Schottmiller, J. v. Grace, G.

J. A17037/19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
JENNIE L. SCHOTTMILLER, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 2549 EDA 2018
:
GEOFFREY B. GRACE :
Appeal from the Order Entered August 3, 2018,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Domestic Relations Division at No. 2012DR00602
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 25, 2019
Jennie L. Schottmiller (“Mother”) appeals pro se from the August 3,
2018 order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County that
continued the monthly support obligation of Geoffrey B. Grace (“Father”) for
the support of the parties’ adult child, Abigail Jane Grace (“Abigail”), who
attained the age of 18 in July 2018, in the amount of $900 and then reduced
the monthly support obligation to $600, effective September 1, 2018; with a
further reduction of monthly support to $300, effective November 1, 2018;
and termination of monthly support on December 31, 2018 as a result of the
trial court’s emancipation determination. The August 3, 2018 order also
directed Father to reimburse Mother for unreimbursed medical expenses for
Abigail in the amount of $2,752.74. We affirm.
The trial court set forth the following:
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[Mother and Father] were married on May 21, 1994
and had a child together with the [name Abigail]. The
parties were divorced on September 14, 2004. A
Complaint for Support was first filed by [Mother] on
April 23, 2012. Subsequent support issues over the
years were held before the Honorable Susan Devlin
Scott and the Honorable James M. McMaster in the
Bucks County Court of Common Pleas. On March 12,
2018, Judge McMaster Ordered that effective
January 1, 2018, [Father] would be responsible for
sharing the cost of [Abigail’s] psychological
treatment. The expenses would be shared by the
parties with [Father] paying fifty-five percent and
[Mother] paying forty-five percent of the costs. The
matter which is the subject of this appeal was brought
before [the trial c]ourt on August 3, 2018 and was
primarily to make a determination as to whether
[Abigail] was emancipated. In addition, the [trial
c]ourt was asked to make a determination regarding
unreimbursed medical expenses.
Trial court opinion, 10/26/18 at 1.
At the hearing, Mother testified that Abigail “was first diagnosed with
anorexia, which was changed to restrictive eating disorder, that she was
diagnosed with Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder, and that she has a ‘mild
diagnosis of cannabis abuse, which she uses for coping.’” (Id. at 5 (record
citation omitted).) Both Mother and Abigail testified as to Abigail’s mental
health and her ability to attain employment.
Following the hearing, the trial court entered the August 3, 2018 order.
Mother filed a timely notice of appeal. The trial court ordered Mother to file a
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Mother timely complied. Thereafter, the trial court filed
its Rule 1925(b) opinion.
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Mother raises the following issues for our review:
1. Future emancipation date: Did the trial court
misapply the law and abuse its discretion in
setting a future date for emancipation based on
speculative events, whereby the two-part test
to determine self-support cannot be applied
immediately prior to emancipation?
2. Credit during residential treatment: Did the
trial court misapply the law and abuse its
discretion in awarding Father a refund of $1,500
for two separate, temporary, 30-day periods of
residential treatment?
3. Deviation of support: Did the trial court
misapply the law and abuse its discretion in
ordering two staggered downward deviations in
future support without a valid, written basis?
4. Lack of due process: Did the trial court abuse
its discretion and violate due process in ruling
without affording the opportunity to testify,
examine or cross-examine witnesses or present
evidence and by failing to rule on the Petition
for Modification?
Mother’s brief at 2-3.
In reviewing an order entered in a support proceeding,
an appellate court has a limited scope of review. The
trial court possesses wide discretion as to the proper
amount of child support and a reviewing court will not
interfere with the determination of the court below
unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. The
function of the appellate court is to determine whether
there is sufficient evidence to sustain the order of the
hearing judge. An abuse of discretion is not merely
an error of judgment; rather, it occurs when the law
is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment
exercised is manifestly unreasonable or the result of
partiality, bias or ill-will.
Style v. Schaub, 955 A.2d 403, 406-407 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted).
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In Pennsylvania, the duty to support a child generally
ceases when the child reaches the age of majority,
which is defined as either eighteen years of age or
when the child graduates from high school, whichever
comes later. Blue v. Blue, 532 Pa. 521, 616 A.2d
628 (1992). 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4321(3), however,
provides that “[p]arents may be liable for the support
of their children who are 18 years of age or older.” In
applying section 4321(3), this Court has found that
there is a presumption that the duty to support a child
ends when the child reaches majority:
Ordinarily a parent is not required to
support his adult child but there is a well
recognized exception supported by
abundant authority that where such child
is too feeble physically or mentally to
support itself the duty on the parent
continues after the child has attained its
majority.
Commonwealth ex. rel. O’Malley v. O’Malley, 105
Pa. Super. 232, 161 A. 883, 884 (Pa. Super. 1932);
see also Verna v. Verna, 288 Pa. Super. 511, 432
A.2d 630, 632 (Pa. Super. 1981); Colantoni v.
Colantoni, 220 Pa. Super. 46, 281 A.2d 662, 664
(1971).
Style, 955 A.2d at 408.
“When the disability resulting in the child’s inability to be self-sufficient
already exists at the time the child reaches the age of majority, . . . the
presumption is rebuttable by the adult child upon proof that there are
‘conditions that make it impossible for her or him to be employed.’” Id. at
409. To rebut the presumption, “the test is whether the adult child is
physically and mentally able to engage in profitable employment and whether
employment is available to the adult child at a supporting wage.” Id.-4-
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(citations omitted). The adult child bears the burden of proof. Id. “Our scope
of review is limited to a determination of whether the trial court committed an
abuse of discretion or an error of law when making a determination in this
regard.” Id. (citations omitted).
Here, because Abigail had turned 18 and completed high school, the
presumption arose that Father’s legal obligation to pay child support had
ended. The presumption, however, was rebuttable by Abigail upon proof that
her disability prevented her from being self-supporting. In finding that Abigail
failed to rebut the presumption, the trial court explained that
[t]he Order in this matter takes into consideration the
nature of [Abigail’s] mental health conditions and is
tailored around the treatment that she is receiving
and her employment capabilities. While the [t]rial
[c]ourt does not wish to minimize [Abigail’s]
condition(s), and is sympathetic to her issues, the
purported condition(s) do not seem equivalent to
those referenced in cases in which the rebuttable
presumption was met and emancipation was denied.
At the hearing on this matter, [Abigail] testified that
she was currently going to treatment at Monte Nido in
Villanova, PA, which is about forty-five minutes from
her house. [Abigail] drove herself to treatment five
days per week, and stayed in treatment for about
eight hours a day. According to [Abigail’s] testimony,
this intensive treatment was set to continue for
another four to six weeks. Subsequently, [Abigail]
would be attending an intensive outpatient program
in Villanova for about nine hours per week. Once that
was completed, [Abigail] would be going to outpatient
treatment in Newtown, close to home, for about two
days per week. Based on the information provided, it
was clear to the [trial c]ourt that [Abigail’s] mental
health condition at that time was not a permanent one
that would prevent her from acquiring self-supporting
employment.
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[Abigail] also testified to her ability to work and that
she is planning on attending Bucks County Community
College in January. She testified that she does see
herself going to college in January of 2019 and getting
a part-time job. [Abigail] has previously had two
part-time jobs where she was a hostess at an Italian
restaurant and a waiter in an “old folks home.” This
testimony demonstrated the subject child is physically
and mentally able to engage in profitable employment
and such employment is available to the child at a
supporting wage, all of which is directly inconsistent
with [Mother’s] contention that the child should not be
emancipated as it was insufficient to rebut the
presumption.
It is the opinion of [the trial c]ourt that [Abigail] has
previously found and maintained gainful employment
and will soon be able to find self-supporting
employment again, despite the fact that her current
treatment schedule did not allow time for employment
at the time.
Trial court opinion, 10/16/18 at 7-8 (citations to notes of testimony omitted).
Based on these findings, the trial court entered the order that reduced
Father’s monthly child support obligation over a five-month period, at which
time support would terminate due to Abigail’s emancipation. Our review of
the record compels the conclusion that there is sufficient evidence to sustain
the order and that the trial court did not commit an abuse of discretion.
Mother, however, contends that the trial court abused its discretion in
setting December 31, 2018 as the emancipation date because the
determination was based on “speculative events, whereby the two-part test
cannot be applied.” (Mother’s brief at 23.) Mother notes that “[n]o case
authorities demonstrate a reasonable way to predict a future date when an
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adult child, unemancipated due to a mental health condition, will become
self-supporting and there is no reasonable way to predict this for Abigail.”
(Id. at 30.) By so arguing, Mother asks this court to ignore the factual findings
that the trial court made after hearing Abigail’s testimony about her progress
and future plans and to speculate that Abigail will be unable to support herself
in the future. We decline Mother’s invitation because this court’s function is
to determine whether the record contains sufficient evidence to sustain the
trial court’s order. See Styles, 955 A.2d at 406. In this case, it does.
We also note that in her brief, Mother excerpts from the hearing
transcript certain comments made by the trial court in an effort to bolster her
abuse of discretion claim. In so doing, Mother takes the trial court’s comments
out of context. For example, Mother claims that the trial court disregarded
the two-part emancipation test and determined Abigail’s emancipation date
because she was capable of “doing things.” (Mother’s brief at 24.) A review
of the transcript, however, reveals that the trial court was merely explaining
that in the cases that declined to find emancipation, there were “drastic,
drastic, drastic problems for a person that renders them essentially incapable
of doing things.” (Notes of testimony, 8/3/18 at 10.) By way of further
example, Mother claims that the trial court disregarded the emancipation
standard that requires a finding that the adult child is capable of being
“entirely self-supporting” because the trial court stated that Abigail “doesn’t
have to be able to support herself completely or fully necessarily.” (Mother’s
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brief at 34-35, citing Com. ex rel. Cann v. Cann, 418 A.2d 403, 405
(Pa.Super. 1980).)1 A review of the transcript, however, reveals that
immediately preceding this comment, the trial court had asked Mother if there
was “any kind of a medical report from a treatment provider that addresses
the issues about whether [Abigail is] capable of supporting herself in some
way” and merely noted that such a report need not state that Abigail is fully
self-supporting. (Notes of testimony, 8/3/18 at 9.) By way of final example,
Mother claims that the trial court disregarded the law and made its decision
by doing its self-described “job [of] being ‘fair’ [and] break[ing] the tie
between the parents.” (Mother’s brief at 38.) A review of the transcript,
however, reveals that the trial court recognized that Abigail became emotional
during her testimony, the trial court assured Abigail that her parents love her,
and then the trial court said to Abigail that “when [people] can’t come to an
agreement, I have to break the tie.” (Notes of testimony, 8/3/18 at 19.)
We further note that despite Mother’s allegations of abuse of discretion
based on comments that the trial court made at the hearing, the record
reflects that Mother never placed any objections on the record. Therefore,
notwithstanding the fact that the trial court’s innocuous comments do not
support a finding of abuse of discretion, Mother’s failure to object to any and
all of the statements she now complains about results in waiver of her claims
1We note an error in the citation that Mother provided for this case, but we
were nevertheless able to locate the authority.
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on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (issues not raised in the lower court are
waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).
Mother next claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it
awarded Father a support credit of $1,500 because the credit cannot be
supported by the record or by the law.
Here, there is no dispute that Abigail was in a residential treatment
facility for two months in 2018. There is also no dispute that Father paid
55 percent of unreimbursed medical expenses for the residential treatment,
as well as $900 per month in support during Abigail’s inpatient stay. The trial
court determined that Father’s payment of his share of the unreimbursed
medical expenses, together with his child support payments, resulted in a
double dip because Abigail’s inpatient treatment included the cost of housing
and food. (Notes of testimony, 8/3/18 at 8, 25; trial court opinion, 10/16/18
at 9-10.) The trial court further recognized that even though Abigail was in
residential treatment, Mother still had household expenses associated with
Abigail’s support during those two months. (Notes of testimony, 8/3/18 at
25.) As such, the trial court awarded Father a partial credit of the
unreimbursed medical expenses that he owed Mother in the amount of
$1,500. (Id. at 25.) Although Mother is clearly unhappy with the amount of
the credit and maintains that the support she provided to maintain the home
during Abigail’s absence cost her more than $300, we find no abuse of
discretion.
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Mother next complains that the trial court misapplied the law and abused
its discretion when it “order[ed] two staggered downward deviations in future
support without a valid, written basis.” (Mother’s brief at 47.) Mother relies
on Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.16-5(a) that requires the trial court to place, in writing or
on the record, its reasons for deviating from the amount of support
determined by the guidelines. Mother also cites to Crawford v. Crawford,
633 A.2d 155 (Pa.Super. 1993), for the proposition that the guidelines apply
to unemancipated adults. (Mother’s brief at 48.) Although Mother correctly
sets forth the rules of law, they are inapplicable to this case. As the trial court
explained,
the hearing that is the subject of this appeal was not
held for the purpose of modifying support and the
Order is not a support modification. Rather, the
primary focus of this matter was to determine whether
[Abigail] was emancipated now that she had turned
eighteen and graduated high school. . . .
....
The [trial c]ourt considered the factors set forth above
related to emancipation and considered the testimony
presented. Based on the lack of evidence showing
that [Abigail] was unable to find self-supporting
employment, [the trial c]ourt’s inclination was to
grant the emancipation, but in recognition of
[Abigail’s] then current treatment schedule, the [trial
c]ourt phased out the support payments to [Mother’s]
benefit, rather than immediately terminating support.
Trial court opinion, 10/16/18 at 10-11. The trial court neither misapplied the
law nor abused its discretion.
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Mother finally claims that the emancipation hearing violated her due
process rights because she was not permitted to present evidence or to
cross-examine Abigail and because the trial court did not provide sufficient
time for the proceedings. The record belies Mother’s claims. When asked
what evidence Mother had to establish Abigail’s condition and her inability to
work, Mother merely stated that she “was under the impression that if [she]
brought a letter it would be hearsay and inadmissible, so [she] didn’t do that.”
(Notes of testimony, 8/3/18 at 10.) With respect to cross-examination of
Abigail, nothing in the record supports Mother’s contention that the trial court
precluded either party from cross-examining Abigail. As for Mother’s claim
that the trial court did not afford sufficient time for the proceedings, the record
reflects that the trial court was forced to recess the proceedings because
Mother “was under the impression” that Abigail would testify after lunch which
made Abigail unavailable when the trial court wanted to hear her testimony.2
(Id. at 11.)3 We have thoroughly reviewed the hearing transcript, and it fails
to support any violation of Mother’s due process rights.
2 The record reflects that trial court informed Mother that “[t]hat was a bad
idea” and that the trial court “didn’t tell you to do that.” Mother apologized.
(Notes of testimony, 8/3/18 at 11.)
3 We note that Mother also raises substantially similar complaints that she
raised in her second issue on appeal regarding her contention that the trial
court misapplied the law in order to support her due process argument. We
need not address those arguments again here. Mother also takes various
statements made by the trial court and Father’s counsel out of context to
bolster her due process violation argument. As stated, we have thoroughly
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Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/25/19
reviewed the hearing transcript, and it fails to support any violation of Mother’s
due process rights.
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