Wojciechowski, A. v. Wojciechowski, P.

J-S44034-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
ARLENE BRYZYSKI WOJCIECHOWSKI, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
PETER A. WOJCIECHOWSKI : No. 38 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order entered December 2, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
Family Court Division, No(s): 8533 May Term 2000
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED JULY 31, 2017
Arlene Bryzyski Wojciechowski (“Wojciechowski”) appeals from the
Order of the trial court, which enforced the trial court’s equitable distribution
Order of December 16, 2009, and directed Wojciechowski to pay $32,000 to
the Estate of Peter A. Wojciechowski (“the Estate”). We affirm.
As part of the equitable distribution of the marital property of
Wojciechowski and Peter A. Wojciechowski (“Decedent”), Wojciechowski was
awarded sole title to the marital residence, subject to her payment of
$32,000 to Decedent, and her assumption of the existing mortgage. Upon
completion, Wojciechowski was to file a certification of payment in the office
of the Clerk of Family Court. About two months after the Divorce Decree
was entered, Decedent transferred title to the marital home to
Wojciechowski. Wojciechowski did not pay $32,000 to Decedent or his
Estate. Decedent died on March 30, 2014.
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On May 25, 2016, the Estate filed a Motion to Enforce the equitable
distribution Order, and to require Wojciechowski to pay the $32,000
specified by that Order. On December 2, 2016, the trial court entered an
Order granting the Estate’s Motion to Enforce. Thereafter, Wojciechowski
filed the instant timely appeal, followed by a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) Concise Statement of matters complained of on appeal.1
In her Statement of Questions Involved, Wojciechowski presents the
following issues for our review:
1. [Whether] the trial court committed an abuse of discretion
and error of law by initiating its own fact[-]finding operation,
taking into consideration and basing its decision upon factors not
before the Court; including, but not limited to the facts
surrounding the [d]ivorce litigation and resolution in its
entirety[?]
2. [Whether] the trial court acted beyond the scope of its
discretion by researching and considering the underlying facts of
the [d]ivorce litigation when ruling upon the application of the
doctrine of laches and the statute of limitations applicable to
contract law[?]
[3.] [Whether] the trial court committed an abuse of discretion
and error of law by prohibiting [Wojciechowski] from testifying
as to her actions and interactions with [Decedent] after the
Divorce Decree was entered[?]
[4.] [Whether] the trial court committed an abuse of discretion
and error of law by reviewing and considering the facts
surrounding the [d]ivorce litigation[?]
1
In its Opinion, the trial court set forth a more detailed recitation of the
procedural history of this case, and the court’s findings of fact, which we
adopt as though fully restated herein. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/27/17, at
1-4.
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[5.] [Whether] the trial court committed an abuse of discretion
and error of law by determining that the death of [Decedent]
and the passing of time did not prejudice [Wojciechowski] and
asserting the defense of laches[?]
[6.] [Whether] the trial court committed an[] abuse of discretion
and error of law that the pursuit of enforcement of a [d]ivorce
Agreement is not bound by the statute of limitations applicable
to contract law[?]
[7.] [Whether] the trial court committed an abuse of discretion
and an error of law by failing to accept and apply the doctrine of
laches[?]
[8.] [Whether] the trial court committed an abuse of discretion
and error of law by considering and concluding [Decedent’s]
state of mind after d]ivorce[?]
[9.] [Whether] the trial court committed an abuse of discretion
and error of law by preparing and submitting findings of fact
based upon its own investigation, none of which were introduced
by either party at trial and none of which were relevant to the
issue before the [c]ourt[?]
[10.] [Whether] the trial court committed an abuse of discretion
and error of law by failing to base its decision upon the
applicable law and the relevant facts in relation to the applicable
law; rather, the trial court erroneously considered prejudicial
facts involving the distribution of the marital estate[?]
[11.] [Whether] the trial court committed an abuse of discretion
and error of law by failing to make a decision upon the applicable
law and the specific limited facts which apply to the law
governing the issue before the [c]ourt[?]
[12.] [Whether] the trial court committed an abuse of discretion
and error of law by considering statements contained in the
Master’s Report, as well as statements contained in [Decedent’s
counsel’s] pleading from 2009[,] when entering its ruling[?]
[13.] [Whether] the trial court committed an abuse of discretion
and error of law by considering the comments made by
[Decedent’s counsel] regarding [Decedent’s] state of mind at the
time of the [d]ivorce when making its decision[?]
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[14.] [Whether] the trial court committed an abuse of discretion
and error of law by exceeding the scope of review when
determining its ruling[?]
[15.] [Whether] the trial court committed an abuse of discretion
and error of law by precluding relevant testimony regarding
[Wojciechowski’s] reasonable reliance o[n] actions on the part of
[Decedent]?
[16.] [Whether] the trial court committed an abuse of discretion
and error of law by utilizing facts concerning the [d]ivorce
[a]ction[,] and reviewing testimony not relevant to the issues
before the court[?]
Brief of Appellant at 4-6 (some issues renumbered, some capitalization
omitted).
In the Argument section her brief, Wojciechowski reduces these issues
to the following four claims:
A. [WHETHER] THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AND ERRED IN THE APPLICATION OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
AND PROPER LEGAL PROCEDURE[?]
B. [WHETHER] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES[?]
C. [WHETHER] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY
THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL[?]
D. [WHETHER] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY
THE DEFENSE OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS[?]
Id. at 10, 12, 14, 15. We will address the four claims presented in the
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Argument section of Wojciechowski’s brief, and find any remaining claims
waived.2
Wojciechowski first claims that the trial court erred and abused its
discretion in its application of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence and
“proper legal procedure.” Brief of Appellant at 10. Specifically,
Wojciechowski challenges the trial court’s preparation and submission of a
timeline of the case, which, Wojciechowski asserts, the court marked as an
“exhibit,” and then considered in rendering its decision. Id.
“When interpreting a property settlement agreement, the trial court is
the sole determiner of facts and absent an abuse of discretion, we will not
usurp the trial court’s fact-finding function.” delCastillo v. delCastillo, 617
A.2d 26, 29 (Pa. Super. 1992). The interpretation of a settlement
agreement between a husband and wife is governed by the law of contracts
unless the agreement itself provides otherwise.” Jackson v. Culp, 583 A.2d
1236, 1238 (Pa. Super. 1990). “Because contract interpretation is a
question of law, this Court is not bound by the trial court’s interpretation.”
2
We direct counsel’s attention to Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a), which provides, in
relevant part, as follows:
The statement of the questions involved must state concisely the
issues to be resolved, expressed in the terms and circumstances
of the case but without unnecessary detail. The statement will
be deemed to include every subsidiary question fairly
comprised therein….
Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (emphasis added). In addition, Pa.R.A.P. 2119 provides,
in relevant part, that [t]he argument shall be divided into as many parts as
there are questions to be argued ….” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).
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Miller v. Poole, 45 A.3d 1143, 1145 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted).
“Our standard of review over questions of law is de novo and[,] to the extent
necessary, the scope of our review is plenary as [the appellate] court may
review the entire record in making its decision.” Kripp v. Kripp, 849 A.2d
1159, 1164 n.5 (Pa. 2004).
In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Wojciechowski’s first claim,
and concluded that it lacks merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/27/17, at 6-7.
We agree with the reasoning and conclusion reached by the trial court, and
affirm on this basis as to Wojciechowski’s first claim, see id., with the
following addendum.
First, we recognize that, upon the filing of a divorce complaint, a trial
court is vested with jurisdiction over all matters relating to the equitable
distribution of the marital estate. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3104(a)(1). In this case,
the court’s jurisdiction continued when the Estate, on behalf of Decedent,
filed its Motion to Enforce the parties’ property settlement agreement. See
Johnson v. Johnson, 864 A.2d 1224, 1228-29 (Pa. Super. 2004)
(recognizing that the trial court retained continuing jurisdiction over the
determination and disposition of property rights and interests between
spouses, even though the equitable distribution was final). Consequently,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in reviewing the record of the
earlier equitable distribution proceedings.
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Wojciechowski also challenges the questioning of a witness by the trial
court. Brief of Appellant at 11. Our Rules of Evidence provide that “[w]here
the interest of justice so requires, the court may examine a witness
regardless of who calls the witness.” Pa.R.E. 614(a). Our review discloses
that the trial court questioned Wojciechowski regarding whether there
existed, beyond her testimony, evidence of the $32,000 payment required
by the equitable distribution Order. See N.T., 12/2/16, at 8-14. As this was
directly related to the issue presented to the court, we discern no error or
abuse of discretion.
Wojciechowski also asserts that the trial court improperly precluded
her from testifying about the actions she took as a result of a discussion with
Decedent. Brief for Appellant at 11-12. Wojciechowski asserts that the trial
court erred in excluding her testimony under the Dead Man’s Statute. Id. at
12.
As this Court has stated,
[the a]dmission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the
trial court and a trial court’s rulings on the admission of evidence
will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion or
misapplication of law. An abuse of discretion is not merely an
error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is
overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is
manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice,
bias or ill-will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion
is abused.
Schuenemann v. Dreemz, LLC, 34 A.3d 94, 100-01 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(quotations and citations omitted).
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“According to the Dead Man’s Rule or Dead Man’s Statute, surviving
parties who have an interest which is adverse to decedent’s estate are
disqualified from testifying as to any transaction or event which occurred
before decedent’s death.” Zigmantanis v. Zigmantanis, 797 A.2d 990,
995 (Pa. Super. 2002). Here, Wojciechowski sought to introduce testimony
regarding the actions she took as a result of a discussion with Decedent.
N.T., 12/2/16, at 17. Wojciechowski sought to introduce this testimony to
establish that she had sent Decedent a check, and that Decedent refused the
payment. See id. at 20 (regarding counsel’s statement that counsel had
subsequently sought the trial court’s guidance following Decedent’s refusal
of mailings from Wojciechowski). Such testimony is clearly barred by the
Dead Man’s Statute, as Wojciechowski sought to use it as evidence of
Decedent’s action of refusing the check. See Zigmantanis, 797 A.2d at
995. We discern no error or abuse of discretion by the trial court in
precluding this evidence based upon the Dead Man’s Statute. See id.In her second claim, Wojciechowski argues that the trial court erred in
denying application of the doctrine of laches. Brief of Appellant at 12.
Wojciechowski contends that Decedent failed to take any steps to assert his
right to the $32,000 payment, and that his actions in refusing the payment
caused prejudice to Wojciechowski. Id. at 13. According to Wojciechowski,
Decedent’s “unavailability and the unavailability of other fact witnesses and
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retrieval of documents due to the passage of time clearly validates
[Wojciechowski’s] assertion of prejudice.” Id.
Generally, the doctrine of laches is applied according to the following
test:
The party asserting laches must show, first, a delay arising from
the other party’s failure to exercise due diligence, and second,
prejudice from the delay…. It is not enough to show delay
arising from failure to exercise due diligence; for laches will not
be imputed where no injury has resulted to the other party by
reason of the delay.
Jackman v. Pelusi, 550 A.2d 199, 202 (Pa. Super. 1988) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
In its Opinion, the trial court found that Wojciechowski did not suffer
prejudice based on Decedent’s alleged delay, and therefore, laches did not
apply. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/2/16, at 9. The trial court reasoned that
Wojciechowski’s credibility was the key issue in the proceedings. Id. The
record supports the trial court’s determination.
The central issue before the trial court was whether Wojciechowski had
complied with the equitable distribution Order by paying $32,000 to
Decedent. Evidence regarding Decedent’s refusal of the $32,000 check
would not provide a defense to Wojciechowski’s failure to comply with the
equitable distribution Order.3 Further, the record reflects that Wojciechowski
suffered no prejudice, as she transferred the property into her name, and
3
There is no evidence that Wojciechowski filed a motion with the trial court
to waive her obligation under the equitable distribution Order, or attempted
to pay the funds into court.
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retained the $32,000. As such, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred
or abused its discretion in denying application of the doctrine of laches.
In her third claim, Wojciechowski argues that the trial court improperly
failed to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Brief for Appellant at 14.
Wojciechowski asserts that Decedent “articulated to [her] that he no longer
wanted the funds.” Id. According to Wojciechowski, Decedent’s conduct, in
refusing to accept payment by mail, supports and substantiates application
of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Id.The doctrine of equitable estoppel
prevents one from doing an act differently than the manner in
which another was induced by word or deed to expect. A
doctrine sounding in equity, equitable estoppel recognizes that
an informal promise implied by one’s words, deeds or
representations[,] which leads another to rely justifiably
thereon to his own injury or detriment, may be enforced in
equity.
Shedden v. Anadarko E. & P. Co., L.P., 136 A.3d 485, 492 (Pa. 2016)
(quoting Novelty Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Siskind, 457 A.2d 502, 503 (Pa.
1983) (emphasis in original)). The party asserting estoppel must establish
by unequivocal evidence
(1) that the party against whom the doctrine is sought to be
asserted intentionally or negligently misrepresented a material
fact, knowing or with reason to know that the other party would
justifiably rely on the misrepresentation, (2) that the other
party acted to his or her detriment by justifiably relying
on the misrepresentation, and (3) that there was no duty of
inquiry on the party seeking to assert estoppel.
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Stonehedge Square Ltd. P’ship v. Movie Merchants, Inc., 685 A.2d
1019, 1024 (Pa. Super. 1996) (emphasis added, citation omitted). Whether
equitable estoppel exists in a given case is a question of law. Id. at 1023.
Here, our review discloses no evidence that Wojciechowski relied to
her detriment or suffered an injury resulting from Decedent’s alleged
actions. Rather, the record reflects that Wojciechowski transferred the
property into her name, without paying the $32,000 required by the
equitable distribution Order.4 Consequently, the trial court did not err in
deeming the doctrine inapplicable. See id. at 1024 (requiring the party
asserting estoppel to establish that she relied to her detriment on the
actions or statements of the party against whom the doctrine is asserted).
In her fourth claim, Wojciechowski argues that the trial court erred in
failing to apply the defense of the statute of limitations. Brief of Appellant at
15. According to Wojciechowski, the four-year statute of limitations
applicable to contracts barred the Estate’s action. Id. Wojciechowski
argues that the Estate was required to bring this action by December 16,
2013, and failed to do so. Id.Pennsylvania’s Divorce Code provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(e) Powers of the court. If at any time, a party has failed to
comply with an order of equitable distribution, as provided for in
this chapter, … after hearing, the court may, in addition to any
4
Additionally, Wojciechowski did not seek a written waiver from Decedent,
or a determination from the trial court that her obligation to comply with the
equitable distribution Order was absolved.
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other remedy available under this part, in order to effect
compliance with its order:
(1) enter judgment;
…
(9) find the party in contempt.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(e) (emphasis added).
Despite Wojciechowski’s characterization of the Estate’s action as one
for breach of contract, the action is simply one to enforce the equitable
distribution Order. Based upon section 3502(e), the trial court had, “at any
time,” broad authority to enforce its Order. See id. Accordingly,
Wojciechowski’s claim lacks merit.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Order of the trial court.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/31/2017
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Circulated 06/28/2017 11:17 AM