Com. v. Smith, Z.

J-A13035-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
ZAHIR SMITH :
:
Appellee : No. 1395 EDA 2021
Appeal from the Order Entered June 24, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002780-2021
BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED JULY 8, 2022
Appellant, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, appeals from the order
entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed
firearms and conspiracy charges filed against Appellee, Zahir Smith. We
reverse and remand.
The trial court set forth the relevant facts of this appeal as follows:
Philadelphia Police Officer Jonathan Arch testified that, in
the early hours of May 31, 2020, he received a radio call for
a burglary in progress at a shopping center located at 3000
Island Avenue in the city and county of Philadelphia. Officer
Arch arrived at that location at approximately 2:45 a.m.,
where he observed a white Nissan Altima, which did not
have a license plate, speeding through the shopping plaza.
The vehicle hit a curb and became disabled, at which time a
male, alleged to be [Appellee] exited from the driver side
door. Subsequently, one female, alleged to be Julisa Prak
… exited the front passenger door, and another woman,
alleged to be Jarenny Ros …, fled from the rear of the
vehicle. The officer ordered [Ms. Ros] to stop, and placed
her in custody in the back of his patrol car. Officer Arch
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testified that he observed that the windows and doors of the
Snipes store at the shopping center were all broken, and
that he observed clothing and sneakers in and around the
white Altima. On cross examination, Officer Arch stated that
there was a riot taking place in the shopping center at the
time he encountered the defendants, and that many people
were looting stores in that location. He further testified that
he did not see the white Altima or the defendants
themselves near the Snipes store, that there are several
stores in the shopping center in question, and that many of
those stores also appeared to have been looted. The officer
positively identified all three defendants as the individuals
he encountered fleeing the white Altima.
Philadelphia Police Detective Francesco Campbell testified
that on the date in question, he executed a search warrant
on the vehicle. Inside was a large amount of merchandise
from the Snipes store. He indicated that he knew it was
from Snipes because a store employee identified the
merchandise from its tags, and estimated its value in the
thousands of dollars. Officers also recovered a firearm from
underneath the merchandise.
(Trial Court Opinion, filed 9/7/21, at 1-2).
On April 8, 2021, the court conducted a preliminary hearing, and
Appellee and his co-defendants’ cases were held for court. On April 20, 2021,
the Commonwealth filed a criminal information charging Appellee with
burglary, criminal trespass, theft by unlawful taking, receiving stolen property,
conspiracy, violations of the Uniform Firearms Act (“VUFA”), and possessing
an instrument of crime (“PIC”). Appellee’s co-defendants subsequently filed
motions “to quash bills of information,” which asserted that the
Commonwealth had failed to establish a prima facie case against them.
Although Appellee did not file a motion, his counsel appeared at the June 24,
2021 evidentiary hearing on the pretrial motions. At that time, Appellee’s
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counsel joined in the co-defendants’ motions by arguing that the court should
also dismiss the charges against Appellee. Specifically, Appellee’s counsel
insisted that “[t]he weapon is in the back seat, and there was a passenger in
the back seat, and identification was also recovered in the back seat.” (N.T.
Evidentiary Hearing, 6/24/21, at 6).
Immediately following the hearing, the court dismissed the VUFA and
conspiracy charges against Appellee. The Commonwealth timely filed a notice
of appeal on July 8, 2021, under Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).1 On July 21, 2021, the
court ordered the Commonwealth to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal. The Commonwealth timely filed
its Rule 1925(b) statement on July 26, 2021.
The Commonwealth now raises one issue for our review:
Did sufficient evidence support a prima facie case for the
charges of [VUFA] and conspiracy, where [Appellee] and his
two female co-defendants were observed fleeing the scene
of the crime, a Snipes retail store; the windows to the store
had been broken; goods belonging to the store were found
scattered throughout the car [Appellee] had been driving;
and a gun was found in the back seat underneath the stolen
goods?
(Commonwealth’s Brief at 6).
The following principles apply to this Court’s review of an order granting
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1 See Pa.R.A.P. 311(d) (stating that in criminal case, Commonwealth may
take appeal as of right from order that does not end entire case where
Commonwealth certifies in notice of appeal that order will terminate or
substantially handicap prosecution).
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a pretrial petition for writ of habeas corpus:
We review a decision to grant a pre-trial petition for a writ
of habeas corpus by examining the evidence and reasonable
inferences derived therefrom in a light most favorable to the
Commonwealth. Whether the Commonwealth satisfied its
burden of establishing a prima facie case for each charged
crime is a question of law, to which this Court’s standard of
review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.
A pre-trial habeas corpus motion is the proper means for
testing whether the Commonwealth has sufficient evidence
to establish a prima facie case. To demonstrate that a prima
facie case exists, the Commonwealth must produce
evidence of every material element of the charged
offense(s) as well as the defendant’s complicity therein. To
meet its burden, the Commonwealth may utilize the
evidence presented at the preliminary hearing and also may
submit additional proof.
Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 203 A.3d 1115, 1117 (Pa.Super. 2019) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
“The Commonwealth establishes a prima facie case when it produces
evidence that, if accepted as true, would warrant the trial judge to allow the
case to go to a jury.” Commonwealth v. Ouch, 199 A.3d 918, 923
(Pa.Super. 2018) (emphasis in original). “The Commonwealth need not prove
the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt; rather, the prima facie
standard requires evidence of the existence of each and every element of the
crime charged.” Id.On appeal, the Commonwealth argues that the facts established at
Appellee’s preliminary hearing “supported an inference that [Appellee] had
knowledge of the gun, had the power to exercise control of the gun, and,
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therefore, had constructive possession of the gun.” (Commonwealth’s Brief
at 14). Further, the Commonwealth asserts that the evidence permitted “an
inference of an agreement among the three occupants of the car, with a
shared intent of burglarizing the Snipes store.” (Id. at 17). The
Commonwealth maintains that it established a prima facie case for the VUFA
and conspiracy charges against Appellee. The Commonwealth concludes that
this Court must reverse the order dismissing the charges against Appellee.
We agree.
The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines the offense of criminal conspiracy
as follows:
§ 903. Criminal conspiracy
(a) Definition of conspiracy.—A person is guilty of
conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a
crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating its
commission he:
(1) agrees with such other person or persons that they
or one or more of them will engage in conduct which
constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to
commit such crime; or
(2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the
planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt
or solicitation to commit such crime.
* * *
(c) Conspiracy with multiple criminal
objectives.—If a person conspires to commit a number of
crimes, he is guilty of only one conspiracy so long as such
multiple crimes are the object of the same agreement or
continuous conspiratorial relationship.
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18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a), (c).
“To sustain a conviction for criminal conspiracy, the Commonwealth
must establish that the defendant (1) entered into an agreement to commit
or aid in an unlawful act with another person or persons, (2) with a shared
criminal intent, and (3) an overt act was done in furtherance of the
conspiracy.” Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 42 (Pa.Super. 2014)
(citation omitted).
The essence of a criminal conspiracy is a common
understanding, no matter how it came into being, that a
particular criminal objective be accomplished. Therefore, a
conviction for conspiracy requires proof of the existence of
a shared criminal intent. An explicit or formal agreement to
commit crimes can seldom, if ever, be proved and it need
not be, for proof of a criminal partnership is almost
invariably extracted from the circumstances that attend its
activities. Thus, a conspiracy may be inferred where it is
demonstrated that the relation, conduct, or circumstances
of the parties, and the overt acts of the co-conspirators
sufficiently prove the formation of a criminal confederation.
The conduct of the parties and the circumstances
surrounding their conduct may create a web of evidence
linking the accused to the alleged conspiracy beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Id. at 42-43. “Once the trier of fact finds that there was an agreement and
the defendant intentionally entered into the agreement, that defendant may
be liable for the overt acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy
regardless of which co-conspirator committed the act.” Commonwealth v.
Barnes, 871 A.2d 812, 820 (Pa.Super. 2005), aff’d, 592 Pa. 301, 924 A.2d
1202 (2007).
Further, the Uniform Firearms Act provides, in relevant part, as follows:
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§ 6106. Firearms not to be carried without a license
(a) Offense defined.—
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), any
person who carries a firearm in any vehicle or any person
who carries a firearm concealed on or about his person,
except in his place of abode or fixed place of business,
without a valid and lawfully issued license under this
chapter commits a felony of the third degree.
* * *
§ 6107. Prohibited conduct during emergency
(a) General Rule.—No person shall carry a firearm
upon the public streets or upon any public property during
an emergency proclaimed by a State or municipal
governmental executive unless that person is:
(1) Actively engaged in a defense of that person’s
life or property from peril or threat.
(2) Licensed to carry firearms under section 6109
(relating to licenses) or is exempt from licensing under
section 6106(b) (relating to firearms not to be carried
without a license).
* * *
§ 6108. Carrying firearms on public streets or public
property in Philadelphia
No person shall carry a firearm, rifle or shotgun at any
time upon the public streets or upon any public property in
a city of the first class unless:
(1) such person is licensed to carry a firearm; or
(2) such person is exempt from licensing under section
6106(b) of this title (relating to firearms not to be carried
without a license).
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6106(a)(1), 6107(a), and 6108.
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“When contraband is not found on the defendant’s person, the
Commonwealth must establish constructive possession….” Commonwealth
v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 121 (Pa.Super. 2005). “We have defined
constructive possession as conscious dominion, meaning that the defendant
has the power to control the contraband and the intent to exercise that
control.” Commonwealth v. Parrish, 191 A.3d 31, 36 (Pa.Super. 2018),
appeal denied, 651 Pa. 10, 202 A.3d 42 (2019) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “The intent to exercise conscious dominion can be inferred from the
totality of the circumstances.” Jones, supra at 121. “Constructive
possession may be found in one or more actors where the item in issue is in
an area of joint control and equal access.” Commonwealth v. Valette, 531
Pa. 384, 388, 613 A.2d 548, 550 (1992).
It is well established that, as with any other element of a
crime, constructive possession may be proven by
circumstantial evidence. In other words, the
Commonwealth must establish facts from which the trier of
fact can reasonably infer that the defendant exercised
dominion and control over the contraband at issue.
Parrish, supra at 36-37 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Instantly, Officer Arch arrived at the scene in response to a burglary
call. (See N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 4/8/21, at 6). Upon arrival, the officer
observed a Nissan Altima speed through the shopping plaza and hit a curb.
(Id.) Appellee, who occupied the driver’s seat, exited the Nissan with his co-
defendants and fled. (Id. at 7). At the preliminary hearing, Officer Arch made
an in-court identification of Appellee and his co-defendants. (Id. at 5).
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Regarding the conspiracy charge, police apprehended Appellee and his
co-defendants after they fled from the Nissan. Police subsequently obtained
a warrant, searched the Nissan, and discovered items belonging to the Snipes
store. (Id. at 6-7). The Snipes store appeared to have been burglarized, as
its windows and doors were broken. (Id. at 6). Although the Commonwealth
did not present evidence of an explicit agreement between Appellee and his
co-defendants, their conduct and circumstances made it reasonable to infer
the existence of a shared criminal intent. See Melvin, supra. Taken
together, the facts established a prima facie case for conspiracy. See Wyatt,
supra.
As for the VUFA charges, Officer Arch testified that his interaction with
Appellee and his co-defendants occurred during a “riot” in the midst of a
COVID-19-related “shut down” in Philadelphia. (See N.T. Preliminary Hearing
at 12, 14). Further, police found a firearm in the backseat of the Nissan,
underneath merchandise from the Snipes store. (Id. at 21). Detective
Campbell testified that Appellee did not have a license to carry a firearm. (Id.
at 22). Since Appellee was the driver of the Nissan, it is reasonable to infer
that he could have exercised conscious dominion over the firearm. See
Parrish, supra. Therefore, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence
to establish a prima facie case for the VUFA charges under the theory of
constructive possession. See Wyatt, supra.
Our review of the testimony produced at the preliminary hearing, viewed
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in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, leads us to conclude that
the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
case as to the VUFA and conspiracy charges filed against Appellee. See
Wyatt, supra; Ouch, supra. Accordingly, we reverse the order granting
Appellee habeas corpus relief, and we remand this case for further
proceedings consistent with this decision.
Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/8/2022
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