Commonwealth v. Loughnane

J. A34007/14
2015 PA Super 245COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 596 MDA 2014
:
DANIEL F. LOUGHNANE :
Appeal from the Order Entered March 17, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
Criminal Division at No. CP-40-CR-0000046-2013
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN AND STABILE, JJ.
OPINION BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 23, 2015
This case concerns the hit and run fatality of Rebecca Marian
McCallick. Herein, the Commonwealth appeals from the order of March 17,
2014, which granted in part and denied in part Daniel Loughnane’s
(“appellee’s”) motion in limine.1 We affirm in part and reverse in part and
remand for further proceedings.2
1
Appellee’s motion was titled “Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence Relating
to Telephone Recordings and Personal Belongings.” It was properly treated
by the trial court as a suppression motion.
2
The Commonwealth may appeal an interlocutory order suppressing
evidence when it provides a certification with its notice of appeal that the
order terminates or substantially handicaps the prosecution.
Commonwealth v. Whitlock, 69 A.3d 635, 636 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2013),
citing Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). In Commonwealth v. Gordon, 673 A.2d 866, 869
(Pa. 1996), our supreme court held that the Commonwealth may appeal the
grant of a defense motion in limine which excludes Commonwealth
evidence and has the effect of substantially handicapping the prosecution.
J. A34007/14
The facts, as summarized by the suppression court, are as follows:
1. On July 24, 2012, at approximately 2:23 a.m.,
Wilkes-Barre City Police responded to the area
of 199 Hazle Street and began an investigation
into the death of an individual who had been
struck and killed by a motor vehicle.
2. The individual struck and killed on Hazle Street
during the early morning hours of July 24,
2012 was identified as Rebecca McCallick.
3. Officer James Fisher of the Wilkes-Barre City
Police Department responded to the scene and
interviewed a witness, John Schenck, III.
4. A description of the vehicle that struck
Ms. McCallick was obtained from
John Schenck, III by Officer Fisher.
5. John Schenck, III described the vehicle as a
“large, dark colored truck with loud exhaust,
possibly a diesel.”
6. Officer Fisher provided the description of the
vehicle he received from John Schenck, III to
other patrol units in the area in an attempt to
locate the vehicle.
7. On July 24, 2012, Peter Sladin was employed
by Legion Security and was working in the
Hawkeye Camera Center, which is located in
the Wilkes-Barre City Police Station.
8. During the early morning hours of July 24,
2012, Mr. Sladin was monitoring the Hawkeye
camera system in the City of Wilkes-Barre.
As the trial court ruling excludes Commonwealth evidence, and the
Commonwealth has certified that the effect of the ruling substantially
handicaps the prosecution, we find that this appeal is properly before this
court.
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9. While monitoring the camera system,
Mr. Sladin heard that an accident had occurred
at 199 Hazle Street as well as a description of
the vehicle involved.
10. Mr. Sladin began reviewing cameras in the
area of 199 Hazle Street to see if he could
locate the vehicle he had heard a description
of.
11. While reviewing a camera located at
Northampton Street and Wilkes-Barre
Boulevard, Mr. Sladin observed a “dark colored
full size pickup truck heading south on
Wilkes-Barre Boulevard” at approximately
2:19 a.m.
12. Mr. Sladin took a snapshot of the vehicle from
the video and provided it to Wilkes-Barre City
Police.
13. The photograph fairly and accurately depicted
the image of the vehicle Mr. Sladin saw on the
video and had not been altered.
14. There is no evidence to suggest that any
member of the Wilkes-Barre City Police
Department altered the photograph of the
vehicle Mr. Sladin obtained from the video.
15. On July 25, 2012, the investigation of the
accident was assigned to Wilkes-Barre City
Detective, David Sobocinski.
16. As part of his investigation,
Detective Sobocinski requested all videos,
photographs or other evidence from Hawkeye.
17. The Hawkeye camera system only preserves
the videotapes for a period of 10 to 14 days.
18. Prior to Detective Sobocinski’s request, the
videotape containing the image of the pickup
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truck was taped over by the Hawkeye camera
system.
19. Although attempts were made to recover the
video from which the photograph had been
generated, it could not be done.
20. At no time was the video intentionally erased
or deleted.
21. Nothing in the record indicates that the
Commonwealth withheld any evidence
favorable to [appellee].
22. Detective Sobocinski received the photograph
of a pickup truck heading south on
Wilkes-Barre Boulevard which he did not alter
in any manner.
23. On July 24, 2012, John Schenck, III, resided at
197 Hazle Street in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania
and his girlfriend at the time was Rebecca
McCallick.
24. At the time the vehicle struck Rebecca
McCallick, John Schenck, III was in the front
room of his apartment looking out the window.
25. John Schenck, III saw the vehicle strike
Rebecca McCallick on Hazle Street in
Wilkes-Barre during the early morning hours of
July 24, 2012.
26. John Schenck, III called 911 and reported the
accident.
27. The photograph of a pickup truck was viewed
by John Schenck, III and he indicated that it
fairly and accurately depicted the vehicle that
struck Rebecca McCallick.
28. A vehicle fitting the description of the pickup
truck that struck Rebecca McCallick was
located by the father of John Schenck, III on
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August 8, 2012 in a driveway at 71 Liberty
Street, Ashley, Pennsylvania.
29. John Schenck, III then positively identified the
vehicle located in the driveway at 71 Liberty
Street, Ashley as the pickup truck that struck
Rebecca McCallick.
30. Although he attempted to do so, Detective
Sobocinski of the Wilkes-Barre City Police
Department was unable to locate the owner of
the vehicle.
31. During the early morning hours of August 9,
2012, the pickup truck was seized from the
driveway at 71 Liberty Street in Ashley and
towed to Wilkes-Barre City Police headquarters
and placed in the basement garage.
32. No search warrant was obtained before the
pickup truck was seized from the driveway
located at 71 Liberty Street in Ashley.
33. Detective Sobocinski of the Wilkes-Barre City
Police Department could have requested
assistance from law enforcement to secure the
pickup truck while he obtained a search
warrant prior to seizing the vehicle.
34. Nothing prevented Detective Sobocinski from
obtaining a search warrant prior to the seizure
of the pickup truck on August 9, 2012.
35. Although the pickup truck was seized on
August 9, 2012, no search warrant was
prepared until August 13, 2012.
36. The pickup truck was not searched until a
search warrant was obtained by
Detective Sobocinski.
37. At the time [appellee’s] pickup truck was
seized without a warrant, the vehicle was
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located on private property and [appellee] was
not in custody.
38. Visual identification of [appellee’s] pickup truck
in the Wilkes-Barre City garage on August 14,
2012 by John Schenck, III, occurred four days
after the vehicle was seized without a warrant.
39. This identification by John Schenck, III may
have taken place before or after a search
warrant was obtained and the vehicle
searched.
40. On August 14, 2012, four days after the
vehicle was seized without a warrant, a sound
identification was performed on the vehicle on
State Street outside the Wilkes-Barre City
Police Department.
Findings of fact and conclusions of law, 3/17/14 at 1-5.
Appellee was arrested on December 18, 2012, and charged with one
count of accidents involving death or personal injury, 75 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 3742(a). On July 30, 2013, appellee filed an omnibus pretrial motion,
which included the following:
1. A motion in limine to exclude all “still
photographs of the vehicle traveling toward the
scene . . . at the time of the incident” based on
the Commonwealth’s inability to authenticate
security videotapes as mandated by
Pa.R.E. 901;
2. A motion in limine to exclude all “still photos of
the vehicle traveling toward the scene . . . at
the time of the incident” based upon the
Commonwealth’s inability to comply with the
best evidence rule;
....
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4. A motion to suppress all “still photos of the
vehicle traveling toward the scene . . . at the
time of the incident” based upon the
Commonwealth’s failure to disclose exculpatory
evidence;
5. A motion to suppress seizure of appellee’s
2006 Ford F-350 pickup truck as well as items
seized from the vehicle;[3]
6. A motion to strike/suppress out of court
identification of appellee’s Ford F-350 pickup
truck as unduly suggestive;
7. A motion to suppress investigators “controlled
test drive” resulting in the sound identification
of appellee’s Ford F-350 pickup truck as unduly
suggestive;
8. A motion in limine to exclude the audio version
of the 9-1-1 call made by Schenck;
9. A motion for an individual voir dire;
10. A motion to suppress inflammatory
photographs.
See Docket #21.
A hearing was held on February 18, 2014; and on March 17, 2014, the
suppression court entered an order granting the motion in part and denying
the motion in part. (Docket #27.) The suppression court held the only
Commonwealth witness that could authenticate the still photos of the vehicle
on the videotape was Schenck; Sladin was prohibited from providing any
testimony of his observations of the video. The court granted appellee’s
3
We note that the resulting search did not reveal any evidence sought to be
used at trial.
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motion concerning the seizure of the truck and all items seized. The court
also granted appellee’s motion and suppressed evidence regarding the
out-of-court identification and the sound identification of appellee’s truck.
The suppression court granted the motion in limine to exclude the audio
version of the 911 call made by Schenck. The court reserved ruling on the
motion to suppress inflammatory photographs until the time of trial.
On March 27, 2014, another pre-trial conference was held, and the
Commonwealth asked for clarification regarding the court’s order in terms of
the testimony of Sladin. The court responded:
Mr. Sladin could testify that the photo was
obtained from the video system. He can’t testify to
the time or location of the vehicle in the photo
because the tape was not able to be provided to the
defense and the tape is no longer -- he watched the
tape -- So it’s my ruling that the photo -- he could
testify that the photo comes from the Hawkeye
system but he will not be allowed to testify as to the
place and time of the photo or the vehicle in the
photo.
Notes of testimony, 3/27/14 at 2-3. The Commonwealth filed a notice of
appeal on March 28, 2014. On May 22, 2014, the suppression court referred
this court to its March 17, 2014 findings of fact and conclusions of law in lieu
of an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(1).
The Commonwealth presents the following issues for our review:
1. Did the Court err when it excluded testimony
from Peter Sladin about Commonwealth
Exhibit # 1 when it found the security tapes
and still photos were not authenticated
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pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 901
or otherwise violated the Best Evidence Rule?
2. Did the Court err when it found there were no
exigent circumstances which justified the
warrantless seizure of [appellee’s] truck and
therefore suppressed the visual and audio
identification of the truck by Mr. Schenck as
fruit of the poisonous tree?
3. Did the Court err when it excluded the audio of
the 911 call by John Schenck, III on July 24,
2012 at 2:23 a.m.?
Appellant’s brief at 4.
We begin by noting our well-settled standard of review:
When the Commonwealth appeals from a
suppression order, we follow a clearly defined
standard of review and consider only the evidence
from the defendant’s witnesses together with the
evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the
context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted.
The suppression court’s findings of fact bind an
appellate court if the record supports those findings.
The suppression court’s conclusions of law, however,
are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty is
to determine if the suppression court properly
applied the law to the facts.
Commonwealth v. Miller, 56 A.3d 1276, 1278-1279 (Pa.Super. 2012)
(citations omitted), appeal denied, 70 A.3d 810 (Pa. 2013).
The Commonwealth contends that the suppression court erred by not
allowing Sladin, who was working the camera system on the night in
question and captured the actual image, to identify the truck in the
photograph. (Appellant’s brief at 13.) The Commonwealth argues that the
exhibit does not fall under the requirement of the best evidence rule and
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avers Sladin’s testimony about the location of the camera that took the
picture is relevant to placing appellee near the scene of the crime at the time
the victim was hit. (Id. at 14-15.) Further, Sladin could authenticate the
photograph by testifying to the process he used to obtain the photograph he
gave to the police.
We first address whether the trial court was correct in holding that the
best evidence rule does not apply to the photograph in question. The
Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence require that an original recording or
photograph be produced in order to “prove its content.” Pa.R.E. 1002. The
Rules, however, also include exceptions in cases where an original is lost or
destroyed, so long as the original was not destroyed as the result of the
proponent acting in bad faith. Pa.R.E. 1004(a); Warren v. Mosites
Construction Co., 385 A.2d 397, 400 (Pa.Super. 1978) (en banc) (stating
that unavailability cannot be the fault of the proponent). In such cases, the
proponent is not required to produce the original. Id.In cases where the best evidence rule is at issue, and an original
cannot be produced by the proponent, the proponent must provide evidence
that the original has indeed been lost or destroyed. McCormick on
Evidence § 237 (7th ed. 2013). This court has previously stated that
whenever the original is lost, a diligent search must be conducted in order to
locate the original. Hera v. McCormick, 625 A.2d 682, 687 (Pa.Super.
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1993). When the original cannot be located, “production of the original is
excused and other evidence becomes admissible.” Id.Appellee cites Commonwealth v. Lewis, 623 A.2d 355 (Pa.Super.
1993), in his argument that the videotape in this case should be subject to
the best evidence rule. In Lewis, the Commonwealth sought to introduce
testimony regarding the contents of surveillance video based on a police
officer having watched the video before apprehending the defendant. Id. at
356-357. This court found that such evidence was inadmissible because
“the explanation concerning the unavailability of the tape was
unsatisfactory.” Id. at 359. Lewis is distinguishable from the instant case
because the videotape in Lewis was available and the Commonwealth had
failed to procure it.4 Id.We find Commonwealth v. Dent, 837 A.2d 571 (Pa.Super. 2003), to
be analogous to the present case. In Dent, the Commonwealth sought to
introduce testimony regarding the contents of surveillance video. Id. at
590. Much like the current case, the tape was unavailable at trial because
the store’s surveillance system was computerized and the system
automatically recycled the tape. Id. This court stated that since the tape
was unavailable at trial, the best evidence rule did not apply. Id. at 591.
4
The videotape at issue in Lewis was stored in the basement of the Sears
store in question. The Sears security officer testified that he was unable to
locate the tape because the storage classification system that was used by
Sears was “imprecise.” Id.- 11 -
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In the instant case, we find that the original videotape was not
destroyed as the result of bad faith on the Commonwealth’s part. Moreover,
we are bound by the suppression court’s findings of fact, which indicate that
the video was erased as a result of Legion Security’s routine practices, that
the tape was erased before the Wilkes-Barre police requested a copy, and
that the tape was not intentionally erased. (Findings of fact and conclusions
of law, 3/17/14 at 3.)
Therefore, the suppression court was correct in holding that the best
evidence rule does not apply to the photograph in question.
We next turn to whether the suppression court erred by not permitting
Sladin to testify as to the photograph’s authenticity. Appellee states that
because the video is not available, there is no way to tell when the
screenshot was captured or what is depicted in the screenshot. Specifically,
appellee claims that while the Commonwealth purports the screenshot of a
truck travelling southbound on Wilkes-Barre Boulevard was captured at
2:19 a.m., the top of the screenshot shows the time of 6:19 a.m.
(Appellee’s brief at 28-29.)
The Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence require a proponent to “produce
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent
claims it is.” Pa.R.E. 901(a). Specifically, the Rules state that testimony of
a “witness with knowledge” may testify that an item is what it is claimed to
be. Id. at 901(b)(1); Commonwealth v. Reid, 811 A.2d 530, 552 (Pa.
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2002). When the evidence in question is a photograph, it may be
authenticated by testimony from a person who has sufficient knowledge that
the photograph fairly and accurately reflects what the proponent is
purporting that photograph to reflect. Nyce v. Muffley, 119 A.2d 530, 532
(Pa. 1956). The Rules also allow a witness to describe the process or
system that produces a particular piece of evidence for the purposes of
authentication. Pa.R.E. 901(b)(9).
In the instant case, Sladin has sufficient knowledge of what is depicted
in the photograph so that he would be able to authenticate it pursuant to
Rule 901(b)(1). During his testimony at the suppression hearing, Sladin
indicated that as soon as he was notified that the police were investigating a
hit-and-run that involved a fatality, he started reviewing cameras in the
general vicinity of the incident, looking for any vehicles that fit the
description he was given.5 (Notes of testimony, 2/18/14 at 12-13.) Upon
finding video of a “dark-colored full-size pickup truck heading south on
Wilkes-Barre Boulevard,” Sladin took a screenshot of what he determined
was the best viewing area of the truck. (Id. at 14-15.) Sladin further
testified that the screenshot depicted a fair and accurate representation of
his observations from the morning of July 24, 2012. (Id. at 15.) Finally,
Sladin provided information as to the process of how he obtained a
5
Sladin received via police radio a report that police were looking for a dark
full-size pickup truck. (Notes of testimony, 2/18/14 at 22.)
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screenshot depicting the truck at 2:19 a.m. by describing the timeline
present on his monitor at the time he took the screenshot. (Id. at 16.)
Based on Sladin’s testimony at the suppression hearing, we conclude
that he will be able to authenticate the photograph pursuant to
Pa.R.E. 901(b)(1) and (9). Sladin has knowledge of what the photograph
depicts and can also testify about the process that he used to procure a
screenshot of the truck, and Sladin can also testify as to the image’s
authenticity because he has knowledge of what the image depicts.
Accordingly, we reverse on this issue and Sladin is permitted to testify in
order to authenticate the photograph. Any issue as to the time discrepancy
of the photograph is a matter of weight to be tested at trial, not of
admissibility.
Next, the Commonwealth avers that the suppression court erred when
it suppressed audio and visual identifications of appellee’s truck by Schenck
on the grounds that the truck was illegally seized.6 Specifically, the
Commonwealth argues that appellee lacked a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his driveway and that exigent circumstances existed to justify the
warrantless seizure and impoundment of the truck until a search warrant
could be obtained.
6
We note that constitutionally, there is no difference between seizing a
vehicle before obtaining a warrant to conduct a search and conducting an
immediate search without a warrant. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,
52 (1970).
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Both the United States Constitution and the Pennsylvania Constitution
guarantee that individuals shall not be subject to unreasonable searches or
seizures.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and possessions from unreasonable searches
and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or
to seize any person or things shall issue without
describing them as nearly as may be, nor without
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation
subscribed to by the affiant.
Pa. Const. Art. I, § 8. A search or seizure conducted without a warrant is,
under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8, presumed to be
unreasonable. Commonwealth v. McCree, 924 A.2d 621, 627 (Pa. 2007)
(citations omitted).
Evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful search is subject to the
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. The United States Supreme Court has
stated that any material, tangible, or verbal evidence “obtained either during
or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion” is inadmissible at trial. Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963).
Our supreme court further stated:
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We need not hold that all evidence is “fruit of
the poisonous tree” simply because it would not have
come to light but for the illegal actions of the police.
Rather, the more apt question in such a case is
“whether, granting establishment of the primary
illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is
made has been come at by exploitation of that
illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.”
Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 370 A.2d 1172, 1176-1177 (Pa. 1977),
quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-488.
Pennsylvania courts have recognized that the protections afforded to
individuals under both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 are
applicable to the curtilage of a person’s home. Commonwealth v.
Bowmaster, 101 A.3d 789, 792 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citations omitted). This
court defined the curtilage of the home as places “where the occupants have
a reasonable expectation of privacy that society is prepared to accept.” Id.citing Commonwealth v. Johnson, 68 A.3d 930, 935 n.3 (Pa.Super. 2013)
(citations omitted).
Curtilage, however, has not been extended to an individual’s driveway.
Commonwealth v. Simmen, 58 A.3d 811, 815 (Pa.Super. 2012). In
determining that the driveway is not part of a residence’s curtilage, this
court, citing the trial court in Simmen, noted that no reasonable expectation
of privacy existed because the car at issue “was parked in plain view of the
street on the driveway, within 20 feet of the road,” and the driveway was
not gated, fenced in, or posted with “no trespassing” signs. Id. at 816.
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At the time of the suppression court’s order, both probable cause and
“exigent circumstances beyond mere mobility” were required in order to
conduct a warrantless search of the truck. See Commonwealth v.
Hernandez, 935 A.2d 1275, 1280 (Pa. 2007). Shortly after the suppression
court’s order at issue in the instant case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
adopted the federal automobile exception in Commonwealth v. Gary, 91
A.3d 102 (Pa. 2014).7 In order to conduct a warrantless search of an
automobile, the police must now establish probable cause, and are no longer
required to establish exigent circumstances “beyond the mere mobility of a
motor vehicle.” Id. at 138. Historically, automobiles have been subject to
an exception from the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement for two
reasons: (1) the inherent mobility of the vehicle; and (2) a vehicle’s owner’s
expectation of privacy is “significantly less than that relating to one’s home
or office.” Id. at 110, quoting California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391
(1985).
The facts of this case create a matter of first impression in
Pennsylvania. It is unclear whether the federal automobile exception, as
7
While Gary was decided after the suppression court had issued its order
and accompanying findings of fact and conclusions of law, we note that
appellate courts are bound to follow the law at the time of the appellate
decision, thus we are required to apply the holding in Gary to the facts of
the instant case. Blackwell v. Commonwealth, State Ethics Com’n, 589
A.2d 1094, 1099 (Pa. 1991), citing Commonwealth v. Cabeza, 469 A.2d
146, 148 (Pa. 1983).
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adopted by Gary, applies to vehicles that are parked in driveways of private
residences, as here.
In a case where the facts are analogous to the present case, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that police were not required to
obtain a warrant to seize a defendant’s vehicle that was parked in the
defendant’s driveway. Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 2), 580 N.E.2d
1014, 1017 (Mass. 1991).8 Specifically, the court stated that the defendant
did not have an expectation of privacy because both the car and the
driveway were, “clearly visible from the public way, the driveway was the
normal route by which to approach the front door of the residence, . . . and
8
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court adopted the federal automobile
exception in 1990. Commonwealth v. Cast, 556 N.E.2d 69, 78 (Mass.
1990) (acknowledging that a vehicle’s mobility can create an exigency).
See also Commonwealth v. Motta, 676 N.E.2d 795, 799 (Mass. 1997).
The relevant provision in the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights prohibiting
unreasonable searches and seizures is very similar to Pennsylvania’s
constitutional protections against unreasonable search and seizure.
Every subject has a right to be secure from all
unreasonable searches, and seizures, of his person,
his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All
warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the
cause or foundation of them be not previously
supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order in
the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in
suspected places, or to arrest one or more suspected
persons, or to seize their property, be not
accompanied with a special designation of the
persons or objects of search, arrest, or seizure; and
no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with
the formalities prescribed by the laws.
Mass. Const. Pt. I, Art. XIV.
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the owner of the automobile had taken no other steps to conceal the parked
automobile from public view.” Id. at 1016. See also United States v.
Blaylock, 535 F.3d 922, 926-927 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that a
warrantless search of a car parked in the defendant’s driveway was subject
to the federal warrant exception), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 830 (2009);
Keehn v. State, 279 S.W.3d 330, 336 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (holding that
the federal automobile exception applies to automobiles parked in a private
driveway).9
In the instant appeal, appellee claims that he had an expectation of
privacy in his driveway. (See appellee’s brief at 43.) The facts of this case,
however, do not indicate that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists
here. Much like the defendants in Simmen and A Juvenile, appellee’s
truck was visible on the driveway in plain view from the street. Specifically,
Schenck’s father observed the truck parked in appellee’s driveway and noted
that it matched a description of the truck provided by Schenck. (Notes of
testimony, 2/18/14 at 160-161.) Schenck was then subsequently able to
identify the truck. (Id. at 161.) Since the truck was visible in plain view
from the street while parked in appellee’s driveway, appellee did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his driveway.
9
Texas adopted the federal automobile exception in Keehn. Id. at 335.
The provision of the Texas Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches
and seizures is virtually identical to Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, supra. See Tex. Const. Art. I, § 9.
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Appellee also claims that the Commonwealth does not adequately
demonstrate that there were exigent circumstances justifying the
warrantless seizure of appellee’s truck. Specifically, appellee argues that the
police being unable to procure personnel to secure the truck while a warrant
was pending, in addition to weather concerns that the police may have had,
were not grounds for exigent circumstances. (Appellee’s brief at 44-46.)
The suppression court agreed with appellee, determining that no exigent
circumstances existed to justify a warrantless seizure of appellee’s truck.
(Findings of fact and conclusions of law, 3/17/14 at 11.) In light of our
supreme court’s recent decision in Gary, we hold that the mere mobility of
the truck itself is adequate for a finding of exigent circumstances, and that
the Commonwealth has met its burden in demonstrating that exigent
circumstances existed at the time the truck was seized. We further hold that
Gary applies to vehicles parked in driveways at private residences, because
driveways are not part of a home’s curtilage, and an individual does not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy over the driveway. See Simmen,
supra at 815. We note that in its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the
suppression court did not reach a determination on whether the
Commonwealth adequately demonstrated probable cause. We therefore
remand to the suppression court so that a probable cause determination can
be made.
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Our third and final issue for review is whether the trial court erred by
excluding the audio recording of Schenck’s 911 call.
[T]he admission of evidence is within the sound
discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only
upon a showing that the trial court clearly abused its
discretion. Admissibility depends on relevance and
probative value. Evidence is relevant if it logically
tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends
to make a fact at issue more or less probable or
supports a reasonable inference or presumption
regarding a material fact. Evidence, even if relevant,
may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed
by the potential prejudice.
Commonwealth v. Fransen, 42 A.3d 1100, 1106 (Pa.Super. 2012),
appeal denied, 76 A.3d 538 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted). See also
Commonwealth v. Jordan, 65 A.3d 318, 325 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied,
134 S.Ct. 1275 (2014) (discusses the balancing of evidentiary value against
potential dangers of unfair prejudice and inflaming the passions of the jury).
This court, in a previous case determining whether an audio recording
of a 911 call was admissible, applied the same balancing test that is applied
to other forms of demonstrative evidence. Commonwealth v. Groff, 514
A.2d 1382, 1384 (Pa.Super. 1986), appeal denied, 531 A.2d 428 (Pa.
1987). Our supreme court provided a balancing test for trial courts to
consider for the admission of potentially inflammatory evidence:
First a trial court must determine whether the
[demonstrative evidence] is inflammatory. If not, it
may be admitted if it has relevance and can assist
the jury’s understanding of the facts. If the
[demonstrative evidence] is inflammatory, the trial
court must decide whether or not the [demonstrative
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evidence is] of such essential evidentiary value that
their need clearly outweighs the likelihood of
inflaming the minds and passions of the jurors.
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 42 A.3d 1017, 1033-1034 (Pa. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S.Ct. 1795 (2013) (considering photographs) (citations
omitted). We find Groff to be analogous because the 911 recording in that
case contained screams of a murder victim and her children. Id.In the instant appeal, the Commonwealth seeks to introduce an audio
recording of the 911 call placed by Schenck from July 24, 2012. There is no
dispute that the recording of the call, in which Schenck witnessed McCallick
being run over by a truck, is relevant. Sounds from McCallick are audible on
the recording, which defense counsel claims could potentially “curry
empathy and sympathy from the jury.” (Notes of testimony, 2/18/14 at
236.) The Commonwealth claims that Schenck’s state of mind must be
understood, as he was an eyewitness to the incident. (Id. at 237.)
Here, we find that the suppression court did not abuse its discretion
when it suppressed the audio recording of Schenck’s call to 911. Much like
the 911 recording in Groff, the 911 recording here contains sounds
emanating from Ms. McCallick, who had just been hit by a pickup truck.
Such sounds run a very high risk of inflaming the jury’s passions as
contemplated in Johnson. Furthermore, any probative value of an audio
recording of Schenck’s 911 call would be significantly outweighed by its
potential prejudicial value, particularly when a transcript of the 911 call is
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available for use at trial. Therefore, the suppression court did not err when
it held that the audio version of Schenck’s 911 call was inadmissible for trial,
and we affirm the suppression court’s order on this issue.
Order reversed in part and affirmed in part. Case remanded for
further proceedings. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/23/2015
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