Com. v. Butler, A.

J-S45020-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
ADAM BUTLER
Appellant No. 2225 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 19, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001557-2015
CP-51-CR-0001558-2015
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED SEPTEMBER 06, 2017
Appellant, Adam Butler, appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgment of
sentence imposed on October 19, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County. On appeal, Butler challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain his conviction for disorderly conduct, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
5503(a)(3), and, for the first time on appeal, raises the claim that the
Commonwealth violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), in waiting
until almost the end of trial to hand over two police reports. We find the
Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction and
the Brady claim waived.
____________________________________________

Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S45020-17
While the passenger in a vehicle that was the subject of a lawful traffic
stop, Butler needed to be removed from the car. Upon his removal, he threw
a temper tantrum in front of a boisterous crowd of onlookers, yelling “[g]et
the eff [i.e., fuck] off of me.” His tantrum, described in detail below, led to
his conviction, after a bench trial, of disorderly conduct; his threatening of
the officers, described in footnote three below, led to his conviction for
terroristic threats. The trial court imposed a sentence of 18 to 36 months for
the terroristic threats conviction and to no further penalty for the disorderly
conduct conviction.
Butler first argues that the Commonwealth presented insufficient
evidence to sustain his conviction for disorderly conduct. In considering this
claim,
we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, and
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in a
light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner,
support the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Critically
important, we must draw all reasonable inferences from the
evidence in favor of the Commonwealth as the verdict-winner.
Where there is sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to
find every element of the crime has been established beyond a
reasonable doubt, the sufficiency of the evidence claim must fail.
Of course, the evidence established at trial need not preclude
every possibility of innocence and the fact-finder is free to
believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented.
The Commonwealth can meet its burden by wholly
circumstantial evidence and any doubt about the defendant’s
guilt is to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so
weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of
fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances. It is
improper for this Court to re-weigh the evidence and substitute
our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Additionally, the entire
-2-
J-S45020-17
record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received
must be considered.
Commonwealth v. Watley, 81 A.3d 108, 113 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Butler’s argument focuses almost exclusively on his contention that
the officers did not testify credibly and that a video of the incident
contradicts their testimony. See Appellant’s Brief, at 11-13.1 As he
succinctly puts it, “whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the
convictions in this matter is directly related to the credibility of the officers.”
Id., at 12. But it is not. This is a challenge not to the sufficiency of the
evidence, but to its weight. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wilson, 825
A.2d 710, 713-714 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“A sufficiency of the evidence review,
however, does not include an assessment of the credibility of the testimony
offered by the Commonwealth.”) By making this argument, Butler “has
blurred the concepts of weight and sufficiency of the evidence.” Id., at 714.
____________________________________________
1
The video is not in the certified record. It was Butler’s responsibility to
ensure that the certified record contains all the items necessary to review his
claims. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kleinicke, 895 A.2d 562, 575 (Pa.
Super. 2006) (en banc). “When a claim is dependent on materials not
provided in the certified record, that claim is considered waived.”
Commonwealth v. Petroll, 696 A.2d 817, 836 (Pa. Super. 1997) (citation
omitted). In any event, as explained in this decision, the video goes to the
weight, not the sufficiency of the evidence. And it bears mention that the
trial court, sitting as the fact-finder, “did not find the video to contradict the
material aspects of the officers’ testimony.” Trial Court Opinion, filed
12/16/16, at 8.
-3-
J-S45020-17
However, Butler does present an argument, albeit buried in his
discussion of credibility, that the officers “testified baldly that he uttered
obscenities, but it is admitted that they do not remember what he said.”
Appellant’s Brief, at 12. The record does not support this claim.
A disorderly conduct conviction under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(3),
requires using “obscene language” “with intent to cause public
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof[.]”
While a passenger in a car that was the subject of a valid traffic stop,
the police removed Butler from the vehicle.2 See N.T., Waiver Trial,
10/13/15, at 17. “[A]bout 30 people,” id., at 40, on “a very small street”
id., at 18, were watching what was going on. According to Officer Ray
D’Amico, Butler “was yelling very loudly” “[g]et the eff [i.e., fuck] off of me.”
Id. Butler was “just out of control.” Id. And the crowd of observers was
“coming up yelling and screaming.” Id., at 41.
Butler’s actions in loudly yelling, in front of a crowd of thirty people,
who were also yelling and screaming, on a small street, for the police
____________________________________________
2
It was necessary to remove Butler from the vehicle after he tried to exit
the car when Officer Ray D’Amico shined a flashlight “inside of the
[passenger] door to illuminate the area” during the nighttime stop. N.T.,
Waiver Trial, 10/13/15, at 17. Butler “took a swing at the flashlight” and told
Officer D’Amico to “‘get that light out of my face, pussy.’” Id.
While being transported to the police station, Butler informed Officer
Steven Toner that he “fuck[s] crackers like you in prison,” id., at 42, and
then threatened the officer’s child, telling him he would “fuck him up, too,”
id.
-4-
J-S45020-17
officers to get the “[g]et the eff [i.e., fuck] off of me” constitutes the use of
obscene language “with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or
alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof.” Accordingly, the Commonwealth
presented sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction under § 5503(a)(3).
Butler’s final claim is his allegation that the Commonwealth violated
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to turn over in discovery
a “PARS” report, which is the Philadelphia Police Department Arrest Record,
and a “7548” report, a Complaint or Incident Report. In Brady, the Court
decided, “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of
the prosecution.” Id., at 87.
At trial, during the redirect examination of Officer Toner, the
Commonwealth sought to mark as Commonwealth’s Exhibit C-1 the “7548”
report, which was also referred to as the “48” report. See N.T., Waiver Trial,
10/13/15, at 49. Butler’s trial counsel stated:
For the record, I don’t have a copy of this, Judge. I understand
there are two CP [docket] numbers maybe that’s why. I’m not
trying to say he’s [i.e., the prosecutor] trying to hide anything
from me. I want to just have a copy, and then I have some
questions with it.
Id. The court crier made a copy of the “7548” report for defense counsel and
handed it to her. See id., at 50. Defense counsel then recross-examined
Officer Toner.
-5-
J-S45020-17
On redirect examination, the Commonwealth referenced the “PARS”
report, see id., at 50, and defense counsel asked Officer Toner questions
about that report on recross-examination, see id., at 51-52. On re-redirect
examination, the prosecutor sought to mark it as Commonwealth’s Exhibit C-
2. See id., at 53. Defense counsel interjected, “I don’t have this either,
Judge. I don’t have it if you don’t give it to me. … If I can have a copy of
that. We never had a copy of that either.” Id. The following discussion
occurred:
The court: Why isn’t the PARS part of discovery?
The prosecutor: I have no idea. I have two files. All of
this should have been uploaded on eDiscovery on two different
ones. If I had known Counsel didn’t have it, I certainly would
have gotten her anything she wanted that we have. I assumed
all those documents were passed. Apparently not.
Defense counsel: I don’t have either of those two
documents. I actually met with Mr. Howell [the prosecutor]. He
handed discovery over to me because I was newly assigned to
the case because I was appointed by Your Honor. We actually
came in here and that’s when he handed it over. There is no
eDiscovery as far as I know.
The court: But there wasn’t then, I think.
The prosecutor: I’ve since put it on and I’ll also state
that the 49[3], the copy and paste on the PARS, I see the 49
sitting on Counsel’s desk.
Defense counsel: This is the 49. It says nothing about it.
The prosecutor: It’s all right there.
____________________________________________
3
Some other type of police report.
-6-
J-S45020-17
The court: All right. Let’s proceed.
Defense counsel: I don’t have the PARS, though.
The court: We’ll get you a copy of the PARS.
Defense counsel: I’ll stip[ulate] for purposes of the trial
that this is the PARS. I didn’t have it. That’s why I asked that
question before on cross.
Id., at 53-54.
The re-redirect examination of Officer Toner continued briefly, see id.,
at 54-55, and then the prosecutor stated, “Nothing further, thank you,” id.,
at 55. Defense counsel responded, “I stip[ulate] to that. That was in the
PARS.” Id. The Commonwealth then moved C-1 and C-2 into evidence and
rested.
At no point during trial did Butler claim a Brady violation. As the trial
court observes, “defense counsel elected to proceed without any further
discussion of the issue.” Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/16/16, at 6. Butler
raises this claim for the first time on appeal.
The “[f]ailure to raise a contemporaneous objection to the evidence at
trial waives that claim on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Pearson, 685 A.2d
551, 555 (Pa. Super. 1996) (en banc) (citing Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not
raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal.”)) (additional citation omitted). “Brady claims … present fact-
based judgments that cannot be adequately first made on appellate review.
That is why Brady challenges must be brought to the district court’s
-7-
J-S45020-17
attention….” United States v. Rice, 607 F.3d 133, 142 (5th Cir. 2010)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we need not
reach the merits of this issue.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
President Judge Gantman joins the memorandum.
Judge Strassburger concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/6/2017
-8-