Abdullah, W. v. McMoran, B.

J-A17016-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
WALIYYUDDIN S. ABDULLAH IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
JUSTIN DAVIDS, KATLIN ELWOOD,
BRENDAN MCMORAN, AND BRANCH
BANK MANAGER
No. 261 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order January 6, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No(s): 161100075
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., RANSOM, J., and PLATT, J.*
JUDGMENT ORDER BY RANSOM, J.: FILED AUGUST 23, 2017
Appellant, Waliyyuddin S. Abdullah, appeals pro se from the order
entered on January 6, 2017, dismissing Appellant’s pro se complaint as
frivolous pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 233.1.
Additionally, the trial court barred Appellant from filing any further claim or
cause of action pro se in the court against same defendants or related
parties without leave of court. We affirm.
We adopt the following procedural history from the trial court opinion,
which in turn is supported by the record. See Trial Court Opinion (TCO),
3/1/17, at 1-2.
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A17016-17
On January 18, 2013, Appellant filed his first lawsuit against Wells
Fargo Bank and Bank of America (“Banks”) in federal court. He alleged that,
in December of 2012, the Banks failed to respond to his inquiries or
application for a small business loan. Appellant alleged that the Banks’
failure to provide him with a loan was the product of racial discrimination.
Since his original action, Appellant has unsuccessfully litigated the
same factual claim six times, under a variety of constitutional and statutory
theories, in both state and federal courts. The actions were dismissed for
various procedural and substantive reasons. The instant matter is
Appellant’s seventh attempt. On appeal, Appellant raises several issues
concerning the litigation of his claims, res judicata, and alleged collusion
between defendants and the Commonwealth. See Appellant’s Brief at 7, 10-
13.
Rule 233.1 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Frivolous Litigation. Pro Se Plaintiff. Motion to Dismiss
(a) Upon the commencement of any action filed by a pro se
plaintiff in the court of common pleas, a defendant may file a
motion to dismiss the action on the basis that
(1) the pro se plaintiff is alleging the same or related
claims which the pro se plaintiff raised in a prior action
against the same or related defendants, and
(2) these claims have already been resolved pursuant to a
written settlement agreement or a court proceeding.
(b) The court may stay the action while the motion is pending.
-2-
J-A17016-17
(c) Upon granting the motion and dismissing the action, the
court may bar the pro se plaintiff from pursuing additional pro se
litigation against the same or related defendants raising the
same or related claims without leave of the court.
Pa.R.C.P. 233.1. Further,
Rule 233.1 does not require the highly technical prerequisites of
res judicata or collateral estoppel to allow the trial court to
conclude that a pro se litigant’s claims are adequately related to
the addressed prior litigation. Nor does it require an identity of
parties or capacities in which they sued or were sued. Rather,
it requires a rational relationship evident in the claims
made and in the defendant’s relationships with one
another to inform the trial court’s conclusion that the bar
the Rule announces is applied.
Gray v. Buonopane, 53 A.3d 829, 838 (Pa. Super. 2012) (emphasis
added).
Rule 233.1 provides Appellees with a judicial mechanism to bring
finality to Appellant’s myriad pro se filings. Our standard of review is
as follows:
“To the extent that the question presented involves
interpretation of rules of civil procedure, our standard of review
is de novo. To the extent that this question involves an exercise
of the trial court's discretion in granting [a] “motion to dismiss,”
our standard of review is abuse of discretion.”
Coulter v. Ramsden, 94 A.3d 1080, 1086 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal
denied, 110 A.3d 998 (Pa. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 44 (2015).
All of Appellant’s cases are rationally related. The cases involve
defendant Banks and their employees. Though the claims were
brought under various constitutional and statutory provisions, the facts
-3-
J-A17016-17
remain the same: the Banks, and their employees, failed to respond to
Appellant’s inquiries regarding a small business loan. After careful
review, we conclude that the relationship requirements laid out in Rule
233.1 are established in the instant case. Thus, the trial court did not
err or otherwise abuse its discretion.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/23/2017
-4-