Com. v. Usanga, P.

J-S36027-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
PATRICK USANGA,
Appellant No. 2349 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of May 20, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-00009710-2013
BEFORE: PANELLA, J. OLSON, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED AUGUST 16, 2017
Appellant, Patrick Usanga, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered on May 20, 2015, as made final by the denial of his post-sentence
motion on July 8, 2015. We affirm.
The trial court accurately summarized the factual background of this
case as follows:
[Appellant], a Nigerian-born United States citizen[,] obtained a
medical degree from the University of Guadalajara in Mexico in
1982. He took the board examination to be a licensed medical
doctor in Pennsylvania several times in the 1980s and [19]90s,
but did not pass. On May 19, 2009, he filed the necessary
paperwork to incorporate a health care facility, Northeast
Behavioral Medicine, Inc., with himself as the sole officer of the
corporation. . . . He applied for and received a license to operate
a psychiatric clinic soon after incorporation. At all times during
the period of time Northeast Behavioral Medicine was in business
and seeing patients, the Appellant was the only provider at the
facility.
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During that period he saw patients for various mental health and
substance abuse issues. Several of his former patients testified
that he told them that he was either a psychologist or a
psychiatrist. As a result of the services provided by the
Appellant, he billed various insurance companies, including
Aetna and Blue Cross[,] for his services. For most of the
invoices, Appellant billed a code, 90808, based on the Current
Procedure Terminology manual (“CPT”) which is used by all
medical insurance companies. The code that Appellant used
relates to a psychological office visit for 75 to 80 minutes.
Appellant also used several other codes that relate to other
psychological and psychotherapy treatments. Appellant never
had a valid license to perform the services for which he was
billing Aetna and Blue Cross. From December 19, 201[0]
through May 15, 2011, Appellant billed Aetna $24,950[.00] and
received $5,036.38 as an out[-]of[-]network provider. Blue
Cross paid a total of $15,763.84 to Appellant. That money was
deposited in a TD Bank account owned by the Appellant.
On November 29, 2011, the Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare (“DPW”) conducted an annual field investigation of
Northeast Behavioral Medicine. Following that visit, DPW sent
Appellant a letter on December 14, 2011 stating that his facility
did not meet the criteria to operate a psychiatric clinic.
Notably[,] it lacked a minimum of 16 hours of psychiatric time
by a licensed psychiatrist and did not employ four full time
mental health professionals. Appellant was given until January
6, 2012 to submit a [p]lan of [c]orrection. He submitted a
timely [p]lan of [c]orrection, however DPW found that the plan
was unacceptable and told him he had ten days to correct his
plan in accordance with 55 Pa. Code § 5200.22. Appellant failed
to satisfy this requirement as well. On March 13, 2012, a DPW
employee made an unannounced field visit to Appellant’s office
where it was closed and the doors were locked. DPW then sent
Appellant a letter . . . stating that due to Appellant’s failure to
conform to the requirements listed, his license to operate a
psychiatric clinic was revoked.
Concurrently to the period of time that Appellant was operating
Northeast Behavioral Medicine, he was also collecting
unemployment compensation and Social Security disability
benefits. Appellant collected unemployment benefits starting on
March 14, 2009 and continuing until January 29, 2011.
Specifically he collected $54,684[.00] from the period
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immediately after he incorporated Northeast Behavioral Medicine
on May 19, 2009 until the termination of his benefits. The
Appellant was not entitled to unemployment benefits once he
incorporated his business and became self-employed. The
Pennsylvania Department of Labor determined that the Appellant
was paid $52,000[.00] in unemployment compensation that he
was not entitled to receive.
Additionally, Appellant filed for disability benefits from the Social
Security Administration in April 2012. Appellant claimed he was
disabled and unable to work from April 2011 through October
2012. He received 32 checks [totaling] $16,108[.00]. The
Social Security Administration determined that he was not
entitled to the full amount that was paid to him during that time
because he was working during that period of time, he was not
truthful on his application regarding whether he was married,
and he did not disclose that he was also receiving unemployment
compensation during that period.
Trial Court Opinion, 8/22/16, at 2-5 (internal citations and certain internal
quotation marks omitted; certain paragraph breaks added).
The procedural history of this case is as follows. On August 15, 2013,
the Commonwealth charged Appellant via criminal information with 27
counts of insurance fraud,1 11 counts of tampering with public records,2 four
counts of theft by deception,3 two counts of attempted theft,4 two counts of
harassment,5 and making a false statement regarding an unemployment
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4117(a)(2), (a)(6).
2
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4911(a)(1).
3
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3922(a)(1).
4
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901, 3922.
5
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709(a)(2), (a)(3).
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compensation claim.6 Appellant subsequently moved to sever the
harassment counts and the trial court denied the severance motion on March
13, 2015.
On March 16, 2015, trial commenced with Appellant present. On
March 23, 2015, Appellant failed to appear for the fifth day of trial and trial
continued in his absence. On March 26, 2015, Appellant was convicted of 23
counts of insurance fraud, eight counts of tampering with public records,
four counts of theft by deception, and making a false statement regarding an
unemployment compensation claim.7
On May 20, 2015, Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 6
to 12 years’ imprisonment followed by five years’ probation.8 On May 28,
2015, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion which was denied on July 8,
2015. This timely appeal followed.9
6
43 P.S. § 871.
7
The trial court found Appellant guilty of making a false statement regarding
an unemployment compensation claim while the jury found Appellant guilty
on the remaining counts.
8
The trial court ordered Appellant’s sentences of 30 to 60 months’
imprisonment on one insurance fraud count, 42 to 84 months’ imprisonment
on one theft by deception count, and five years’ probation on one tampering
with public records count to run consecutively. Each sentence for the
remaining 33 convictions was ordered to run concurrently with one of those
three sentences previously described.
9
On May 19, 2016, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal (“concise statement”). See
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On June 24, 2016, Appellant filed his concise statement.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Appellant raises four issues for our review:
1. Did the [trial] court err in denying Appellant’s motion to sever
the charge[s] of [h]arassment . . . ?
2. Did the [trial] court err by denying Appellant’s motion for a
mistrial where the Commonwealth twice referenced
Appellant’s post-arrest silence?
3. Did the [trial] court err by admitting into evidence documents
that the Commonwealth failed to properly authenticate?
4. Did the [trial] court err by imposing terms of incarceration
well in excess of the guidelines without offering a basis for
doing so?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to
sever the harassment charges. We review a trial court’s decision to deny a
severance motion for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Richard,
150 A.3d 504, 509 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). Severance of
offenses charged in a single criminal information is governed by
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 583,10 which provides that, “The
court may order separate trials of offenses or defendants, or provide other
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
On August 22, 2016, the trial court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion. All
issues raised on appeal were included in Appellant’s concise statement.
10
Appellant argues that his severance motion was governed by Pennsylvania
Rule of Criminal Procedure 582. This is incorrect. Rule 582 addresses
situations in which the Commonwealth charges a defendant with offenses in
multiple criminal informations and then seeks to consolidate the informations
for trial.
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appropriate relief, if it appears that any party may be prejudiced by offenses
or defendants being tried together.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 583.
When considering a motion to sever, the trial court must determine
(1) whether the evidence of each of the offenses would be
admissible in a separate trial for the other; (2) whether such
evidence is capable of separation by the jury so as to avoid
danger of confusion; and, if the answers to these inquiries are in
the affirmative, (3) whether the defendant will be unduly
prejudiced by the consolidation of offenses.
Commonwealth v. Jordan, 65 A.3d 318, 328 n.2 (Pa. 2013) (citation
omitted).
The evidence regarding the harassment charges would have been
admissible in Appellant’s trial for the economic crimes. The harassment
charges arose from Appellant’s alleged touching of a patient’s foot and
making sexually suggestive comments during an appointment. This
evidence tended to prove that Appellant failed to render the medical services
to that patient for which he billed her insurance company. Thus, it was
relevant with respect to one of the insurance fraud charges. Second, the
evidence was capable of separation by the jury. The jury’s inability to reach
a verdict on one of the harassment charges11 suggests that it was able (and
did) distinguish between whether Appellant’s conduct constituted
harassment and whether he provided the services for which he billed the
patient’s insurance company. Third, Appellant did not face any undue
11
The trial court found Appellant not guilty of the other harassment charge.
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prejudice as a result of consolidation of the offenses. The testimony
regarding the harassment charges was a tiny portion of a trial that lasted
over a week and the Commonwealth did not focus on that charge. Instead,
the focus of the Commonwealth’s case was Appellant’s economic crimes.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
denying Appellant’s severance motion.
In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for a mistrial. “A trial court may grant a mistrial only
where the incident upon which the motion is based is of such a nature that
its unavoidable effect is to deprive the defendant of a fair trial by preventing
the jury from weighing and rendering a true verdict.” Commonwealth v.
Bryant, 67 A.3d 716, 728 (Pa. 2013) (internal alteration and citation
omitted). We review a trial court’s denial a motion for mistrial for an abuse
of discretion. Commonwealth v. Smith, 131 A.3d 467, 474 (Pa. 2015)
(citation omitted).
During the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, it called two individuals
involved in the investigation of Appellant’s crimes. Syreeta Scott (“Scott”)
testified that the United States Department of Labor “attempted to interview
[Appellant] when [it executed a] search warrant at his home and arrested
him, but he did not want to be interviewed.” N.T., 3/18/15, at 77.
Similarly, Luke Heller (“Heller”) testified that the Pennsylvania Department
of Labor and Industry mailed Appellant a questionnaire and attempted to
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reach him by telephone; however, Appellant did not respond to the
questionnaire nor did he agree to speak over the telephone. N.T., 3/19/15,
at 18.
Appellant argues that these statements were impermissible references
to his post-arrest silence. He therefore argues that the Commonwealth
violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Preliminarily, we must
determine whether Appellant preserved this claim for appellate review. In
order to preserve a claim that the trial court erred in admitting evidence at
trial, a party must make a contemporaneous objection thereto setting forth
the grounds of the objection unless the grounds are apparent from the
context. See Pa.R.Evid. 103(a); Commonwealth v. Walter, 119 A.3d 255,
264 (Pa. 2015). In this case, Appellant did not object to Heller’s testimony
until after his testimony was complete. See N.T., 3/19/15, at 48. The
objection was too late to preserve this claim of error as it relates to Heller’s
statement. See Commonwealth v. Parker, 847 A.2d 745, 749 (Pa. Super.
2004) (citation omitted). Appellant did, however, preserve his claim of error
with respect to Scott’s testimony as he contemporaneously objected to her
statement. N.T., 3/18/15, at 77. Thus, we proceed to consider the merits
of Appellant’s claim of error as it relates to Scott’s testimony.
We conclude that even if Scott’s testimony was an impermissible
reference to Appellant’s post-arrest silence, the curative instruction given by
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the trial court was able to cure any prejudice that resulted therefrom. As
this Court has explained:
If the Commonwealth mentions a defendant’s post-arrest
silence, the court might still be able to cure any prejudice
through prompt and adequate curative instructions. To evaluate
whether cautionary instructions can cure a reference to a
defendant’s post-arrest silence, courts must consider 1) the
nature of the reference to the defendant’s silence; 2) how it was
elicited; 3) whether the district attorney exploited it; and 4) the
promptness and adequacy of the cautionary instructions. If the
reference to the defendant’s post-arrest silence was such that it
incurably compromised the jury’s objectivity and would deprive
the defendant of a fair trial, then the court should grant a
mistrial.
Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 176 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal
citations, quotation marks, and footnote omitted).
In this case, Scott’s reference to Appellant’s post-arrest silence was
brief and fleeting. Scott’s answer was in response to the Commonwealth’s
question of, “Why did you determine your los[s] date from March, the
inception of the application?” N.T., 3/18/15, at 76. This question was not
meant to elicit a response regarding Appellant’s post-arrest silence. Instead,
Scott merely explained the process she followed to determine the
appropriate loss date. That process includes interviewing the suspect;
however, as Appellant was unwilling to speak to Scott, she had to make a
determination without the benefit of such an interview. The Commonwealth
did not exploit Appellant’s post-arrest silence. It did not continue
questioning Scott about the subject. Finally, the trial court gave a complete
curative instruction immediately after Scott’s reference to Appellant’s post-
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arrest silence. N.T., 3/18/15, at 77-78. Thus, all four factors weigh in favor
of finding that the trial court’s instruction cured any prejudice Appellant may
have suffered as a result of Scott’s statement. Therefore, we conclude that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for
mistrial.
In his third issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in
admitting documents that were not properly authenticated. “[Q]uestions
regarding the admission of evidence are left to the sound discretion of the
trial court, and we, as an appellate court, will not disturb the trial court’s
rulings regarding the admissibility of evidence absent an abuse of that
discretion.” Commonwealth v. Windslowe, 158 A.3d 698, 712–713 (Pa.
Super. 2017) (citation omitted).
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 901 provides that, “To satisfy the
requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the
proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
item is what the proponent claims it is.” Pa.R.Evid. 901(a). Appellant
contends that the individuals who authenticated five exhibits did not
“create[] the exhibit[s] or ha[ve] any direct knowledge of the creation of the
exhibit[s].” Appellant’s Brief at 21. Thus, according to Appellant, the trial
court erred in admitting those five exhibits.
Exhibit 5 is a spreadsheet containing payments that Aetna made to
Northeast Behavioral Medicine along with the patients for whom those
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payments were made. This spreadsheet was properly authenticated
pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 901(b)(1), which provides that an
exhibit may be authenticated through “testimony that an item is what it is
claimed to be.” Pa.R.Evid. 901(b)(1). Garrett Shohan (“Shohan”), an Aetna
employee, testified that he was “familiar with how records regarding claims
are kept” by Aetna. N.T., 3/17/15, at 97. Shohan then testified that Exhibit
5 is a spreadsheet containing payments that Aetna made to Northeast
Behavioral Medicine along with the patients for whom those payments were
made. Id. at 98. As Shohan was an Aetna employee familiar with the
record keeping process, his testimony was sufficient to authenticate Exhibit
5.
Exhibit 9 is comprised of several claim forms that Northeast Behavioral
Medicine submitted to Aetna. Exhibit 9 was also authenticated pursuant to
Rule 901(a)(1). As noted above, Shohan testified that he was familiar with
Aetna’s record keeping process with respect to claims. Id. at 97. He also
testified that he was “familiar with Aetna’s health insurance claim forms[.]”
Id. He then testified that Exhibit 9 was a group of claim forms that
Northeast Behavioral Medicine filed with Aetna. Detective Karl Supperer
testified that an Aetna employee gave him the claim forms. Id. at 135-136.
Therefore, Exhibit 9 was properly authenticated.
Exhibit 10 is comprised of several claim forms that Northeast
Behavioral Medicine submitted to Blue Cross. Exhibit 10 was properly
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authenticated pursuant to Rule 901(a)(1). Robert Climaldi (“Climaldi”), a
Blue Cross Employee, testified that he personally “access[ed] the medical
claim forms submitted to Blue Cross from Northeast Behavioral Medicine.”
N.T., 3/19/15, at 112. Climaldi also testified that Exhibit 10 was a copy of
the claims forms he accessed on Blue Cross’ computers. Id. Detective Karl
Supperer testified that a Blue Cross employee gave him the claim forms.
N.T., 3/17/15, at 143. Therefore, Exhibit 10 was properly authenticated.
Exhibit 17-A is a computer printout of answers that Appellant gave
using an automated telephone system in order to receive unemployment
compensation. Exhibit 18 includes extended benefits claim forms that
Appellant submitted to the Pennsylvania Department of Labor. Exhibits 17-A
and 18 were properly authenticated pursuant to Rule 901(b)(10), which
provides that “[a]ny method of authentication or identification allowed by a
statute” satisfies the requirement of Rule 901(a). Pa.R.Evid. 901(b)(10).
The Judicial Code provides that, “Whenever provision is made by law for
recording or filing in a public office any document, the record thereof made,
and exemplifications of the document lawfully certified, shall be legal
evidence in all matters in which the document would be competent
evidence.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106. As a provision of law provides for the filing
of unemployment compensation claim forms in a public office, the record
thereof is automatically authenticated pursuant to section 6106. Cf. 43 P.S.
§ 753(w)(1) (defining a valid application for benefits); Hanna v.
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Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 2015 WL 5458604, *1 (Pa.
Cmwlth. July 8, 2015) (explaining that one way of filing claims is through
the telephone system used by Appellant). Therefore, the trial court did not
error in admitting Exhibits 17-A and 18 into evidence and Appellant is not
entitled to relief on his third claim of error.
In his final issue, Appellant argues that the trial court imposed an
excessive sentence with respect to the theft by deception and insurance
fraud convictions.12 This argument challenges the discretionary aspects of
his sentence. See Commonwealth v. Rhoades, 8 A.3d 912, 915 (Pa.
Super. 2010), appeal denied, 25 A.3d 328 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted).
Pursuant to statute, Appellant does not have an automatic right to appeal
the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
Instead, Appellant must petition this Court for permission to appeal the
discretionary aspects of his sentence. Id.
As this Court has explained, in order to reach the merits of a
discretionary aspects claim,
[w]e conduct a four part analysis to determine: (1) whether
[the] appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal; (2) whether
the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to
reconsider and modify sentence; (3) whether [the] appellant’s
brief has a fatal defect; and (4) whether there is a substantial
question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate
under the Sentencing Code.
12
Appellant does not challenge the discretionary aspects of his tampering
with public records or making a false statement regarding an unemployment
compensation claim sentences.
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Commonwealth v. Popielarcheck, 151 A.3d 1088, 1093 (Pa. Super.
2016) (citation omitted).
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and properly preserved the
issue for our review in his post-sentence motion. Appellant’s brief also
contains a statement pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure
2119(f). We thus turn to whether the appeal presents a substantial
question.
“In order to establish a substantial question, the appellant must show
actions by the trial court inconsistent with the Sentencing Code or contrary
to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process.”
Commonwealth v. Bonner, 135 A.3d 592, 603 (Pa. Super. 2016), appeal
denied, 145 A.3d 161 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted). “The determination of
whether a particular issue raises a substantial question is to be evaluated on
a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Treadway, 104 A.3d 597, 599
(Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). In his Rule 2119(f) statement,
Appellant argues that the trial court failed to adequately explain why it
sentenced him outside the guidelines. “This Court has held that claims that
the sentencing court imposed a sentence outside the standard guidelines
without stating adequate reasons on the record presents a substantial
question.” Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 759 (Pa. Super.
2014), appeal denied, 95 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). Therefore,
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Appellant presents a substantial question and we proceed to the merits of
his discretionary aspects claim.
“Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a
manifest abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Solomon, 151 A.3d 672,
677 (Pa. Super. 2016), appeal denied, 2017 WL 1414955 (Pa. Apr. 19,
2017) (citation omitted). In order to show an abuse of discretion, Appellant
“must establish, by reference to the record, that the [trial] court ignored or
misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality,
prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.”
Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 132 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal
denied, 117 A.3d 297 (Pa. 2015) (citation omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9781(c) (providing that when a trial court sentences a defendant outside
of the guidelines this Court must vacate the sentence if it is unreasonable).
Appellant stipulated to a standard sentencing guideline range of 9 to
16 months for one theft by deception charge with an aggravated range of 16
to 25 months.13 The standard sentencing guideline range for Appellant’s
insurance fraud convictions was restorative sanctions to three months with
13
As the trial court ordered all of Appellant’s theft by deception sentences to
run concurrently, we only address the sentence for that count with the
highest sentencing guideline range. Similarly, as the trial court ordered all
of Appellant’s insurance fraud sentences to run concurrently, we only
address one of those sentences.
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an aggravated range of six months. See 204 Pa. Code §§ 303.15,
303.16(a).
As this Court has explained:
The sentencing court may, in an appropriate case, deviate from
the guidelines by fashioning a sentence which takes into account
the protection of the public, the rehabilitative needs of the
defendant, and the gravity of the particular offense as it relates
to the impact on the life of the victim and the community. In
doing so, the sentencing judge must state of record the factual
basis and specific reasons which compelled him or her to deviate
from the guideline ranges. When evaluating a claim of this type,
it is necessary to remember that the sentencing guidelines are
advisory only.
Commonwealth v. McLaine, 150 A.3d 70, 76–77 (Pa. Super. 2016),
appeal denied, 2017 WL 1408255 (Pa. Apr. 20, 2017).
In this case the trial court had the benefit of a presentence
investigation report. “Where the [trial court] had the benefit of a
presentence investigation report, [we presume it] was aware of the relevant
information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those
considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v.
Finnecy, 135 A.3d 1028, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2016), appeal denied, 159 A.3d
935 (Pa. 2016) (internal alteration and citation omitted).
At sentencing, the trial court explained in great detail its reasons for
deviating from the sentencing guidelines applicable to Appellant’s convictions
for both theft by deception and insurance fraud. It stated that Appellant’s
offenses were “very serious matters[.]” N.T., 5/8/15, at 32. The trial
continued by explaining how Appellant’s failure to appear on the fifth day of
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trial, although he was required to appear as a condition of his bail bond,
evidenced that Appellant “still doesn’t get it.” Id. at 32-33. The trial court
stated that Appellant’s failure to acknowledge that he lacked a Pennsylvania
physician’s license and was not a counselor further proved that he still didn’t
get it. Id. at 33.
The trial court found that Appellant would continue his criminal
conduct “until he’s stopped.” Id. at 34. The trial court noted that
Appellant’s convictions “were very serious matters. This isn’t just 1, 2[, or]
3 [convictions.]” Id. After acknowledging the repeated pattern of criminal
conduct at issue in this case, the trial court observed that, “The behavior in
this case is egregious. The public has been harmed.” Id. at 36. The trial
court then explained the harm to the individual patients who believed they
were being treated by a licensed doctor when they in fact were being treated
by an unlicensed individual. Id. at 36-37. Finally, the trial court stated
that:
I’m still concerned. I’m alarmed that what I hear from
[Appellant] today. He’s launching into the same – first he begins
by going into a tirade about why he’s entitled to unemployment
compensation, for crying out loud, after being found guilty of
[36] counts. We still are being subjected to why he’s entitled to
unemployment. . . . There is no remorse. It’s kind of like, well, I
didn’t really do anything that bad and it’s a little
misunderstanding. No, it’s not just a misunderstanding.
Id. at 39-40. Therefore, the trial court deviated from the sentencing
guidelines and imposed an aggregate sentence of 6 to 12 years’
imprisonment followed by five years’ probation.
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The trial court carefully considered all of the relevant sentencing
factors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). Appellant was convicted of
dozens of serious offenses and showed no remorse after his conviction nor
did he show any respect for the judicial process during trial. We conclude
that the trial court’s deviation from the sentencing guidelines and imposition
of an aggregate sentence of 6 to 12 years’ imprisonment was not
unreasonable. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
sentencing Appellant outside of the guidelines.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/16/2017
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