Com. v. Jones, J.

J-S16017-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JAQUIL JONES :
:
Appellant : No. 1569 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 4, 2021,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County,
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0002349-2020.
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED JULY 12, 2022
Jaquil Jones appeals from the judgment of sentence entered following
his jury trial and conviction of persons not to possess firearms, possession of
drug paraphernalia, and conspiracy.1 He challenges the denial of his motion
to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search of his apartment.
We affirm.
On July 15, 2020, Reading Police Officer Christopher Bucklin filed a
criminal complaint charging Jones after a search of Jones’ apartment revealed
two firearms, accessories, drugs, money, and paraphernalia. Jones and K.R.,2
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1), 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32), and 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 903(a)(1), respectively.
2 We identify K.R. by initials based on the disposition of the case against her.
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a woman who was in the apartment, moved to suppress evidence obtained
during the search. The suppression court heard both motions at a virtual
hearing on February 10, 2021. It found the following facts:
[] Jones is under the supervision of the State Department
of Probation and Parole and specifically supervised by State Parole
Agent [Lori] Lynde. In mid-July [2020], Agent Lynde received a
tip that . . . Jones was in possession of a firearm and two extended
magazines for the firearm, that he may be dealing drugs, and had
traveled to California recently without his parole agent’s
permission. This information was provided directly to the parole
agent from the confidential source in mid-July and was based on
firsthand knowledge.[3] It was decided to do a home visit and
search of . . . Jones’ approved residence. Permission to search
the apartment was requested from and granted by Supervisor
Nadeen DelVecchio in advance of the search.
On July 15, 2020, various members of the Pennsylvania
State Board of Probation and Parole went to the residence of . . .
Jones . . . for an unannounced home visit. The intention of the
state parole team was to search the residence. The team
consisted of three parole agents, Justin Johnston, Lori Lynde and
Jeff Zimmerman, as well as the supervisor who approved the
search, Nadeen DelVecchio. Upon arrival of the state parole team,
. . . Jones was placed in handcuffs.[4] [K.R.] was present in the
home of . . . Jones and was not placed in handcuffs but was
escorted from the residence into the stairwell area and subjected
to a pat down search. [K.R.] was not a resident of the apartment
but was a visitor. When she was taken out of the room, she
attempted to take a box with her and was not permitted to do so.
Supervisor DelVeccchio remained with [K.R.]
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3 To avoid revealing the informant’s identity, the suppression court sustained
the Commonwealth’s objection to asking if the informant had been inside
Jones’ apartment to see the reported violations. N.T., 2/10/21, at 47–48.
4 Agent Lynde testified that after she handcuffed Jones, Jones admitted to
going to California without her written permission, which violated the terms
and conditions of his parole. N.T., 2/10/21, at 35.
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Agent Lynde found a grinder on the floor that was suspected
drug paraphernalia. Agent Johnston searched a red backpack that
was on the floor outside the closet. He was not aware of the owner
of the backpack. The backpack was first lifted and based on the
weight of the item, was opened where the agent found a loaded
drum magazine, two loaded extended magazines and a gun case
for a pistol. [K.R.] indicated the items in the backpack belonged
to her. The state parole team stopped the search after having
seen the contents of the backpack and contacted the Reading
Police Department. Officer Christopher Bucklin arrived and
determined that ‘the’ gun was legally purchased by [K.R.] and no
charges regarding the items found in the backpack would be filed
by the Reading Police Department. The items in the backpack
specifically matched the items that the confidential informant had
said would be found in the home.
Supervisor DelVecchio got continued approval from a
supervisor to continue the search for drugs. The state parole team
resumed their search. [K.R.] indicated that she had to go to work
and needed her tote and purse. She did not give authorization or
consent to search any of the items she said belonged to her. The
agents indicated they needed to clear the room before she could
go in and get herself together to go to work. [K.R.] specifically
indicated the items she needed were the brown tote purse that
was under a black bag and a pair of ‘scrubs’ on top sitting on the
floor. The tote purse was clearly a woman’s purse. Accordingly,
Agent Lynde then searched those items.
Agent Lynde lifted the black bag and saw a large amount of
banded U.S. currency and two plastic containers of what she
believed to be marijuana in the open brown tote purse. The
Reading Police officer was again summoned, and the vice unit was
then contacted. Ultimately, Reading Police sought a search
warrant based on the information provided by the state parole
team, and their own observations of the evidence uncovered by
the state parole team in their search of the tote purse of [K.R.]
Pursuant to the Reading Police search warrant, two firearms,
magazines, ammunition, over one thousand (1000) grams of
methamphetamine, a small amount of marijuana, [over] $39,000
of US currency and packaging material were seized.
Suppression Court Opinion, 5/19/21, at 2–4 (footnotes omitted).
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The suppression court first concluded that the informant’s tip provided
reasonable suspicion to allow parole agents to search Jones’ apartment. With
respect to K.R., the court concluded that it was improper to search her bags
before letting her leave with them. The search warrant, based on this
improper search, was tainted as to K.R. Therefore, the court granted K.R.’s
motion to suppress.
With respect to Jones, however, the suppression court found that Jones
did not have an expectation of privacy in K.R.’s items. Therefore, the warrant
was not tainted against Jones. Even if it had been, the court found that parole
agents would have inevitably discovered the evidence in Jones’ apartment.
Accordingly, the court denied Jones’ motion to suppress.
Jones’ case proceeded to trial, where a jury convicted him of persons
not to possess firearms, possession of drug paraphernalia, and conspiracy to
possess drug paraphernalia.5 On November 4, 2021, the trial court imposed
an aggregate sentence of 54 months to 10 years of incarceration. Jones did
not file post-sentence motions. He timely appealed. Jones and the trial court
complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.
Jones raises the following issues:
A. Did Parole Officers lack the necessary reasonable suspicion to
enter Appellant’s apartment without a warrant or his consent
where the information they relied and impetuously acted on
came from a single hitherto-unknown informant whose tip was
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5 The jury acquitted Jones of possession with intent to deliver, possession of
a controlled substance, and additional conspiracy charges.
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uncorroborated by independent investigation or observation,
and otherwise vague and conjectural?
B. Does the principle of “inevitable discovery” apply where the
informant’s tip was uncorroborated by independent
investigation or observation, and there was no indication that
the parole officers had any prior or other reason to enter
Appellant’s apartment, or that they would have applied for a
warrant to do so, if it were not for this one defective tip?
C. Was the question of Appellant’s expectation of privacy in his
friend’s bag irrelevant, as the initial non-consensual entry into
and continued search of his apartment was illegal, and so
Appellant had standing to suppress all the poisoned evidentiary
fruits of the search?
Jones’ Brief, at 4–5.
The following principles guide our review:
Appellate review of a suppression decision is limited to the
suppression record, considering the evidence presented by the
Commonwealth as the prevailing party and any uncontradicted
evidence presented by the defense. This Court is bound by the
facts as found by the suppression court so long as they are
supported by the record, but our review of its legal conclusions is
de novo.
Commonwealth v. Lehnerd, 273 A.3d 586, 589 (Pa. Super. 2022) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Valdivia, 195 A.3d 855, 861 (Pa. 2018)) (italics added).
Generally, police officers may not search a residence without a warrant
supported by probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Pa. Const. art. I, § 8.
Because Jones was on state parole, his residence was subject to search by
parole agents. By statute, state parole agents are peace officers who have
police power and authority to arrest state parolees for parole violations. 61
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Pa.C.S.A. § 6152 (repealed).6 Parole agents may search the home of a
parolee on reasonable suspicion of a violation of parole.
In his first issue, Jones challenges the conclusion that parole agents had
reasonable suspicion to search his apartment. The statute allowing a search
by a parole officer provides, in relevant part:
(b) Searches and seizures authorized.--
(1) Agents may search the person and property of offenders in
accordance with the provisions of this section.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit searches
or seizures in violation of the Constitution of the United States or
section 8 of Article I of the Constitution of Pennsylvania.
* * *
(d) Grounds for personal search of offender.--
(1) A personal search of an offender may be conducted by an
agent:
(i) if there is a reasonable suspicion to believe that the
offender possesses contraband or other evidence of
violations of the conditions of supervision[.]
* * *
(2) A property search may be conducted by an agent if there is
reasonable suspicion to believe that the real or other property in
the possession of or under the control of the offender contains
contraband or other evidence of violations of the conditions of
supervision.
* * *
(6) The existence of reasonable suspicion to search shall be
determined in accordance with constitutional search and seizure
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661 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6152 and 6153, in effect at the time of the search of Jones’
apartment, were repealed and replaced by 61 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6181 and 6182.
The former and current statutes are materially identical as applied to this case.
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provisions as applied by judicial decision. In accordance with such
case law, the following factors, where applicable, may be taken
into account:
(i) The observations of agents.
(ii) Information provided by others.
(iii) The activities of the offender.
(iv) Information provided by the offender.
(v) The experience of agents with the offender.
(vi) The experience of agents in similar circumstances.
(vii) The prior criminal and supervisory history of the
offender.
(viii) The need to verify compliance with the conditions of
supervision.
61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6153(b), (d) (repealed).7
Applying these statutes to warrantless searches of parolees, we have
explained:
“[P]arolees agree to ‘endure warrantless searches’ based
only on reasonable suspicion in exchange for their early release
from prison.” Commonwealth v. Curry, 900 A.2d 390, 394 (Pa.
Super. 2006) (quoting Commonwealth v. Appleby, 856 A.2d
191, 195 (Pa. Super. 2004)). “[Parole] agents need not have
probable cause to search a parolee or his property; instead,
reasonable suspicion is sufficient to authorize a search.” Id.A search will be deemed reasonable “if the totality of the
evidence demonstrates: (1) that the parole officer had a
reasonable suspicion that the parolee had committed a parole
violation, and (2) that the search was reasonably related to the
parole officer’s duty.” Commonwealth v. Gould, 187 A.3d 927,
935 (Pa. Super. 2018). See 61 Pa.C.S. § 6153(d)(2) (grounds
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7 The Commonwealth and the suppression court cite 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9912,
which applies to county probation officers and county offenders. Id.
§ 9912(b)(1). These statutes are otherwise identical in all relevant aspects.
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for state parole agent’s property search exist “if there is
reasonable suspicion to believe that the real or other property in
the possession of or under the control of the offender contains
contraband or other evidence of violations of the conditions of
supervision.”).
Parole officers may form reasonable suspicion based on
personal observations and third-party information.
Commonwealth v. Colon, 31 A.3d 309, 315–16 (Pa. Super.
2011).
Commonwealth v. Wright, 255 A.3d 542, 549–50 (Pa. Super. 2021)
(citation formatting altered).
Whether a parole agent has reasonable suspicion to search is an
objective inquiry based on the totality of the circumstances “at the moment
of the intrusion.” Commonwealth v. Moore, 805 A.2d 616, 619–20 (Pa.
Super. 2002) (brackets and citations omitted).
A tip from an informant may provide reasonable suspicion if the officer
verifies the informant’s reliability. Id. at 621; see 61 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 6153(d)(6)(ii) (repealed, now 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6182(d)(4)(ii)) (permitting
consideration of “[i]nformation provided by others”). Relevant factors in
assessing an informant’s tip include “the veracity of the informant, the
reliability of the information, and the informant’s basis of knowledge.”
Commonwealth v. Griffin, 954 A.2d 648, 651 (Pa. Super. 2008) (assessing
whether a tip provided reasonable suspicion for an investigative detention).
Importantly, if a parole agent knows the informant’s identity, this “tip[s]
the scales toward credibility,” because the informant faces consequences for
providing false information. Commonwealth v. Brown, 996 A.2d 473, 478
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(Pa. 2010). Thus, where a known informant, himself a parolee, cooperated
with parole officers, his tip was reliable. Commonwealth v. Altadonna, 817
A.2d 1145, 1152 (Pa. Super. 2003). By contrast, an anonymous informant’s
tip would not provide reasonable suspicion without additional investigation to
corroborate it. In re J.E., 907 A.2d 1114, 1120 (Pa. Super. 2006);
Commonwealth v. Hayward, 756 A.2d 23, 38 (Pa. Super. 2000).
Likewise, the level of detail of the information in a tip and the basis for
that information factor into reasonable suspicion—“The more intimate the
basis of knowledge, the more likely the information is to be trustworthy.”
Griffin, 954 A.2d at 650–51 (citing In the Interest of O.A., 717 A.2d 490(Pa. 1998)). For example, a report from a known 911 caller who described a
man urinating in public and drinking beer while driving provided reasonable
suspicion to detain a man who matched the description, with no corroboration
needed. Commonwealth v. Barber, 889 A.2d 587, 595 (Pa. Super. 2005).
However, even if an informant is known, a vague tip is insufficient to
provide reasonable suspicion. Thus, a report from a later-identified 911 caller
that a specific car “was involved in drug activity” was insufficient to provide
reasonable suspicion to detain the car’s driver. Commonwealth v. Jones,
845 A.2d 821, 822–23 (Pa. Super. 2004) [T. Jones]. We affirmed the grant
of suppression, reasoning that even though the caller’s identity was known,
the scant information provided was too vague to form the basis of reasonable
suspicion. Id. at 825–26. Similarly, an anonymous tip that a parolee was
dealing drugs and had received a traffic citation was of insufficient quality to
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provide reasonable suspicion to search his apartment without a warrant.
Commonwealth v. Coleman, 130 A.3d 38, 48 (Pa. Super. 2015).
Jones urges that the informant’s tip alone was inadequate to provide
reasonable suspicion. Jones’ Brief at 13–25. He points out that the informant
was untested and mysterious, that the tip was vague and lacked indication of
how it was learned, and that agents did not corroborate the tip before going
to Jones’ apartment. Moreover, the information about the location of the
firearm turned out to be incorrect. Jones therefore argues that there was no
reasonable suspicion to search his apartment. We disagree.
Here, the informant’s tip provided reasonable suspicion for parole
agents to search Jones’ apartment. Agent Lynde knew who the informant was
and spoke directly with the informant by telephone in mid-July 2020. The
informant had firsthand knowledge that Jones had a firearm and two extended
magazines for the firearm, that he may be dealing drugs,8 and that he had
traveled to California recently without permission. Unlike the vague assertion
in T. Jones that a car “was involved in drug activity,” the informant’s
allegations here implicated Jones in specific parole violations, namely
possessing a firearm and accessories, dealing drugs, and leaving
Pennsylvania. Searching for evidence of these violations in Jones’ apartment
reasonably related to the parole agents’ duty. Based on the tip by a known
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8 Agent Lynde explained that the informant “observed certain things” “that are
indicative of someone dealing drugs.” N.T., 2/10/21, at 49–50.
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informant with firsthand knowledge that Jones committed multiple parole
violations, the parole agents did not need to further investigate before
searching Jones’ apartment.9 Therefore, the suppression court did not err in
concluding that parole agents had reasonable suspicion to search Jones’
apartment.
In his remaining appellate issues, Jones protests any analysis beyond
the state parole agents’ cause to enter his apartment. He argues that because
the parole agents did not have reasonable suspicion to enter his apartment in
the first place, the doctrine of inevitable discovery should not apply. Jones’
Brief at 25–29. He further contends that his privacy interest in K.R.’s bags is
irrelevant to determine whether the agents should have been at his apartment
that morning.10 Id. at 30–33.
However, these arguments fail because the informant’s tip did provide
reasonable suspicion to search Jones’ apartment, as noted supra. Because
the parole agents could enter the apartment, it was proper for the suppression
court to consider what happened once they were inside.
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9The Commonwealth adds that “before the search of the room began,” Jones
admitted that he went to California, thereby partially corroborating the tip.
Commonwealth’s Brief at 16. This elides that Jones made this statement only
after agents had entered his apartment and handcuffed him. Because we
assess reasonable suspicion “at the moment of the [intrusion],” Moore, 805
A.2d at 619, Jones’ partial admission does not play into our analysis.
10 Having narrowed his issues on appeal, Jones makes no argument that any
of the items in the apartment (such as those in K.R.’s bags) were not his or
that he did not possess them.
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In sum, the detailed tip from a known informant gave reasonable
suspicion that Jones violated his parole and that evidence of the violations
would be in his apartment. The suppression court properly considered the
parties’ arguments and did not err in denying Jones’ motion to suppress.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 07/12/2022
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