Com. v. Thomas, V.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
VINCENT THOMAS
Appellant No. 2983 EDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order entered September 9, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Criminal Division at No: CP-23-CR-0006925-1981
BEFORE: OLSON, STABILE, and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JUNE 29, 2017
Appellant, Vincent Thomas, appeals from the September 9, 2016 order
entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, denying his
petition for collateral relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA),
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Upon review, we affirm.
The underlying facts and procedural history of the case are not at
issue here. Briefly, Appellant, who was in his early thirties at the time he
committed the crimes giving rise to the instant matter,1 after being found
guilty by a jury, was sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 12-
40 years on October 1, 1982. See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 499 A.2d
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1
The record shows Appellant was born on June 30, 1949, and that he
committed the crimes at issue here on October 22, 1981 and November 15,
1981, when he was over 32 years old.
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501, 503-04 (Pa. Super. 1984). Appellant timely appealed to this Court. On
direct appeal, we affirmed. Id. at 508. The Supreme Court denied
Appellant’s petition for allocatur on September 18, 1984. See
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 835 EDA 1999 and 836 EDA 1999,
unpublished memorandum at *2 (Pa. Super. filed July 18, 2000).
Subsequently, Appellant “has filed numerous petitions challenging the
judgment of sentence pursuant to the [PCRA].” Appellant’s Brief at 5. More
recently, Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition on March 2016, which the
PCRA court denied on September 9, 2016. PCRA Court Opinion, 10/14/16,
at 3. This appeal followed.
“[A]n appellate court reviews the PCRA court’s findings of fact to
determine whether they are supported by the record, and reviews its
conclusions of law to determine whether they are free from legal error.”
Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014). All PCRA
petitions, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within
one year of the date the judgment becomes final” unless an exception to
timeliness applies. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). “The PCRA’s time
restrictions are jurisdictional in nature. Thus, [i]f a PCRA petition is
untimely, neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction over the
petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to
address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d
520, 522 (Pa. 2006) (first alteration in original) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). As timeliness is separate and distinct from the
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merits of Appellant’s underlying claims, we first determine whether this
PCRA petition is timely filed. See Commonwealth v. Stokes, 959 A.2d
306, 310 (Pa. 2008) (consideration of Brady claim separate from
consideration of its timeliness). The timeliness requirements of the PCRA
petition must be met, even if the underlying claim is a challenge to the
legality of the sentence. See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 933 A.2d 57, 60
(Pa. 2007) (“Although legality of sentence is always subject to review within
the PCRA, claims must still first satisfy the PCRA’s time limits or one of the
exceptions thereto”) (citing Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223
(1999)).
As noted above, the instant PCRA petition was filed over 30 years after
his judgment of sentence became final. As such, the instant petition is
facially untimely. To overcome the untimeliness of his petition, Appellant
argues that his sentence is illegal under Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136
S. Ct. 718 (2016), and Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012),2 and that
Montgomery and Miller qualify as an exception to the timeliness
requirement under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii) (relating to new
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2
In Miller, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “mandatory life without parole
for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments.” Miller, 132
S. Ct. at 2460 (emphasis added). In Montgomery, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that Miller was a new substantive rule that, under the United States
Constitution, must be retroactive in cases on state collateral review.
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736.
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constitutional right recognized by the United States Supreme Court or the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court after the expiration of the standard deadline).
Specifically, according to Appellant, Montgomery announced a new
constitutional rule that is retroactive and applicable to him. Appellant also
contends that the new constitutional rule announced in Montgomery “is not
applicable to juvenile offender[s] only but to any and all United States
[c]itizen[s] serving an unconstitutional, illegal or unlawfully imposed”
sentence. Appellant’s Brief at 7. We disagree.
Appellant is not entitled to any relief under Miller/Montgomery. As
properly noted by the PCRA court, “because Appellant is neither serving a
sentence of mandatory life sentence, nor was he a juvenile at the time that
[he committed the crimes],” PCRA Court Opinion, 10/14/16 at 5, Miller does
not apply. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460. Because Appellant has no claim
under Miller, Montgomery does not affect the timeliness of his petition.
We, therefore, conclude, the PCRA court properly denied the instant petition
as untimely.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/29/2017
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