Commonwealth v. Perfetto

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2017 PA Super 281COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
MARC PERFETTO,
Appellee No. 2479 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order July 13, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0013338-2014
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., OTT, J.,
STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., MOULTON, J., and RANSOM, J.
OPINION BY RANSOM, J.: FILED AUGUST 30, 2017
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order entered
July 13, 2015, granting Appellee Marc Perfetto’s motion to dismiss, which
asserted a violation of Pennsylvania’s compulsory joinder rule. See 18
Pa.C.S. § 110. Subject to certain jurisdictional exceptions, which will be
explained herein, we hold that the subsequent prosecution of an offense
arising out of a criminal episode that had triggered the former prosecution of
a different offense is barred where those multiple offenses occur in the same
judicial district. However, because of jurisdictional exceptions applicable to
Philadelphia, the holding of the trial court is reversed.
We derive the following statement of facts and procedural background
of this case from the trial court’s opinion, which in turn is supported by the
record. See Trial Ct. Op., 11/6/2015, at 1-2. In July 2014, Appellee was
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arrested in the City and County of Philadelphia1 and charged with three
counts of driving under the influence (“DUI”) and the summary offense of
driving without lights when required.2 In September 2014, Appellee was
found guilty of the summary traffic violation following a trial in absentia in
the Philadelphia Municipal Court Traffic Division. Thereafter, the
Commonwealth proceeded separately on the DUI charges in the Philadelphia
Municipal Court General Division. Following a preliminary hearing, Appellee
was held over for court and the matter was listed for trial in the Philadelphia
Court of Common Pleas.
In June 2015, Appellee filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that
subsection (1)(ii) of 18 Pa.C.S. § 110, known as the compulsory joinder rule,
barred his prosecution for DUI. See Motion to Dismiss, 6/4/2015, at 1
(asserting that he had already been tried for the offenses charged); see
also Memorandum in Support, 6/4/2015, at 1-3 (suggesting dismissal was
appropriate because the multiple charges filed against him arose from the
same criminal episode, occurred within the same judicial district, and the
Commonwealth was aware of the charges.).
Following a hearing, the trial court granted Appellee’s motion to
dismiss. The court noted that (1) an earlier prosecution had resulted in a
1
Philadelphia is the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania. 42 Pa.C.S. §
901(a).
2
75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(a)(1), (d)(1), (d)(2); and 4302, respectively.
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conviction for a summary traffic offense; (2) Appellee’s DUI charges arose
from the same criminal episode; (3) the Commonwealth was aware of the
multiple charges; and (4) all charges occurred in the same judicial district.
See Trial Ct. Op., 11/6/2015, at 3 (citing in support Commonwealth v.
Reid, 77 A.3d 579, 582 (Pa. 2013)). The court also referenced the recent
restructuring of Philadelphia Municipal Court, in which that court absorbed
the former Traffic Court of Philadelphia. See Act 17-2013 (S.B. 334), P.L.
55 (2013).3 According to the court, the merger brought charges within the
jurisdiction of the same court, and the court reasoned that the policy aims of
18 Pa.C.S. § 110(1)(ii) dictated that the secondary prosecution be barred.
Trial Ct. Op., 11/6/2015 at 4-5. After careful analysis, we disagree.
In August 2015, the Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal and a
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The trial court issued a responsive opinion. A
panel of this Court sua sponte sought en banc certification of this matter to
address the effect of amended language of the compulsory joinder rule on
our Commonwealth, and certification was granted on August 30, 2016. Both
parties submitted additional briefs, and this case was argued before the
Court en banc on December 13, 2016.
3
Contemporaneous with the legislature’s restructure of the courts, a number
of statutes defining terms, venue, jurisdiction, and procedure were
amended, effective June 19, 2013. See, e.g., 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 102, 325,
1121, 1123, 1127, 1302, and 1321.
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The issue presented is whether the trial court erred when it dismissed
DUI charges pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 110 based on the prior adjudication of
Appellee’s summary traffic offense. Commonwealth’s Brief at 4. Whether
the lower court misapplied the 2002 amendment raises a question of law,
and thus our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is
plenary. See Commonwealth v. Fithian, 961 A.2d 66, 72 (Pa. 2008). A
statute’s plain language generally offers the best indication of the General
Assembly's intent. Martin v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp., Bureau
of Driver Licensing, 905 A.2d 438, 443 (Pa. 2006). “When the words of a
statute are clear and unambiguous, there is no need to look beyond the
plain meaning of the statute ‘under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.’”
Fithian, 961 A.2d at 74 (citing 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b)); see also
Commonwealth v. Veon, 150 A.3d 435, 445 (Pa. 2016).
“Section 110 is a codification of the rule announced by our Supreme
Court in Commonwealth v. Campana, 304 A.2d 432 (Pa. 1973), vacated
and remanded, 94 S.Ct. 73 (1973), reinstated, 314 A.2d 854 (Pa. 1974),
cert. denied, 94 S.Ct. 3172 (1974).” Commonwealth v. Gimbara, 835
A.2d 371, 374 (Pa. Super. 2003). In Campana, our “Supreme Court held
that ‘the Double Jeopardy Clause requires a prosecutor to bring, in a single
proceeding, all known charges against a defendant arising from a single
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criminal episode.’” Id. at 374 (quoting Campana, 304 A.2d at 441).4 The
compulsory joinder rule serves two distinct policy considerations:
(1) to protect a person accused of crimes from governmental
harassment of being forced to undergo successive trials for
offenses stemming from the same criminal episode; and (2) as a
matter of judicial administration and economy, to assure finality
without unduly burdening the judicial process by repetitious
litigation.
Commonwealth v. Hude, 458 A.2d 177, 180 (Pa. 1983). It is well-
established that the “burden to protect a defendant from vexatious litigation
and to conserve judicial resources rests squarely on the shoulders of the
Commonwealth, and thus, it is the Commonwealth's burden, rather than the
defendant's, to move for consolidated trials.” Commonwealth v. Failor,
770 A.2d 310, 313-15 (Pa. 2001) (citing Commonwealth v. Stewart, 425
A.2d 346, 349-50 (1981)); Commonwealth v. Muffley, 425 A.2d 350, 352
(Pa. 1981); Commonwealth v. Holmes, 391 A.2d 1015, 1018 (Pa. 1978).
The Court may only find waiver of the compulsory joinder rule when a
4
Though similar, the Double Jeopardy Clause and the compulsory joinder
rule are not coterminous. Commonwealth v. Bellezza, 603 A.2d 1031,
1036 (Pa. Super. 1992) (citing Commonwealth v. Evers, 554 A.2d 531,
536 (Pa. Super. 1989) (Brosky, J., dissenting)). “The double jeopardy
protections afforded by the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions are
coextensive and prohibit successive prosecutions and multiple punishments
for the same offense.” Commonwealth v. Barber, 940 A.2d 369, 377 (Pa.
Super. 2007) (citing Commonwealth v. States, 891 A.2d 737 (Pa. Super.
2005)). However, Section 110 offers greater protection than the Double
Jeopardy Clause as it is not limited to prosecutions for the same act when
certain conditions are met. Bellezza, 603 A.2d at 1036 (citing Evers, 554
A.2d at 536 (Brosky, J., dissenting)); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 466
A.2d 636, 640 (Pa. Super. 1983).
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defendant affirmatively acts to separate the prosecutions pending against
him. Failor, 770 A.2d at 314-15 (citing Stewart, 425 A.2d at 349-50); see
also Commonwealth v. Tarver, 357 A.2d 539 (Pa. 1976).5
Prior to the 2002 amendment, Pennsylvania’s compulsory joinder
statute stated in relevant part:
§ 110. When prosecution barred by former prosecution for
different offense
Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different provision
of the statutes than a former prosecution or is based on different
facts, it is barred by such former prosecution under the following
circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or
in a conviction as defined in section 109 of this title
(relating to when prosecution barred by former prosecution
for the same offense) and the subsequent prosecution
is for:
***
(ii) any offense based on the same conduct or
arising from the same criminal episode, if such
offense was known to the appropriate prosecuting
officer at the time of the commencement of the first
trial and was within the jurisdiction of a single
court unless the court ordered a separate trial of the
charge of such offense …
5
See Commonwealth v. Simmer, 814 A.2d 696, 699 (Pa. Super. 2002)
(recognizing, “a defendant's voluntary entry into an ARD program, with
respect to a charge of DUI, constitutes a waiver of the defendant's right to
later assert section 110 as a bar to prosecution of the DUI offense, upon the
defendant's removal from the ARD program[ ]”); see also Gimbara, 835
A.2d at 376- 77 (Where a summary defendant mails in a guilty plea on one
or some charges and a not guilty plea on the other charge or charges, the
compulsory joinder statute does not bar the defendant's prosecution for the
charges to which he pled not guilty.).
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18 Pa.C.S. § 110 (1973) (amended 2002) (emphasis added).
Our Supreme Court outlined a four-prong test utilized to determine
when the compulsory joinder rule applied to subsequent prosecution. If
each of the prongs in the following test was met, subsequent prosecution
was barred:
(1) the former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or conviction;
(2) the current prosecution was based on the same criminal
conduct or arose from the same criminal episode; (3) the
prosecutor in the subsequent trial was aware of the charges
before the first trial; and (4) the instant charges and the former
charges were within the jurisdiction of a single court.
Commonwealth v. Bracalielly, 658 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1995).
The phrase, “within the jurisdiction of a single court” was consistently
interpreted by our Supreme Court to mean that Magisterial District Courts
and Courts of Common Pleas were not a “single court.” Barber, 940 A.2d at
378; see e.g. Commonwealth v. Beatty, 455 A.2d 1194 (Pa. 1983) (on
jurisdictional grounds, reading Section 110 as excluding traffic violations
under the Vehicle Code), Commonwealth v. Breitegan, 456 A.2d 1340(Pa. 1983) (determining the compulsory joinder rule did not preclude the
prosecution of misdemeanors after a defendant’s guilty plea to three
summary traffic offenses arising from the same episode), Commonwealth
v. Taylor, 522 A.2d 37, 39 (Pa. 1987) (“since the harassment charge, as a
summary offense, was in the jurisdiction of the district justice, conviction or
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a plea of guilty to that charge in a summary proceeding did not bar the
subsequent trial of the [misdemeanor] weapons offense.”).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Geyer, 687
A.2d 815, 818 (Pa. 1996) examined its holdings in Beatty, Breitegan, and
Taylor, and clarified that summary offenses were also subject to a
compulsory joinder analysis provided that there were multiple summary
offenses at issue within a single court.6 Geyer, 687 A.2d at 818, see also
Failor, 770 A.2d at 313-14 (Appellant’s prosecution for driving with a
suspended license was barred following his guilty plea in court for a speeding
citation when all four prongs of compulsory joinder test met.).
However, on August 27, 2002, the General Assembly amended Section
110(1)(ii) to its current language (“2002 amendment”). Act 82-2002 (S.B.
1109), P.L. 481, § 1 (2002). Specifically, the legislature substituted the
phrase “was within the jurisdiction of a single court” with “occurred within
the same judicial district as the former prosecution.” 18 Pa.C.S. §
110(1)(ii) (emphasis added). In recognition of the 2002 amendment, the
fourth prong of the compulsory joinder test was updated to reflect the
amended language, which now reads:
6
The Geyer Court specifically overruled this Court's decisions in
Commonwealth v. Hoburn, 485 A.2d 24 (Pa. Super. 1984), and
Commonwealth v. Fischl, 525 A.2d 775 (Pa. Super. 1987), both of which
erroneously cited Breitegan, 456 A.2d at 1341, for the categorical
exception that Section 110 did not apply to prior summary convictions
under the Vehicle Code. Geyer, 687 A.2d at 818, n.5.
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(1) the former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or conviction;
(2) the current prosecution was based on the same criminal
conduct or arose from the same criminal episode; (3) the
prosecutor in the subsequent trial was aware of the charges
before the first trial; and (4) all charges [are] within the
same judicial district as the former prosecution.
Commonwealth v. Reid, 77 A.3d at 582 (citing Commonwealth v.
Nolan, 855 A.2d 834, 839 (Pa. 2004) (superseded by statute on other
grounds) (emphasis added)).
In 2008, our Supreme Court examined the legislative intent behind the
2002 amendment:
Based upon the plain words of these statutory provisions, we
have no problem in concluding the General Assembly intended
that, for purposes of the compulsory joinder statute, the phrase
“judicial district” means the geographical area established by the
General Assembly in which a court of common pleas is located.
Fithian, 961 A.2d at 75; see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 901 (defining the judicial
districts of this Commonwealth).
Despite the noted shift in the court’s inquiry, from “same jurisdiction”
to “same judicial district,” no case before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
has addressed how this change in statutory language affected pre-
amendment compulsory joinder practices. In our view, the amended
language of Section 110 is clear and unambiguous, and it requires a court to
consider not the jurisdiction of a court, but rather whether multiple offenses
occurred within the same judicial district. If so, and provided the prosecutor
is aware of the offenses, all charges shall be joined and prosecuted together.
Thus, the addition of the “same judicial district” language requires that all
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charges occurring within the same judicial district, arising from the same
criminal conduct or criminal episode, and known to a prosecutor, shall be
joined at the time of commencement of the first prosecution. 18 Pa.C.S. §
110.
The Commonwealth raises arguments challenging the trial court’s
application of the compulsory joinder rule.
The Commonwealth’s first claim asserts that the trial court ignores the
longstanding precedent of this Commonwealth. Commonwealth’s
Substituted Brief at 10-13; Commonwealth’s Substituted Reply Brief at 4-5,
10-12. In support of this argument, the Commonwealth cites cases which
predate the 2002 amendment. See Beatty, 455 A.2d at 1198; Breitegan,
456 A.2d at 1341; Taylor, 522 A.2d at 39-40; Commonwealth v. Bergen,
4 A.2d 164, 168 (Pa. Super. 1939); Commonwealth v. Caufman, 662
A.2d 1050, 1051 (Pa. 1995); Commonwealth v. Masterson, 418 A.2d
664, 669 (Pa. Super. 1980); Bellezza, 603 A.2d at 1036.7 Insofar as these
7
One case decided after the 2002 amendment that the Commonwealth cites
is Barber, 940 A.2d at 379. Commonwealth’s Substituted Brief at 12. In
Barber, a PCRA Appellant whose summary, misdemeanor and felony crimes
were adjudicated in 2001, was granted a new trial for his misdemeanor and
felony convictions and subsequently sought to have the new trial dismissed
as a violation of his constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy.
Barber, 940 A.2d at 379, n.6, n.7. We analyzed Appellant’s compulsory
joinder claim under the pre-amendment version of Section 110, which was in
effect at the time of Appellant’s summary convictions, and expressly
declined to examine the effect of the 2002 amendment. Id. at n.6, n.7
(“The question of whether the amended language would bar Appellant's
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cases premise their joinder analysis on the jurisdiction of a single court, they
are of limited precedential value, and we reject the Commonwealth’s
assertion.
Second, citing in support 18 Pa.C.S. § 112, the Commonwealth argues
that joinder is not required where the initial prosecution proceeds before a
court that lacks jurisdiction over offenses charged in a subsequent
prosecution. Commonwealth’s Substituted Reply Brief at 7-10. However,
the Commonwealth misinterprets Section 112.
Section 112 provides in relevant part:
§ 112. Former prosecution before court lacking
jurisdiction or when fraudulently procured by the
defendant
A prosecution is not a bar within the meaning of section 109 of
this title (relating to when prosecution barred by former
prosecution for same the offense) through section 111 of this
title (relating to when prosecution barred by former prosecution
in another jurisdiction) under any of the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution was before a court which
lacked jurisdiction over the defendant or the offense.
18 Pa.C.S. § 112.
This Court has previously interpreted Section 112. In
Commonwealth v. Schmotzer, 831 A.2d 689 (Pa. Super. 2003), a
defendant’s federal case was dismissed for “want of jurisdiction.”
Schmotzer, 831 A.2d at 691. Thereafter, the Commonwealth pursued
subsequent prosecution for the non-summary offenses here is not before
this Court; thus, we need not decide this question.”).
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criminal charges for the same conduct in state court. Id. The defendant
sought dismissal on double jeopardy grounds. Id. at 691-92. However, the
trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Id. at 692. This Court affirmed,
holding that Section 112 applied because the federal court had lacked
jurisdiction and that a second prosecution was permitted. Id. at 696. Thus,
where an initial prosecution proceeds before an improper court – a court
without jurisdiction – a subsequent prosecution for the same offense in a
proper court is not barred. Id.; 18 Pa.C.S. § 112(1). As such, we reject the
Commonwealth’s argument.
Nevertheless, while jurisdiction is no longer an element of the
compulsory joinder test, the jurisdiction of a court remains a consideration
implicit to any compulsory joinder analysis, and it is particularly important in
those judicial districts that, for various reasons, have distinct minor courts or
magisterial district judges vested with exclusive jurisdiction over specific
matters.8
“The jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas under this section shall
be exclusive except with respect to actions and proceedings concurrent
jurisdiction of which is by statute or by general rule adopted pursuant to
8
The Court in Beatty noted that 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 931(b) (relating to original
jurisdiction and venue of Courts of Common Pleas) appears to recognize
concurrent jurisdiction in such cases of the Court of Common Pleas and
District Justices. Beatty, 455 A.2d at 1198, n.3. However, the Court
declined to construe the phrase “and was in the jurisdiction of a single court”
in such a manner as to ignore the division of labor in our court system. Id.
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section 5039 vested in another court of this Commonwealth or in the
magisterial district judges.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 931(b).
One such example of where the exclusive jurisdiction of the court of
common pleas is superseded by the exclusive jurisdiction of a minor court or
magistrate district judge is found in 42 Pa.C.S. § 1302, which governs the
jurisdiction and venue of traffic courts. In judicial districts with a designated
and open traffic court such as Philadelphia,10 42 Pa.C.S. § 1302 expressly
defines the jurisdiction of a traffic court and effectively carves out an
exception to the normal operation of the compulsory joinder rule.
§ 1302. Jurisdiction and venue
(a) General rule.--Except as set forth in subsection (a.1) or as
otherwise prescribed by any general rule adopted pursuant to
section 503 (relating to reassignment of matters), each traffic
court shall have jurisdiction of all prosecutions for summary
offenses arising under:
(1) Title 75 (relating to vehicles).
(2) Any ordinance of any political subdivision enacted
pursuant to Title 75.
(a.1) Traffic Court of Philadelphia.—
9
“The Supreme Court may by general rule provide for the assignment and
reassignment of classes of matters among the several courts of this
Commonwealth and the magisterial district judges as the needs of justice
shall require and all laws shall be suspended to the extent that they are
inconsistent with such general rules.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 503(a).
10
Pittsburgh and cities of the third class are also authorized to operate a
traffic court. See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 1321, 1331, and 1341.
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(1) Except as otherwise prescribed by any general rule
adopted pursuant to section 503, each traffic court under
Subchapter B1 (relating to Traffic Court of Philadelphia)
shall, at the direction of the President Judge of the
Philadelphia Municipal Court, have jurisdiction of all
prosecutions for summary offenses arising under:
(i) Title 75.
***
(b) Concurrent and exclusive jurisdiction.--The
jurisdiction of a traffic court under this section shall be
exclusive of the courts of common pleas and magisterial
district judges, except that such jurisdiction shall be concurrent
with the magisterial district judges whenever the traffic court is
closed.
42 Pa.C.S. § 1302(a.1), (b) (emphasis added).11 This distinction requires
that all summary traffic violations be adjudicated in the traffic court of a
judicial district. Therefore, where a defendant is charged with a summary
traffic violation, a misdemeanor, and a felony, in judicial districts with a
traffic court, the Title 75 summary offense may be disposed of in a prior
proceeding in the traffic court, which has exclusive jurisdiction to hear it,
without violating the compulsory joinder rule.12
11
The language regarding magisterial district judges is inapplicable in
Philadelphia, as no magisterial district judges sit in the First Judicial District.
12
The exclusive jurisdiction of a traffic court may also be exercised by a
community court. See 42 Pa.C.S. 1105(a) (“each community court shall
have the jurisdiction which under law was exercised by the municipal court
or traffic court or by magisterial district judges, as the case may be, within
the judicial district.”).
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However, the jurisdictional organization of the Philadelphia Courts,
consisting of the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia Municipal Court, and
Traffic Court of Philadelphia is unique in Pennsylvania,13 and the
Commonwealth and the Appellee argue that the compulsory joinder rule
warrants opposite outcomes in this judicial district. Accordingly, we next
examine how the Philadelphia Municipal Court exercises jurisdiction over
Title 75 summary offenses following its 2013 restructure, so that we may
thereafter determine how, if at all, the compulsory joinder should be applied.
The jurisdictional guidance found in Section 1302 was instituted in
tandem with the General Assembly’s 2013 restructuring of the Philadelphia
Municipal Court.14 The new Municipal Court comprises two administrative
sections, designated the General Division and the Traffic Division. 42
Pa.C.S. § 1121. These divisions have unique jurisdiction as defined in 42
Pa.C.S. § 1123(a) (relating to jurisdiction and venue). Among the matters
listed as within the jurisdiction of the Philadelphia Municipal Court are
prosecutions for summary offenses arising under Title 75. 42 Pa.C.S. §
1123(a)(9):
§ 1123. Jurisdiction and venue
13
See 42 Pa.C.S. 301.
14
The Traffic Court of Philadelphia was subsumed by Traffic Division of the
Philadelphia Municipal Court “following the 2011 federal investigation and
subsequent indictment of Philadelphia Traffic Court personnel on allegations
of corruption involving ‘ticket-fixing.’” In re Bruno, 101 A.3d 635, 640, 643
n.3 (Pa. 2014).
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(a) General rule.--Except as otherwise prescribed by any
general rule adopted pursuant to section 503 (relating to
reassignment of matters), the Philadelphia Municipal Court shall
have jurisdiction of the following matters:
(1) Summary offenses, except those arising out of the
same episode or transaction involving a delinquent act for
which a petition alleging delinquency is filed under Chapter
63 (relating to juvenile matters).
(2) Criminal offenses by any person (other than a juvenile)
for which no prison term may be imposed or which are
punishable by imprisonment for a term of not more than
five years, including indictable offenses under Title 75
(relating to vehicles). In cases under this paragraph the
defendant shall have no right of trial by jury in the
municipal court, but shall have the right of appeal for trial
de novo, including the right of trial by jury, to the court of
common pleas …
***
(9) Prosecutions for summary offenses arising
under:
(i) Title 75 …
***
(b) Concurrent and exclusive jurisdiction.--The jurisdiction
of the municipal court under this section shall be concurrent with
the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County except with
respect to matters specified in subsection (a)(2), as to which the
jurisdiction of the municipal court shall be exclusive except as
otherwise prescribed by any general rule adopted pursuant to
section 503.
42 Pa.C.S. § 1123 (emphasis added). Thus, the Philadelphia Municipal Court
has concurrent jurisdiction over Title 75 summary offenses.
However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has the power to prescribe
general rules governing practice and procedure of all courts including the
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power to provide for assignment and reassignment of classes of actions or
classes of appeals among the several courts as the needs of justice shall
require. Pa. Const. art. V, § 10; see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 503(a). Our
Supreme Court retains exclusive rule-making authority to establish rules of
procedure for state courts. Commonwealth v. McMullen, 961 A.2d 842(Pa. 2008) (citing Pa. Const. art. V, § 10(c);3). Through this authority, the
Court is empowered to create procedural law; law that addresses the
method by which rights are enforced. Id.
Here, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has reassigned Title 75
summaries as a class to the Philadelphia Municipal Court Traffic Division.
This is evidenced by the unchanged definition of a Municipal Court case and
a series of amended comments to rules of criminal procedure, specific to
Philadelphia. A Municipal Court case is still defined as:
[A]ny case in which the only offense or offenses charged are
misdemeanors under the Crimes Code or other statutory criminal
offenses for which no prison term may be imposed or which is
punishable by a term of imprisonment of not more than 5 years,
including any offense under the Vehicle Code other than a
summary offense.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 1001(A) (emphasis added). Subsequently, in May 2014, the
comment to this Section clarified that summary traffic offenses remain the
responsibility of the Philadelphia Municipal Court Traffic Division:
This rule, which defines “Municipal Court case,” is intended to
ensure that the Municipal Court will take dispositive action,
including trial and verdict when appropriate, in any criminal case
that does not involve a felony, excluding summary cases
under the Vehicle Code. The latter are under the
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jurisdiction of the Municipal Court Traffic Division, the
successor of the Philadelphia Traffic Court …
Pa.R.Crim.P. 1001(D), cmt. (emphasis added).
These amended comments facilitate the function of the Municipal Court
and are instructive. The comments suggest the appropriate manner in
which the labor in Philadelphia Courts shall be divided. Particularly, rules
1002 and 1030 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the Municipal Court
and the Philadelphia Municipal Court Traffic Division, as amended after June
19, 2013, distinguish between non-traffic summaries and traffic summaries,
and their comments reinforce that the Traffic Division has jurisdiction over
traffic summary offenses. See Pa.R.Crim.P. Rule 1002, cmt. (“all summary
offenses under the motor vehicle laws … are under the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Court Traffic Division”); 1030, cmt. (“the jurisdiction and functions
of the Philadelphia Traffic Court were transferred to the Philadelphia
Municipal Court Traffic Division”).15
The aforementioned amendments, collectively, illuminate our Supreme
Court’s intent following the restructure to divide the Philadelphia Municipal
Court’s labor to allocate disposition of summary traffic offenses solely to the
Philadelphia Municipal Court Traffic Division.
Therefore, in the context of compulsory joinder, where a defendant is
charged with a summary traffic violation and a misdemeanor, the Title 75
15
Specifically referencing Act 17-2013 (S.B. 334), P.L. 55 (2013).
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summary offense must be disposed of in a proceeding in the Philadelphia
Municipal Court Traffic Division, which has jurisdiction exclusive of the Court
of Common Pleas, and a separate proceeding must be held for the
remaining, higher offenses.
With these principles in mind, we address the facts of the instant
Philadelphia case in which Appellee was charged with summary traffic
offenses and misdemeanor offenses. What is before this Court is the
analysis of compulsory joinder in the First Judicial District, a judicial district
which has a traffic court and where the defendant is charged with a
summary traffic offense. It is undisputed that the first three prongs of the
compulsory joinder test have been satisfied:
[U]nder this test, the earlier prosecution did in fact result in a
conviction for failure to use lights, a summary offense. The later
prosecution for DUI arose from the same criminal episode and
was charged at the same time as the traffic citation. Because
both the summary and non-summary offenses were charged at
the same time, the prosecutor in the initial prosecution would
have certainly been aware of these charges at the start of the
first trial. The only issue argued before this court was whether
all charges came within the same judicial district.
Trial Ct. Op., 11/6/2015, at 3. It is also undisputed that Appellee’s offenses
occurred in the City and County of Philadelphia, which, in its entirety,
comprise a single judicial district and features a traffic court. 42 Pa.C.S. §
901. Consequently, Appellee’s subsequent prosecution for DUI is not subject
to dismissal under compulsory joinder. Further, applying the framework
outlined herein, Appellee’s summary traffic offense was to be heard solely in
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the Philadelphia Municipal Court Traffic Division. 42 Pa.C.S. §
1302(a.1)(1)(i). As such, the trial court erred and improperly barred
Appellee’s subsequent prosecution. This Court holds that, in the
circumstances just described, Section 1302 carves out an exception to
compulsory joinder and directs that the summary traffic offense is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the traffic court. A prior disposition of a summary
traffic offense in a traffic court does not bar the later prosecution of other
criminal charges which arose in the same judicial district and at the same
time as the summary traffic offense.
In sum, the amended language “occurred within the same judicial
district” found in Section 110 is clear and unambiguous. Rather, a court
must consider whether all charges occurred in the same judicial district.
Because of the implicit consideration of jurisdiction, where summary traffic
offenses are included in multiple crimes charged, in those judicial districts
which have a separate traffic court, the summary traffic offenses may reach
disposition in a single, prior proceeding without precluding subsequent
prosecution of higher offenses. Where there is a separate traffic court, the
traffic court is charged with disposing with the summary traffic violation(s)
of the crimes charged without violation of the compulsory joinder rules. In
those judicial districts which do not have a separate traffic court, the four-
prong test compulsory joinder must be applied in order to determine
whether the compulsory joinder rules have been violated.
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J-E03007-16
Here, because of the unique jurisdictional organization of the
Philadelphia Courts, Appellee’s subsequent DUI prosecution is not barred.
For these reasons, we reverse the order of the trial court. This matter is
remanded for further proceedings in accord with this Opinion. Jurisdiction is
relinquished.
Order Reversed.
Judges Bowes, Panella, Ott and Stabile join the opinion.
Judge Moulton files a concurring opinion in which Judge Ott joins.
Judge Dubow files a dissenting opinion in which PJE Bender and
Judge Lazarus join.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/30/2017
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