Com. v. Coker, C.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
CHRISTOPHER COKER
Appellant No. 2397 EDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order June 30, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-1200411-2003
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED JULY 26, 2017
Appellant, Christopher Coker, appeals from the order dismissing his
petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§
9541-9546 without a hearing.1 Appellant raises seven claims based upon his
assertion that both trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. After careful
review, we conclude that none of Appellant’s claims have merit, and
therefore affirm.
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1
The PCRA court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion states that Appellant’s petition was
denied following an evidentiary hearing on June 30, 2016. See PCRA Court
Opinion, 10/26/16, at 2. However, upon evaluation of the transcript, it is
evident that the purpose of the June 30 hearing was not to collect evidence,
but rather to hold a hearing pursuant to the dictates of Commonwealth v.
Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998), to determine whether Appellant wanted to
continue with appointed counsel. See N.T., Grazier Hearing, 6/30/16. Thus,
we will evaluate the denial of Appellant’s PCRA petition as a denial without
an evidentiary hearing.
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A panel of this Court previously summarized the facts of this matter as
follows.
The facts of this case involve Appellant firing multiple
gunshots at his victim at the street corner where the two men
were arguing on April 13, 2003. One neighbor testified to having
heard two gunshots and then seeing Appellant standing in a
“shooting posture” with his left hand supporting the gun-holding
right while aiming it at the victim, who at that point was trying
to run away. Watching from his enclosed porch, where he had
told his children to wait while the dispute between Appellant and
his victim was escalating, the neighbor heard a “few more shots”
and the victim yell for someone to “please help” just moments
before he fell to the ground. Another witness testified to hearing
six to eight gunshots, and seconds later looked out her window
directly across the street and could clearly see her neighbor,
Appellant, holding a gun as he entered his home for several
minutes before leaving in his car. She phoned police
immediately.
Emergency personnel found the victim unconscious and
bleeding heavily from various parts of the body, including the
back of his leg, where a bullet severed a major artery. Listed in
critical condition upon arrival at Temple University Hospital’s
emergency room, Appellant never regained consciousness and
died from his injuries on May 11, 2003. Approximately four
months later, Appellant was arrested by the “warrant squad” of
the Philadelphia Police Department and charged with murder
along with [possessing an instrument of crime].
Commonwealth v. Coker, No. 2539 EDA 2007, at 2 (Pa. Super., filed
12/15/09) (unpublished memorandum) (internal citations to the record
omitted).
Appellant proceeded to a jury trial where he was convicted of
voluntary manslaughter and possessing an instrument of crime. On August
30, 2005, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of seven
to fourteen years’ incarceration followed by a ten-year probation term.
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Appellant did not file a direct appeal, but later filed a timely PCRA petition
seeking the reinstatement of his direct appeal rights. The PCRA court
reinstated Appellant’s appeal rights and appointed Richard Brown, Jr.,
Esquire, as appellate counsel. Appellant subsequently presented a challenge
to the trial court’s alleged ex parte interaction with the jury at his trial to this
Court. We affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence and our Supreme Court
denied allocator.
On November 12, 2010, Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition,
alleging the ineffectiveness of both trial counsel, Todd Henry, Esquire, and
appellate counsel, Attorney Brown. The PCRA court appointed PCRA counsel,
Elayne Bryn, Esquire. Attorney Bryn filed a Turner/Finley no-merit letter
and petition to withdraw as counsel on May 11, 2015. The following day, the
PCRA court granted Attorney Bryn’s request to withdraw and issued a Rule
907 notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing. Appellant
filed a response, requested the appointment of new counsel, and requested
a hearing. The PCRA court granted Appellant’s request for new counsel and
appointed David Rudenstein, Esquire, on August 28, 2015.
Shortly thereafter, Attorney Rudenstein filed an amended petition
through which Appellant raised seven allegations of ineffective assistance of
counsel, renewed Appellant’s request for an evidentiary hearing, and
requested a new trial. The PCRA court filed a Rule 907 notice of its intent to
dismiss the petition as amended on May 12, 2016. In response, Appellant
filed a motion for leave to hold an immediate Grazier hearing. The PCRA
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held the Grazier hearing, and after determining that Appellant did not wish
to proceed without counsel, denied the petition on June 30, 2016. This
timely appeal followed.
On appeal, Appellant contends that the PCRA court erred by dismissing
his PCRA petition without an evidentiary hearing. See Appellant’s Brief, at 3.
To support this claim, Appellant raises seven separate allegations of trial
counsel ineffectiveness and appellate counsel ineffectiveness that he claims
would have proved meritorious at an evidentiary hearing. See id., at 13-22.
“On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard and scope of
review is limited to determining whether the PCRA court’s findings are
supported by the record and without legal error.” Commonwealth v.
Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339, 345 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted) “[Our] scope of
review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of
record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the
PCRA court level.” Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 131 (Pa.
2012) (citation omitted).
Through all of Appellant’s claims on appeal, he asserts ineffectiveness
of counsel. See Appellant’s Brief, at 13-22. We presume the effective
assistance of counsel; an appellant has the burden of proving otherwise.
See Commonwealth v. Pond, 846 A.2d 699, 708 (Pa. Super. 2004). “In
order for Appellant to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
he must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, ineffective assistance of
counsel which … so undermined the truth-determining process that no
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reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.”
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 868 A.2d 1278, 1281 (Pa. Super. 2005)
(citation omitted). Further,
Appellant must plead and prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that: (1) the underlying legal claim has arguable merit;
(2) counsel had no reasonable basis for his action or inaction;
and (3) Appellant suffered no prejudice because of counsel’s
action or inaction.
Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 260 (Pa. 2011) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted).
The right to an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction petition is not
absolute. See Commonwealth v. Jordan, 772 A.2d 1011, 1014 (Pa.
Super. 2001). It is within the PCRA court’s discretion to decline to hold a
hearing if the petitioner’s claim is patently frivolous and has no support
either in the record or other evidence. See id. It is the responsibility of the
reviewing court on appeal to examine each issue raised in the PCRA petition
in light of the record certified before it in order to determine if the PCRA
court erred in its determination that there were no genuine issues of
material fact in controversy and in denying relief without conducting a
hearing. See Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, 701 A.2d 541, 542-543 (Pa.
1997).
In “ineffectiveness claim in particular, if the record reflects that the
underlying issue is of no arguable merit or no prejudice resulted, no
evidentiary hearing is required.” Commonwealth v. Bauhammers, 92
A.3d 708, 726-727 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). “Arguable merit exists
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when the factual statements are accurate and could establish cause for
relief. Whether the facts rise to the level of arguable merit is a legal
determination.” Commonwealth v. Barnett, 121 A.3d 534, 540 (Pa.
Super. 2015) (citation omitted). “Prejudice is established if there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”
Commonwealth v. Stewart, 84 A.3d 701, 707 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). We review a PCRA court’s decision
to deny a claim without a hearing for an abuse of discretion. See id.In his first two claims, Appellant contends trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to object to statements made by the prosecutor in her opening
remarks. See Appellant’s Brief, at 9, 13-15. We have previously recognized
that
[n]ot every unwise remark made by an attorney amount to
misconduct or warrants the grant of a new trial. Comments by a
prosecutor do not constitute reversible error unless the
unavoidable effect of such comments would be to prejudice the
jury, forming in their minds fixed bias and hostility toward the
defendant so they could not weigh the evidence objectively and
render a true verdict.
Furthermore, according to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Commonwealth v. Chmiel, [889 A.2d 501, 543-544
(Pa. 2005)]:
In determining whether the prosecutor engaged in
misconduct, courts must keep in mind that comments
made by a prosecutor must be examined within the
contest of defense counsel’s conduct. It is well settled
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that the prosecutor may fairly respond to points made
in the defense closing. A remark by a prosecutor,
otherwise improper, may be appropriate if it is in fair
response to the argument and comment of defense
counsel. Moreover, prosecutorial misconduct will not be
found where comments were based on the evidence or
proper inferences therefrom or were only oratorical
flair.
Commonwealth v. Collins, 70 A.3d 1245, 1252-53 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted; brackets added and
omitted).
Appellant first challenges the references to the victim’s race the
prosecutor made during opening statements. See Appellant’s Brief, at 9, 13-
14. Specifically, Appellant contends that the following statements improperly
injected the issue of race into the trial. See id., at 13-14.
COMMONWEALTH: Well I’m going to tell you right now that the
facts you’re going to hear today and the next few days in this
case were not ripped from the pages of today’s headlines or any
other day’s headlines for that matter. Because it’s a sad reality
for us as citizens of the City of Philadelphia that when a young,
black man gets shot, cut down in his prime and gets killed in the
streets of Philadelphia it very, very rarely makes the headlines.
But that’s exactly what happened in this case, ladies and
gentlemen. The defendant Christopher Coker, shot and killed the
victim in this case Jermane Morgan. Jermane Morgan, a young
black man of 29 years of age.
N.T., Jury Trial, 7/13/05, at 35-36. The prosecutor mentioned the victim’s
race again, stating:
COMMONWEALTH: Like I said, it doesn’t make headlines when a
young black man gets killed on the streets of Philadelphia.
Id., at 37.
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We agree with the PCRA court, see PCRA Court Opinion, 10/25/16, at
5-6, that this issue has no merit. While perhaps ill advised, the prosecutor’s
statement did not inflame any racial bias within the jury: the main issue in
the case was self-defense and both the victim and defendant were African-
American. Thus, this issue merits no relief.
Appellant next argues trial counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s
impermissible remark concerning Appellant’s Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent. See Appellant’s Brief, at 9, 15. Appellant draws this
conclusion from the prosecutor’s remark that “[t]he one person who will not
be taking this stand is [the victim], but the physical evidence will testify for
him and speak for him.” N.T., Jury Trial, 7/13/05, at 42. Appellant contends
that, through this statement, the prosecutor impermissibly implied Appellant
would be testifying at trial, thus violating his Fifth Amendment right to
choose not to testify. See Appellant’s Brief, at 15.
As a general rule, “any comment that the prosecuting attorney makes
regarding a defendant’s election not to testify is a violation of the
defendant’s right against self-incrimination as guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 9 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution and by statute, codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5941.”
Commonwealth v. Trivigno, 750 A.2d 243, 248 (Pa. 2000) (plurality)
(citation omitted). A comment will infringe upon this right if “the language
used by the prosecutor is intended to create for the jury an adverse
inference from the failure of the defendant to testify.” Commonwealth v.
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Clark, 710 A.2d 31, 39 (Pa. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by
Commonwealth v. Freeman, 827 A.2d 385 (Pa. 2003).
Instantly, unlike situations in which a prosecutor comments on a
defendant’s failure to testify, Appellant claims that the prosecutor indicated
that Appellant would be testifying. Appellant does not, and cannot, point to
any case law that indicates that a prosecutor’s comments relating to the
mere fact that a defendant was planning to testify violates these rights.
Further, there is a severe attenuation in the leap from the actual comment
by the prosecutor to Appellant’s understanding of the comment. Therefore,
we do not find that Appellant could have shown that he was prejudiced in
any manner by this statement. Thus, the PCRA court properly denied this
claim without an evidentiary hearing.
Next, Appellant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
notify Appellant of a conflict of interest that arose during the course of the
trial. See Appellant’s Brief, at 9, 16. Specifically, Appellant claims that trial
counsel’s prior representation of one of the Commonwealth’s witness’s
daughters in an unrelated matter renders counsel ineffective. See id., at 16.
An attorney owes his client a duty of loyalty, including a duty to avoid
conflicts of interest. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688
(1984). “An appellant cannot prevail on a preserved conflict of interest claim
absent a showing of actual prejudice” Commonwealth v. Collins, 957 A.2d
237, 251 (Pa. 2008) (citations omitted). However, if an appellant is able to
show that trial counsel experienced an actual, rather than potential conflict
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of interest, prejudice is presumed. See id. “To show an actual conflict of
interest, the appellant must demonstrate that: (1) counsel actively
represented conflicting interests; and (2) those conflicting interests
adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Id. (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
We agree with the PCRA court that this issue has no merit. As the
PCRA court explains in its well-written opinion:
At trial, the prosecutor informed the trial court that trial
counsel had a possible conflict of interest as he had previously
represented the daughter of one of the Commonwealth’s
witnesses in a matter involving a street fight between the
daughter and other girls in the neighborhood. N.T. 7/13/05 at
107-110. However, trial counsel informed the court that, while
he had represented the daughter, there was no actual conflict of
interest as the daughter would not be testifying at defendant’s
trial, defendant was not involved in the daughter’s street fight,
and trial counsel had not contacted the daughter or the
Commonwealth witness in any way to request assistance in
defendant’s case. N.T. 7/13/05 at 109-110. In addition, the
Commonwealth witness at issue was only being called by the
Commonwealth to say that she saw defendant running with a
gun, which were the facts not disputed in this self-defense case.
N.T. 7/13/05 at 110.
PCRA Court Opinion, 10/25/16, at 8.
It is clear from the record trial counsel did not represent competing
interests. As there was no actual conflict, this issue merits no relief.
In his fourth alleged error, Appellant contends trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance for failing to move for a “proper” cautionary instruction
and mistrial following an improper statement made by James Wirth that
Appellant and his friends were “known in the area.” Appellant’s Brief, at 17-
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18. Appellant contends this statement, when combined with Wirth’s earlier
statement that he fled Philadelphia because he feared for his life, improperly
introduced evidence of Appellant’s prior bad acts. See id. Further, Appellant
contends that while the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the
statement as it applied to Appellant’s friends, the trial judge failed to include
Appellant in this instruction. See id. Therefore, Appellant contends it was
error for trial counsel to fail to specifically request Appellant be included in
this instruction and to fail to move for a mistrial. See id.“Evidence of prior crimes or bad acts may not be presented at trial to
establish the defendant’s criminal character or proclivities.”
Commonwealth v. Hudson, 955 A.2d 1031, 1034 (Pa. Super. 2008)
(citation omitted). See also Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1).
Appellant’s claim of error rests upon his belief that Wirth’s statement
that he left town because he was afraid and that Appellant and his friends
were “known in the area” introduced prior bad acts evidence in violation of
Rule 404. There is no evidence of record, however, that Wirth testified as to
any prior actions on behalf of Appellant that would have inspired his fear. As
he “did not mention other crimes, wrongs, or acts, [Wirth’s] testimony does
not implicate Rule 404.” Commonwealth v. Cook, 952 A.2d 594, 620 (Pa.
2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, trial
counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a “proper” cautionary
instruction or move for a mistrial based upon the introduction of this
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evidence. Thus, we will not disturb the PCRA court’s determination that this
issue was meritless and did not require an evidentiary hearing.2
Next, Appellant argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object
to a police officer’s alleged irrelevant testimony relating to a search warrant.
See Appellant’s Brief, at 18-19. Specifically, Appellant contends that the
following comments made by Detective Richard Flynn were irrelevant and
allowed the Commonwealth to place its “imprimatur on the case” Id., at 19.
PROSECUTOR: I’m going to ask you to explain to the jury what a
search and seizure warrant is and what power, if any, does it
give you.
DETECTIVE FLYNN: A search and seizure warrant allows a police
officer, anybody in law enforcement, to enter someone’s
property in order to find evidence of a crime. In order to do that,
you have to convince a judicial authority, the person issuing the
warrant, that there was enough probable cause to do this; there
is enough evidence or to believe that there is enough of a crime
within a person’s home.
N.T., Jury Trial, 7/14/05, at 12.
“Admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court
and will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court clearly abused
its discretion.” Commonwealth v. Drumheller, 808 A.2d 893, 904 (Pa.
2002) (citation omitted). “All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
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2
“[A]n appellate court may affirm the lower court on any basis, even one
not considered or presented in the court below.” Commonwealth v. Burns,
988 A.2d 684, 690 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2009).
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otherwise provided by law. Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible.”
Pa.R.E. 402.
The PCRA court “agrees that it is not relevant at trial that a judicial
authority found probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime would be
found in defendant’s home.” PCRA Court Opinion, 10/25/16, at 10. The
police obtained the warrant obtained to search for the handgun used in the
shooting. At trial, as the PCRA court notes, Appellant admitted he possessed
the handgun—and that he shot the decedent. The only issue at trial was self-
defense. “Under these circumstances, the evidence that probable cause
existed to show that defendant had a gun in his home could not have
adversely affected defendant’s case.” Id., at 11. This reasoning is sound.
Appellant cannot establish prejudice. Thus, Appellant’s fifth claim of trial
counsel ineffectiveness on appeal fails.
Appellant raises a similar challenge to the introduction of allegedly
irrelevant evidence in his sixth issue. Appellant claims appellate counsel was
ineffective when he failed to challenge, on direct appeal, the trial court’s
evidentiary ruling that allowed a detective to testify that the Commonwealth
witness, Wirth, had been arrested for absconding from probation following
his testimony. See Appellant’s Brief, at 21. Appellant contends that this
information was not relevant, and therefore its introduction only served to
prejudice Appellant by unfairly undermining the impeachment of Wirth. See
id.
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The PCRA court cogently explained its reasoning for dismissing this
claim in its opinion:
Here, the evidence of Wirth’s arrest after testifying was
highly relevant to corroborate an important part of Wirth’s
testimony. In particular, Wirth testified that he returned to
Philadelphia after absconding knowing that there was a warrant
outstanding for his arrest, and fully expecting to surrender to
authorities. He also testified that no promises had been made to
him for returning and testifying, and that he was aware that he
could face new charges and be imprisoned upon his return. N.T.
7/13/05 at 134-136. Wirth’s arrest following his testimony
corroborated Wirth’s stated belief that he was actually not
receiving favorable treatment and would face consequences for
violating probation. Moreover, the potential for unfair prejudice
was minimal.
PCRA Court Opinion, 1025/16, at 12.
We agree with the PCRA court that the testimony was relevant. Thus,
an objection posed by trial counsel would have failed. We cannot deem
Appellate counsel ineffective for failing to present a meritless claim on direct
appeal. See Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 960 A.2d 473, 478 (Pa. Super.
2008).
In his seventh and final alleged error, Appellant claims that trial
counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and call Kia Miller as a
witness at trial. See Appellant’s Brief, at 22.
“Where a[n appellant] claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to
call a particular witness, we require proof of that witness’s availability to
testify, as well as an adequate assertion that the substance of the purported
testimony would make a difference in the case.” Commonwealth v.
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Michaud, 70 A.3d 862, 867 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted; brackets in
original). In the PCRA petition, the petitioner “shall include a signed
certification as to each intended witness stating the witness’s name,
address, date of birth and substance of testimony and shall include any
documents material to that witness's testimony.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(d)(1).
Here, Appellant establishes the identity of the witness, Kia Miller—and
that is all. Appellant writes in his appellate brief that “in being forthright,
[he] does not have any information pertaining to Kia Miller.” Appellant’s
Brief, at 22. He raises this claim only to “preserve the issue at this time and
would investigate if the case were remanded for an evidentiary hearing
and/or a new trial were granted.” Id. That is not how one successfully raises
this claim. The PCRA court committed no error in finding it was without
merit.
Order affirmed.
President Judge Emeritus Ford Elliott joins the memorandum.
Judge Olson concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/26/2017
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