DocketNumber: Appeal, 47
Citation Numbers: 185 A. 864, 122 Pa. Super. 438, 1936 Pa. Super. LEXIS 127
Judges: Keller, Cunningham, Baldrige, Stadteeld, Parker, James, Bhodes
Filed Date: 4/17/1936
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/13/2024
Argued April 17, 1936. On the afternoon of December 6, 1934, the court below, having charged the jury, left instructions that when the verdict was reached, it was to be sealed. The following morning, eleven of the jurors were in the jury box, but the foreman was absent. A minor son of the foreman presented a certificate, from a physician, stating that the juror was too ill to come to court and also a note from the foreman making the same explanation, and submitted an envelope containing the verdict slip. The envelope was torn open and the verdict read to the eleven jurors, who, when asked whether this was the same verdict that had been agreed upon the evening before, replied that it was; whereupon, the court directed that the verdict be recorded. Neither counsel for the plaintiff nor defendant was present *Page 440 when the verdict was recorded. On the same day, defendant filed exceptions to the receiving and recording of the verdict, and thereafter presented his motion for a new trial alleging, among other grounds, the verdict was illegal on account of the manner in which it was received and recorded; which motion was refused and from the judgment entered on the verdict, this appeal was taken.
By the sixth section of the Declaration of Rights, it is provided that "trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate"; and its meaning is that a jury shall continue to be the tribunal for the determination of all questions of fact in controversies between individuals and in actions and prosecutions brought by the Commonwealth, its substantial feature being that the jury shall consist of twelve good and lawful men, whose verdict must be unanimous: Wynkoop v. Cooch,
"A verdict, vere dictum, is either privy, or public. A privy verdict is when the judge hath left or adjourned the court: and the jury, being agreed, in order to be delivered from their confinement, obtain leave to give their verdict privily to the judge out of court: which privy verdict is of no force unless afterwards affirmed by a public verdict given openly in court; wherein the jury may, if they please, vary from the privy verdict. So that the privy verdict is indeed a mere nullity; and yet it is a dangerous practice, allowing time for the parties to tamper with the jury, and therefore very seldom indulged. But the only effectual and legal verdict is the public verdict: in which they openly declare to have found the issue for the plaintiff, or for the defendant; and if for the plaintiff, they assess the damages also sustained by the plaintiff in consequence of the injury upon which the action is brought": Blackstone's Comm., Vol. *Page 441 3, p. 376. "A privy verdict is that which, for the sake of being released from confinement, is given by a jury out of court to a judge; but if the court be adjourned to the judge's chamber, it is not privy but public. With us, a practice equally safe and convenient has obtained, of permitting the jury to reduce their finding to writing, and after sealing it up, to separate till the meeting of the court; when the paper being handed to the judge, their verdict is received from the lips of the foreman, and recorded in the usual way; but this difference is unimportant; for neither in the one case, or the other, is a privy verdict, thus delivered, recorded. As the jury may depart from it, their finding in court is what decides the rights of the parties, and what is admitted of record; the paper delivered to the judge having performed its office, is never filed or preserved; and if it even should be, it would form no part of the record. The verdict in open court by the proper officer was, therefore, the only competent evidence of what the jury directly found . . . . . .": Dornick et al. v. Reichenback — opinion by GIBSON, J. — 10 S. R. 84, 89, 90.
The origin and practice of allowing the jury to seal a verdict and then to separate is fully considered in Kramer v. Kister,
In the case of King v. Faber Co.,
It may be, as argued by appellee, that no injustice has been suffered by plaintiff; but that is not a question for the court below, or for this court, to determine. We are bound by the fundamental rules of law and practice of our Commonwealth, which require a verdict to be rendered by the unanimous finding of twelve jurors orally announced in court.
Judgment reversed with a venire facias de novo. *Page 443
King v. Faber & Co. , 1866 Pa. LEXIS 46 ( 1866 )
Wynkoop v. Cooch , 1879 Pa. LEXIS 174 ( 1879 )
Eastley v. Glenn , 313 Pa. 130 ( 1933 )
Snaman v. Donahoe's Incorporated , 307 Pa. 282 ( 1932 )
Kramer v. Kister , 187 Pa. 227 ( 1898 )
Havranek v. Pitssburgh , 344 Pa. 375 ( 1942 )
Criner v. Greco , 190 Pa. Super. 316 ( 1959 )
Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. , 385 Pa. Super. 151 ( 1989 )
Finn v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation , 68 F. Supp. 423 ( 1946 )
Ottavio v. Fibreboard Corp. , 421 Pa. Super. 284 ( 1992 )