Com. v. Civitella, M.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
MICHAEL CIVITELLA
Appellant No. 353 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 25, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0007319-2011
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED MARCH 09, 2015
Michael Civitella appeals from the judgment of sentence, imposed by
the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, following his convictions for
driving while operating privilege is suspended1 and driving under the
influence (“DUI”).2
On May 29, 2011, shortly after 2:00 a.m., Officer Stephen Bannar of
the Radnor Township Police Department received a dispatch call for an
accident at Brookside Road and Conestoga Roads in Wayne, PA. Officer
Anthony Radico was the first to respond, followed by Officer Bannar.
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(b)(1).
2
75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(c).
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When the officers arrived at the scene, the vehicle was no longer
present. Officer Bannar saw that some of the shrubbery and rocks lining the
perimeter of the park appeared out of place, and he observed tire marks in
the mud in front of the rocks. Officer Bannar further observed reddish fluid
leading from the accident location down Conestoga Road to Parkes Run. The
two officers followed the trail of fluid down Parkes Run and onto Leslie Road.
The fluid trail ended about half a mile from the scene of the accident,
at a private residence located at 860 Leslie Road. The officers shined their
spotlights onto the fluid and followed it up the driveway of the residence.
When the officers reached the top of the driveway, they observed a black
Mercedes parked parallel across the driveway, with the nose of the vehicle
facing the residence. There was white smoke coming from the vehicle.
Upon further inspection, the officers observed severe front-end
damage to the Mercedes, and both the driver-side and passenger-side
airbags had deployed. The officers found Civitella lying on the ground next
to the vehicle on the passenger-side.
Officer Radico asked Civitella what happened and if he needed medical
attention. Civitella responded that he had struck some rocks on the trail and
that “it wasn’t a big deal.” Civitella had a strong odor of alcohol on his
breath, his speech was impaired, his face was flushed, his eyes were red and
glossy, and he was unsteady on his feet. Officers Bannar and Radico helped
Civitella to his feet because he could not stand on his own. When asked for
identification, insurance, and registration, Civitella handed the officers his
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business card. Officer Radico also asked Civitella where he was coming
from. Civitella told the officer that he had been at a bar in Conshohocken.
Based upon his observations, Officer Bannar believed that Civitella was
under the influence of alcohol. Officer Radico then placed Civitella under
arrest and transported him to Bryn Mawr Hospital. The officers did not read
Civitella his Miranda3 warnings.
On August 24, 2012, Civitella filed a Motion to Suppress the
statements he made to police, arguing that the police had failed to provide
him Miranda warnings prior to questioning. Hearings on that motion
occurred on April 25, 2013, and May 2, 2013. The lower court denied the
motion on July 12, 2013, and a jury trial commenced on August 6, 2013.
Following trial, a jury found Civitella guilty of DUI and driving while
operating privilege is suspended. On October 25, 2013, the court sentenced
Civitella to a term of 12 to 24 months’ imprisonment, plus 90 days, followed
by three years of probation and $3,800 in fines and costs. The court found
Civitella eligible for participation in the Recidivism Risk Reduction Incentive
(RRRI) and awarded him credit for time served. Trial Court Opinion,
5/14/14, at 1. Civitella filed post-sentence motions, which the court denied
on January 2, 2014. Thereafter, on January 31, 2014, Civitella filed the
instant appeal.
____________________________________________
3
Miranda v. Arizona, 385 U.S. 436 (1966).
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On appeal, Civitella presents the following issue for our review:
whether the trial court erred when it denied Civitella’s motion to suppress his
statements because he was subjected to custodial questioning without the
benefit of Miranda warnings, in violation of PA. Const. Art. 1, § 9, and U.S.
Const. Amend. V, XIV. Appellant’s Brief, at 5.
Our standard of review for suppression rulings is well established:
[I]n addressing a challenge to a trial court’s denial of a
suppression motion [we are] limited to determining whether the
factual findings are supported by the record and whether the
legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Since the
[Commonwealth] prevailed in the suppression court, we may
consider only the evidence of the [Commonwealth] and so much
of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when
read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record
supports the factual findings of the trial court, we are bound by
those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn
therefrom are in error.
Commonwealth v. Cauley, 10 A.3d 321, 325 (Pa. Super. 2010).
Civitella maintains that his statements to the officers on the night of
his arrest were not voluntary. Rather, he claims the statements were the
product of a custodial interrogation without proper Miranda warnings.
Therefore, Civitella argues, the statements should have been suppressed.
As such, the key inquiry will be whether Civitella was in custody at the time
he made the statements to the arresting officers.
“An encounter between police and a suspect may be described as a
mere encounter, an investigative detention, a custodial detention, or a
formal arrest.” Commonwealth v. Haupt, 567 A.2d 1074, 1077-78 (Pa.
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Super. 1989), quoting Commonwealth v. Douglass, 539 A.2d 412, 417
(Pa. Super. 1988). This Court, in Douglass, went on to explain:
A “mere encounter” (or request for information) need not be
supported by any level of suspicion, but it carries no official
compulsion to stop or respond. An “investigative detention”
must be supported by reasonable suspicion; it subjects the
suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not involve
such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional
equivalent of arrest. A “custodial detention” must be supported
by probable cause; it is deemed to arise when the conditions
and/or duration of an investigating detention become so coercive
as to be the functional equivalent of arrest. Formal arrest
requires probable cause, and needs no further definition. Among
the factors the court utilizes in determining whether the
detention is custodial or investigative are: the basis for the
detention; the duration; the location; whether the suspect was
transported against his will, how far, and why; whether
restraints were used; the show, threat, or use of force; and the
methods of investigation used to confirm or dispel suspicions.
Id. at 417-18, 421 (citations omitted).
When police interrogate an individual, they must administer proper
warnings as to that individual’s constitutional rights to counsel and to remain
silent, as well as the significance of waiving those rights. Miranda, supra.
“Interrogation” has been defined as, “questioning initiated by law
enforcement officials.” Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 787 A.2d 394, 401
(Pa. 2001), citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
Instantly, the interaction between Civitella and the officers began as a
mere encounter, in which the officers were trying to determine if a motor
vehicle accident had occurred and if there was a need for immediate medical
assistance. At trial, Officer Radico testified to the following:
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Q [District Attorney]: What’s the first thing you do when you
see this person [referring to Civitella]?
A: His eyes were shut so I start, you know, asking him if he’s
okay. And you know he opened his eyes. He said yeah. I said
are you okay? He said yeah. I said what happened? He said I
hit some rocks at the trail. He said no big deal. I said are you
sure you’re okay? Yeah, I’m okay. I said okay. Then I started
my investigation just that he was the driver of the vehicle for the
accident.
N.T. Trial, 8/7/13, at 21-22.
We read Officer Radico’s testimony in conjunction with the following
testimony presented by Officer Bannar at the suppression hearing:
Q: And at this point [after the initial questions] in time was Mr.
Civitella under arrest?
A: No.
Q: Would he have been free to go?
A: At that point in time no, because he has a strong odor of
alcohol on his breath, and on his person so at that point in time
he presented enough evidence that he was actually intoxicated
and that he actually was driving this vehicle when he said he
struck these rocks. No.
N.T. Suppression Hearing, 4/25/13, at 26.
Based upon our review of the certified record, we agree with the trial
court’s conclusion that the interaction between Civitella and the officers
began as a mere encounter. See Commonwealth v. Kendall, 976 A.2d
503 (Pa. Super 2009) (officer’s initial contact constituted a mere encounter
where driver pulled over for an unknown reason). Accordingly, there was no
need to provide Miranda warnings at that time.
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At trial, Officer Radico testified that during their encounter, Civitella
had trouble standing up, was unsteady on his feet, smelled of alcohol,
mentioned that he had hit some rocks, and was unable to produce his
identification from his wallet. N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 12/20/11, at 23.
Based on these observations, the officers developed a reasonable suspicion
that Civitella had been driving under the influence, raising the level of the
interaction to an investigative detention. See Commonwealth v. DeLeon,
419 A.2d 82 (Pa. Super. 1980) (damage to accident site and vehicle,
coupled with odor of alcohol on appellant, who was found lying near car,
sufficient to reasonably suspect DUI occurred); see also Commonwealth
v. Kasunic, 620 A.2d 525 (Pa. Super 1993) (defendant found next to
vehicle, smelling of alcohol and exhibiting signs of intoxication, consistent
with suspicion that he operated vehicle while intoxicated).
As discussed above, an investigative detention must be supported by
reasonable suspicion and “it subjects the suspect to a stop and a period of
detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the
functional equivalent of arrest.” Douglass, 359 A.2d at 417-18. Here, the
officers had reasonable suspicion to believe Civitella had operated a vehicle
under the influence when they observed a trail of fluid from the site of an
accident directly to his home, found his car severely damaged with deployed
airbags, and saw Civitella lying on the ground exhibiting signs of
intoxication. At the onset of that suspicion, the encounter elevated to an
investigative detention, whereby the police asked questions in an
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investigatory manner. The whole interaction between Civitella and the
officers lasted less than one half hour. N.T. Suppression Hearing, 4/25/13,
at 30. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that police
used, or threatened the use of, any force beyond, as Civitella suggests, the
potential use of overhead squad lights to illuminate a dark and secluded
area. Appellant’s Brief, at 10. While the officers did admit to touching
Civitella, this was only to help him to his feet and to prevent him from
falling. N.T. Suppression Hearing, 4/25/13, at 25. There is no evidence to
suggest that police in anyway moved Civitella, or restricted his freedom of
movement.
Although the officers testified that Civitella would not have been free
to leave, we note that, “the test for custodial interrogation does not depend
on the subjective intent of the law enforcement interrogator. Rather, the
test focuses on whether in the individual being interrogated reasonably
believes his freedom of action is being restricted.” Commonwealth v.
Williams, 650 A.2d 420, 427 (1994). Civitella fails to present any evidence
to support his assertion that he reasonably believed his freedom was being
restricted prior to his arrest.
Based on the foregoing, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that
Civitella was not in custody at the time he made the statements in question.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/14/14, at 5. Civitella was not physically deprived of
his freedom in any way or placed in a situation where he would reasonably
believe that his movement was restricted. Because he was not in custody,
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Civitella was not entitled to Miranda warnings. Accordingly, we conclude
that the record supports the suppression court’s findings, and that the legal
conclusions drawn therefrom were not made in error. Cauley, supra.Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/9/2015
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