Com. v. Oxford, C.

J-A28019-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
CLINTON D. OXFORD
Appellant No. 71 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 11, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-48-CR-0001602-2014
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and SHOGAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PER CURIAM: FILED JANUARY 15, 2016
Appellant, Clinton D. Oxford, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered September 11, 2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton
County. We affirm.
Oxford sent his probation officer numerous bizarre and threatening e-
mails. He also went to what he thought was her residence, but was actually
her former residence, where her son still resided, and stared into the home.
After a two-day jury trial, the jurors convicted Oxford of one count of
stalking, two counts of terroristic threats, and one count of harassment. The
trial court later sentenced Oxford to a term of incarceration. After the denial
of post-sentence motions, this timely appeal followed.
Preliminarily, we must remark about the quality of the brief Oxford has
submitted in support of his appeal. There are 390 pages of trial transcript in
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this case. Oxford’s statement of the case consists of nine sentences. There is
not even one citation to the notes of testimony in the entire brief. We
strongly recommend Oxford’s counsel review Rules 2117(a)(1-2, 4) and
2119(b) and (c) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. The
failure to conform to the Rules of Appellate Procedure results in the waiver
of Oxford’s first two issues on appeal, as he has failed to present developed
legal arguments.
In the first issue, Oxford argues that the Commonwealth presented
insufficient evidence to sustain the convictions of stalking and terroristic
threats. Apart from setting forth boilerplate law regarding sufficiency of the
evidence claims and reproducing the statutory language for terroristic
threats and stalking, the brief provides no further developed legal argument
to support the claim that the convictions are based on insufficient evidence.
Oxford presents a patently undeveloped claim, which we find waived. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Miller, 721 A.2d 1121, 1124 (Pa. Super. 1998)
(finding claim waived where there was a “lack of factual background and
citation to the record, coupled with the anemic state of the argument portion
of Appellant’s brief[]”).
For instance, Oxford simply asserts that the “uncontested facts” prove
he did not act “intentionally and deliberately.” Appellant’s Brief, at 13
(unnumbered). But he fails to provide any discussion of the facts. Oddly, he
also claims that the evidence was insufficient because the trial court denied
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his request for a psychiatric evaluation. See id. This claim is not even a
sufficiency of the evidence claim.
In any event, even if we did not find the claim waived we would not
hesitate to conclude that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence
to sustain the convictions for stalking and terroristic threats. At trial, the
Commonwealth presented evidence of many e-mails where Oxford
threatened his probation officer and other extremely bizarre e-mails he sent
her. See, e.g., N.T., Trial, 9/10/14, at 39, 60, 70-73, 83, 131, 133-134. The
victim testified that she feared for her safety as well as her six-year-old
son’s safety. See id., at 139, 158, 161.
In his second issue, Oxford states “[t]he jury’s verdict of guilty for
terroristic threat [sic] and stalking was against the weight of the evidence.”
Id. That is the sum and substance of the issue. He provides nothing further
in support of the contention that the convictions were against the weight of
the evidence. We find this woefully undeveloped claim waived. See
Commonwealth v. Clayton, 816 A.2d 217, 221 (Pa. 2002) (“[I]t is a well
settled principle of appellate jurisprudence that undeveloped claims are
waived and unreviewable on appeal.”). In addition, Oxford failed to raise this
claim in the trial court, thus providing another basis for finding the claim
waived. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(1-3) and Comment.
Even if we were to address this claim on the merits, we would find that
it provides Oxford no relief. After finding the claim waived, the trial court
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noted that it would have found the verdict was not against the weight of the
evidence.
We will reverse a jury’s verdict and grant a new trial only where the
verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.
See Commonwealth v. Passmore, 857 A.2d 697, 708 (Pa. Super. 2004).
A verdict is said to be contrary to the evidence such that it shocks one’s
sense of justice when “the figure of Justice totters on her pedestal,” or when
“the jury’s verdict, at the time of its rendition, causes the trial judge to lose
his breath, temporarily, and causes him to almost fall from the bench, then
it is truly shocking to the judicial conscience.” Commonwealth v.
Davidson, 860 A.2d 575, 581 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted), aff’d,
938 A.2d 198 (Pa. 2007). The verdict in this case does not shock one’s
sense of justice.
The final issue presents yet another waived claim. Oxford maintains
that the trial judge erred in failing to recuse herself from the case where she
previously represented the victim. The trial judge disclosed her prior
representation during Oxford’s guilty plea hearing, which was subsequently
withdrawn, on July 22, 2014. See N.T., Guilty Plea Hearing, 7/22/14, at 7-8.
At that time, Oxford stated, through counsel, that he felt “comfortable”
proceeding. Id., at 8. Oxford did not object to the trial court’s hearing of the
case until September 9, 2014, just prior to jury selection. See N.T., Pre-
Trial, 9/9/14, at 5.
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“A party seeking recusal or disqualification [is required] to raise the
objection at the earliest possible moment, or that party will suffer the
consequence of being time barred.” In re Lokuta, 11 A.3d 427, 437 (Pa.
2011) (emphasis added) (quoting Goodheart v. Casey, 565 A.2d 757, 763
(Pa. 1989)). Once a party has waived the issue, “he cannot be heard to
complain following an unfavorable result.” Commonwealth v. Stanton,
440 A.2d 585, 588 n.6 (Pa. Super. 1982) (citations omitted).
The earliest possible moment in this case was the trial judge’s initial
disclosure on July 22, 2014. Instead of objecting then, Oxford waited 49
days later, just prior to jury selection, to object. Accordingly, we find the
claim waived.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/15/2016
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