Com. v. Wilson, F.

J-S71023-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
FORREST JAMES WILSON
Appellant No. 801 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 23, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Criminal Division at Nos: CP-09-CR-0004181-2016
BEFORE: PANELLA, STABILE, and PLATT,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED APRIL 16, 2018
Appellant, Forrest James Wilson, appeals from the February 23, 2017
judgment of sentence of 12-24 months’ imprisonment for reckless
endangerment.1 Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain
his conviction, and that his guilty verdict for reckless endangerment is
inconsistent with his not guilty verdicts on other charges. We affirm.
The following evidence was adduced during trial. The victim, Amilla
Laidler, testified that she had previously lived with Appellant and her daughter
in Apartment 4, the second floor unit, in a duplex at 819 Cedar Avenue in
Croydon, Bristol Township, Bucks County, Pennsylvania. Laidler and her
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705.
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daughter had moved out of the apartment in March 2015, leaving many of her
possessions behind. Appellant continued to live in Apartment 4. Laidler
testified that she left Appellant because he was violent. She described certain
incidents that occurred shortly before, and leading up to, her leaving
Appellant. On one occasion, Appellant took Laidler’s car keys and would not
let her leave the apartment. During that incident, she testified that Appellant
punched her and threw her to the ground by her hair. On another occasion,
he accused her of “messing around,” which she denied. He then pulled out a
wire object that looked like pieces of wire hanger twisted together. He
threatened to beat her with it if she continued to lie about it. N.T. 10/25/16,
pp. 61-62, 107. On a third occasion, he cornered her in the bathroom of
Apartment 4, plugged in a clothing iron and threatened to burn her with it.
Id. at 109-10.
On May 20, 2015, shortly before 11:30 p.m., Laidler contacted Appellant
via text and asked if she could come into the Apartment 4 to get some
clothing. Laidler stated she was going on vacation the following day to Myrtle
Beach and wanted to retrieve some items left in the apartment. Appellant
agreed. At 11:30 p.m., Laidler ended her shift at her place of employment
and drove directly to the apartment. Upon arrival, Laidler again texted
Appellant asking if he would bring her things down to her. He responded that
she was to come up to the apartment and get them. Id. at 55.
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Laidler went up the apartment and straight to the bedroom to retrieve
her clothing. She observed at some point that Appellant had locked the
apartment door after she entered and remained standing at the door. As she
was getting her items, including her bathing suit and other summer-type
clothing, Appellant entered the bedroom and began questioning her about
what she had been doing and about other men (people she was “messing
with”). Laidler saw Appellant with the same wire object described above. He
began striking her with the object, in a whipping fashion, on her arms and
legs, while continuing to accuse her of “messing” with other men. Id. at 58-
59, 61, 118. Laidler was crying and denied sleeping with other men, and she
used her hands to try to block the strikes. When Laidler told Appellant she
was leaving, he told her that she “was going to die tonight if [she] left.” Id.
at 68, 122. When she told Appellant that she was going to call the police, he
knocked her cell phone from her hand, breaking it.
Laidler was afraid of Appellant and was trying to think of a way to leave
the apartment. She continuously asked Appellant for a glass of water to make
him move away from her. Eventually he agreed and walked from the bedroom
into the kitchen. When Appellant moved into the kitchen, Laidler grabbed her
purse and cell phone and ran to the bathroom, locking the door behind her.
She considered climbing through the bathroom window to get away. She
testified: “[Appellant] wasn’t going to let me go. He was going to continue to
hit me. I was scared. I didn’t know how else to get out of that apartment.”
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Id. at 80. Immediately after, Appellant began breaking through the bathroom
door. Laidler had no time to think, and she managed to open the bathroom
window and jumped from the second story building to the grass below,
injuring her ankle. Id. at 72-75, 79, 87.
Laidler heard Appellant jump from the window behind her and fall to the
ground. She continued to run, explaining that she was afraid as Appellant
appeared to be right behind her, and she did not want to take the time to try
to find her car keys in her purse. She ran to a nearby Sunoco gas station,
where she saw a couple with a baby outside in the parking lot. She asked
them to call 911; the woman did so. The 911 call, which was played for the
jury, took place at approximately 12:12 a.m. on the morning of May 21, 2015.
The caller reported that the victim advised that a guy was trying to kill her.
Laidler can be heard in the background, audibly upset. While waiting for police
to arrive, Laidler stayed in the couple’s vehicle. A short time later, the police
and an ambulance arrived at the Sunoco. Laidler was transported to Lower
Bucks Hospital with cuts and abrasions on her hands, arms and legs. Her
ankle was wrapped and she was released. Id. at 86-99.
Officer Jason Mancuso of the Bristol Township Police responded to the
Sunoco gas station and met with Laidler. She was out of breath, was crying
hysterically and had visible injuries to her arms and palms. The injuries to
her palms looked like defensive injuries. Laidler stated that Appellant had
struck her with a wire object causing her injuries. She was barefoot and
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complained of pain to her ankle. The officer also saw the damage to Laidler’s
phone. Id. at 131-33, 145.
Police officers went to Apartment 4 and met with Appellant. Appellant
had an obvious injury to his ankle that appeared to be a break. Officer
Mancuso observed that the kitchen and bedroom were in disarray, with items
knocked over, indicating that a recent physical altercation. He described the
bathroom door as “destroyed,” with the frame and molding broken and a slab
of the door lying on the floor. Id. at 136. Police did not recover a wire object.
Id. at 145.
Appellant told police that the victim had come over to the apartment,
and he claimed that he believed she took $700.00 from him and ran into the
bathroom. He stated that he broke down the door to confront her to get his
money back. He told police that she pushed him out the window, causing him
to injure his ankle. Officer Mancuso did not find any money (or very little
money) in Laidler’s possession. Id. at 137, 148, 152.
Appellant was a large man, over 6 feet tall, well-built and strong. Laidler
was 5’9,” approximately 130 lbs. and did not appear physically strong or fit.
Appellant was transported to Aria Hospital, Bucks County Campus, for
treatment, and he reported to the medical staff that his injury was caused
when he jumped out of a window landing on his feet. Id. at 140-45.
At the preliminary hearing in this case, after Laidler testified, Appellant
told her in open court, “you don’t know who you’re messing with.” Id. at 147.
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Appellant also testified at trial. His testimony was, in many respects, non-
responsive and argumentative. He denied that he and Laidler were ever in a
romantic relationship, despite the fact that they lived together. Appellant
attempted to disparage Laidler by accusing her of using drugs. Yet, he
testified that they occasionally saw each other after she moved out, including
earlier in the day on May 20, 2015, which Laidler denied. Appellant
corroborated Laidler’s account of the incident, in part. However, he did not
admit to hitting her, stating that he did not care enough about her “to be
beating on her.” N.T., 10/26/18, at 18. Appellant offered no explanation to
the condition of the apartment, with the exception of the bathroom door.
Appellant maintained that he thought Laidler stole his rent money, so he
kicked in the bathroom door and pursued her, following her out the window
onto the roof. He claimed that while partially still in the window, Laidler
pushed back at him, causing him to fall and break two bones in his leg. He
did not describe what happened to Laidler, how she exited the window or made
it to the Sunoco.
Appellant admitted pursuing Laidler out of the bathroom window,
stating: “If I caught her, she probably would have gotten assaulted, wouldn’t
have been no simple assault, would have been criminal assault if I caught her
with my money, but I couldn’t catch her.” Id. at 18. Appellant further
volunteered, “I done a lot of stuff all my life. I’ve been a predator all my life,
but I don’t prey on people no more. If I can’t help you, I don’t hurt you,
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unless you’re trying to hurt me. I ain’t nobody’s prey. That’s what I’m trying
to explain to her, I don’t care what you do, so long as you don’t do it to me.”
Id. at 17. However, despite his violent conduct and admitted intent, Appellant
also testified that he did not know for sure that Laidler took his money and
that he did not directly accuse her of taking the money or even mentioning
this to her. When questioned about calling police for the alleged theft of his
monies, Appellant replied, “I don’t call the police.” Id. at 31.
The jury found Appellant guilty of reckless endangerment but not guilty
of possessing an instrument of crime, simple assault, terroristic threats and
harassment.
Appellant’s first argument in this appeal is that the evidence was
insufficient to support his conviction for reckless endangerment.
As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency claims
requires that we evaluate the record “in the light most favorable
to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.”
Commonwealth v. Widmer, [] 744 A.2d 745, 751 ([Pa.] 2000).
Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it
establishes each material element of the crime charged and the
commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt.
Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a
mathematical certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is
to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak
and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact
can be drawn from the combined circumstances.
Commonwealth v. Rahman, 75 A.3d 497, 500-01 (Pa. Super. 2013).
A person is guilty of reckless endangerment if “he recklessly engages in
conduct which places or may place another person in danger of death or
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serious bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705. Reckless endangerment can occur
when the defendant’s conduct creates danger of death or serious bodily injury
to the victim by causing a “panic situation.” Commonwealth v. Trowbridge,
395 A.2d 1337, 1341 n. 14 (Pa. Super. 1977). Appellant clearly caused a
“panic situation” here. Laidler testified that Appellant struck her repeatedly
and would not permit her to leave and broke her phone when she said she
was calling police. Appellant’s threats and violent conduct placed her in fear
of her safety. When she was able to lock herself in the bathroom away from
Appellant, Appellant pursued her and broke down the bathroom door to get to
her, which forced her to jump from a second story window to escape him. As
the trial court reasoned:
The evidence, including Laidler’s dangerous escape from the
second floor bathroom window, [Appellant’s] own admission that
he not only kicked in the bathroom door off its hinges but also
jumped from the same window, breaking his leg and back in the
process, and Officer Mancuso's testimony that the apartment
appeared “destroyed” after that incident, revealed that an
extremely violent and reckless encounter had occurred between
[Appellant] and Laidler. At the very least, Laidler had reasonable
cause to believe that as a result of [Appellant’s] conduct and
actions she was in imminent danger of great bodily harm.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/27/17, at 5-6. For these reasons, Appellant’s challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence fails.
In his second and final argument, Appellant contends that the guilty
verdict for reckless endangerment was inconsistent with the not guilty verdict
on all other charges. Appellant is not entitled to relief.
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Inconsistent verdicts are permissible in Pennsylvania. Commonwealth
v. States, 938 A.2d 1016, 1025 (Pa. 2007).
Inconsistent verdicts, while often perplexing, are not considered
mistakes and do not constitute a basis for reversal. Rather, the
rationale for allowing inconsistent verdicts is that it is the jury’s
sole prerogative to decide on which counts to convict in order to
provide a defendant with sufficient punishment. When an
acquittal on one count in an indictment is inconsistent with a
conviction on a second count, the court looks upon the acquittal
as no more than the jury’s assumption of a power which they had
no right to exercise, but to which they were disposed through
lenity. Thus, this Court will not disturb guilty verdicts on the basis
of apparent inconsistencies as long as there is sufficient evidence
to support the verdict.
Commonwealth v. Frisbie, 889 A.2d 1271, 1273 (Pa. Super. 2005). As
discussed above, there was ample evidence to support the guilty verdict for
reckless endangerment. Thus, assuming arguendo that the verdicts were
inconsistent, Appellant’s conviction for reckless endangerment still stands.
In any event, the trial court cogently reasoned that the verdicts were
actually consistent:
A review of the record reveals that clear discrepancies existed
between the testimonies of Laidler and [Appellant] concerning the
injuries Laidler sustained during this incident. Laidler alleged her
injuries resulted from a beating [Appellant] administered to her in
the bedroom with a piece of wire while he interrogated her about
her current personal relationships. She testified that the wire
appeared to be about a foot long and approximately an inch thick
and was constructed from the “bottom parts of metal hangers
intertwined.” [Appellant], however, denied ever beating her with,
or even possessing, such a wire, and suggested she sustained
those “bruises by climbing off the roof and climbing out that
window.” Furthermore, Officer Mancuso testified that he did not
find the wire when he responded to the apartment on May 21,
2015. (See N.T. 10/25/16, pp. 61-66, 118, 151; N.T. 10/26/16,
p. 14.)
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The testimony of [Appellant] and Laidler also differed as to the
underlying cause of the violence that occurred that night.
According to Laidler, her alleged beating by [Appellant] stemmed
from his jealousy of potential intimate relationships she might be
having with other men. Not surprisingly, [Appellant] denied ever
striking Laidler or having any romantic interest in her. He
suggested she was “drug addict,” and he testified that after Laidler
went into the bathroom and locked the door, he discovered that
she had allegedly stolen $700[.00] from his dresser drawer. He
asserted that that was the reason for his kicking the door in and
chasing after her. (See N.T. 10/25/16, pp. 58-61, 117-123, 137,
148; N.T. 10/26/16, pp. 13-18.)
It is well-established that “[t]he weight of the evidence is a matter
exclusively for the finder of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or
none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the
witnesses.” Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 723
(Pa. Super. 2015). Here, the discrepancies in the testimony as
well as the lack of physical evidence regarding the wire were
apparently sufficient to create reasonable doubt in the minds of
the jurors that [Appellant] was guilty of the charges of possessing
an instrument of crime and simple assault.
Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that the jury determined
that in certain aspects, [Appellant] was the more credible witness
and that his version of the events instilled some doubt in the
jurors’ minds as to veracity of Laidler’s description of what had
occurred or her explanation of the causes that led to the events
of that night. Consequently, the jury could conclude from
[Appellant]’s version of those events that reasonable doubt
existed as to his guilt of the remaining charges of terroristic
threats and harassment.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/27/17, at 7-8. Accordingly, Appellant’s second
argument fails.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/16/18
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