In Re: Payne, J., III Appeal of: Com. of Pa

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2015 Pa. Super. 272
IN RE: JOHN MARSHALL PAYNE III : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: COMMONWEALTH OF :
PENNSYLVANIA : No. 1113 MDA 2013
Appeal from the Order Entered May 22, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-MD-1000291-1986
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., DONOHUE, J.,
SHOGAN, J., ALLEN, J., LAZARUS, J., MUNDY, J., and STABILE, J.
DISSENTING OPINION BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED DECEMBER 29, 2015
I agree with the dissenting opinion which holds that Mr. Payne failed to
set forth a prima facie case of actual innocence under the facts of this case.
I write separately to highlight that Mr. Payne also failed to establish the
statutory timeliness of his petition as mandated by the DNA statute at 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9543.1(d)(1)(iii) and our Supreme Court’s decision in
Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 619 Pa. 549, 65 A.3d 339 (2013), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 639, 187 L. Ed. 2d 423 (2013). Therefore, I
respectfully dissent on this ground as well.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
Around 9:00 p.m. on December 17, 1981, family members of Victim found
Victim dead in her bed. Victim was ninety years’ old at that time. Victim’s
family members discovered Victim with the covers pulled up over her body
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and a pillow over her head. When family members removed the covers and
pillow, they saw Victim’s head and face were covered with blood. Family
members noticed several objects in Victim’s bedroom had been moved,
closet doors and drawers were pulled open and appeared to have been
rummaged through, and Victim’s jewelry was strewn around the room.
Victim usually slept with the telephone on her bed so she could quickly call
her family in case of an emergency. When family members discovered
Victim, the telephone was not in its usual place on the bed but on the
nightstand next to Victim’s bed. Victim’s glasses were also not in their usual
spot. Additionally, family members saw a broken window downstairs.
According to Dr. Joan W. Gibble (pathologist), Victim suffered multiple blows
to her head with a firm instrument; the blow to the right side of Victim’s
head caused her death. Dr. Gibble opined Victim’s injuries were consistent
with being stuck with a telephone.
Officer Kenneth Miller and Detective Robert Harman (among others)
responded to the crime scene. Officer Miller also noticed the drawers in
Victim’s bedroom appeared to have been ransacked, closet doors were open,
paper was strewn about, and a window downstairs had been broken. Officer
Miller and another sergeant processed the items they thought might contain
fingerprints. Officer Miller used a special evidence vacuum cleaner; police
retain as evidence anything collected in the vacuum cleaner and process the
evidence for fingerprints. Importantly, police sent all physical evidence
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collected from the crime scene to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”)
for testing and examination. No physical evidence found at the crime scene
produced a suspect.
In March 1983, Officer Daniel Garber was investigating an unrelated
case. Mr. Payne was assisting Officer Garber with his investigation. During
a meeting on March 25, 1983, Mr. Payne mentioned that a state trooper was
accusing him of beating a 90-year-old woman to death with a telephone.
Officer Garber related Mr. Payne’s comment to Detective Harman. Notably,
prior to 1983, police had not disclosed the suspicion that a telephone was
the potential murder weapon in Victim’s case.
In August 1983, police received further information from Deborah
Wallick about Victim’s murder. Ms. Wallick informed police Mr. Payne had
told her that he and two others went to rob Victim’s house on the night in
question. Mr. Payne heard a noise from the bedroom and, when he went to
the bedroom, he saw Victim being beaten with a telephone. Mr. Payne told
Ms. Wallick he ran from the crime scene and thought Victim was dead. Ms.
Wallick said Danny Everett was also involved in the crimes.
Sonny Olgesby, an inmate in York County prison, supplied police with
more information about Victim’s case. Mr. Olgesby informed Detective
Harman that on December 24, 1985, Mr. Payne had told Mr. Olgesby about a
lady who was murdered and asked Mr. Olgesby what Mr. Payne could do to
avoid conviction. Mr. Payne then admitted his involvement in the crimes.
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Mr. Payne said he needed money, so he, his girlfriend Melody, and a friend
Danny (last name Edwards or Everett, nicknamed “Dago”) decided to rob
Victim. Mr. Payne admitted he beat Victim to death.
The Commonwealth subsequently charged Mr. Payne with murder and
related offenses. Several days before Mr. Payne’s jury trial was to begin,
Christopher Gibson, an inmate in York County prison, told police he had
additional information about Victim’s case. Mr. Gibson related that on
August 15, 1986, at approximately 7:30 p.m., Mr. Gibson was in the prison
law library when Mr. Payne approached him and asked what Mr. Gibson
thought about his case and about making it look like Victim’s grandson had
committed the murder. During this conversation, Mr. Payne disclosed that
he and two others (one person named Danny and the other possibly named
Rick) committed the murder, but Mr. Payne was confident the
Commonwealth lacked sufficient evidence to prove his guilt. Mr. Payne
stated he did not plan to kill Victim, as he believed no one was home on the
night of the robbery. Mr. Payne admitted he struck Victim with a telephone,
but he just thought she was “knocked out.” Mr. Payne also disclosed he
broke a window in Victim’s house to gain entry. Additionally, Mr. Gibson
revealed that Mr. Payne previously asked Mr. Gibson if he knew anyone who
would be willing to say Mr. Payne had worked for him in December 1981 or
January 1982, so Mr. Payne could prove he was working at that time and
had a source of income.
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Mr. Payne proceeded to a jury trial on August 20, 1986. The
Commonwealth presented testimony/evidence from, inter alia, Victim’s
family members, Dr. Gibble, the investigating police officers/detectives, Ms.
Wallick, Mr. Olgesby, and Mr. Gibson. Officer Miller and Detective Harman
testified about their roles and actions in the investigation of Victim’s case.
Both officers testified that all physical evidence collected at the crime scene
was submitted to the FBI for testing and examination; and no physical
evidence connected Mr. Payne to the crimes.1 Ms. Wallick, Mr. Olgesby,
and Mr. Gibson each testified as to Mr. Payne’s respective admissions of
guilt. Defense counsel thoroughly and vigorously cross-examined these
three witnesses. During his cross-examination of Ms. Wallick, defense
counsel established Ms. Wallick was a heavy LSD drug user at the time she
approached police with Mr. Payne’s confession, which sometimes interfered
with her perception. Defense counsel also elicited testimony from Ms.
Wallick about her previous conviction for hindering apprehension or
prosecution.
During cross-examination of Mr. Olgesby, defense counsel elicited
testimony that Mr. Olgesby was facing the death penalty in an unrelated
homicide case; Mr. Olgesby had negotiated a plea deal with the
Commonwealth in which he could plead guilty to third-degree murder (and
avoid the death penalty), in exchange for his testimony against two
1
Detective Harman also testified that no physical evidence connected Daniel
Everett to the crimes.
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individuals involved in his own case and for his testimony against Mr. Payne.
During cross-examination of Mr. Gibson, defense counsel attacked the
witness’ credibility by establishing Mr. Gibson had prior convictions for theft
and burglary. Mr. Gibson also conceded he had negotiated a plea deal with
the Commonwealth in which Mr. Gibson could plead guilty to theft (reduced
from a robbery charge) and receive a county sentence in exchange for his
testimony against Mr. Payne. Following Mr. Gibson’s testimony, the
Commonwealth rested its case.
In his defense, Mr. Payne presented testimony from several witnesses
to refute the testimony of Ms. Wallick, Mr. Olgesby, and Mr. Gibson. Mr.
Payne also presented testimony from Melody Codora (Mr. Payne’s girlfriend
at the time of the crimes) and Daniel Everett, whom the Commonwealth
witnesses had mentioned as Mr. Payne’s possible cohorts. Both witnesses
denied their participation in the crimes. Mr. Payne also testified in his own
defense. Mr. Payne maintained he had no involvement in the crimes
charged and was not present at the crime scene. Mr. Payne also denied
having made any admissions/confessions to Ms. Wallick, Mr. Olgesby, or Mr.
Gibson.
On August 22, 1986, the jury convicted Mr. Payne of second-degree
murder, burglary, aggravated assault, and criminal conspiracy.2 On March
23, 1987, the court sentenced Mr. Payne to life imprisonment for the felony
2
The jury acquitted Mr. Payne of first-degree murder.
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murder conviction; the court imposed consecutive sentences of two to four
years’ imprisonment each for the burglary and conspiracy convictions.3
Additionally, the court sentenced Mr. Payne on an unrelated robbery
conviction to two to four years’ imprisonment, consecutive to his sentence
for second-degree murder but concurrent to his sentences for burglary and
conspiracy. This Court affirmed Mr. Payne’s judgment of sentence on
February 29, 1988, and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on
January 23, 1991. See Commonwealth v. Payne, 541 A.2d 1153
(Pa.Super. 1988).
On June 7, 1991, Mr. Payne filed his first petition under the Post
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”);4 Mr. Payne expressly established his intent to
proceed pro se. In his PCRA petition, Mr. Payne asserted, inter alia, prior
counsel was ineffective, Mr. Payne’s sentence was illegal, and the
Commonwealth committed gross prosecutorial misconduct by withholding
exculpatory evidence. As to this last claim, Mr. Payne specifically alleged the
Commonwealth had submitted for testing certain physical evidence found at
the crime scene, but the Commonwealth withheld this evidence from Mr.
Payne and trial counsel. On June 25, 1991, Mr. Payne filed a pro se motion
for production of documents requesting, inter alia, a copy of the FBI
report(s) used during the investigation of his crimes. On July 30, 1991, Mr.
3
The aggravated assault conviction merged with felony murder.
4
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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Payne filed a consolidated motion for discovery and a request for an
evidentiary hearing again asserting his previous request for the production
of documents. On September 9, 1991, the court entered an order, inter
alia, scheduling an evidentiary hearing for October 1, 1991, and directing
the Commonwealth to produce to Mr. Payne the results of the processing
and tests done by the police or FBI. The court also granted Mr. Payne’s
request to proceed pro se.
The court held a PCRA hearing on October 1, 1991. Importantly, at
the very beginning of the hearing, the Commonwealth stated on the record it
had fully complied with the court’s September 9, 1991 order and supplied
Mr. Payne with the FBI reports at issue. Mr. Payne did not dispute the
Commonwealth’s representation. During the hearing, Mr. Payne advanced
his challenges pertaining to the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Mr.
Payne did not offer any argument at the hearing regarding his prior claim
that the Commonwealth withheld exculpatory evidence. Similarly, in his
post-hearing brief, Mr. Payne argued all issues presented in his PCRA
petition, except for his earlier claim that the Commonwealth withheld
exculpatory evidence, which Mr. Payne abandoned.
On June 26, 1992, the PCRA court denied relief. In its supporting
opinion, the court expressly stated:
[Mr. Payne’s] allegation that exculpatory evidence was
withheld from him in the form of FBI reports is…without
merit. Testimony at the PCRA hearing indicated that all
FBI information was in the possession of [Mr. Payne]. No
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further mention of this information was made in [Mr.
Payne’s] brief, leading this [c]ourt to the conclusion that
the allegation of withholding exculpatory evidence is
without merit.
(PCRA Court Opinion, filed June 26, 1992, at 29) (internal citation omitted).
On July 7, 1992, Mr. Payne timely filed a notice of appeal. Mr. Payne
did not mention on appeal any claim that the Commonwealth withheld
exculpatory evidence. On April 30, 1993, this Court affirmed Mr. Payne’s
conviction for second-degree murder but reversed the conspiracy conviction
because the relevant statute of limitations had already run when the
Commonwealth charged Mr. Payne with that crime. Additionally, this Court
vacated Mr. Payne’s burglary sentence, where burglary was the predicate
offense for the second-degree murder conviction, and remanded the case for
the court to modify Mr. Payne’s sentence accordingly. On July 5, 1994, the
trial court vacated Mr. Payne’s sentences for conspiracy and burglary.
Over twenty years after Mr. Payne first received the FBI documents,
on June 14, 2012, Mr. Payne filed his current petition for DNA testing. 5 In
his petition, Mr. Payne sought DNA testing of the following items recovered
from the crime scene: (1) brown head hairs found on Victim’s nightgown and
bedsheet (designated Q8 and Q11); (2) human blood (designated Q1, Q7-
Q11, Q13-Q15, Q17-Q19); and (3) a brown pubic hair (designated Q16).
5
Mr. Payne alleges he originally filed his request for DNA testing on
February 9, 2012, but the court misplaced it or failed to file it. The
approximate four-month difference in the filing date is immaterial to my
analysis.
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Mr. Payne maintained DNA testing was not available at the time of his trial
and current DNA testing will reveal the absence of Mr. Payne’s DNA on the
evidence sought to be tested. Mr. Payne claimed the absence of his DNA
would prove his actual innocence of the crimes charged.
Notably, Mr. Payne alleged in his petition he had no idea such potential
“exculpatory evidence” existed. Mr. Payne stated: “For the first time (ever)
[Mr. Payne] was made aware that this important new evidence does exist
and is preserved and is available for DNA testing.” (Petition for DNA testing,
filed June 14, 2012, at 12, ¶ 19). Mr. Payne further claimed he “was just
(for the very first time)—provided the proof that these exhibits/specimens
Q8, Q11, and Q16, ever existed.” (Id.) Mr. Payne alleged he received this
information from the FBI (mailed to his attorney) on January 8, 2012. Mr.
Payne continued: “I want to emphasize that (at no time previous to this)
was I aware that the evidence/specimens Q8, Q11, Q16, ever existed. Only
when the FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, provided this information
was [Mr. Payne] alerted to these specimens that existed.” (Id. at 13, ¶ 19)
(emphasis in original). Mr. Payne attached to his petition a letter from the
FBI dated December 30, 2011, addressed to Mr. Payne (c/o Attorney Enid
Harris) informing Mr. Payne the FBI was providing him with 110 pages from
the FBI file regarding Victim’s murder, pursuant to the Freedom of
Information/Privacy Act. The attached FBI file contains letters from the
police dated December 20, 1981, and December 24, 1981, requesting
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testing and examination of physical evidence recovered from the crime
scene. The attached FBI file also contains the FBI’s analyses of the physical
evidence by documents dated December 21, 1981, December 30, 1981,
February 18, 1982, and January 24, 1983.
The court appointed counsel to represent Mr. Payne on January 3,
2013. On April 19, 2013, the court held a hearing on Mr. Payne’s request
for DNA testing. Mr. Payne testified at the hearing that he did not receive
the FBI file until December 2011. Mr. Payne claimed the results of DNA
testing would establish his actual innocence. Mr. Payne also asserted that
performance of DNA testing will give the Commonwealth an opportunity to
discover the “true” killer by comparing the DNA tested to national databases.
The Commonwealth argued DNA testing would not establish Mr.
Payne’s actual innocence because police officers conceded at Mr. Payne’s
jury trial that no physical evidence connected him to the crimes; and the
jury convicted Mr. Payne in the absence of physical evidence.
On May 23, 2013, the PCRA court granted Mr. Payne’s request for DNA
testing, deciding Mr. Payne had presented a prima facie case of actual
innocence. Significantly, the PCRA court did not address the timeliness of
Mr. Payne’s petition. The Commonwealth timely filed a notice of appeal on
June 18, 2013. On June 19, 2013, the court ordered the Commonwealth to
file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), which the Commonwealth timely filed on July 8, 2013.
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On October 3, 2014, a panel of this Court affirmed the PCRA court’s order
granting Mr. Payne’s request for DNA testing, with one dissent. On October
17, 2014, the Commonwealth filed a petition for en banc review, which this
Court granted.
To begin, our standard of review in this case is as follows:
Generally, the trial court’s application of a statute is a
question of law that compels plenary review to determine
whether the court committed an error of law. When
reviewing an order [granting or] denying a motion for
post-conviction DNA testing, this Court determines
whether the movant satisfied the statutory requirements
listed in Section 9543.1. We can affirm the court’s
decision if there is any basis to support it, even if we rely
on different grounds to affirm.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 35 A.3d 44, 47 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal
denied, 616 Pa. 467, 50 A.3d 121 (2012) (internal citations omitted).
Requests for post-conviction DNA testing are governed by statute at
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543.1, which provides in pertinent part:
§ 9543.1. Postconviction DNA testing
(a) Motion.−
(1) An individual convicted of a criminal offense in a
court of this Commonwealth and serving a term of
imprisonment or awaiting execution because of a
sentence of death may apply by making a written
motion to the sentencing court for the performance of
forensic DNA testing on specific evidence that is related
to the investigation or prosecution that resulted in the
judgment of conviction.
(2) The evidence may have been discovered either
prior to or after the applicant’s conviction. The
evidence shall be available for testing as of the date of
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the motion. If the evidence was discovered prior to the
applicant’s conviction, the evidence shall not have been
subject to the DNA testing requested because the
technology for testing was not in existence at the time
of the trial or the applicant’s counsel did not seek
testing at the time of the trial in a case where a verdict
was rendered on or before January 1, 1995, or the
applicant’s counsel sought funds from the court to pay
for the testing because his client was indigent and the
court refused the request despite the client’s indigency.
(b) Notice to the Commonwealth.—
(1) Upon receipt of a motion under subsection (a),
the court shall notify the Commonwealth and shall
afford the Commonwealth an opportunity to respond to
the motion.
(2) Upon receipt of a motion under subsection (a) or
notice of the motion, as applicable, the Commonwealth
and the court shall take the steps reasonably necessary
to ensure that any remaining biological material in the
possession of the Commonwealth or the court is
preserved pending the completion of the proceedings
under this section.
(c) Requirements.−In any motion under subsection (a),
under penalty of perjury, the applicant shall:
(1)(i) specify the evidence to be tested;
(ii) state that the applicant consents to provide
samples of bodily fluid for use in the DNA testing;
and
(iii) acknowledge that the applicant understands that,
if the motion is granted, any data obtained from any
DNA samples or test results may be entered into law
enforcement databases, may be used in the
investigation of other crimes and may be used as
evidence against the applicant in other cases.
(2)(i) assert the applicant’s actual innocence of the
offense for which the applicant was convicted; and
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* * *
(3) present a prima facie case demonstrating that
the:
(i) identity of or the participation in the crime by the
perpetrator was at issue in the proceedings that
resulted in the applicant’s conviction and sentencing;
and
(ii) DNA testing of the specific evidence, assuming
exculpatory results, would establish:
(A) the applicant’s actual innocence of the offense
for which the applicant was convicted;
* * *
(d) Order.−
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the court
shall order the testing requested in a motion under
subsection (a) under reasonable conditions designed to
preserve the integrity of the evidence and the testing
process upon a determination, after review of the
record of the applicant’s trial, that the:
(i) requirements of subsection (c) have been met;
(ii) evidence to be tested has been subject to a chain
of custody sufficient to establish that it has not been
altered in any material respect; and
(iii) motion is made in a timely manner and for
the purpose of demonstrating the applicant’s
actual innocence and not to delay the execution
of sentence or administration of justice.
(2) The court shall not order the testing requested in
a motion under subsection (a) if, after review of the
record of the applicant’s trial, the court determines that
there is no reasonable possibility that the testing would
produce exculpatory evidence that:
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(i) would establish the applicant’s actual innocence of
the offense for which the applicant was convicted;
* * *
(f) Posttesting procedures.−
(1) After the DNA testing conducted under this
section has been completed, the applicant may,
pursuant to section 9545(b)(2) (relating to jurisdiction
and proceedings), during the 60-day period beginning
on the date on which the applicant is notified of the test
results, petition to the court for postconviction relief
pursuant to section 9543(a)(2)(vi) (relating to eligibility
for relief).
(2) Upon receipt of a petition filed under paragraph
(1), the court shall consider the petition along with any
answer filed by the Commonwealth and shall conduct a
hearing thereon.
(3) In any hearing on a petition for postconviction
relief filed under paragraph (1), the court shall
determine whether the exculpatory evidence resulting
from the DNA testing conducted under this section
would have changed the outcome of the trial as
required by section 9543(a)(2)(vi).
* * *
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543.1 (emphasis added).
Thus, under Section 9543.1(a):
The statute sets forth several threshold requirements to
obtain DNA testing: (1) the evidence specified must be
available for testing on the date of the motion; (2) if the
evidence was discovered prior to the applicant’s conviction,
it was not already DNA tested because (a) technology for
testing did not exist at the time of the applicant’s trial; (b)
the applicant’s counsel did not request testing in a case
that went to verdict before January 1, 1995; or (c) counsel
sought funds from the court to pay for the testing because
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his client was indigent, and the court refused the request
despite the client’s indigency.
Williams, supra at 49 (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543.1(a)(2)).
Additionally:
The text of the statute set forth in Section 9543.1(c)(3)
and reinforced in Section 9543.1(d)(2) requires the
applicant to demonstrate that favorable results of the
requested DNA testing would establish the applicant’s
actual innocence of the crime of conviction. The statutory
standard to obtain testing requires more than conjecture
or speculation; it demands a prima facie case that the
DNA results, if exculpatory, would establish actual
innocence.
Id. (emphasis added). In DNA testing cases, “an absence of evidence is not
evidence of absence.” Commonwealth v. Heilman, 867 A.2d 542, 547
(Pa.Super. 2005). See also Commonwealth v. Smith, 889 A.2d 582
(Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, 588 Pa. 769, 905 A.2d 500 (2006)
(affirming denial of request for post-conviction DNA testing where absence
of appellant’s DNA from victim’s fingernails would not establish appellant’s
innocence of victim’s murder).
In addition to a showing of actual innocence, an equally important
eligibility requirement under the DNA statute is Section 9543.1(d), which
commands the petitioner to make a timely request for DNA testing.6 See
6
The timeliness requirement under Section 9543.1(d) is unique to the DNA
statute; it is distinct from the jurisdictional timeliness provisions under the
PCRA, which do not apply to DNA petitions. See Williams, supra
(explaining motions for post-conviction DNA testing are separate and distinct
from claims brought pursuant to other general provisions of PCRA; thus,
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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543.1(d)(1)(iii). The PCRA court is required to analyze the
timeliness of the DNA petition under Section 9543.1(d)(1)(iii) and decide if
the purpose of the applicant’s request for post-conviction DNA testing is to
delay the execution of sentence or administration of justice. Edmiston,
supra at 578, 65 A.3d at 357.
In Edmiston, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder,
rape, statutory rape and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, stemming
from events that occurred on October 5, 1988, when the defendant
kidnapped the two-year-old victim, inflicted gruesome injuries on her,
murdered her and left her body in a wooded area. On October 5, 1989, a
jury decided in favor of a sentence of death for the defendant’s crimes.
Twenty years later, on September 30, 2009, the defendant filed a motion for
post-conviction DNA testing.
In reviewing the PCRA court’s denial of the defendant’s DNA petition,
the Supreme Court confronted the timeliness requirement of a motion for
post-conviction DNA testing as an issue of first impression. See id. at 578,
65 A.3d at 356. The Court recited the statutory language under Section
9543.1(d), which governs the PCRA court’s review of the DNA petition. See
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543.1(d). The Court continued:
The applicant, as the moving party, bears the burden
of showing that the test is requested for the purpose
of demonstrating actual innocence and not for delay.
one-year jurisdictional time bar related to general PCRA provisions does not
apply to motions for DNA testing under Section 9543.1).
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Here, although the trial court purported to find that the
motion was timely, it observed that it could not know with
certainty whether the motion was filed merely for the
purpose of delay. The PCRA court identified other factors
to support its finding of timeliness, specifically referring to
advances in technology, the nature of the issues raised in
the serial PCRA petition, no claim of prejudice by the
Commonwealth, and the sentence of death, but did not
explain how these factors are relevant to an assessment
of timeliness under Section 9543.1(d)(1)(iii).
Respectfully, we agree with the Commonwealth that the
PCRA court’s declaration that it could not know for
sure what Appellant’s incentive was for filing the
petition for DNA testing demonstrates a
misperception of the court’s obligation to render a
specific determination in this respect. Timing
determinations requiring examination of case-specific
factors are not particularly unusual or difficult and, in any
event, …, any difficulty in the applicant’s proof does
not relieve the defense of its burden or the PCRA
court of its duty. … As difficult as it may be, PCRA
courts are specifically charged with making this
determination.
Although the PCRA court did not make the requisite
finding of timeliness, we see no need to remand for
the court to do so because, …, our own review of the
record and circumstances surrounding [the
defendant’s] post-conviction DNA testing request
leads to the conclusion that this motion was
untimely as a matter of law and was forwarded only to
delay further the execution of the sentence. …
[The defendant] has known of the existence of
physical evidence he now seeks to test since his trial
over twenty years ago. From that time to the present
he has been represented by counsel, who knew of the
statute, the technology, and the evidence, and who were
vigorously pursuing post-conviction relief on his behalf.
Under such circumstances, courts should exercise a
healthy skepticism when faced with requests for DNA
testing.
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This is especially true when, as here, careful examination
of the record reveals that [the defendant] is not a likely
candidate to be exonerated by DNA testing.
* * *
The PCRA court also spoke of “advances in technology,”
but as the Commonwealth notes, the statute does not
make advances in technology an excuse for failing
timely to request DNA testing. The statute
recognized that the testing available at the time of
its enactment was of sufficient reliability that
defendants could seek DNA testing, in cases where
good faith claims of innocence were timely raised.
[The defendant’s] guilty status has not changed
since his 1989 conviction; advances in technology
allegedly occurring after that date do not explain
why he, if truly innocent, did not seek immediate
testing, or, at the very least, testing available as
technology improved during the intervening years,
rather than languishing on death row, all the while
being supposedly innocent.
* * *
Taking into consideration the strength of the evidence
proffered against [the defendant] at trial, as the DNA
testing provision explicitly requires, [the defendant’s]
deliberate decision at the time of trial not to seek further
scientific testing, his counsel’s apparent decision not to
seek DNA testing throughout these lengthy post-conviction
proceedings, and the belated timing of the current claim, it
cannot reasonably be concluded that his DNA testing
motion was made in a timely manner and for the
purpose of demonstrating the applicant’s actual
innocence and not to delay the execution of sentence
or administration of justice.
Id. at 578-81, 65 A.3d at 356-59 (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, our Supreme Court affirmed the order
denying post-conviction DNA testing, albeit on other grounds. Id. at 581-
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82, 65 A.3d at 359. See also Commonwealth v. Walsh, ___ A.3d ___,
2015 Pa. Super. 222 (filed October 23, 2015) (holding appellant failed to
request DNA testing in timely manner, where appellant knew of existence of
hammer at time of his trial in 2004 and did not seek DNA testing of hammer
until 2014).
The take-away from Edmiston and Walsh is first that petitioners
seeking DNA testing must exercise due diligence in pursuing requests for
relief under Section 9543.1, or they will be ineligible for relief under the DNA
statute. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543.1(d)(1)(iii); Edmiston, supra; Walsh,
supra. Next, our Supreme Court made clear that Section 9543.1(d)(1)(iii)
specifically charges the PCRA court to assess whether the petition is timely
filed. See Edmiston, supra. See also Commonwealth v. Scarborough,
619 Pa. 353, 364, 64 A.3d 602, 609 (2013) (stating: “If the movant is
successful in making this showing [of actual innocence] and the court
additionally determines the requirements of 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9543.1(d)(1) have been met, as well as determines the testing is not
barred by the provisions of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543.1(d)(2), the relief the
movant receives is the trial court’s ordering of the requested DNA testing on
the particular evidence specified in the motion…”) (emphasis added). This
timeliness assessment is mandatory under the DNA statute, and stands as
a threshold eligibility inquiry, regardless of whether the Commonwealth
complains. See id.
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Instantly, I am convinced Mr. Payne’s current DNA request is untimely
as a matter of law. At Mr. Payne’s jury trial in 1986, Officer Miller and
Detective Harman testified they collected physical evidence from the crime
scene and submitted it to the FBI for testing and examination. Neither Mr.
Payne nor his trial counsel made any claim at trial that the Commonwealth
had failed to disclose the FBI’s findings or that they were not made available
to the defense during pre-trial discovery. In his direct appeal, Mr. Payne
similarly made no claim that he was not privy to the FBI’s findings discussed
at trial.
On June 7, 1991, Mr. Payne alleged for the first time that the
Commonwealth submitted for testing physical evidence found at the crime
scene and withheld this evidence from Mr. Payne and trial counsel. On June
25, 1991, Mr. Payne filed a pro se motion for production of documents
requesting, inter alia, a copy of the FBI report(s) used during the
investigation of his crimes. On July 30, 1991, Mr. Payne filed a consolidated
motion for discovery and a request for an evidentiary hearing renewing his
request for the production of documents. On September 9, 1991, the court
directed the Commonwealth to produce to Mr. Payne the results of the
processing and tests done by the police or FBI.
The court held a PCRA hearing on October 1, 1991. Significantly, at
the very beginning of the hearing, the Commonwealth stated on the record it
had fully complied with the court’s September 9, 1991 order and supplied
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Mr. Payne with, inter alia, the FBI reports at issue. At no time did Mr.
Payne dispute the Commonwealth’s representation. During the
hearing, Mr. Payne offered no argument that the Commonwealth had
withheld exculpatory evidence. Similarly, in his post-hearing brief, Mr.
Payne abandoned any claim that the Commonwealth had withheld
exculpatory evidence. On June 26, 1992, the PCRA court denied relief. In
its supporting opinion, the court expressly stated:
[Mr. Payne’s] allegation that exculpatory evidence was
withheld from him in the form of FBI reports is…without
merit. Testimony at the PCRA hearing indicated that all
FBI information was in the possession of [Mr. Payne]. No
further mention of this information was made in [Mr.
Payne’s] brief, leading this [c]ourt to the conclusion that
the allegation of withholding exculpatory evidence is
without merit.
(PCRA Court Opinion, filed June 26, 1992, at 29) (internal citation omitted).
Mr. Payne did not challenge this determination on appeal.
On July 10, 2002, the state legislature enacted the DNA statute at 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9543.1 (effective 60 days later). Mr. Payne waited almost ten
years to file his petition on June 14, 2012, for DNA testing of the following
items recovered from the crime scene: (1) brown head hairs found on
Victim’s nightgown and bedsheet (designated Q8 and Q11); (2) human
blood (designated Q1, Q7-Q11, Q13-Q15, Q17-Q19); and (3) a brown pubic
hair (designated Q16). Astonishingly, Mr. Payne alleged he had no idea this
potential “exculpatory evidence” existed and “[f]or the first time (ever) [he]
was made aware that this important new evidence does exist and is
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preserved and is available for DNA testing.” (Petition for DNA testing, filed
June 14, 2012, at 12, ¶ 19). Mr. Payne further claimed he “was just (for the
very first time)—provided the proof that these exhibits/specimens Q8, Q11,
and Q16, ever existed.” (Id.) Mr. Payne alleged he received this
information from the FBI (mailed to his attorney) on January 8, 2012. Mr.
Payne represented: “I want to emphasize that (at no time previous to this)
was I aware that the evidence/specimens Q8, Q11, Q16, ever existed. Only
when the FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, provided this information
was [Mr. Payne] alerted to these specimens that existed.” (Id. at 13, ¶ 19)
(emphasis in original). At the April 19, 2013 hearing on Mr. Payne’s petition
for DNA testing, he testified he did not receive the FBI file until December
2011.
Without addressing if the petition was timely under Section
9543.1(d)(1)(iii), the PCRA court limited its review to whether Mr. Payne
presented a prima facie case of actual innocence and granted Mr. Payne’s
DNA request. In this regard, the court neglected its specifically charged
duty to make a determination of timeliness prior to granting relief. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9543.1(d)(1)(iii); Edmiston, supra; Scarborough, supra. In
my opinion, the “timeliness” of the DNA petition is an unwaivable statutory
eligibility requirement. The Commonwealth did not have to raise a specific
objection to Mr. Payne’s DNA petition on timeliness grounds to avoid
relieving “the defense of its burden or the PCRA court of its duty.” See
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Edmiston, supra. Notably, the DNA statute dictates the petitioner’s
burden under the statute (see 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543.1(c)) and the court’s
required review of the petition (see 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543.1(d)), to obtain
DNA testing. The DNA statute affords the Commonwealth an opportunity
to respond to an applicant’s petition (see 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543.1(b)(1)), but
nowhere does the statute require the Commonwealth to object specifically to
the petitioner’s claims or to respond at all. Even in the absence of any
response by the Commonwealth to a DNA petition, the petitioner still bears
the burden of complying with the requirements under Section 9543.1(c), and
the court still must conduct review of the petition under Section 9543.1(d).
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543.1(c); (d); Scarborough, supra. Just as the PCRA
court was obligated to decide whether Mr. Payne presented a case of actual
innocence to be eligible for relief under the DNA statute (see 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9543.1(d)(2)(i)), the court was similarly required to assess the timeliness of
the petition under Section 9543.1(d)(1)(iii).
The PCRA contains analogous eligibility requirements, which the PCRA
court (and our Court) must decide are met, even in the absence of an
objection by the Commonwealth. See, e.g., 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(1)
(explaining that to be eligible for relief under PCRA, petitioner must plead
and prove by preponderance of evidence that petitioner has been convicted
of crime under laws of Pennsylvania, and is at time relief is granted currently
serving sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole for crime; awaiting
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execution of sentence of death for crime; or serving sentence which must
expire before person may commence serving disputed sentence). See also
Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 548 Pa. 544, 699 A.2d 718 (1997) (explaining
petitioner must be currently serving sentence of imprisonment, probation, or
parole to be eligible for PCRA relief; plain language of statute requires denial
of relief for petitioner who has finished serving his sentence; to grant relief
at time when appellant is not currently serving sentence ignores statutory
language). Thus, a defendant must be serving the sentence he is
challenging in a PCRA petition as a preliminary statutory eligibility
requirement that needs no specific objection to preserve it. In other words,
the petitioner does not qualify for relief if he fails to meet the statutory
eligibility requirements, regardless of whether the Commonwealth
complains. Likewise, if the petitioner maxes out on the sentence at issue
while his petition is pending, he no longer meets the statutory eligibility
requirements for relief, and again the Commonwealth does not risk waiver
by failing to raise the issue or to object. The timeliness requirement under
the DNA statute is akin to the eligibility-for-relief requirements under the
general provisions of the PCRA. Whether Mr. Payne filed his petition in a
timely manner is a statutory eligibility requirement under Section
9543.1(d)(1)(iii), which the petitioner must plead and the court is bound to
address as a threshold matter that cannot be waived. The Commonwealth’s
“duty” for purposes of a DNA petition is limited to taking steps reasonably
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necessary to ensure that any remaining biological material in the
Commonwealth’s possession is preserved pending the completion of the
proceedings. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543.1(b)(2).
The PCRA court’s failure to conduct the necessary timeliness
calculation does not require remand, however, because the record makes
clear Mr. Payne’s DNA request is untimely as a matter of law. See
Edmiston, supra. Quite simply, the record belies Mr. Payne’s repeated
allegations that he just received the FBI file in this case. Giving Mr. Payne
the benefit of the doubt, at the very latest, Mr. Payne received the relevant
documents in 1991 during litigation of his first PCRA petition, more than
twenty years before filing his current request for DNA testing. (See
PCRA Court Opinion, filed June 26, 1992, at 29.) Mr. Payne presents no
evidence whatsoever to support his bald assertions that he “just” received
the FBI documents. The fact that the FBI mailed his attorney a copy of the
relevant documents by letter dated December 30, 2011, certainly does not
prove Mr. Payne lacked possession of those documents earlier. Likewise, Mr.
Payne’s request for DNA testing fails to provide any evidence to support his
claims that he tried to obtain the relevant FBI documents over the years, to
no avail. Curiously, in his petition for DNA testing, Mr. Payne does not even
allege that he recently learned of the blood samples he wants tested—he
limits his claimed “new discovery” to the hair samples.
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Additionally, the FBI file attached to Mr. Payne’s DNA petition contains
letters from the police dated December 20, 1981, and December 24, 1981,
requesting testing and examination of physical evidence recovered from the
crime scene. The attached FBI file also contains the FBI’s analyses of the
physical evidence by documents dated December 21, 1981, December 30,
1981, February 18, 1982, and January 24, 1983. Nowhere in his DNA
petition does Mr. Payne assert that the FBI file he “just” received contains
new documents, or anything other than the documents Mr. Payne had in his
possession in 1991.
Moreover, Mr. Payne did not even need the FBI documents to request
DNA testing. Mr. Payne knew at the time of his trial that police had collected
and submitted for testing and examination physical evidence recovered from
the crime scene. Mr. Payne could have requested DNA testing of the
physical evidence recovered in or around 1995, when DNA technology
became widely available. Alternatively, once our legislature enacted the
DNA statute in 2002, Mr. Payne could have petitioned the court for DNA
testing of the physical evidence recovered from the crime scene. Nothing in
the record indicates that Mr. Payne exercised due diligence in pursuit of his
current request for DNA testing. Rather, the record makes clear Mr. Payne
had the relevant FBI documents in his possession in 1991, and failed to
request DNA testing for more than twenty years. Under these
circumstances, Mr. Payne’s belated request for DNA testing is untimely as a
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matter of law. See Edmiston, supra; Walsh, supra.
In my opinion, the PCRA court erred when it granted Mr. Payne’s
petition for DNA testing, without examining the timeliness of the petition,
because the petition was untimely under Section 9543.1(d)(1)(iii) as a
matter of law. I also agree with the other dissenting opinion that Mr. Payne
failed to set forth a prima facie case of actual innocence under the facts of
this case. Accordingly, I dissent on both bases.
Judge Stabile concurs in the result.
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