Coyle, B. v. Coyle, R.

J-A27039-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
BETTY LOU COYLE IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
REED B. COYLE, III
Appellant No. 1842 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Order entered October 16, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County
Domestic Relations at No: No. 2009-5253
BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON, and STABILE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED DECEMBER 21, 2015
Appellant Reed B. Coyle, III (“Husband”) appeals from an order of the
Court of Common Pleas of Washington County (“trial court”), which denied
his petition for special relief. Upon review, we affirm.
The facts and procedural history underlying this case are undisputed.
Briefly, on June 24, 2009, Appellee Betty Lou Coyle (“Wife”) filed for divorce,
alleging that her marriage to Husband was irretrievably broken. On October
29, 2010, the trial court entered a consent order, memorializing the parties’
agreement with respect to the equitable distribution of assets. On April 13,
2011, Husband filed a motion to quash the October 29, 2010 consent order,
alleging that Wife refused to provide him with a copy of the prenuptial
agreement and barred him from obtaining his personal belongings and
J-A27039-15
business records. The trial court denied the motion. On August 3, 2011,
Husband filed an emergency petition for special relief, alleging:
5. One vital piece of information still in possession of [Wife],
which she has refused to return, was the agreement between
[Wife] and [Husband] regarding the proceeds from 225 Victoria
Lane, McMurray, Pennsylvania 15317 in the event of a divorce.
Prior to the parties’ marriage, [Husband] owned 209 Braun
Drive, McMurray, Pennsylvania 15317 and the proceeds of the
sale of that residence went, in part, towards the purchase of the
Victoria Lane property.
6. The contents of the agreement, which was drafted by [Wife’s]
former attorney, Ms. Louann G. Petrucci, stated that due to
[Husband’s] prior ownership of the Braun Drive property he
would receive the entire selling price of $375,000.00 in the event
of divorce. It is [Husband’s] belief that [Wife] deliberately hid
or destroyed the executed agreement [(Braun
Agreement)] in order to prevent [Husband] from receiving
the proceeds from his pre-marital property.
7. At the time of the execution of the above-mentioned [October
29, 2010 consent order, Husband] was unable to obtain a copy
of the [Braun Agreement] to assert his equitable
distribution rights to his pre-marital property due to
[Wife’s] refusal to comply with the discovery request
made on July 29, 2010.
....
9. The parties are currently before Eric Held regarding the
[p]etition for [c]ontempt [Husband] brought against [Wife] for
the discovery requests. Testimony has been given by
[Husband] as to the existence of the [Braun Agreement]
and another hearing date has been scheduled for August 31,
2011 to continue with the testimony.
Husband’s Emergency Petition, 8/3/11 (emphasis added). Based on the
foregoing allegations, Husband requested the trial court to deposit the net
proceeds from the sale of the parties’ Deep Creek property, located in
Maryland, into an escrow account until the issue of Husband’s pre-marital
property was resolved. The trial court granted the emergency petition to the
extent it directed Wife to produce copies of all documents relating solely to
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the Deep Creek property in her possession. On November 17, 2011, Divorce
Master Eric Held filed his report and recommendation, to which both parties
filed exceptions. On April 11, 2012, the trial court granted in part and
denied in part Wife’s exceptions to the report. On May 8, 2012, the trial
court issued a decree, divorcing Husband and Wife from the bonds of
matrimony under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3301(c).
Eventually, more than two years later, Husband filed the instant
petition for special relief on October 16, 2014, alleging once again:
7. One vital piece of information still in possession of [Wife],
which she has refused to return despite several [c]ourt orders to
do so, was the [Braun Agreement] between [Husband] and
[Wife] regarding the purchase of 225 Victoria Lane, McMurray,
Pennsylvania 15317 as well as the proceeds from 209 Braun
Drive, McMurray, Pennsylvania 15317 ([Husband’s] pre-marital
property) in the event of a divorce.
8. It is undisputed that prior to the parties’ marriage, [Husband]
owned 209 Braun Drive, McMurray, Pennsylvania 15317. A copy
of the deed to 209 Braun Drive, McMurray, Pennsylvania 15317
is attached hereto[.]
9. Despite [Wife’s] attempts to keep [Husband’s]
documents hidden, [Husband] was able to obtain a copy of
the [Braun Agreement]. A copy of the [Braun Agreement] is
attached hereto and marked as Exhibit “G.”
10. The contents of the [Braun Agreement], which was drafted
by [Wife’s] former attorney, Ms. Louann G. Petrucci, stated that
due to [Husband’s] prior ownership of the Braun Drive property
he would receive reimbursement for all purchase sums expended
by him for the purchase and real estate fees as well as
improvements to Victoria Lane in the event of a divorce
(including down payment and prorated items as stated on the
final settlement statement executed at the closing on August 26,
2003). . . .
11. On September 29, 2006, the property located at 209 Braun
Drive, McMurray, Pennsylvania 15317 was sold for
$375,000.00. . . .
....
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13. It is [Husband’s] belief that [Wife] deliberately hid or
destroyed the executed [Braun Agreement] in order to
prevent [Husband] from receiving the proceeds from his
pre-marital property.
Husband’s Petition for Special Relief, 10/16/14 (emphasis added). Based on
these allegations, Husband petitioned the trial court to impose a constructive
trust (under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3505(d)) on the Victoria Lane property.
Wife filed an answer and new matter in response to the petition for
special relief, asserting that “[Husband] was provided all documents by his
prior counsel at a date prior to August of 2011. [Husband] continues to
allege that he has been harmed by [Wife’s] alleged failure to return
documents that have been in his possession for over three (3) years.”
Wife’s Answer to Petition for Special Relief, 10/16/14, ¶ 6. Wife further
asserted:
The issue has been fully litigated. [Husband], while being
represented, entered into [the October 29, 2010 agreement].
He now wants us to believe that he simply forgot about the
previous [Braun Agreement], and now, four (4) years later,
wishes to re-litigate and [sic] agreed upon issue. [Husband’s]
counsel has been in possession of the [Braun Agreement] since
prior to August 2011.
Id. at ¶ 25. The trial court denied the petition on the same day. Husband
timely appealed to this Court. The trial court directed Husband to file a
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. Husband
complied. In response, the trial court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion,
concluding in part that Husband was barred by the doctrine of res judicata
from re-litigating the issue of the Braun Agreement pertaining to Husband’s
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J-A27039-15
pre-marital property. In defining res judicata, our Supreme Court has
explained:
Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prohibits parties involved in
prior, concluded litigation from subsequently asserting claims in
a later action that were raised, or could have been raised, in the
previous adjudication. The doctrine of res judicata developed to
shield parties from the burden of re-litigating a claim with the
same parties, or a party in privity with an original litigant, and to
protect the judiciary from the corresponding inefficiency and
confusion that re-litigation of a claim would breed.
Wilkes ex rel. Mason v. Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins. Co., 902 A.2d
366, 376 (Pa. 2006) (citations omitted).
On appeal, Husband raises only two issues for our review.
1. Were [Husband’s] rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3505(d) and 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 3332 violated due to the trial court’s error of law by
failing to grant a hearing regarding the pre-marital and marital
property pertaining to the parties that was not previously
distributed?
2. Were [Husband’s] rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution violated when [Husband] was
denied a hearing, without the presentation of evidence, without
testimony and without the opportunity to argue or object
regarding the equitable distribution of pre-marital and marital
property?
Husband’s Brief at 3.1 The issue of res judicata, upon which the trial court
predicated its decision to deny Husband’s petition for special relief, was not
addressed in any meaningful way in Husband’s brief. Nonetheless, after
careful review of the parties’ briefs, the record on appeal, and the relevant
____________________________________________
1
To the extent Husband challenges the divorce decree under Section 3332
of the Divorce Code, we reject the challenge as waived. Husband raised this
issue for the first time on appeal in his Rule 1925(b) statement. See
Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
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J-A27039-15
case law, we conclude that the trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion authored by
the Honorable Valarie S. Costanzo adequately disposes of Husband’s issues
on appeal. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/30/14, at 4-11. We, therefore,
affirm the trial court’s order denying Husband’s petition for special relief.
We direct that a copy of the trial court’s December 30, 2014 Rule 1925(a)
opinion be attached to any future filings in this case.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/21/2015
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/
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL DIVISION
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OPINION PURSUANT TO Pa.R.A.P. 1925{a)
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This matter comes before the Trial Court ("Court") pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a)
regarding an appeal of its order dated October 16, 2014 ("Order") which denied Reed B. Coyle's
("Appellant") Petition for Special Relief ("Petition"). The Petition contained allegations that
Betty Lou Coyle ("Appellee") "deliberately hid or destroyed" documents relating to the
"purchase of 225 Victoria Lane, McMurray, Pennsylvania 15317 as well as the proceeds from
209 Braun Drive, McMurray, Pennsylvania 15317." Upon consideration of Appellant's petition,
Appellee's response, and arguments during motions court, the Petition was denied. For the
reasons that follow, the Petition was properly denied.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The underlying procedural history is extensive, containing six files over a five year
period. Therefore, the most pertinent events are highlighted herein. On June 24, 2009, Appellee
filed the Complaint in Divorce. Thereafter, on August 4, 2009, the parties entered into a Consent
Agreement which granted Appellee exclusive possession of the parties' residence located at 225
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Victoria Lane and Appellant exclusive possession of the parties' residence located at 270 Lake
Forest Estates. On October 29, 2010, the parties signed a Consent Agreement regarding
equitable distribution. At that time, the parties stipulated that the only remaining issues subject
to equitable distribution were Steeler tickets and division of household contents.
On April 8, 2011, Appellant filed a Motion to Quash the October 29, 2010 Consent
Agreement averring that he never received certain personal belongings or business records.
Furthermore, Appellant claimed that he did not receive a copy of a Pre-Nuptial Agreement
executed on September 30, 1982 until after he entered into the October 29, 2010 Consent
Agreement. According to Appellant, the Pre-Nuptial Agreement outlined "the parameters of the
parties' intentions regarding their personal assets." Judge DiSalle denied the Motion to Quash.
On August 3, 2011, Appellant presented another Petition for Special Relief. Among other
things, Appellee was thereby ordered to produce copies of any and all documentation, in her
possession, pertaining to the parties' Deep Creek property.
Divorce Master Eric Held, Esq. conducted hearings on March 18, 2011, March 28, 2011,
July 25, 2011, and August 31, 2011. Both parties submitted Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law on September 19, 2011. Appellant asserted that certain unsettled issues
were addressed at the hearings before Master Held including "the season Steeler Tickets and the
PSLs, the division of the household contents of Victoria Lane, payment of legal fees for the
Harborside Resort property, additional funds owed by either party and the contempt claim made
by Husband against Wife for failure to produce documents in her possession." Thereafter on
November 17, 2011, Master Held issued a Report and Recommendation, finding that Husband's
testimony was credible and recommending that the court sanction Wife the amount of $4500 for
being in contempt of a court order. Each party subsequently filed exceptions.
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On Aprill l, 2012, Judge Gilman addressed the exceptions filed by each party and stated
in his order that the Master made a reasonable decision regarding a $4500 sanction imposed
upon Appellee for Appellant's expenses in attempting to retrieve documents. Judge Gilman
further stated in his order that the decision of Master Held was primarily based upon the
credibility of the witnesses, and thus, the Court would not disturb the Master's finding of
credibility. The final divorce decree was issued by Judge Gilman on May 8, 2012.
On August 31, 2012, Appellant filed another Petition for Contempt and in the petition
stated that "Defendant had made several attempts to retrieve his professional and personal
documents, including but not limited to, trust documentation, [ and] agreements between Plaintiff
and Defendant regarding marital and pre-marital assets ... " Judge Gilman addressed Appellant's
petition in an order dated August 31, 2012 and determined that the matter would be heard on
September 5, 2012. Subsequently, on September 10, 2012, Judge Gilman issued an order
addressing Appellant's claim that Appellee withheld documents. Judge Gilman noted that the
issue was previously addressed, and "no appeal was taken to the Superior Court and this Court
will not re-litigate the issue of sanctions."
More than two years later, on October 16, 2014, Appellant filed a lengthy Petition for
Special Relief to this Court in which Appellant claimed Appellee "deliberately hid or destroyed"
an agreement dated August 26, 2003 regarding the distribution of proceeds from the Braun Drive
property and improvements made to the Victoria Lane property in the event of divorce. In this
same petition, Appellant averred that Appellee refused to comply with a July 19, 2010 discovery
request. Appellee responded by filing a document entitled "Answer and New Matter" stating,
among other things, that Appellant had all discovery information that Appellee had in her
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possession. Appellee also provided this Court with a copy of an index, which indicated that
Appellant had been provided with the documents at issue.
Appellee further averred that Appellant was present during the negotiations regarding the
October 29, 2010 Consent Agreement, never asserted that any such documents existed, and is
simply attempting to relitigate the issue of sanctions. Appellee also claimed that this matter is
another attempt by Appellant to re-open the October 29, 2010 Consent Agreement. On October
16, 2014, after each side had an opportunity to present his or her respective position, this Court
denied Appellant's Motion for Special Relief. Appellant appealed the Order; therefore, on
November 6, 2014, this Court issued an order in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) directing
Appellant to file and concurrently serve upon the trial judge a Concise Statement ("Statement")
of the matters complained of on this appeal. Appellant's Statement was filed on November 26,
2014. Accordingly, this matter is ripe for consideration.
OPINION
The first three assertions of Appellant's Statement overlap, thus they will be addressed
together. Specifically, Appellant asserts that the Court erred in the following three ways:
I. The trial court violated Appellant's procedural due process rights guaranteed by the 14th
Amendment to the United States Constitution by entering the order without granting a
hearing, without the presentation of evidence, without testimony and without the
opportunity to argue or object;
2. The trial court violated Appellant's procedural due process rights guaranteed by the 14th
Amendment of the United States Constitution by entering the order. which effects [sic]
property owned by him without a hearing, without the presentation of evidence, without
testimony and without the opportunity to argue or object;
3. The Court abused its discretion by denying Appellant's request for a hearing to address
the validity of the claim by Appellant that Appellee hid the documentation pertaining to
the parties' agreement prior to and up until the time of the parties' consent order of court
regarding the distribution of premarital and marital property was solidified.
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The Court did not violate Appellant's procedural due process rights nor did the Court
abuse its discretion by denying Appellant's request for a hearing. As demonstrated by the
extensive procedural history of this case, Appellant has previously litigated the exact issues of
which he now complains. If the Court granted him a new hearing, he would have been
improperly provided with an opportunity to relitigate the same issues. The Court will further
explain its reasoning below.
On October 16, 2014, the parties argued their respective positions before this Court.
Appellant asked the Court to impose a constructive trust with respect to property located on
Victoria Lane and argued that such relief was warranted because Appellee deliberately hid or
destroyed documents. Tr. 3: 5-17 (Oct. 16, 2014). Appellant also requested a hearing if the
Court was not inclined to immediately grant a constructive trust.
Appellee countered that it was apparent that Appellant was merely attempting to disguise
an issue that was already raised or could have been raised. According to Appellee, the parties
have "been down this road so many times previously," and Appellant presented a similar petition
in April 2011 asking that the October 29, 2010 Consent Agreement be vacated. Tr. 6: 3-8 (Oct.
16, 2014). Appellee also asserted that Appellant has been in possession of all necessary
documents since August of 2011. Tr. 6: 15-17. The Court was provided with an index of all
documents Appellant received in support of this assertion. Tr. 6:23-25; 7: 3-8. Finally, Appellee
stated that the parties were still in front of Master Held at this point in time as their final hearing
was not until August 31, 2011. Tr. 7: 9-16. The Court agrees with Appellee and finds that
Appellant had all necessary documents and indeed had the opportunity to previously assert the
issues of which he now complains. The Court finds that 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 3333 bars Appellant
from reasserting its claim now.
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According to 23 Pa. C.S.A. §3333 "Res Judicata and Estoppel:"
The validity of a divorce or annulment decree granted by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter may not be questioned by a party who was
subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court except by direct appeal provided
or prescribed by law. A party who sought and obtained a decree, financed or
agreed to its procurement, or accepted a property settlement, alimony pendente
lite or alimony pursuant to the terms of the decree, or who remarries after the
decree, or is guilty of laches, is barred from making a collateral attack upon the
validity of the decree unless, by clear and convincing evidence, it is established
that fraud by the other party prevented the making of a timely appeal from the
divorce or annulment decree.
23 Pa. C.S.A. § 3333 (West). Here, Appellant did not meet his burden. He did not establish by
clear and convincing evidence that fraud by Appellee prevented the making of a timely appeal
from the divorce or annulment decree. Furthermore, Appellant never properly appealed any of
the previous judgments issued by other judges in this case. Appellee provided a convincing
argument and submitted proof that Appellant had an opportunity to be heard. Namely, Appellee
provided an index of all documents in Appellee's possession and also pointed to the procedural
history of this case. It became clear that Appellant has filed numerous petitions in front of
different judges, has had opportunities to be heard, and an appeal was never filed from any of
these previous judgments. Therefore, this Court finds that there was nothing left to decide and
no reason to grant a new hearing.
Moreover, the Superior Court in Lebeau v. Lebeau succinctly explained resjudicata. 393
A.2d 480 (Pa Super. 1978). The underlying policy of the doctrine is to minimize the judicial
energy devoted to individual cases, establish certainty and respect for court judgments, and
protect the party relying on the prior adjudication from vexatious litigation. Id. citing James and
Hazard, Civil Procedure, 523 (1977). Res judicata will generally apply where the cause of action
in one suit is identical with that involved in a prior judgment. Id. A final judgment rendered by
a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive of the rights of the parties and their
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privies and constitutes a bar to a subsequent action involving that same claim, demand, or cause
of action and issues determined therein. Id. ( See also Dempsey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 653
A.2d 679, 680-81 (Pa. Super. 1995)). Four conditions must be shown to support a claim of re
judicata: 1) the identity of the thing sued upon; 2) identity of the cause of action; 3) identity of
the persons or parties to the action; and 4) identity of the quality or capacity of the parties suing
or sued. Id.Here, res judicata is applicable because Appellant is attempting to relitigate allegations
that Appellee "deliberately hid or destroyed" documents subject to discovery. The matter on
appeal has been addressed extensively. Specifically, Appellant presented a Motion to Quash the
October 29, 2010 Consent Agreement because he was unable to obtain from Appellee 2003
documents subject to discovery. The Motion to Quash was denied by Judge DiSalle on April 13,
2011. Additionally, the parties had an opportunity to be heard by Master Held, who
acknowledged that the October 29, 2010 Consent Agreement was binding. Master Held found
Appellee in contempt of a court order directing her to provide Appellant with various personal
documents and recommended that the court impose sanctions upon Appellee in the amount of
$4500, to be allocated in equitable distribution. On April 11, 2012, Judge Gilman issued an
order confirming the Master's recommendation and the sanctions.
Appellant has continued to file Petitions regarding the issue at hand. On August 31,
2012, Appellant filed a Petition for Contempt reasserting that he made "several attempts to
retrieve his professional and personal documents, including ... agreements between Plaintiff and
Defendant regarding marital and pre-marital assets ... " Subsequently, Judge Gilman determined:
(1) that the Master already addressed the issue; (2) defendant's divorce exceptions were already
stricken; (3) no appeal was taken to the Superior Court; and (4) the issue of sanctions will not be
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relitigated. In light of the aforementioned, this Court declined to re-visit the issue because it is
clear that it has been addressed on numerous occasions, and there is simply nothing left to
decide. See Ham v. Sulek, 620 A.2d 5, 8 (Pa. Super. 1993) (where parties have been afforded an
opportunity to litigate a claim before a court of competent jurisdiction, and where the court has
finally decided the controversy, the interests of the state and of the parties require that the
validity of the claim and any issue actually litigated in the action not be litigated again).
Appellant raises two additional assertions in his Statement, which are addressed together
because they overlap.
4. The Court erred as a matter of law in failing to follow 23 Pa. C.S. § 3505(d), which states
if a party fails to disclose information required by general rule of the Supreme Court and in
consequence thereof an asset or assets with a fair market value of $1000 or more is omitted
from the final distribution of property, the party aggrieved by the nondisclosure may at any time
petition the court granting the award to declare the creation of a constructive trust as to all
undisclosed assets for the benefit of the parties and their minor or dependent children, if any.
By statute the Court was required to grant Appellant's petition to set a hearing to determine, if
indeed, the Appellee failed to disclose assets as required in 23 Pa.C.S. § 3505(d).
5. The Court erred as a matter of law by failing to follow 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3332
relating to modification, which states a motion to open a decree of divorce or annulment
may be made only within the period limited by 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505 (relating to
modification of orders) and not thereafter. The motion may lie where it is alleged that
the decree was procured by intrinsic fraud or that there is new evidence relating to the
cause of action which will sustain the attack upon its validity. A motion to vacate a
decree or strike a judgment alleged to be void because of extrinsic fraud, lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter or a fatal defect apparent upon the face of the record
must be made within five years after entry of the final decree. Since the petition stated
the equitable distribution order was procured in part by extrinsic fraud, Appellant had
five (5) years from the date of the equitable distribution order to attack its validity and
thus the presentation of the petition was timely.
These arguments are appropriately rejected in accordance with 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 3332.
According to 23 Pa. C.S.A. §3332 "Opening or vacating decrees:"
A motion to open a decree of divorce or annulment may be made only
within the period limited by 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505 (relating to modification of
orders) and not thereafter. The motion may lie where it is alleged that the
decree was procured by intrinsic fraud or that there is new evidence
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relating to the cause of action which will sustain the attack upon its
validity. A motion to vacate a decree or strike a judgment alleged to be
void because of extrinsic fraud, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
or a fatal defect apparent upon the face of the record must be made within
five years after entry of the final decree. Intrinsic fraud relates to a matter
adjudicated by the judgment, including perjury and false testimony,
whereas extrinsic fraud relates to matters collateral to the judgment which
have the consequence of precluding a fair hearing or presentation of one
side of the case.
23 Pa. C.S.A § 3332 (West). Additionally, according to 23 Pa. C.SA. 3505(d):
(d) Constructive trust for undisclosed assets -- If a party fails to disclose
information required by general rule of the Supreme Court and in consequence
thereof an asset or assets with a fair market value of $1,000 or more is omitted
from the final distribution of property, the party aggrieved by the nondisclosure
may at any time petition the court granting the award to declare the creation of a
constructive trust as to all undisclosed assets for the benefit of the parties and their
minor or dependent children, if any. The party in whose name the assets are held
shall be declared the constructive trustee unless the court designates a different
trustee, and the trust may include any terms and conditions the court may
determine. The court shall grant the petition upon a finding of a failure to disclose
the assets as required by general rule of the Supreme Court.
23 Pa. C.S.A. § 3505 (West). The Court finds that there was no evidence of fraud in accordance
with§ 3332 and thus no reason to grant a hearing to determine whether a constructive trust
should be imposed pursuant to§ 3505. Common sense belies Appellant's argument. He
essentially is asking the Court to impose a constructive trust based upon Appellee's failure to
provide an agreement between the parties from 2003 that he was involved in negotiating. The
Court finds he was fully aware of the provisions of this voluntary agreement and had access to it
as well, especially because he signed it.
Appellant relies significantly on Creeks; however, this Court finds the case is not
applicable. Creeks v. Creeks, 619 A.2d 754 (Pa. Super 1993). In Creeks, Wife alleged that
Husband breached the disclosure clause of their Marital Settlement Agreement by failing to
disclose marital funds which he deposited during the marriage, into his paramour's bank account.
Id. at 755. Hence, Wife sought to have a constructive trust imposed on the undisclosed assets.
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Id. The funds Husband deposited into his paramour's bank account were not listed on Husband's
Inventory and Appraisement Forms. Id. at 756. The Superior Court held that Husband violated
the Agreement by not disclosing the funds and concluded that since Husband failed to disclose
assets which may have been subject to equitable distribution, a constructive trust was
appropriate. Id. at 756-57.
The current case is distinguishable from Creeks because all issues regarding disclosure of
assets were previously addressed by different judges. Additionally, in the instant case, Appellant
asserts that Appellee hid documents which he knew existed because he signed them in 2003.
Appellant voluntarily entered into a new Consent Agreement knowing that another agreement
existed. In contrast, in Creeks, Husband deposited marital funds into a paramour's account, and
Wife had absolutely no knowledge of the existence of these marital funds at the time she entered
into a Marriage Settlement Agreement. This Court finds that Creeks is inapplicable, and there
are no remaining issues to resolve regarding nondisclosure of assets.
Appellant raises a sixth issue in his Statement contending:
6. The Court abused its discretion by failing to grant Appellant's request for an award of
attorney's fees due to Appellee's deliberate, dilatory and vexatious behavior regarding the
hiding of premarital and marital property.
The Court did not abuse its discretion by failing to grant Appellant's request for an award
of attorney's fees. According to 42 Pa, C.S.A. § 2503, the following participants shall be entitled
to a reasonable counsel fee as part of the taxable costs of the matter:
(7) Any participant who is awarded counsel fees as a sanction against another
participant for dilatory, obdurate or vexatious conduct during the pendency of a
matter.
(9) Any participant who is awarded counsel fees because the conduct of another
party in commencing the matter or otherwise was arbitrary, vexatious or in bad
faith.
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42 Pa. C.S.A. § 2503 (West). The Court, in its discretion, did not award counsel fees to either
participant in this matter because it did not find that either party, and certainly not Appellant, was
entitled to fees.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court respectfully submits that the Order of the Court
dated October 16, 2014 should be affirmed and Appellant's appeal dismissed.
DATE: BY THE COURT:
...
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Valarie Costanzo (/
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