Com. v. Ingram, R.

J-A25024-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
RONALD INGRAM
Appellant No. 3433 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 27, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0004131-2013
BEFORE: DONOHUE, J., MUNDY, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED DECEMBER 01, 2015
Appellant, Ronald Ingram, appeals from the October 27, 2014
aggregate judgment of sentence of 81 to 162 months’ incarceration,
imposed following his conviction by a jury of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver (PWID) and tampering with evidence.1 After
careful review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the factual background of this case as
follows.
Appellant was arrested on April 30, 2013 at
approximately 1:00 a.m. as a result of a vehicle stop
conducted by two Pennsylvania State Police Officers
in a marked patrol vehicle. The Troopers were
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30) and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4910(1), respectively.
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driving northbound on I-95 in the vicinity of Upper
Chichester, Delaware County, Pennsylvania at mile
marker two. Trooper Richardson observed a
Chevrolet Cruze vehicle in the center lane with a
right taillight that was cracked and the vehicle was
clocked traveling approximately 65 mph in a 55 mph
zone. [] Appellant, the sole occupant of the
speeding vehicle, stopped his vehicle at the exit
ramp for Route 452. Trooper Richardson testified
that he asked [] Appellant to step out of his vehicle
and [Appellant] reached for a duffel bag on the front
passenger-side seat and retrieved a vial. As []
Appellant exited the vehicle, he pulled out the vial
and smashed it on the ground. The two Troopers
could smell [phencyclidine,] PCP. [] Appellant was
arrested and placed in handcuffs.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/14/15, at 1-2.
Following his arrest, Appellant was charged with numerous offenses
including those mentioned above.2 Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial
motion including a motion to suppress statements and physical evidence. A
hearing on Appellant’s motion was held on January 10, 2014, at which
Trooper Richardson was the only witness. On January 27, 2014, the trial
court issued an order, including its findings of fact and conclusions of law,
which, inter alia, denied Appellant’s motion to suppress physical evidence.
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2
In addition to PWID and tampering with evidence, Appellant was charged
with two counts each of aggravated assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(3);
simple assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1); recklessly endangering another
person, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705; and one count each of intentional possession
of a controlled substance, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16); and possession of drug
paraphernalia, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32). Appellant was also cited with two
summary traffic offenses for a defective taillight, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4303(b);
and speeding, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3362(a). All these additional charges were
either dismissed by the trial court or withdrawn by the Commonwealth prior
to trial.
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The matter proceeded to a jury trial, commencing on September 30,
2014. On October 2, 2014, the jury returned a verdict of guilty for PWID
and tampering with evidence. On October 27, 2014, the trial court
sentenced Appellant to a term of incarceration of six to 12 years on the
PWID count and a consecutive term of incarceration of nine to 18 months on
the tampering with evidence count. Appellant did not file a post-sentence
motion. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on November 23, 2014.3
On appeal appellant raises a single question for our consideration.
Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s
pretrial motion to suppress, where an officer
conducted an investigative detention, by ordering
Appellant to exit his vehicle, when the officer did not
have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was
afoot?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
When reviewing a challenge to a trial court’s denial of a suppression
motion, we observe the following principles.
[An appellate court’s] standard of review in
addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression
motion is limited to determining whether the
suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn
from those facts are correct. Because the
Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression
court, we may consider only the evidence of the
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3
Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure 1925. The trial court’s 1925(a) opinion incorporates by
reference its January 27, 2014 order, findings and conclusions. Trial Court
Opinion, 1/14/15, at 3.
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Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the
defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the
context of the record as a whole. Where the
suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
the record, [the appellate court is] bound by [those]
findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal
conclusions are erroneous. Where … the appeal of
the determination of the suppression court turns on
allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s
legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate
court, whose duty it is to determine if the
suppression court properly applied the law to the
facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts
below are subject to [] plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Garibay, 106 A.3d 136, 138-139 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en
banc), appeal denied, --- A.3d ---, 2015 WL 5972499 (Pa. 2015). Our scope
of review is limited to the suppression hearing record. In re L.J., 79 A.3d
1073, 1080 (Pa. 2013).
In evaluating the level of interaction [between a
police officer and a defendant], courts conduct an
objective examination of the totality of the
surrounding circumstances. We are bound by the
suppression court’s factual findings, if supported by
the record; however, the question presented—
whether a seizure occurred—is a pure question of
law subject to plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Lyles, 97 A.3d 298, 302 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted).
Based on the testimony received during the suppression motion
hearing, the trial court summarized its findings of fact concerning the
circumstances as they developed during the subject traffic stop. After
Appellant pulled over, as recited above, the following occurred.
[Trooper Richardson] approached [Appellant’s]
vehicle from the passenger side, as was his general
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practice. He asked [Appellant], who was the sole
occupant of the vehicle, for his driver’s license,
registration and insurance information. [Appellant]
produced a New York driver’s license, and a rental
agreement for the vehicle. … The Trooper then
explained to [Appellant] why he stopped him and
told him he was going to give him a warning.
As the Trooper approached the car he realized that
the rear light was stuck in the “on” position and was
not cracked as he had originally thought. Trooper
Wiley was also outside the police vehicle. When
Trooper Richardson initially approached the vehicle,
he testified that he smelled some type of chemical
odor but he was not sure what it was.
Once Trooper Richardson received [Appellant’s]
license, he used his patrol vehicle’s computer and
ran a check of [Appellant] through NCIC. The
Trooper learned that [Appellant’s] name was on the
rental car agreement. The NCIC check also
produced an extensive rap sheet for [Appellant].
[Appellant] had been convicted of possession of a
firearm and robbery and other crimes from New
Jersey, Delaware, Texas and Maryland.
Trooper Richardson determined that [Appellant’s]
vehicle was rented in Philadelphia, however
[Appellant] told the Officer that he had rented the
vehicle in New Jersey and was headed to New Jersey
to return the vehicle.
Trooper Richardson had decided to give [Appellant] a
warning for the two traffic violations but was unable
to print the warning because the printer in his
vehicle was not working. The Trooper exited the
patrol vehicle and approached the passenger-side of
[Appellant’s] vehicle and asked him to step out of
the car. Trooper Richardson wanted to show
[Appellant] the broken tail light. When the Officer
asked [Appellant] to step out, [Appellant] grabbed
the gear shift knob and the ignition keys, then
reached for a duffle bag on the front passenger-side
seat and retrieved a vial. Trooper Richardson
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backed up to the rear of the vehicle and drew his
firearm. [Appellant] put both of his hands in his
pockets. As [Appellant] reached into the duffel bag,
the Trooper was concerned that he had a weapon.
As [Appellant] exited the vehicle, he pulled out the
vial and smashed it on the ground. Trooper
Richardson could smell PCP.
Trial Court Order and Findings, 1/27/14, at 2-3.
From these findings, the trial court determined that the traffic stop
was not completed at the time Trooper Richardson asked Appellant to step
out of the vehicle. Trial Court Order and Findings, 1/27/14, at 6. The trial
court found that Trooper Richardson merely asked Appellant to exit the
vehicle in order to show him the defective taillight before issuing the warning
and terminating the stop.4 Id. The trial court determined that the police
officers did not need reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to request an
occupant to exit a vehicle during a lawful traffic stop. Id. at 5.
“As a matter of precaution, a police officer is entitled to ask occupants
of a vehicle to step from the vehicle during a traffic stop.” Commonwealth
v. Van Winkle, 880 A.2d 1280, 1285 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations omitted),
appeal denied, 898 A.2d 1071 (Pa. 2006). “[F]ollowing a lawful traffic stop,
an officer may order both the driver and passengers of a vehicle to exit the
vehicle until the traffic stop is completed, even absent a reasonable
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4
The trial court also concluded that the police officers would have had
reasonable belief that Appellant might be armed, but that the officer’s
request was not specifically for safety reasons. Trial Court Order and
Findings, 1/27/14, at 7.
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suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Commonwealth v. Pratt, 930
A.2d 561, 564, (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted), appeal denied, 946
A.2d 686 (Pa. 2008).
Once the primary traffic stop has concluded,
however, the officer’s authority to order either driver
or occupant from the car is extinguished. Thus, if
subsequently the officer directs or requests the
occupants to exit the vehicle, his show of authority
may constitute an investigatory detention subject to
a renewed showing of reasonable suspicion.
Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196, 1202, (Pa. Super. 2002)
(citations omitted).
Appellant concedes the validity of the initial traffic stop for speeding
and taillight infractions. Appellant’s Brief at 11. Appellant attempts to
distinguish this precedent, noting, “Appellant was left in the vehicle for the
entire investigation. Officer safety cannot be used to justify the decision to
ask Appellant out of the vehicle in the present case.” Id. at 13. Additionally
Appellant asserts “[t]he stated reason for asking Appellant to exit the
vehicle, to show him the malfunctioning taillight is illogical given the fact
that the vehicle was a rental car.” Id. at 13. Finally, Appellant argues that
the purpose of the traffic stop was essentially complete at the time the
police officer directed him to exit the vehicle, and that the police officers had
excessively prolonged the traffic stop with the subjective intent to further
investigate Appellant without any reasonable suspicion to do so. Id. at 13-
14, citing Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct 1609, 1612 (2015)
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(holding, “a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for
which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against
unreasonable seizures”). We disagree with Appellant’s arguments.
The fact that Appellant had not been asked to exit the vehicle earlier,
does not negate any safety concern the officers acquired during the stop
upon learning of Appellant’s extensive criminal record. As the cases make
clear, no additional reasonable suspicion is required to justify a police
officer’s request for an occupant to exit a vehicle during a valid traffic stop.
See Van Winkle, supra. The timing of that request is irrelevant.
In any event, the trial court found that the purpose of Officer
Richardson’s request was to show him the defective taillight. Trial Court
Order and Findings, 1/27/14, at 6. Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, we
conclude this stated purpose is not “illogical” because the car was a rental.
It is prudent for any driver to be aware of defects with the vehicle he or she
is driving so they can operate it more safely. Knowledge of a malfunctioning
light will allow a driver to be aware of what surrounding traffic perceives that
may affect how they react to his driving. That the car is a rental is
inapposite to these legitimate concerns.
We further conclude that Appellant’s reliance on Rodriguez is
misplaced. In Rodriguez, the police had stopped the defendant for a traffic
violation, completed the attendant document and record checks, and issued
a written warning. Rodriguez, supra at 1613. Thereafter, police continued
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to detain Appellant while they walked a drug-sniffing dog around the vehicle.
Id. The United States Supreme Court held the prolongation of the traffic
stop without reasonable suspicion beyond that required to effect the purpose
of the stop was constitutionally infirm. Id. at 1616. Instantly, the traffic
stop had not been completed and the request to exit the vehicle was not an
unrelated action that “prolonged” the purpose of the stop. Rather it was
integral to the purpose of the stop to show Appellant the defective light.
Because this is not a case of improperly extending a traffic stop, Rodriguez
does not apply.
Appellant characterizes the police officers’ request as a supposed
“pretext for an ulterior motive” to investigate for drugs and weapons.
Appellant’s Brief at 12. That the police officers had multiple concerns, does
not negate the legitimacy of their request as found by the trial court. We
have noted that where a legitimate objective basis for police action exists,
“an officer’s uncommunicated subjective intent to act illegally is irrelevant.”
Commonwealth v. Bennett, 827 A.2d 469, 480 (Pa. Super. 2003)
(citations omitted).
Based on our review of the record, we conclude the trial court’s
findings are supported by the testimony of Officer Richardson. See
Garibay, supra. We further conclude that the trial court’s legal conclusions
that Officer Richardson acted within the purpose of the traffic stop when
requesting Appellant to alight the vehicle and that additional reasonable
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suspicion need not be shown to justify the request are correct.5 Therefore,
the trial court correctly denied Appellant’s motion to suppress physical
evidence in this case. Accordingly, we affirm the October 27, 2014
judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge Donohue joins the memorandum.
Justice Fitzgerald concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/1/2015
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5
Given the legitimacy of the request to exit the vehicle, Appellant does not
dispute that his subsequent actions in reaching for the duffle bag, retrieving
a vial, and smashing the vial on the pavement provided probable cause to
arrest.
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