Krayzel, A. v. Roberts, L.

J-A30011-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
ALEC AND RICHARD KRAYZEL IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellants
v.
LAWRENCE J. ROBERTS,
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF
GORDON A. SPIWAK, DEC’D
Appellee No. 489 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment Entered January 28, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No(s): June Term, 2012, No. 1970
BEFORE: MUNDY, J., JENKINS, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED DECEMBER 22, 2015
Appellants, Alec and Richard Krayzel,1 appeal from the judgment
entered on January 28, 2014 in favor of Appellee, Lawrence J. Roberts,
Administrator of the Estate of Gordon A. Spiwak, deceased, (Administrator)
following a jury verdict that Administrator was not liable to Appellants. After
careful review, we affirm.
We set forth the facts and procedural history of this case, as
summarized from the certified record, as follows. This negligence action
arises out of a motor vehicle accident. On July 21, 2010, a vehicle driven by
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
As Appellants share a surname, we refer to them individually by their first
names.
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Gordon A. Spiwak (Decedent) negligently rear-ended the vehicle driven by
Richard in which Alec was a passenger. Administrator admitted that
Decedent was negligent. Each Appellant asserted that he sustained serious
bodily injury from whiplash in the form of soft tissue damage to his back,
neck, and spine as a result of the accident.
On February 22, 2013, the case proceeded to arbitration. The
arbitration panel found in favor of the Appellants and awarded each
Appellant $10,000.00 in damages, for a total award of $20,000.00. On
March 21, 2013, Administrator filed a notice of appeal to the court of
common pleas, demanding a jury trial. Thereafter, on July 31, 2013,
Appellants stipulated to limit the maximum amount of damages to
$25,000.00, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1311.1.
On September 17, 2013, a two-day jury trial commenced. On
September 18, 2013, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Administrator.
Specifically, the jury found that the negligence of Decedent was not a factual
cause of injury to either Appellant. On September 30, 2013, Appellants filed
a timely post-trial motion,2 and the trial court denied the motion on
____________________________________________
2
The tenth day to timely file a post-trial motion fell on Saturday, September
28, 2013. When computing the ten-day filing period “[if] the last day of any
such period shall fall on a Saturday or Sunday … such day shall be omitted
from the computation.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908. Accordingly, the last day for
Appellants to timely file a post-trial motion was on Monday, September 30,
2013.
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December 31, 2013. Thereafter, on January 28, 2014, Appellants filed a
praecipe to enter judgment, and judgment was entered in favor of
Administrator. That same day, Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal. 3
On appeal, Appellants raise the following issues for our review.
1. Did the trial court err in overruling [Appellants’]
objection to [Administrator’s] cross-examination of []
Alec Krayzel regarding a social media statement that
he expected to recover $1,000,000.00 where: (a)
the statement obtained from social media was not
disclosed to [Appellants’] counsel despite an ongoing
discovery request; (b) the question was knowingly
misleading as [Appellants] stipulated to limiting
damages to $25,000.00 under Pa.R.C.P. 1311.1; (c)
statements with regard to the amount of damages
demanded are inadmissible, and (d) the statement
was otherwise inadmissible, irrelevant and
prejudicial?
2. Did the trial court err in limiting presentation of
[Appellants’] medical reports offered pursuant to
Pa.R.C.P. 1311.1?
3. Was the verdict in favor of the defendant, that
defendant’s negligence was not a factual cause of
any injury to [Appellants], contrary to the weight of
the uncontradicted, uncontroverted evidence and the
result of prejudice and partiality, entitling
[Appellants] to a new trial?
4. Did the trial court err in refusing [Appellants’]
requested charge on damages as mandated by
Pa.R.C.P. 223.3 and requested points for charge
____________________________________________
3
Appellants and the trial court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure 1925. The trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion adopts the
reasoning expressed in footnote one of its December 31, 2013 order denying
Appellants’ post-trial motion.
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regarding the nature and compensability of soft
tissues injuries?
5. Did the trial court err in refusing [Appellants’]
requested point for charge that the verdict must bear
a reasonable relation to the loss suffered as
demonstrated by uncontroverted evidence per
Neison v. Hines, 653 A.2d 634, 637 (Pa. 1995)?
6. Did the trial court err in denying [Appellants’]
requested instruction that under the facts of the
case, the jury must find defendant’s negligence was
a factual cause of harm to [Appellants]?
Appellants’ Brief at 6-8.
All of Appellants’ issues in their post-trial motion sought to obtain a
new trial. We begin by noting our standard of review.
In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion for a
new trial, the standard of review for an appellate
court is as follows:
[I]t is well-established law that, absent a
clear abuse of discretion by the trial court,
appellate courts must not interfere with the
trial court’s authority to grant or deny a new
trial.
* * *
Thus, when analyzing a decision by a
trial court to grant or deny a new trial, the
proper standard of review, ultimately, is
whether the trial court abused its discretion.
Moreover, our review must be tailored to a well-
settled, two-part analysis:
We must review the court’s alleged
mistake and determine whether the court erred
and, if so, whether the error resulted in
prejudice necessitating a new trial. If the
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alleged mistake concerned an error of law, we
will scrutinize for legal error. Once we
determine whether an error occurred, we must
then determine whether the trial court abused
its discretion in ruling on the request for a new
trial.
ACE Am. Ins. Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyds and Cos., 939 A.2d 935,
939 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted), affirmed, 971 A.2d 1121 (Pa.
2009).
In their first issue on appeal, Appellants argue that the trial court
improperly admitted a statement Alec posted to his public Facebook page.
Appellants’ Brief at 28. In that statement, which Alec posted to Facebook
during jury selection, Alec identified his location as Philadelphia City Hall by
“tagging” himself at that location on Facebook and commented that he was
“becoming a millionaire.” Administrator’s Brief at 4. During the cross-
examination of Alec, the trial court permitted Administrator to question Alec
on the statement, over Appellants’ objection. We review a trial court’s
evidentiary rulings according to the following standard.
When we review a trial court ruling on admission of
evidence, we must acknowledge that decisions on
admissibility are within the sound discretion of the
trial court and will not be overturned absent an
abuse of discretion or misapplication of law. An
abuse of discretion is not merely an error of
judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is
overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised
is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality,
prejudice, bias or ill-will, as shown by the evidence
or the record, discretion is abused.
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Commonwealth Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Smith, 15 A.3d 492, 496 (Pa. Super.
2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Further, “[a] trial
judge has considerable latitude in determining the scope of cross-
examination and his determination will not be reversed in the absence of an
abuse of discretion unless a party suffers obvious disadvantage.” Yacoub v.
Lehigh Valley Med. Assocs., P.C., 805 A.2d 579, 597 (Pa. Super. 2002),
appeal denied, 825 A.2d 639 (Pa. 2003) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
The trial court explained that it permitted the cross-examination
question for the following reasons.
This was proper cross-examination under the
circumstances and went to [Alec’s] state of mind,
motive, bias and credibility. The Facebook post was
certainly available to Alec [], the poster, and cross-
examination of him with his mid-trial post did not
violate any rule of discovery or evidence.
Trial Court Order, 12/31/13, at 1-2 n.1.
In admitting this statement, we discern no abuse or error of law.
Specifically, even though Appellants stipulated to a maximum of $25,000.00
of damages, Alec’s Facebook post still was relevant to show Alec’s state of
mind, motive, bias, and credibility. See Yacoub, supra (stating that a
party may cross-examine to explore credibility or bias that would affect the
testimony of the witness). Its probative value to demonstrate that Alec did
not sustain significant injuries and was attempting to use the litigation to
profit outweighed any prejudice to Appellants. Moreover, the statement was
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made by Alec on his Facebook account and was available to him.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
denying Appellants’ motion for a new trial on these grounds. See
Commonwealth Fin. Sys., supra; Yacoub, supra. ACE Am. Ins., supra.
In their second issue on appeal, Appellants argue that the trial court
improperly limited the presentation of Appellants’ medical reports under
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1311.1. Appellants’ Brief at 42. As
noted above, we review a trial court’s admission of evidence for an abuse of
discretion or an error of law. See Commonwealth Fin. Sys., supra. Rule
1311.1 provides the procedure for admitting documents, including expert
reports, at the trial of an appeal from arbitration in which the plaintiff elects
to limit the maximum amount of damages to $25,000.00.
Rule 1311.1. Procedure on Appeal. Admission
of Documentary Evidence
(a) The plaintiff may elect a limit of $25,000.00 as
the maximum amount of damages recoverable upon
the trial of an appeal from the award of arbitrators.
…
(b) If the plaintiff has filed and served an election as
provided in subdivision (a), any party may offer at
trial the documents set forth in Rule 1305(b)(1)[,
including reports of licensed health care providers
and expert reports]. The documents offered shall
be admitted if the party offering them has provided
written notice to every other party of the intention to
offer the documents at trial at least twenty days
from the date the appeal is first listed for trial. …
(c) A document which is received into evidence
under subdivision (b) may be used only for those
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purposes which would be permissible if the person
whose testimony is waived by this rule were
present and testifying at the hearing. The court shall
disregard any portion of the document so received
that would be inadmissible if the person whose
testimony is waived by this rule were testifying in
person.
(d) Any other party may subpoena the person whose
testimony is waived by this rule to appear at or serve
upon a party a notice to attend the trial and any
adverse party may cross-examine the person as to
the document as if the person were a witness for
the party offering the document. …
Pa.R.C.P. 1311.1(a)-(d).
Appellants contend that pursuant to Rule 1311.1, the trial court
abused its discretion by not permitting Appellants to read the entirety of
their expert reports and health care provider report to the jury. Appellants’
Brief at 42. “We, as judges on an appellate court, are mindful that trial
judges have wide discretion in the management and conduct of trial
proceedings. Thus, we are most careful not to second-guess trial court
judges in the exercise of their discretion to so manage.” In re C.W., 960
A.2d 458, 469 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). However, “[w]hen legal
issues such as the interpretation of a rule are concerned, our standard of
review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. We further note that
the object of all interpretation and construction of rules is to ascertain and
effectuate the intention of the Supreme Court.” Kopytin v. Aschinger, 947
A.2d 739, 744 (Pa. Super. 2008), appeal denied, 964 A.2d 2 (Pa. 2009).
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Contrary to Appellants’ argument, there is nothing in the plain
language of Rule 1311.1 that requires a trial court to permit a party offering
a document into evidence under Rule 1311.1 to read the entirety of the
document to the jury. Rule 1311.1 merely provides that the document must
be admitted into evidence. Pa.R.C.P. 1311.1(b). Here, the trial court
complied with Rule 1311.1 by admitting Appellants’ expert reports into
evidence. Moreover, even though it was under no obligation to do so, the
trial court allowed Appellants to read the highlights of the reports to the
jury. See N.T., 9/17/13, at 52-68 (presenting to the jury segments of
expert reports and treatment notes describing the various injuries Appellants
sustained in the car accident). Further, as the trial court explained, the
reports were admitted into evidence in their entirety, and the full reports
were with the jury while it deliberated. Trial Court Order, 12/31/13, at 1-2
n.1. Because the trial court complied with Rule 1311.1, we will not second-
guess the trial court’s discretion in the management and conduct of the jury
trial. See In re C.W., supra. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion or err as a matter of law in denying Appellants’ post-trial motion
for a new trial on this basis, and Appellants’ second issue does not warrant
relief. See ACE Am. Ins., supra.
In their third issue on appeal, Appellants contend that the verdict of no
liability was against the weight of the evidence. Appellants’ Brief at 46. Our
standard of review of such claims is as follows.
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Appellate review of a weight claim is a review
of the [trial court’s] exercise of discretion, not
of the underlying question of whether the
verdict is against the weight of the evidence.
Because the trial judge has had the
opportunity to hear and see the evidence
presented, an appellate court will give the
gravest consideration to the findings and
reasons advanced by the trial judge when
reviewing a trial court’s determination that the
verdict is against the weight of the evidence.
One of the least assailable reasons for granting
or denying a new trial is the lower court’s
conviction that the verdict was or was not
against the weight of the evidence and that a
new trial should be granted in the interest of
justice.
The factfinder is free to believe all, part, or none of
the evidence and to determine the credibility of the
witnesses. The trial court may award a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial only when
the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to
shock one's sense of justice. In determining whether
this standard has been met, appellate review is
limited to whether the trial judge’s discretion was
properly exercised, and relief will only be granted
where the facts and inferences of record disclose a
palpable abuse of discretion. When a fact finder’s
verdict is so opposed to the demonstrative facts that
looking at the verdict, the mind stands baffled, the
intellect searches in vain for cause and effect, and
reason rebels against the bizarre and erratic
conclusion, it can be said that the verdict is
shocking.
Haan v. Wells, 103 A.3d 60, 69-70 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted; brackets in original).
Appellants contend that because Administrator conceded negligence
and did not present a factual challenge to the underpinnings of the expert
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reports detailing their injuries, the jury’s verdict of no factual causation is
not supported by the evidence. Appellants’ Brief at 69. Appellants
apparently maintain that because the Administrator admitted Decedent was
negligent, the jury had to find that negligence was the factual cause of
Appellants’ injuries. The trial court, however, explained that the issue of
factual causation was contested and the evidence supported the jury’s
verdict as follows.
The gist of the dispute involves the verdict of no
factual cause in the face of uncontradicted medical
evidence. [Appellants] are correct that the medical
evidence was not subject to cross-examination and
there was no defense expert, [but] the issue of
whether [Appellants] suffered any injuries was hotly
contested. [Appellants] did not seek any emergency
care or complain about any injuries at the time of
the accident. They engaged in normal physical
activities shortly after the accident, treated only with
a chiropractor, never saw an orthopedist or
neurologist and never underwent any objective
diagnostic testing. They were also impeached as to
the extent and duration of their claimed disability
and injuries. We also note that the demeanor of
plaintiffs was disinterested and lackadaisical.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict winner, the jury was entitled to disbelieve
[Appellants] and find that they suffered no injuries of
any kind from the rear end collision. Likewise, a jury
may choose not to credit expert testimony, even if
uncontradicted. Clearly, the jury accepted the
argument of defense counsel, which [was]
reasonably based in the evidence, or lack thereof,
and inferences reasonably drawn, that [Appellants]
suffered no injuries from the accident and that
neither [Appellants] nor their chiropractor were
worthy of belief on this score.
Trial Court Order, 12/31/13, at 1-2 n.1 (citation omitted).
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We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence.
Under our standard of review, we may not reevaluate the underlying
question of whether the evidence was against the weight of the evidence.
See Haan, supra. Although Administrator conceded that Decedent was
negligent, Administrator never stipulated that his negligence caused the
Appellants’ injuries or that Appellants were injured. As the plaintiffs,
Appellants had the burden of proof and persuasion on these issues. We
discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s conclusion that Appellants
did not meet their burden, even though they presented the only expert on
the issue of damages. See id. Accordingly, Appellants’ third issue has no
merit and the trial court did not abuse its discretion or commit an error of
law in denying Appellants’ post-trial motion on this basis. See ACE Am.
Ins., supra.
We address Appellants’ three remaining issues together as they all
challenge various jury instructions. Appellants’ Brief at 71-72.
Our standard of review regarding jury instructions is
limited to determining whether the trial court
committed a clear abuse of discretion or error of law
which controlled the outcome of the case. Error in a
charge occurs when the charge as a whole is
inadequate or not clear or has a tendency to mislead
or confuse rather than clarify a material
issue. Conversely, a jury instruction will be upheld if
it accurately reflects the law and is sufficient to guide
the jury in its deliberations.
The proper test is not whether certain portions
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or isolated excerpts taken out of context
appear erroneous. We look to the charge in its
entirety, against the background of the
evidence in the particular case, to determine
whether or not error was committed and
whether that error was prejudicial to the
complaining party.
In other words, there is no right to have any
particular form of instruction given; it is enough that
the charge clearly and accurately explains the
relevant law.
Krepps v. Snyder, 112 A.3d 1246, 1256 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). Further, “to obtain a new trial based on
the trial court’s treatment of a jury’s question, the moving party must
demonstrate in what way the trial error caused an incorrect result.” Jeter
v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 716 A.2d 633, 636 (Pa. Super. 1998)
(citation omitted).
In their fourth issue on appeal, Appellants argue that the trial court
erred in its instructions on damages. Appellants’ Brief at 73-76.
Specifically, Appellants contend that the trial court erred in refusing to
charge the jury regarding the seriousness of soft tissue injuries. Id. at 76.
The jury, however, found Decedent’s negligence was not the factual cause of
Appellants’ injuries and therefore did not reach the issue of damages.
Accordingly, this alleged error did not contribute to the verdict. See Jeter,
supra; Garcia v. Bang, 544 A.2d 509, 511 (Pa. Super. 1988) (noting an
alleged erroneous instruction on damages did not warrant relief because the
jury did not reach the issue of damages). Therefore, the trial court did not
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abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law in refusing to grant a new trial
on this basis. See ACE Am. Ins., supra.
In their fifth issue, Appellants claim that the trial court erred in failing
to give the jury its requested charge that the verdict “must not be a product
of passion, prejudice, partiality or corruption, and must bear some
reasonable relation to the loss suffered by the plaintiff as demonstrated by
the uncontroverted evidence presented at trial.” Appellants’ Brief at 77,
quoting Requested Point for Charge No. 32. First, the trial court adequately
instructed the jury that its verdict must conform to the law and the facts and
could not be a product of prejudice. See N.T., 9/18/13, at 26 (directing the
jury that “your function is to reach a fair conclusion from the evidence and
the applicable law[]”); Id. at 28 (instructing “[d]o not allow sympathy of any
kind or prejudice against any person or group to influence your
deliberations. You should not be influenced by anything other than the law
and the evidence in this case keeping in mind that all parties stand equally
before this [c]ourt and each is entitled to the same fair and impartial
treatment in your hands[]”). Moreover, as discussed above, the issues of
factual cause and damages were at issue, so the requested instruction,
suggesting that those issues were “uncontroverted,” would have been
misleading. Therefore, this issue is meritless, and the trial court did not
abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law in refusing to grant a new trial
on this basis. See Krepps, supra; ACE Am. Ins., supra.
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Similarly, in their sixth issue, Appellants contend that the trial court
erred in refusing to instruct the jury that it must find that Decedent’s
negligence was a factual cause of Appellants’ harm. Appellants’ Brief at 79.
For the reasons discussed above, such an instruction was not appropriate
because the issue of factual causation was in dispute and the jury had to
resolve the issue. Appellants’ requested charge was not warranted in these
circumstances. Moreover, the trial court accurately instructed the jury on
the legal principle of factual cause. See N.T., 9/18/13, at 18-19 (charging
on factual cause). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion or
err as a matter of law in refusing to give Appellants’ requested instruction.
See Krepps, supra. Consequently, this issue is without merit, and the trial
court did not err in denying Appellants’ post-trial motions raising challenges
to the jury instructions. See ACE Am. Ins., supra.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants’ issues on appeal do not warrant
relief. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion or err as a
matter of law in refusing to grant Appellants’ post-trial motions. See id.
Accordingly, we affirm the January 28, 2014 judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/22/2015
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