Lane, A. v. CBS Broadcasting

J. A20007/14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
ALYCIA LANE, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
CBS BROADCASTING, INC., : No. 1258 EDA 2013
T/A KYW-TV; MICHAEL COLLERAN AND :
LAWRENCE MENDTE :
Appeal from the Order, March 20, 2013,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No. September Term, 2008, No. 03425
ALYCIA LANE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
CBS BROADCASTING INC., :
T/A KYW-TV; MICHAEL COLLERAN, :
LAWRENCE MENDTE :
:
APPEAL OF: LAWRENCE MENDTE, : No. 1416 EDA 2013
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Order Dated May 16, 2011,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No. September Term, 2008, No. 03425
J. A20007/14
ALYCIA LANE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
CBS BROADCASTING, INC. :
T/A KYW-TV, MICHAEL COLLERAN, :
LAWRENCE MENDTE :
:
APPEAL OF: CBS BROADCASTING INC. :
AND MICHAEL COLLERAN, : No. 1417 EDA 2013
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Order Dated May 16, 2011,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No. September Term, 2008, No. 03425
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., MUNDY AND MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 05, 2015
This is a consolidated appeal in the defamation action brought by
plaintiff, Alycia Lane (“Lane”). We reverse in part, affirm in part, and
remand for further proceedings.
The underlying facts of this matter may be briefly summarized as
follows:
Plaintiff Alycia Lane was employed by CBS as a news
anchor from September 2003 to January 2008. See
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, ¶ 9. CBS also
employed Defendant Lawrence Mendte (“Mendte”) as
a news anchor until approximately June 2008.
Beginning in 2006, Mendte began illegally accessing
both the personal and work email accounts of
Plaintiff.[Footnote 1] Mendte used a device known
as a “KeyCatcher” to obtain the passwords to
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Plaintiff’s email accounts. After acquiring the
passwords, he repeatedly accessed Plaintiff’s email
accounts without her authorization. Mendte
accessed Plaintiff’s passwords and emails when he
was both at work and at home. See Mendte
Deposition, p. 115-117; Government Criminal
Information, p. 3-17. He then would “leak” some of
the information he read in Plaintiff’s emails to the
press and the information would appear in numerous
news stories. See Amended Complaint, 18, 23, 25,
28; Mendte Deposition, p. 152-153, 157, 167-168,
207. Plaintiff alleges that Mendte accessed her email
accounts without her authorization over 7,000 times
throughout a two-year time period. See Amended
Complaint, ¶¶ 14, 17. Mendte eventually pled guilty
in a criminal case against him to intentionally
accessing Plaintiff’s email accounts without her
authorization.[Footnote 2]
[Footnote 1] CBS provided to its
employees, including Plaintiff, a “work”
email account. The Plaintiff also had two
personal email accounts -- one with
Apple Computer (“.mac account”) and
one with Yahoo!. See Amended
Complaint, ¶11.
[Footnote 2] Specifically, Mendte pled
guilty to violating federal criminal statute
18 U.S.C. §§1030(a)(2)(C) and
1030(c)(2)(B)(ii).
Plaintiff claims that she repeatedly informed
CBS of her belief that somebody was hacking into
her email accounts. Despite her repeated
complaints, Plaintiff alleges that CBS did not perform
a reasonable investigation into the hacking. Plaintiff
filed the present lawsuit in September 2008 against,
inter alia, CBS and Mendte. In Count VII of the
Amended Complaint, Plaintiff brought a claim for
negligence against CBS. Plaintiff claims that CBS
had a duty to protect Plaintiff from Mendte’s criminal
conduct and to investigate the allegation of criminal
conduct made by Plaintiff. See Plaintiff’s Omnibus
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Opposition to Summary Judgment, p. 65. Plaintiff
alleges that as a direct and proximate result of CBS’
negligence, Plaintiff suffered reputational damage
and financial losses arising from that reputational
damage. See Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, ¶ 160.
CBS is now moving for summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s negligence claim.
Trial court opinion, 5/16/11 at 1-2.
Lane also brought a claim for defamation against CBS based upon the
following January 8, 2008 statement, read on the air:
CBS 3 announced today that Alycia Lane has
been released from her contract. Lane is facing a
charge of assaulting a police officer in New York last
month, a charge she categorically denies.
CBS 3 President and General Manager Michael
Colleran issued the following statement, it says
quote:
After assessing the overall impact
of a series of incidents resulting from
judgments she has made, we have
concluded that it would be impossible for
Alycia to continue to report the news as
she, herself, has become the focus of so
many news stories. We wish to make
clear that we are not prejudging the
outcome of the criminal case against
Alycia that is pending in New York. We
understand that Alycia expects to be fully
vindicated in that proceeding. We hope
that is the case and we wish her the best
in all her future endeavors.
On December 12, 2012, the Honorable Allan L. Tereshko dismissed all
claims against CBS, and some claims against Mendte, based on spoliation of
evidence. Specifically, Judge Tereshko found that Lane had intentionally
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disposed of her 2005 Apple G4 laptop computer (“the 2005 Laptop”),
thereby depriving CBS and Mendte of any meaningful defense.
Judge Tereshko determined that Lane’s case was overwhelmingly based
upon documents originated and stored in her 2005 Laptop. Also on
December 12, 2012, Judge Tereshko granted summary judgment for CBS on
Lane’s claims for defamation and false light. On March 20, 2013, the
remaining claims against Mendte were dismissed based on spoliation.
We will address Lane’s claims on appeal first. She has raised the
following issues for our review:
1. Utilizing “strict scrutiny,” did the trial court
abuse its discretion in dismissing Plaintiff’s
claims based upon spoliation?
2. Did the trial court err and violate the
coordinate jurisdiction rule in reversing the
denial of the CBS motion for summary
judgment as to defamation and false light?
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in
excluding the expert testimony of Frank Keel
as to defamation?
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in
denying Plaintiff’s motion in limine to preclude
at trial the deposition of Officer Bernadette
Enchautegui, and Plaintiff’s motion for a
de bene esse deposition of her?
5. Viewed in totality, does Judge Tereshko’s
conduct evidence an appearance of
impropriety?
Lane’s brief at 4-5.
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“When reviewing a court’s decision to grant or deny
a spoliation sanction, we must determine whether
the court abused its discretion.” Mount Olivet
Tabernacle Church v. Edwin L. Wiegand
Division, 781 A.2d 1263, 1269 (Pa.Super. 2001)
(citing Croydon Plastics Co. v. Lower Bucks
Cooling & Heating, 698 A.2d 625, 629 (Pa.Super.
1997) (recognizing that “[t]he decision whether to
sanction a party, and if so the severity of such
sanction, is vested in the sound discretion of the trial
court”)). Such sanctions arise out of “the common
sense observation that a party who has notice that
[evidence] is relevant to litigation and who proceeds
to destroy [evidence] is more likely to have been
threatened by [that evidence] than is a party in the
same position who does not destroy [the evidence].”
Mount Olivet, 781 A.2d at 1269 (quoting
Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills
Distributors, Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 218 (1st Cir.
1982)). Our courts have recognized accordingly that
one potential remedy for the loss or destruction of
evidence by the party controlling it is to allow the
jury to apply its common sense and draw an
“adverse inference” against that party. See
Schroeder v. Commonwealth of Pa., Dep’t of
Transp., 551 Pa. 243, 710 A.2d 23, 28 (1998).
Although award of summary judgment against the
offending party remains an option in some cases, its
severity makes it an inappropriate remedy for all but
the most egregious conduct. See Tenaglia v.
Proctor & Gamble, Inc., 737 A.2d 306, 308
(Pa.Super. 1999) (“[S]ummary judgment is not
mandatory simply because the plaintiff bears some
degree of fault for the failure to preserve the
product.”).
Creazzo v. Medtronic, Inc., 903 A.2d 24, 28-29 (Pa.Super. 2006).
To determine the appropriate sanction for spoliation,
the trial court must weigh three factors:
(1) the degree of fault of the party who
altered or destroyed the evidence;
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(2) the degree of prejudice suffered by the
opposing party; and (3) whether there is
a lesser sanction that will avoid
substantial unfairness to the opposing
party and, where the offending party is
seriously at fault, will serve to deter such
conduct by others in the future.
Mount Olivet, 781 A.2d at 1269-70 (quoting
Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d
76, 79 (3d Cir.1994)). In this context, evaluation of
the first prong, “the fault of the party who altered or
destroyed the evidence,” requires consideration of
two components, the extent of the offending party’s
duty or responsibility to preserve the relevant
evidence, and the presence or absence of bad faith.
See Mt. Olivet, 781 A.2d at 1270. The duty prong,
in turn, is established where: “(1) the plaintiff knows
that litigation against the defendants is pending or
likely; and (2) it is foreseeable that discarding the
evidence would be prejudicial to the defendants.”
Id. at 1270-71.
Id. at 29.
Here, we note that the defendants never requested production of the
2005 Laptop during discovery. The Honorable Howland Abramson, who
presided over this case until his retirement, previously ruled that Lane had
satisfied her discovery document production obligations. In addition, from
our review of the record, the defendants’ argument that there are missing
documents including e-mail correspondence between Lane and her friends is,
at best, speculative.
Lane explained that her 2005 Laptop “died” and the screen went black,
so she purchased a new MacBook laptop (“the 2008 Laptop”) from the
Apple store. According to Lane, the Apple store transferred data including
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photographs from her old laptop to the new one, and she then discarded the
2005 Laptop.1
The trial court’s conclusion that Lane’s case is based upon documents
originated and stored in her 2005 Laptop, and that her disposal of the
2005 Laptop was with the intent to destroy material evidence and thus
deprive the defendants of any meaningful defense, is simply not tenable.
Lane had e-mail accounts with both Yahoo! and Apple (“.mac”). The subject
of Lane’s complaint were the communications stored on her remote, web-
accessed Yahoo! and .mac accounts, which were preserved. Those e-mails,
which were the subject of an FBI investigation, are stored indefinitely on the
Yahoo! and .mac remote servers. Similarly, e-mails sent through Lane’s
CBS work e-mail account would be stored on CBS servers, not on Lane’s
laptop. The defendants cannot point to any missing, material evidence from
Lane’s 2005 Laptop that she intentionally destroyed. Obviously this court is
bound by the trial court’s credibility determination that Lane intentionally
disposed of the 2005 Laptop; however, the suggestion that there are
missing e-mails detrimental to Lane’s case that were stored only on her
1
Lane described this process as “cloning.” The trial court relied on the
defense expert, Mr. McGowan’s testimony that “cloning” is a “byte-for-byte”
transfer of data which would not have been possible because the 2005
Laptop and 2008 Laptop used different computer chips. However, Lane is
not a computer expert, she is a layperson, and her use of the term “cloning”
may have been inadvertent. Furthermore, Mr. McGowan conceded that files
including e-mails and photographs could have been transferred from the
2005 Laptop to the 2008 Laptop.
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2005 Laptop is speculation. Under these circumstances, the extreme
sanction of dismissal was unwarranted.
Next, Lane argues that Judge Tereshko’s grant of summary judgment
for CBS ran afoul of the coordinate jurisdiction rule, since Judge Abramson
had previously denied CBS’s motion for summary judgment.
Initially, we note:
Our scope of review of a trial court’s
order disposing of a motion for summary
judgment is plenary. Accordingly, we
must consider the order in the context of
the entire record. Our standard of
review is the same as that of the trial
court; thus, we determine whether the
record documents a question of material
fact concerning an element of the claim
or defense at issue. If no such question
appears, the court must then determine
whether the moving party is entitled to
judgment on the basis of substantive
law. Conversely, if a question of
material fact is apparent, the court must
defer the question for consideration of a
jury and deny the motion for summary
judgment. We will reverse the resulting
order only where it is established that
the court committed an error of law or
clearly abused its discretion.
Grimminger v. Maitra, 887 A.2d 276, 279
(Pa.Super.2005) (quotation omitted). “[Moreover,]
we will view the record in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be
resolved against the moving party.” Evans v.
Sodexho, 946 A.2d 733, 739 (Pa.Super.2008)
(quotation omitted).
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Ford Motor Co. v. Buseman, 954 A.2d 580, 582-583 (Pa.Super. 2008),
appeal denied, 970 A.2d 431 (Pa. 2009).
[T]his Court has long recognized that judges of
coordinate jurisdiction sitting in the same case
should not overrule each other[’s] decisions. See,
e.g., Okkerse v. Howe, 521 Pa. 509, 516-517, 556
A.2d 827, 831 (1989). This rule, known as the
“coordinate jurisdiction rule,” is a rule of sound
jurisprudence based on a policy of fostering the
finality of pre-trial applications in an effort to
maintain judicial economy and efficiency. Id. See
also Golden v. Dion & Rosenau, 410 Pa.Super.
506, 510, 600 A.2d 568, 570 (1991) (once a matter
has been decided by a trial judge the decision should
remain undisturbed, unless the order is appealable
and an appeal therefrom is successfully prosecuted).
Commonwealth v. Starr, 664 A.2d 1326, 1331 (Pa. 1995).
In our view, this coordinate jurisdiction rule
falls squarely within the ambit of a generalized
expression of the “law of the case” doctrine. This
doctrine refers to a family of rules which embody the
concept that a court involved in the later phases of a
litigated matter should not reopen questions decided
by another judge of that same court or by a higher
court in the earlier phases of the matter. See
21 C.J.S. Courts § 149a; 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and
Error § 744. Among the related but distinct rules
which make up the law of the case doctrine are that:
(1) upon remand for further proceedings, a trial
court may not alter the resolution of a legal question
previously decided by the appellate court in the
matter; (2) upon a second appeal, an appellate court
may not alter the resolution of a legal question
previously decided by the same appellate court; and
(3) upon transfer of a matter between trial judges of
coordinate jurisdiction, the transferee trial court may
not alter the resolution of a legal question previously
decided by the transferor trial court. See Joan
Steinman, Law of the Case: A Judicial Puzzle in
Consolidated and Transferred Cases and in
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Multidistrict Litigation, 135 U.Pa.L.Rev. 595, 602
(1987) (citing A. Vestal, Law of the Case:
Single-Suit Preclusion, 12 Utah L.Rev. 1, 1-4
(1967)) (hereinafter “Judicial Puzzle”).
Id.
The various rules which make up the law of the
case doctrine serve not only to promote the goal of
judicial economy (as does the coordinate jurisdiction
rule) but also operate (1) to protect the settled
expectations of the parties; (2) to insure uniformity
of decisions; (3) to maintain consistency during the
course of a single case; (4) to effectuate the proper
and streamlined administration of justice; and (5) to
bring litigation to an end. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 149a;
Judicial Puzzle at 604-605.
Id.
Departure from either of these principles is allowed
only in exceptional circumstances such as where
there has been an intervening change in the
controlling law, a substantial change in the facts or
evidence giving rise to the dispute in the matter, or
where the prior holding was clearly erroneous and
would create a manifest injustice if followed.
Compare Musumeci v. Penn’s Landing
Corporation, 433 Pa.Super. 146, 151-152, 640
A.2d 416, 419 (1994), appeal denied, 539 Pa. 653,
651 A.2d 540 (1994) (the coordinate jurisdiction rule
applies in all cases except where newly-discovered
evidence or newly-developed legal authority compel
a result different than that reached by the first
judge) and Commonwealth v. Brown, 485 Pa.
368, 371, 402 A.2d 1007, 1008 (1979) (where the
evidence is substantially the same as that originally
ruled upon by the first judge, a second judge
commits a per se abuse of discretion in overruling or
vacating the prior order) (citations omitted) with
21 C.J.S. Courts § 149b (same).
Id. at 1332.
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Our supreme court has recently recognized the
continuing validity of the clearly erroneous/manifest
injustice exception. [Zane v. Friends Hospital,
836 A.2d 25, 29-30 (Pa. 2003)] (upholding the
clearly erroneous/manifest injustice exception to the
law of the case doctrine in those circumscribed cases
in which the prior court’s ruling was so clearly
erroneous that it would create a manifest injustice
that would be, in essence, plainly intolerable, if
followed). See also Ryan v. Berman, 572 Pa. 156,
813 A.2d 792 (2002); Gerrow v. John Royle &
Sons, 572 Pa. 134, 813 A.2d 778 (2002) (plurality);
Commonwealth v. Yarris, 557 Pa. 12, 731 A.2d
581 (1999). The Zane court clearly instructs,
however, that Pennsylvania courts must be
scrupulous in applying the exception so that it does
not swallow the rule. First, the prior court’s ruling
must, in fact, be so palpably erroneous that reversal
is almost certain on appeal. Zane, supra at 243-44,
836 A.2d at 29. Even then, the error must also
create such an injustice as to be plainly intolerable.
Id. at 30.
Commonwealth v. Viglione, 842 A.2d 454, 464-465 (Pa.Super. 2004)
(en banc) (footnote omitted). See also Gerrow, 813 A.2d at 782 (“In
some circumstances, however, application of the rule can ‘thwart the very
purpose the rule was intended to serve, i.e., that judicial economy and
efficiency be maintained.’”), quoting Salerno v. Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc., 546 A.2d 1168, 1170 (Pa.Super. 1988).
Judge Tereshko revisited Judge Abramson’s ruling based, in part, on
changed circumstances, i.e., dismissal of the case on spoliation grounds,
and exclusion of Lane’s expert report on defamation. For the reasons
discussed above, we have already determined that outright dismissal of the
case based on spoliation was error. As explained below, we agree with the
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ruling regarding Lane’s expert. At the time Judge Abramson ruled, the
defendants’ challenge to the admissibility of Keel’s report had not yet been
decided by that court. It was assumed that Keel was going to testify at trial.
However, Judge Abramson did not explicitly rely on Mr. Keel’s expert report.
Rather, Judge Abramson, citing Michael Colleran’s deposition testimony,
stated as his reason for denying summary judgment that there were genuine
issues of material fact based on his interpretation of Colleran’s testimony as
to whether CBS entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement.2
2
Judge Abramson’s May 12, 2011 order provided, in relevant part:
The Court finds that the statement at issue in this case
(the “Statement”) is capable of defamatory meaning,
given the context in which the Statement was made.
Genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether
the Statement was understood as defamatory by the
recipients of the Statement. In other words, genuine
issues of material fact exist as to whether an average
person could conclude from the Statement that Plaintiff
committed the alleged actions in New York, which
underlay the criminal case.
Further, since Plaintiff is a public figure, she
“must prove that the defendant published the offending
statement with ‘actual malice,’ i.e., with knowledge
that the statement was false or with reckless disregard
of its falsity.” Weaver v. Lancaster Newspapers, Inc.,
926 A.2d 899, 903 (Pa. 2007) (citations omitted).
“[F]or the purposes of establishing that a defendant
acted with reckless disregard for the truth, there must
be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the
defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the
truth of his publication.” Id.The Court finds that Plaintiff has produced
sufficient evidence of actual malice to survive summary
judgment. Plaintiff has pointed to specific deposition
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Therefore, the record on the summary judgment defamation issue was not
materially different and without more, we would find a violation of the
coordinate jurisdiction rule.
However, Judge Tereshko also found that permitting the case to go to
trial on the basis of CBS’s statement would result in a manifest injustice, and
that Judge Abramson’s ruling denying CBS’s summary judgment motion was
clearly erroneous. According to Judge Tereshko, the statement is not
capable of a defamatory meaning as a matter of law.
“Defamation is a communication which tends to
harm an individual’s reputation so as to lower him or
her in the estimation of the community or deter third
persons from associating or dealing with him or her.”
Elia v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 430 Pa.Super.
384, 634 A.2d 657, 660 (1993). Only statements of
fact, not expressions of opinion, can support an
testimony in the record which creates genuine issues of
material fact as to whether CBS entertained “serious
doubts” as to the truth of the Statement. (See, e.g.,
Calabria Dep., p. 429; Colleran Dep., p. 572-575, 623-
629). Therefore, CBS’s Motion for Summary Judgment
on Plaintiff’s defamation claim is denied.” (Order,
5/12/11 at 1-2 n.1.)
We note that portions of Colleran’s deposition testimony cited by Lane are taken
out of context, to create an impression that Colleran subjectively believed Lane
was guilty of criminal misconduct in New York. In fact, Colleran testified that he
had no idea whether the allegations were true, that Lane struck a police officer
and made a homophobic slur. (RR at 2014.) However, this is not relevant to
the alleged defamatory content of the CBS statement. Viewing Colleran’s
testimony in its totality, it is clear that he simply felt that given the news stories
concerning Lane, including the pending charges in New York, she had lost
credibility as a television journalist and CBS could not continue to employ her.
The CBS statement does not accuse Lane of criminal misconduct, in fact CBS
noted that it was not prejudging Lane and that it hoped she would be
exonerated.
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action in defamation. Id. In a defamation case, a
plaintiff must prove: “(1) The defamatory character
of the communication; (2) its publication by the
defendant; (3) its application to the plaintiff; (4) the
understanding by the recipient of its defamatory
meaning; (5) the understanding by the recipient of it
as intended to be applied to the plaintiff; (6) special
harm resulting to the plaintiff from its publication;
and (7) abuse of a conditionally privileged occasion.”
Porter v. Joy Realty, Inc., 872 A.2d 846, 849 n. 6
(Pa.Super. 2005), quoting, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8343(a).
See also, Weber v. Lancaster Newspapers, Inc.,
878 A.2d 63 (Pa.Super. 2005).
Moore v. Cobb-Nettleton, 889 A.2d 1262, 1267 (Pa.Super. 2005).
It is for the trial court to determine as a matter of
law whether a statement is one of fact or opinion, as
well as to determine whether a challenged statement
is capable of having defamatory meaning. Elia, 634
A.2d at 660, citing Braig v. Field
Communications, 310 Pa.Super. 569, 456 A.2d
1366 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 970, 104 S.Ct.
2341, 80 L.Ed.2d 816 (1984). “A communication is
. . . defamatory if it ascribes to another conduct,
character or a condition that would adversely affect
his fitness for the proper conduct of his proper
business, trade or profession.” Maier v. Maretti,
448 Pa.Super. 276, 671 A.2d 701, 704 (1995),
appeal denied, 548 Pa. 637, 694 A.2d 622 (1997),
citing Gordon v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hospital
Association, 340 Pa.Super. 253, 489 A.2d 1364(1985). Additionally, the court should “consider the
effect the statement would fairly produce, or the
impression it would naturally engender, in the minds
of average persons among whom it is intended to
circulate.” Maier, 671 A.2d at 704, citing Rybas v.
Wapner, 311 Pa.Super. 50, 457 A.2d 108 (1983).
Constantino v. University of Pittsburgh, 766 A.2d 1265, 1270 (Pa.Super.
2001). “It is clear that expressions of pure opinion that rely on disclosed
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facts are not actionable.” Feldman v. Lafayette Green Condominium
Ass’n, 806 A.2d 497, 501 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2002) (citations omitted).
It is not disputed that Lane, as a newscaster, was a public figure.
[T]he appropriate standard of fault depends on
whether the plaintiff is a public or private figure. If
the plaintiff is a public official or public figure, and
the statement relates to a matter of public concern,
then to satisfy First Amendment strictures the
plaintiff must establish that the defendant made a
false and defamatory statement with actual malice.
In contrast, states are free to allow a private-figure
plaintiff to recover by establishing that the defendant
acted negligently rather than maliciously.
American Future Systems, Inc. v. Better Business Bureau of Eastern
Pennsylvania, 923 A.2d 389, 400 (Pa. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1076(2007) (citations and parentheticals omitted).3
3
As used in this discussion, the term “actual malice”
(sometimes shortened to “malice”) is a term of art
that refers to a speaker’s knowledge that his
statement is false, or his reckless disregard as to its
truth or falsity. Thus, it implies at a minimum that
the speaker “‘entertained serious doubts about the
truth of his publication,’ . . . or acted with a ‘high
degree of awareness of . . . probable falsity.’”
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496,
510, 111 S.Ct. 2419, 2429, 115 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991)
(quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727,
731, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 1325, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968);
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74, 85 S.Ct.
209, 216, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964)). This term
“should not be confused with the concept of malice
as an evil intent or a motive arising from spite or ill
will.” Id.Id. at 76 n.6, 923 A.2d at 395 n.6.
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Here, CBS stated, after noting that Lane was facing criminal charges in
New York, a true statement at the time, that “it would be impossible for
Alycia to continue to report the news, as she herself has become the focus of
so many news stories.” This merely conveys an opinion, which is not
actionable as a matter of Pennsylvania law. While Lane argues that the
statement somehow suggests or implies that she committed criminal acts,
the statement clearly relates the fact that Lane denies she committed any
crime, and that she expects to be “fully vindicated.” The statement also
expresses CBS’s hope that Lane will be fully vindicated. Lane’s
interpretation contradicts the statement’s plain terms and clear meaning.
The statement makes clear that there had been no determination of guilt or
innocence and that CBS hoped Lane would be cleared of any charges. There
is simply no evidence that CBS knew anything in the statement was false or
probably false, or that the statement was made with actual malice. In fact,
Lane admitted that taken at face value, there was nothing false about CBS’s
statement. (Lane deposition, 1/21/11 at 604-608.) While Lane claims the
statement implies guilt, as the trial court states, innuendo can only support
a defamation action where it is warranted, justified and supported by the
publication. (Trial court opinion and order, 12/12/12 at 33, citing
Livingston v. Murray, 612 A.2d 443, 449 (Pa.Super. 1992), appeal
denied, 617 A.2d 1275 (Pa. 1992)). Lane’s argument that the statement
implies she committed crimes is directly contrary to its plain terms. Lane
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failed to establish that the publication was capable of defamatory meaning. 4
As the appellate court, we find Judge Abramson’s prior ruling was so
palpably erroneous that reversal would be almost certain on appeal. As
such, the prior court’s ruling was clearly erroneous and an exception to the
coordinate jurisdiction rule applied.5
In her third assignment of error, Lane contends that CBS should not
have been permitted to use Officer Bernadette Enchautegui’s deposition
where Lane did not have a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine.
During Officer Enchautegui’s deposition concerning the New York incident,
plaintiff’s counsel moved to strike on the basis of CPL § 160.50, which
provides for the sealing of records relating to the arrest and prosecution
upon the termination of a criminal proceeding in the favor of the accused.
According to plaintiff’s counsel, Officer Enchautegui was not allowed to
testify to documents in the police file, and could even be exposing herself to
criminal liability. (Trial court opinion, 1/27/12 at 3, citing notes of
4
It follows that Lane’s claim for false light also cannot be maintained. To
make out a false light invasion of privacy claim, Lane would have to prove,
inter alia, that “the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard
as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the
other would be placed.” Restatement (Second) Torts, § 652E(b). Here,
there was nothing false about CBS’s statement announcing Lane’s
termination.
5
“Moreover, it is a well-settled doctrine in this Commonwealth that a trial
court can be affirmed on any valid basis appearing of record.” In re T.P.,
78 A.3d 1166, 1170 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 93 A.3d 463 (Pa.
2014) (citations omitted).
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testimony, Enchautegui deposition, 1/10/11 at 100-105.) At that point,
Officer Enchautegui requested counsel and asked that the deposition be
adjourned.
As the trial court states, the privilege afforded by Section 160.50 is not
absolute and is waived where the accused makes the criminal prosecution an
issue in a civil action. (Id. at 6.) That is clearly the case here. The trial
court explains,
In the instant matter, Plaintiff put the details of her
arrest squarely at issue as she has alleged that CBS
defamed her by conveying to the viewing public that
CBS had determined that Plaintiff was guilty of the
crime charged in New York and terminated her
contract as a result. In doing so, Plaintiff has waived
the privilege conferred by CPL § 160.50, and the
threats leveled at Officer Enchautegui during the
deposition by Plaintiff’s counsel were baseless.
Id. We agree. Lane was not unfairly denied an opportunity to
cross-examine Officer Enchautegui, where her own frivolous objections
caused Officer Enchautegui to request counsel and stop the proceedings.
Next, Lane argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
precluding the testimony of her expert on the defamation issue, Frank J.
Keel (“Keel”). “The admission of expert testimony is a matter of discretion
[for] the trial court and will not be remanded, overruled or disturbed unless
there was a clear abuse of discretion.” Blicha v. Jacks, 864 A.2d 1214,
1218 (Pa.Super. 2004).
An expert witness is a witness who possesses
knowledge not within ordinary reach or
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understanding, and who, because of this knowledge,
is specially qualified to address a particular subject.
Steele v. Shepperd, 411 Pa. 481, 192 A.2d 397(1963). When a witness is offered as an expert, the
first question the trial court should ask is whether
the subject to be addressed by the witness is “so
distinctly related to some science, profession,
business or occupation” that it is beyond the
understanding of the average layperson. McDaniel
v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme, 367 Pa.Super. 600, 533
A.2d 436, 440 (1987), appeal denied, 520 Pa. 589,
551 A.2d 215 (1998) (quoting Dambacher v.
Mallis, 336 Pa.Super. 22, 485 A.2d 408, 415
(1984), appeal dismissed, 508 Pa. 643, 500 A.2d
428 (1985)). If the answer to that question is “Yes,”
the trial court must then ascertain whether the
proposed witness has “sufficient skill, knowledge, or
experience in that field or calling as to make it
appear that his opinion or inference will probably aid
the trier in [the] search for truth.” Id.Bergman v. United Services Auto. Ass’n, 742 A.2d 1101, 1105
(Pa.Super. 1999).
Necessity is fundamental to the admissibility of
opinion evidence. Cooper v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 323 Pa. 295, 186 A. 125 (1936). If the
facts can be fully and accurately described to the
fact-finder, who, without special knowledge or
training, is able to estimate the bearing of those
facts on the issues in the case, then the opinions of
witnesses are inadmissible because they are
unnecessary in the search for truth. Whyte v.
Robinson, 421 Pa.Super. 33, 617 A.2d 380 (1992).
The trial court must determine whether the necessity
for the testimony exists and whether the witness is
qualified to testify. Ruzzi v. Butler Petroleum Co.,
527 Pa. 1, 588 A.2d 1 (1991); Cooper, supra.Id.This Court has also emphasized that expert
testimony should not invite the fact-finder to
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abdicate its responsibility to ascertain and assess the
facts and, instead, defer to the expert’s opinion.
Commonwealth v. Montavo, 439 Pa.Super. 216,
653 A.2d 700 (1995), appeal denied, 541 Pa. 636,
663 A.2d 689 (1995). The primary purpose of the
expert testimony must be to assist the trier of fact in
understanding complicated matters, not simply to
assist one party or another in winning the case.
Panitz v. Behrend, 429 Pa.Super. 273, 632 A.2d
562 (1993).
Id.Lane argues that Keel’s testimony was necessary to put the CBS
statement into context, and to explain how it relied on undisclosed
defamatory facts. In the introduction to his expert report, Keel states that,
“This opinion is limited to addressing the effect that the Statement at issue
would have on the average recipient or listener, and the public perception of
the Statement with respect to the average members of the community and
general public.” (Trial court opinion, 2/16/12 at 2.) Keel then goes on to
conclude that, inter alia: the statement tended to harm Lane’s reputation
in the community and deter third persons from dealing with her; the
statement conveys that Lane was guilty of a felony and had exhibited
criminal bad judgment, such that she could not possibly continue to work in
her chosen field; the statement conveys that Lane had credibility issues so
severe it was impossible for her to continue to practice her profession; and
the statement was, in fact, untrue. (Id. at 2-3.)
We agree with the trial court that permitting Keel to testify as to the
statement’s effect on the average listener would invade the province of the
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jury. Whether the statement has the effect of conveying to the average
viewer that Lane was guilty of a felony is not beyond the knowledge or
experience of the average layperson. As the trial court remarked, “this
Court is presented with the proposition that an Expert is required to tell the
average person on a jury what the average person would think about
Defendant’s Statement.” (Id. at 3 (emphasis deleted).) Keel’s proposed
testimony would only serve to confuse the jury and unduly influence them.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit this
testimony.
Finally, Lane argues that Judge Tereshko’s conduct in this matter
evidences an appearance of impropriety and bias. Primarily, Lane’s
argument in this regard focuses on Judge Tereshko’s adverse rulings
including on the spoliation issue and revisiting Judge Abramson’s denial of
CBS’s summary judgment motion. While we conclude the spoliation ruling
was in error, and we express concerns regarding the trial court’s findings in
this regard, we cannot say that there is an appearance of impropriety or bias
in the defendants’ favor.
We now turn to CBS’s cross-appeal.6 First, CBS argues that the trial
court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment on Lane’s
6
Lane has filed motions to quash both CBS’s and Mendte’s cross-appeals,
arguing that because they prevailed in the court below, they are not
“aggrieved parties” with standing to appeal. We disagree. Neither CBS nor
Mendte received all the relief they requested, e.g., the trial court denied
summary judgment on Lane’s negligence claim against CBS. While a
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negligence claim. Lane brought a claim under § 213 of the Restatement
(Second) of Agency, alleging that CBS negligently failed to prevent Mendte’s
tortious conduct of hacking into Lane’s e-mails. CBS argues that the trial
court failed to identify any legal duty CBS owed to Lane.
Initially, we observe that in addition to arguing lack of a legal duty to
Lane, CBS claims that Lane’s negligence cause of action is statutorily barred
by the Workers’ Compensation Act; that there was no evidence Lane was
harmed by Mendte’s conduct; and that the negligence claim is barred by the
statute of limitations. None of these particular issues were raised in
CBS’s concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b); therefore, they are deemed waived. In CBS’s
Rule 1925(b) statement, it alleged only that the trial court erred by denying
its summary judgment motion as to Lane’s theory of negligence based upon
the Restatement of Agency (Second) § 213. It is firmly established that
issues not raised in a Rule 1925(b) statement are waived on appeal.
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii).
Section 213 provides,
protective cross-appeal is not required under Pa.R.A.P. 511, it is permitted
where CBS and Mendte were clearly “aggrieved” by particular rulings in the
trial court. See Pittsburgh Const. Co. v. Griffith, 834 A.2d 572, 588-590
(Pa.Super. 2003) (the prevailing party properly cross-appealed where it was
aggrieved by a judgment that did not grant it the full contractual relief it
sought).
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A person conducting an activity through servants or
other agents is subject to liability for harm resulting
from his conduct if he is negligent or reckless:
(a) in giving improper or ambiguous orders
of [sic] in failing to make proper
regulations; or
(b) in the employment of improper persons
or instrumentalities in work involving risk
of harm to others:
(c) in the supervision of the activity; or
(d) in permitting, or failing to prevent,
negligent or other tortious conduct by
persons, whether or not his servants or
agents, upon premises or with
instrumentalities under his control.
The Comment states that, “Liability exists only if all the requirements
of an action of tort for negligence exist.” This court has commented, “these
Restatement sections do no more than to restate the existing tort law of
Pennsylvania. They impose on an employer the duty to exercise reasonable
care in selecting, supervising and controlling employees.” Brezenski v.
World Truck Transfer, Inc., 755 A.2d 36, 42 (Pa.Super. 2000), quoting
R.A. v. First Church of Christ, 748 A.2d 692 (Pa.Super. 2000). See also
Heller v. Patwil Homes, Inc., 713 A.2d 105, 107 (Pa.Super. 1998) (“Our
reasoning that an employer may be liable directly for wrongful acts of its
negligently hired employee comports with the general tort principles of
negligence long recognized in this jurisdiction.”), citing Dempsey v. Walso
Bureau, Inc., 246 A.2d 418 (Pa. 1968).
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CBS has a duty to hire and supervise its employees to prevent
foreseeable harm. Instantly, there was evidence that CBS had either actual
or constructive notice of the harm that Mendte was to cause Lane. As
Judge Abramson found in denying CBS’s motion for summary judgment:
The Court finds that [Lane] has produced sufficient
evidence to proceed on her Section 213 theory of
negligence with respect to her personal emails.[7]
Paragraph (d) of Section 213 states that an
employer is liable “in permitting or failing to prevent,
negligent or other tortious conduct by persons,
whether or not his servants or agents upon premises
or with instrumentalities under his control.” In this
instance, it is undisputed that Defendant Mendte
illicitly accessed Lane’s personal email accounts, and
that this accessing occurred (in part) on CBS
property and utilizing CBS’ chattels. Moreover, while
CBS may not have known that Mendte was the
perpetrator, the record indicates that a genuine issue
of material fact exists as to whether CBS had
“constructive” notice that one of its employees was
committing tortious actions on its premises and
using its chattels.
Opinion and Order, 5/16/11 at 15-16 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in
original). The trial court did not err in denying CBS’s motion for summary
judgment on Lane’s negligence claim.
Secondly, CBS complains that the trial court denied its motion for
sanctions under Pa.R.C.P. 4019 for Lane’s conduct relative to the
Enchautegui deposition. “Discovery matters are within the discretion of the
trial court, and, therefore, we employ an abuse of discretion standard of
7
The trial court refused to recognize a personal privacy interest in Lane’s
corporate e-mail.
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review.” McNeil v. Jordan, 814 A.2d 234, 241 (Pa.Super. 2002), reversed
on other grounds, 894 A.2d 1260 (Pa. 2006), citing Luszczynski v.
Bradley, 729 A.2d 83, 87 (Pa.Super. 1999). We can discern no basis for
disturbing the trial court’s ruling in this regard, which would seem to be
uniquely within the trial court’s discretion. In fact, there was some
indication that Officer Enchautegui had been led to believe that she was
represented by counsel for CBS, which was untrue, and this was at least part
of the reason she refused to continue with the deposition. In any event, it
could be argued that Lane’s conduct worked to CBS’s benefit where we have
held that the deposition testimony would have been admissible in the
defamation action despite lack of cross-examination.
Finally, we turn to Mendte’s arguments on cross-appeal. Mendte
appeals the May 16, 2011 order granting partial summary judgment in favor
of Lane on Counts III and XIII (Invasion of Privacy -- Intrusion Upon
Seclusion), IV (Tortious Interference with Prospective Contractual Relations),
and V (Invasion of Privacy -- Publicity Given to Private Life).
Judge Abramson granted summary judgment on these counts as to liability
only, limited to Lane’s personal e-mails, with causation and damages to be
determined at trial.
Mendte had pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(2)(C) and
1030(c)(2)(B)(ii), which require the government to prove that the defendant
(1) intentionally; (2) accessed a computer without authorization; and
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(3) thereby obtained information from any protected computer; (4) the
conduct involved an interstate communication; and (5) the defendant did so
in furtherance of any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution
or laws of the United States or any state. (Opinion and Order, 5/16/11 at
1 n.1.) Pursuant to his guilty plea in federal court, Mendte admitted the
underlying facts, including that from January to March 2008, he accessed
Lane’s personal e-mail accounts without authorization more than 500 times.
(Id.) These included e-mails between Lane and her attorneys discussing
Lane’s criminal case in New York. (Id.) Mendte admitted that he read these
e-mails and leaked information to the press. (Id.) In addition, Mendte
admitted that he attempted to undermine Lane’s efforts to achieve a
favorable disposition of her criminal case in New York, including sending an
anonymous letter to the New York City district attorney’s office. (Id. at 1-2
n.1.) Judge Abramson concluded that these facts constitute the torts set
forth in the above counts and Mendte is judicially estopped from denying or
disputing these facts at trial. (Id. at 2 n.1.)
The doctrine of judicial estoppel holds that [a]s a
general rule, a party to an action is estopped from
assuming a position inconsistent with his or her
assertion in a previous action, if his or her contention
was successfully maintained. The purpose of this
doctrine is to uphold the integrity of the courts by
preventing parties from abusing the judicial process
by changing positions as the moment requires.
Bugosh v. Allen Refractories Co., 932 A.2d 901, 912 (Pa.Super. 2007),
appeal dismissed as improvidently granted, Bugosh v. I.U. North
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America, Inc., 971 A.2d 1228 (Pa. 2009) (quotation marks and citations
omitted).
Mendte admitted to the above facts as part of his guilty plea and is
now estopped from denying them in a subsequent civil trial. Notably,
Judge Abramson found that the issues of causation and damages suffered, if
any, were never determined and that Mendte would not be precluded from
litigating those issues in the present case. Therefore, to the extent Mendte
argues that Lane suffered no damages from his tortious interference with
prospective contractual relations where the criminal charges in New York
were ultimately dismissed, he will have the opportunity to litigate that issue
despite his previous admissions in criminal court. Judge Abramson did not
err in granting partial summary judgment for Lane, limited to liability.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part. Remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this memorandum. CBS’s application for
sanctions, filed April 7, 2014, and joined by Mendte on April 24, 2014, is
hereby denied. Jurisdiction is relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/5/2015
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