Com. v. Santiago, R.

J-S41004-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
RICHARD SANTIAGO :
:
Appellant : No. 3727 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 18, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-09-CR-0004133-2017
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 22, 2018
Appellant Richard Santiago appeals the judgment of sentence entered
by the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County after Appellant was convicted
of Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Deliver (PWID),
Possession of a Controlled Substance, and Use/Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia.1 Appellant claims the trial court erred in denying his
suppression motion. We affirm.
On May 24, 2017, Appellant was arrested and charged with the
aforementioned offenses and on October 4, 2017, Appellant filed a motion to
suppress evidence obtained from the stop of his vehicle. On October 17,
2017, the trial court held a suppression hearing at which the Commonwealth
presented the testimony of Trooper Thomas Fleisher.
____________________________________________
1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), (a)(16), and (a)(32), respectively.
____________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S41004-18
Trooper Fleisher has been employed by the State Police for over ten
years and has served as member of the Drug Law Enforcement Division’s
Eastern Shield Unit since September 2013. This unit is primarily tasked with
patrolling highways to promote public safety and detect contraband.
Trooper Fleisher testified that he has extensive experience with the
interdiction of contraband on highways and claimed to have conducted
thousands of arrests. Trooper Fleisher indicated that he has attended
additional continuing education classes to remain knowledgeable on drug
interdiction trends.
Trooper Fleisher testified that on May 24, 2017, at approximately 12:25
p.m., he was on patrol in a marked vehicle on the Pennsylvania Turnpike in
Bensalem Township near the Pennsylvania-New Jersey border. At this time,
he observed a green 1998 Acura Integra traveling eastbound toward New
Jersey. Trooper Fleisher noticed that the Acura was following a construction
vehicle too closely; although the vehicles were travelling between 55-65 miles
per hour, the Acura was less than a car length away from the construction
vehicle. Based on this observation, Trooper Fleisher initiated a traffic stop.
Trooper Fleisher approached the Acura, which had very dark window
tinting which prevented Trooper Fleisher from viewing inside of the vehicle.
Trooper Fleisher noted that the dark tinting raised suspicion as such tinting is
often used to conceal activity within a vehicle. After Trooper Fleisher informed
the driver, Appellant, that he was stopped for following the truck too closely
-2-
J-S41004-18
and asked for Appellant’s license and registration, Appellant complied with
the trooper’s direction.
Trooper Fleisher noticed that Appellant’s vehicle had a single key in the
ignition. Based on his training and experience, Trooper Fleisher knew it was
common practice of drug traffickers to employ “work vehicles” that several
employees of the drug distribution organization can access for deliveries. In
addition, Trooper Fleisher made note of the vehicle’s windshield stickers
supporting the Police Benevolent Association and Teamsters; in Trooper
Fleisher’s experience, he learned that drug traffickers would often display
similar stickers to appear aligned with the interests of police officers.
Trooper Fleisher asked Appellant where he was going; Appellant told the
officer that he was coming from Parx Casino and was in the area looking for
work. Trooper Fleisher found this explanation to be strange as Appellant was
wearing sweatpants, a T-shirt, and sandals at that time. Trooper Fleisher also
noted that he had stopped Appellant’s vehicle at the Bristol exit of the
Turnpike, which is known to be a drug trafficking corridor.
Trooper Fleisher returned to his patrol car to run Appellant’s license and
registration. A criminal history check revealed that Appellant had prior
convictions in New Jersey for possession of a controlled substance with intent
to deliver a well as a bench warrant from South Carolina for forgery, which
was not an extraditable offense. Trooper Fleisher also learned that the Acura
was registered to a third party female from Perth, New Jersey.
-3-
J-S41004-18
While Trooper Fleisher was obtaining this information in his patrol car,
he received a call from Trooper Justin Hope, who was also on patrol in this
same area at that time. Trooper Hope informed Trooper Fleisher that he had
observed Appellant’s vehicle traveling in the opposite direction on the Turnpike
just an hour earlier. Based on this information, Trooper Fleisher suspected
that Appellant had previously lied about his whereabouts before the traffic
stop, and concluded that this timeframe would allow Appellant to make a short
trip, arrange a drug transaction, and return within a short timeframe. Trooper
Fleisher testified that traveling between Pennsylvania and New Jersey in a
short time span was consistent with drug trafficking activity.
When Trooper Fleisher returned to Appellant’s vehicle, he asked
Appellant to step out of the vehicle and approach the back of the vehicle,
where they could speak away from the traffic. Trooper Fleisher asked for
Appellant’s consent to a patdown, which Appellant permitted. Thereafter,
Trooper Fleisher told Appellant that he would issue him a warning for the
vehicle code violation of following too closely, but did not tell Appellant he was
free to leave.
Trooper Fleisher asked Appellant about his criminal history, after which
Appellant told the officer about his South Carolina warrant. In addition,
Trooper Fleisher again asked Appellant what time he had come to
Pennsylvania that morning, and Appellant indicated that he had arrived in
Pennsylvania at about 8:30 or 9:30 a.m. Trooper Fleisher found this
statement reaffirmed his belief that Appellant was lying about his whereabouts
-4-
J-S41004-18
that morning as Trooper Hope had observed his vehicle traveling into
Pennsylvania between 11 and 11:30 a.m.
Thereafter, Trooper Fleisher asked Appellant for permission to search
his vehicle. Appellant gave his consent, reading and signing a written waiver
form agreeing to the search. Upon searching the vehicle, Trooper Fleisher
looked behind the front passenger seat and discovered a shopping bag filled
with other bags of heroin wrapped in newspaper. Appellant was placed under
arrest for PWID and was given his Miranda rights. Appellant admitted
knowing that the heroin was in the vehicle.
After the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court denied Appellant’s
suppression motion. Appellant proceeded to a stipulated bench trial at which
the trial court convicted Appellant of the aforementioned offenses. The lower
court sentenced Appellant to two and a half (2½) to five (5) years’
imprisonment. This timely appeal followed.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
A. Did the lower court err in holding that the trooper had
reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative detention of
Appellant following a traffic stop?
B. Did the lower court err in finding that Appellant’s consent to
the search was valid and was not tainted by the preceding
illegal detention?
Appellant’s brief, at 4.
In reviewing a trial court’s decision to deny a suppression motion, our
standard of review is as follows:
-5-
J-S41004-18
In reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, our role is
to determine [] whether the suppression court's factual
findings are supported by the record and whether the legal
conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the
Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we
may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and
so much of the evidence for the defense as remains
uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a
whole. Where the suppression court's factual findings are
supported by the record, we are bound by these findings
and may reverse only if the court's legal conclusions are
erroneous. Where, as here, the appeal of the determination
of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error,
the suppression court's legal conclusions are not binding on
an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the
suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.
Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject
to our plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 605 Pa. 188, 988 A.2d 649, 654
(2010) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Our scope of
review is limited to the evidence presented at the suppression
hearing. In re L.J., 622 Pa. 126, 79 A.3d 1073, 1080 (2013).
Commonwealth v. Thran, 185 A.3d 1041, 1043 (Pa.Super. 2018) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Mackey, 177 A.3d 221, 226 (Pa.Super. 2017)).
Appellant concedes that Trooper Fleisher lawfully conducted a traffic
stop of his vehicle and had the right to ask Appellant to step out of the vehicle
during the stop. However, Appellant argues that Trooper Fleisher did not have
the authority to continue his investigative detention once his driver’s license
and registration were determined to be valid. As Appellant argues that
Trooper Fleisher did not have reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity to
justify any additional questioning, he asserts that he was subjected to an
unreasonable seizure that invalidated his consent to the search of vehicle. As
-6-
J-S41004-18
a result, Appellant claims that the heroin subsequently seized from the vehicle
should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.
Given that there is no dispute as to the legality of the initial traffic stop,
we will first analyze whether Trooper Fleisher had the authority to continue to
detain Appellant and ask him additional questions. This Court has held:
When conducting a routine traffic stop, an officer may request a
driver's license and vehicle registration, run a computer check and
issue a citation. Upon producing a valid driver's license and
registration, the driver must be allowed to proceed on his way,
without being subject to further delay by police for additional
questioning. In order to justify detaining the driver for further
questioning, the officer must have reasonable suspicion of illegal
transactions in drugs or of any other serious crime.
Commonwealth v. Lopez, 609 A.2d 177, 181-82 (Pa.Super. 1992) (citations
and quotation marks omitted).
In determining whether an officer may continue to detain an individual
beyond an initial traffic stop, our courts have held the following:
A police officer may detain an individual in order to conduct an
investigation if that officer reasonably suspects that the individual
is engaging in criminal conduct. Commonwealth v. Cook, 558
Pa. 50, 735 A.2d 673, 676 (1999). “This standard, less stringent
than probable cause, is commonly known as reasonable
suspicion.” Id. In order to determine whether the police officer
had reasonable suspicion, the totality of the circumstances must
be considered. In re D.M., 566 Pa. 445, 781 A.2d 1161, 1163
(2001). In making this determination, we must give “due weight
... to the specific reasonable inferences [the police officer] is
entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.” Cook,
735 A.2d at 676 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct.
1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). Also, the totality of the
circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an examination of
only those facts that clearly indicate criminal conduct. Rather,
“even a combination of innocent facts, when taken together, may
-7-
J-S41004-18
warrant further investigation by the police officer.” Cook, 735
A.2d at 676.
Commonwealth v. Kemp, 961 A.2d 1247, 1255 (Pa.Super. 2008) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Rogers, 578 Pa. 127, 134, 849 A.2d 1185, 1189 (2004)).
In Kemp, this Court concluded that an officer was justified in detaining the
appellant beyond the initial traffic stop as the officer had reasonable suspicion
that the appellant was engaged in criminal activity based on, inter alia, the
trooper’s extensive training in drug trafficking detection, the appellant’s use
of a large amount of air fresheners to mask scents in his vehicle, and the
appellant’s use of a vehicle registered to a third-party).
In this case, after Trooper Fleisher conducted a valid traffic stop of
Appellant’s vehicle and determined that he had a valid license and registration
for the vehicle, he was required to demonstrate that he had reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity to detain Appellant beyond the initial traffic stop.
After reviewing the totality of the circumstances in this case, we agree
with the trial court’s that Trooper Fleisher had reasonable suspicion to believe
that Appellant was engaged in criminal activity. The trial court specifically
found:
[t]he following factors when considered in their totality, would
cause a reasonable police officer with Trooper Fleisher’s
experience to believe there was reasonable suspicion that criminal
activity was afoot: (1) Appellant drove a vehicle registered to
another person; (2) the vehicle had dark tinted windows; (3)
Appellant traveled along a known drug corridor; (4) the vehicle
had Police Benevolent Association and Teamster disclaimers,
presumably displayed to curry favor with law enforcement; (5)
Appellant operated the vehicle using a single key, a known drug
trafficking indicator; (6) Appellant had a criminal history including
-8-
J-S41004-18
drug offenses; (7) South Carolina had an outstanding bench
warrant for Appellant; and (8) Appellant lied to Trooper Fleisher
about his purpose for traveling to New Jersey as contradicted by
Appellant’s outfit and Trooper Hope. … The instant facts, viewed
as a reasonable person with Trooper Fleisher’s experience,
amount to reasonable suspicion.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/30/18, at 9.
Although Appellant argues that each of these facts do not necessarily
show that Appellant was involved in criminal activity, when considering all of
the facts together in light of Trooper Fleisher’s extensive training and
experience in drug trafficking detection on Pennsylvania highways, we find it
reasonable for the trial court to give weight to Trooper Fleisher’s inferences
that Appellant was involved in drug trafficking. See Commonwealth v.
Newsome, 170 A.3d 1151, 1154 (2017) (emphasizing that “[a]n appellate
court must give weight to the specific, reasonable inferences drawn from the
facts in light of the officer's experience and acknowledge that innocent facts,
when considered collectively, may permit the investigative detention”)
(citation omitted).
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in rejecting Appellant’s claim that
Trooper Fleisher’s continued investigation beyond the initial traffic stop
constituted an illegal seizure. Thus, based on this conclusion, we need not
review Appellant’s claim that his consent to the search of the vehicle was
invalidated by the allegedly illegal seizure of his person.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
-9-
J-S41004-18
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/22/18
- 10 -