Com. v. Brown, J.

J-S11020-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JAMIE BROWN :
:
Appellant : No. 851 WDA 2021
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 9, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-02-CR-0000086-2021
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: May 11, 2022
Appellant, Jamie Brown, appeals from the June 9, 2021 judgment of
sentence imposing an aggregate two years’ probation following her bench trial
conviction for theft by unlawful taking or disposition – movable property and
simple assault.1 We affirm.
The trial court summarized the factual history as follows:
On June 27, 2020, at approximately 1:30 p.m., a physical
altercation ensued between [Appellant] and her child's father [in
a parking lot located along] Carson Street in [the] South Side
[neighborhood of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania]. On the date of the
incident, [the victim] had taken his daughter to the TRAC
program[,2 located along] Carson Street [] for court ordered
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3921(a) and 2701(a)(1), respectively.
2 We take judicial notice that TRAC Services for Families is an organization
whose mission is “to provide a range of services and resources for children,
youth, adults[,] and families to ensure stable relationships and strong
J-S11020-22
visitation. [The victim] dropped his daughter off at the program
on time and was sitting inside his vehicle for five to ten minutes
[afterwards] when [Appellant] approached his [vehicle’s] driver's
side door. [Appellant] opened [the victim’s] driver's side door and
asked [the victim], "[w]here's my F-ing daughter?," to which he
replied that he had dropped her off at the program.
Subsequently, [Appellant] sprayed [the victim] in the face with
mace and began to swing her arms "repeatedly" toward him. [The
victim] then screamed, exited his vehicle[,] and "got into a tussle"
with [Appellant]. [Appellant] bit [the victim] and sprayed him in
the face with mace again. [The victim] was yelling for help when
a security guard came out of the TRAC building to break up the
altercation, saying that he was calling the police. The security
guard was present at the scene when [Appellant] was there, and,
after [Appellant] "took off running[,]" he retrieved a bottle of
water for [use in rinsing the mace from the victim’s] eyes.
[Appellant] took [the victim’s cellular telephone] and glasses
before she fled toward Carson Street. [The victim’s cellular
telephone] was [valued at] approximately $200[.00]-$300[.00]
and [] his glasses were [valued at] approximately
$600[.00]-$700[.00. The victim] never recovered his [cellular
telephone] or his glasses. At the time of the incident, there was
an outstanding warrant for [Appellant] for a violation of an active
Protection From Abuse ("PFA")[, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6101-6122,]
order that [the victim] had filed against her.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/2/21, 3-4 (record citations and footnote omitted).
On June 9, 2021, the trial court, in a non-jury trial, found Appellant
guilty of the aforementioned crimes. On that same date, the trial court
____________________________________________
community connections.” See https://tracpgh.com/about-2/ (last visited
04/07/2022). The services provided are “geared to strengthen the total family
unit, in efforts to improve family relationships and overall functioning, of those
families working toward being reunified with their children who are in the
foster care system, as well as those involved in complex custody cases.” See
https://tracpgh.com/outpatient-services/ (last visited 04/07/2022).
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J-S11020-22
sentenced Appellant to two years’ probation for her theft conviction and two
years’ probation for her simple assault conviction, which was set to run
concurrently to the sentence imposed for the theft conviction.3 On June 18,
2021, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial court
subsequently denied. This appeal followed.4
Appellant raises the following issue for our review: “Did the trial court
err by denying [Appellant’s] post[-]sentence motion for a new trial because
the guilty verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence provided?”
Appellant’s Brief at 6.
Appellant’s issue raises a claim that the verdict was against the weight
of the evidence, for which our standard and scope of review is as follows:
Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of
discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict
is against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial [court]
had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an
appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings
and reasons advanced by the trial [court] when reviewing a trial
court’s determination that the verdict is [or is not] against the
weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for
granting or denying a new trial is the [trial] court’s conviction that
the verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence and
that a new trial should be granted in the interest of justice.
____________________________________________
3 Appellant was also ordered to have no contact with the victim, successfully
complete a batterers’ intervention program, undergo drug and alcohol and
mental health evaluations (and successfully complete any recommended
treatment), and pay restitution to the victim in the amount of $688.00. Order
of Sentence, 6/9/21.
4 Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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Commonwealth v. Horne, 89 A.3d 277, 285 (Pa. Super. 2014), citing
Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745 (Pa. 2000). A trial court abuses
its discretion “where the course pursued represents not merely an error of
judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the
law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of
partiality, prejudice, bias[,] or ill-will.” Horne, 89 A.3d at 285-286 (citation
omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013)
(stating, “[t]he term ‘discretion’ imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom[,]
and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion within the framework of the
law, and is not exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the [trial
court]”). In order for an appellant to prevail on a weight of the evidence claim,
“the evidence must be so tenuous, vague[,] and uncertain that the verdict
shocks the conscience of the [trial] court.” Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 820
A.2d 795, 806 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted), appeal denied, 833 A.2d 143 (Pa. 2003).
When the challenge to the weight of the evidence is predicated on
the credibility of trial testimony, our review of the trial court's
decision is extremely limited. Generally, unless the evidence is so
unreliable [or] contradictory as to make any verdict based thereon
pure conjecture, these types of claims are not cognizable on
appellate review.
Commonwealth v. Bowen, 55 A.3d 1254, 1262 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal
denied, 64 A.3d 630 (Pa. 2013).
Appellant challenges the weight of the evidence to support both her theft
by unlawful taking conviction and her simple assault conviction. Appellant’s
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Brief at 14-26. Regarding her theft by unlawful taking conviction, Appellant
asserts that the victim’s testimony regarding Appellant “grabbing” his cellular
telephone and glasses conflicts with Appellant’s strenuous denial of this fact.
Id. at 20. Appellant contends that “no objective witness, neither the security
guard nor the arresting officer, either saw [Appellant] take anything from the
scene, or [be] in possession of [the victim’s] property.” Id. at 21. Appellant
argues, “[b]ased upon the relationship dynamics evidenced between the
parties at trial, along with the objective testimony about the volatile
interaction at TRAC which provided that the parties looked like two wrestlers
in the parking lot, [the victim’s] vague testimony that [Appellant] ‘just
grabbed stuff’ should be treated with caution.” Id. at 22.
Concerning the simple assault conviction, Appellant explained that her
use of mace, which she admittedly sprayed in the victim’s face, was justified,
as self-defense, because “[w]hen she opened the door to [the victim’s vehicle]
after being denied visitation with her child, [she] saw [the victim] furtively
moving toward the far side of his front seat, and, because of the animosity
between the parties, she became fearful for her safety.” Id. at 24. Appellant
asserts that she “knew [the victim] to carry a weapon with him at all times”
even though the victim denied having a weapon in his vehicle that day. Id.
at 25. The fact that the victim “had to receive treatment for a broken hand
after this incident,” Appellant contends, is very telling and “seems to create
an inference that he had been very violent during this altercation.” Id.
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J-S11020-22
In denying Appellant’s post-sentence motion challenging the weight of
the evidence to support both of her convictions, the trial court stated,
[The trial] court found the victim [] to be highly credible. He
appeared confident and sincere, and he was consistent in his
testimony. Moreover, his testimony was corroborated by the
observations made by the responding officer, who observed
injuries to [the victim’s] face and hand when he responded to the
physical altercation call shortly thereafter. Additionally, [the
victim’s] testimony was corroborated by the observations made
by the security guard at the scene, who observed [Appellant]
approach [the victim’s vehicle] and the physical altercation
between [Appellant] and [the victim], and who subsequently
intervened to break up the fight.
Moreover, [Appellant] admitted to spraying [the victim] in the face
with mace, unprovoked. While [Appellant] claimed that she
suspected [the victim] was reaching for a gun in his vehicle before
she sprayed him, [the victim] credibly testified that he did not own
a gun, nor had [Appellant] ever [observed] him with one.
[Appellant] also admitted on cross[-]examination that she never
actually saw what [the victim] was supposedly reaching for in his
vehicle.
Likewise, the [trial] court did not find [Appellant’s] self-serving
testimony to be credible in the least. [Appellant] was incredibly
hostile and combative, and her testimony had material
inconsistencies and was unsupported by the other credible
evidence in the record. For example, [Appellant] testified on
cross[-]examination that there was an active PFA order against
her, prohibiting her from making contact with [the victim].
Despite her knowledge of the active PFA order against her,
[Appellant] admitted to initiating contact with [the victim] by
approaching his vehicle, opening the vehicle's doors, and
questioning [the victim] about their daughter. [Appellant] also
testified on direct[-]examination that she was told by the
employees at the TRAC program that her daughter was at the
facility but that they were not going to let her see the child.
However, she then went on to testify that she approached [the
victim’s] vehicle after leaving the facility because she "thought her
daughter was" in the vehicle. The [trial] court also did not believe
her testimony that she was given permission to leave by the
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J-S11020-22
security guard because he clearly testified that she had already
left by the time he could process what had transpired.
Furthermore, [Appellant] testified on direct[-]examination that
she told a TRAC employee that there was no warrant out for her
arrest and, on cross[-]examination, accused [the victim] of filing
a false police report against her[. Appellant] also testified that
she felt threatened by [the victim] during the altercation.
However, she subsequently testified that she did not wait for the
police to arrive and instead chose to leave the scene, which is
curious given her testimony that [the victim] caused her to fear
for her safety because she thought he was reaching for a firearm.
[Appellant’s] version of events further failed to account for the
injuries that were readily observable by law enforcement shortly
after the altercation[,] and [Appellant’s version of events was]
contradictory to what the security guard [] observed[.]
Specifically, [Appellant] testified that she never swung at [the
victim]. However, the responding officer observed that [the
victim] had an injured hand, the security guard testified that
[Appellant] was swinging her arms at [the victim], and [the
victim] testified that he was using his hands to try to protect his
face. [Appellant’s] testimony not only failed to carry "the ring of
truth," but in [the trial] court's estimation, it was entirely
self-serving and contrived, particularly when considered against
the testimony provided by the victim, the responding officer, and
the security guard at the scene.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/2/21, 12-16 (record citations and original brackets
omitted).
Appellant’s argument invites this Court to do nothing more than
reassess the credibility of the victim, Appellant, and the other witnesses and
reweigh the evidence in an attempt to convince us to reach a result different
than the one reached by the trial court as the fact-finder. See, e.g.,
Appellant’s Brief at 22 (stating, “believing [the victim’s] tenuous and also
clearly slanted testimony to find [Appellant] guilty is offensive to one’s sense
of justice”). We decline Appellant’s invitation. Clay, 64 A.3d at 1056 (holding
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that, the role of an appellate court when addressing a weight claim is to
determine if the trial court exceeded its limit of judicial discretion or invaded
the providence of the fact-finder). Based upon the record before us, we
discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying
Appellant’s request for a new trial based upon her claim that the verdict was
against the weight of the evidence. Therefore, Appellant’s claim is without
merit.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/11/2022
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