 MONTHS[’]
COUNTY INCARCERATION AT CC 201411237,
AND TO 2 YEARS PROBATION AT
CC 201408005, WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT
ABUSED ITS SENTENCING DISCRETION WHEN
IT FAILED TO PLACE REASONS ON THE
RECORD JUSTIFYING ITS SENTENCING
DECISION, REVOCATION WAS BASED SOLELY
ON A TECHNICAL VIOLATION OF PROBATION
AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF 42 PA.C.S.A.
§ 9721(B) AND 42 PA.C.S.A. § 9725 WERE
NOT MET?
Appellant’s brief at 12. For the ease of our discussion, we have elected to
address appellant’s claims in a slightly different order than presented in his
appellate brief.
Appellant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to establish
that he violated the terms of his probation. (Appellant’s brief at 21.) In
support of this contention, appellant maintains that, “at the time of
revocation, [he] had not yet proceeded to trial on the [March 24, 2015
simple assault] charge . . . [and] the mere fact of an arrest has no probative
value and is insufficient to warrant revocation of probation.” (Id.) We
disagree.
Preliminarily, we note that a revocation of probation is governed by
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771, which provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(b) Revocation.--The court may revoke an order
of probation upon proof of the violation of
specified conditions of the probation. Upon
revocation the sentencing alternatives
available to the court shall be the same as
were available at the time of initial sentencing,
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due consideration being given to the time
spent serving the order of probation.
(c) Limitation on sentence of total
confinement.--The court shall not impose a
sentence of total confinement upon revocation
unless it finds that:
(1) the defendant has been convicted
of another crime; or
(2) the conduct of the defendant
indicates that it is likely that he will
commit another crime if he is not
imprisoned; or
(3) such a sentence is essential to
vindicate the authority of the court.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(b), (c).
This court has long recognized that the Commonwealth bears the
burden of proving a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.
The Commonwealth establishes a probation violation
meriting revocation when it shows, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the
probationer’s conduct violated the terms and
conditions of his probation, and that probation has
proven an ineffective rehabilitation tool incapable of
deterring [the] probationer from future antisocial
conduct.
Commonwealth v. A.R., 990 A.2d 1, 4 (Pa.Super. 2010), affirmed, 80
A.3d 1180 (Pa. 2013) (citation and footnote omitted).
“[A] preponderance of the evidence is the lowest burden of proof in
the administration of justice, and it is defined as the greater weight of the
evidence, i.e., to tip a scale slightly in one’s favor.” Commonwealth v.
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Ortega, 995 A.2d 879, 886 n.3 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 20 A.3d
1211 (Pa. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the
question we must ask is not whether the evidence, if admitted at trial, would
have been sufficient to convict the defendant of the offenses that
engendered the probation revocation proceeding, but rather, whether a
preponderance of the evidence showed that probation had proven ineffective
at rehabilitating appellant. See id.Contrary to appellant’s contention, we find that the evidence was
sufficient to establish that appellant violated the conditions of his probation
and that said probation had proven ineffective. At the April 23, 2015
hearing, Probation Officer Richard Zeleznik testified that he contacted
appellant prior to the hearing about the fact that he had “done nothing
towards the condition of his probation[,]” and appellant informed him that
“he had . . . two years to get this stuff done” and was content to address the
trial court. (Notes of testimony, 4/23/15 at 2.) Officer Zeleznik further
testified that on March 25, 2015, he was notified by the Castle Shannon
Police Department that appellant had been arrested and charged in
connection with yet another assault of Ondek on March 24, 2015. (Id.)
During the course of this hearing, the trial court also heard testimony from
appellant, who failed to accept responsibility for the assault and alleged that
Ondek’s injuries were the result of her falling “on her face because she was
so intoxicated.” (Id. at 4-6.)
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Thereafter, on July 30, 2015, the trial court conducted a Gagnon II
hearing and indicated that it was incorporating Officer Zeleznik’s testimony
from the April 23, 2015 hearing into the record. (Notes of testimony,
7/30/15 at 2.) Appellant’s counsel acknowledged at said hearing that
appellant had a pending criminal case for assaulting Ondek a third time, but
stated that “[a]ppellant has always maintained his innocence through trial
and through these violation hearings[.]” (Id. at 2-3.) The record further
reflects that at no point during the course of these hearings did appellant
provide any explanation as to why he failed to contact or meet with
Officer Zeleznik from the date he began serving his probation, January 28,
2015, until the new charges were filed, on March 24, 2015.
In finding that appellant failed to comply with the conditions of
probation, the trial court reasoned as follows:
Okay. Well, you pretty much were in total
noncompliance, including a new arrest with the same
victim. I guess you didn’t have quite enough time to
go to the Batterer’s Intervention program[,] which
may very well have prevented the third case from
occurring.
Notes of testimony, 7/30/15 at 4; see also trial court opinion, 3/7/16 at 3.
Based on the foregoing discussion, we find ample support for the trial
court’s conclusions. Clearly, the record demonstrates, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that probation has been ineffective in deterring appellant’s
continuous pattern of domestic abuse against Ondek. Accordingly,
appellant’s contention that there was insufficient evidence presented at the
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probation revocation hearings that he had violated the terms of his probation
is meritless.
We now turn to appellant’s claim that the trial court abused its
discretion in sentencing him to 11½ to 23 months’ imprisonment, followed
by 2 years’ probation, after the revocation of his probation because it failed
to consider the criteria set forth in Section 9721(b), including his “character,
personal history, and rehabilitative needs.” (Appellant’s brief at 31.)
Our standard of review in assessing whether a trial court has erred in
fashioning a sentence following the revocation of probation is well settled.
When we consider an appeal from a sentence
imposed following the revocation of probation, our
review is limited to determining the validity of the
probation revocation proceedings and the authority
of the sentencing court to consider the same
sentencing alternatives that it had at the time of the
initial sentencing. Revocation of a probation
sentence is a matter committed to the sound
discretion of the trial court, and that court’s decision
will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an
error of law or an abuse of discretion.
Commonwealth v. McNeal, 120 A.3d 313, 322 (Pa.Super. 2015) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
“[I]t is within our scope of review to consider challenges to the
discretionary aspects of an appellant’s sentence in an appeal following a
revocation of probation.” Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 893 A.2d 735,
737 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 906 A.2d 1196 (Pa. 2006). Where
an appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence, the right
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to appellate review is not absolute. See Commonwealth v. Allen, 24 A.3d
1058, 1064 (Pa.Super. 2011). Rather, an appellant challenging the
discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this court’s jurisdiction by
satisfying the following four-part test:
(1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether
Appellant preserved his issue; (3) whether
Appellant’s brief includes a concise statement of the
reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with
respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence; and
(4) whether the concise statement raises a
substantial question that the sentence is appropriate
under the sentencing code.
Commonwealth v. Carrillo-Diaz, 64 A.3d 722, 725 (Pa.Super. 2013)
(citations omitted).
Instantly, the record reveals that appellant has filed a timely notice of
appeal and has preserved his sentencing claim, albeit in part, in his
August 6, 2015 post-sentence motion. Appellant’s brief also includes a
statement that comports with the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). (See
appellant’s brief at 26-30.) Accordingly, we must determine whether
appellant has raised a substantial question.
“The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d
932, 935 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 76 A.3d 538 (Pa. 2013)
(citation omitted). “A substantial question exists only when the appellant
advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were
either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or
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(2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing
process.” Commonwealth v. Glass, 50 A.3d 720, 727 (Pa.Super. 2012),
appeal denied, 63 A.3d 774 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). “At a minimum,
the Rule 2119(f) statement must articulate what particular provision of the
code is violated, what fundamental norms the sentence violates, and the
manner in which it violates that norm.” Commonwealth v.
Mastromarino, 2 A.3d 581, 585-586 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 14
A.3d 825 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted).
Herein, the record reflects that appellant failed to raise his claims that
the trial court failed to consider his character and personal history during the
July 30, 2015 sentencing hearing or in his August 6, 2015 post-sentence
motion. Accordingly, these claims are waived. See Commonwealth v.
Felder, 75 A.3d 513, 515 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 85 A.3d 482(Pa. 2014) (stating that, “[c]hallenges to the discretionary aspects of a
sentence must be raised . . . either in a post-sentence motion or by
presenting them during the sentencing proceedings. The failure to do so
results in a waiver of all such claims.” (citations omitted)).
However, to the extent appellant argues in his post-sentence motion
that the trial court “failed to recognize [his] rehabilitative needs[,]” we find
this claim presents a substantial question for our review. (See Motion to
Reconsider Sentence, 8/6/15 at ¶ 8.) See Commonwealth v. Baker, 72
A.3d 652, 662 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 86 A.3d 231 (Pa. 2014)
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(recognizing that an assertion that the trial court failed to account for
appellant’s rehabilitative needs was a substantial question suitable for
appellate review). Accordingly, we proceed to consider the merits of this
claim.
As discussed, the trial court found that appellant was “in total
noncompliance” with the terms of his probation and sentenced him to an
aggregate term of 11½ to 23 months’ imprisonment, followed by 2 years’
probation. (Notes of testimony, 7/30/15 at 4.) Although the guidelines are
not applicable herein, the record reflects that this sentence was well within
the sentencing guidelines range available to the court at the time of initial
sentencing, in accordance with Section 9771(b). Although the trial court did
not specifically state at the July 30, 2015 sentencing hearing that it
considered appellant’s rehabilitative needs, the record reflects that the trial
court was in possession of a PSI report. (Id. at 2.) Where the trial court
has the benefit of a PSI report, “we shall . . . presume that the sentencing
judge was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s character
and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.”
Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 761 (Pa.Super. 2014),
appeal denied, 95 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we
find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion, and appellant’s challenge to the
discretionary aspects of his sentence must fail.
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Lastly, appellant argues that the sentence imposed at docket number
CP-02-CR-0011237-2014 was illegal because it failed to give him credit for
the 33 days that he was incarcerated from the date of his arrest (July 27,
2014) to the date he posted bond (August 29, 2014). (Appellant’s brief at
23-24.)
A challenge to a trial court’s failure to award credit for time-served in
custody implicates the legality, not the discretionary, aspects of sentencing
and is, therefore, appealable as of right. Commonwealth v. Clark, 885
A.2d 1030, 1032 (Pa.Super. 2005). “[T]he determination as to whether the
trial court imposed an illegal sentence is a question of law; our standard of
review in cases dealing with questions of law is plenary.” Commonwealth
v. Williams, 868 A.2d 529, 532 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, 890
A.2d 1059 (Pa. 2005) (citations omitted).
Instantly, the Commonwealth concedes that the certified record is
“deficient” in that it contains no evidence as to whether appellant is entitled
to an additional 33 days’ credit for time-served. (Commonwealth’s brief at
16.) The trial court, in turn, acknowledged in its Rule 1925(a) opinion that it
was “unable to evaluate the merits of [appellant’s] claim for sentencing
credit at this time.” (Trial court opinion, 3/7/16 at 5.) We are constrained
to agree. Accordingly, we vacate appellant’s sentence and remand this
matter so that the trial court can conduct an evidentiary hearing for the
limited purpose of determining whether appellant should receive an
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additional 33 days’ credit for time-served. In all other respects, we affirm
appellant’s convictions.
Convictions affirmed. Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded
with instructions. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/30/2016
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