Com. v. Shamberger, G.

J-S65039-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
GREGORY C. SHAMBERGER :
:
Appellant : No. 1604 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 15, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-06-CR-0004642-2016
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: JANUARY 29, 2019
Gregory C. Shamberger appeals the judgment of sentence entered on
May 15, 2017. Shamberger challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the
discretionary aspects of his sentence, and the introduction of testimony from
a witness. We affirm in part and vacate in part.
The trial court aptly summarized the facts and procedural history of this
case as follows:
At 2:41 p.m. on August 22, 2016, [] Shamberger, and
Kendra Scott entered the lobby of Fox Berkshire movie theater, a
multiplex movie theater located in Wyomissing, Berks County,
Pennsylvania. Fox Berkshire has eight screens. Screening rooms
1 and 2 are located to the left of the box office, and rooms 3
through 8 are located to the right. On that date, the nationally-
released movie Sausage Party was playing at Fox Berkshire at
2:45 p.m. in one of the screening rooms numbered 3 through 8.
Later that day, Rosemary Grill and her mother arrived at
Fox Berkshire and attended the 4:00 p.m. screening of Ben-Hur
in screening room 2. Ms. Grill brought a purse with her to Fox
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Berkshire. Ms. Grill’s wallet was inside the purse when she entered
screening room 2. Among other things, the wallet contained two
credit cards and one debit card issued to Ms. Grill. Ms. Grill and
her mother were the only two people in screening room 2 at the
start of the movie, and they sat in the first two seats of the second
row from the back, with Ms. Grill’s mother on the aisle. Ms. Grill
placed her purse on the floor next to her chair (toward the center
of the row), reclined her chair, and settled in for the movie.
At 4:08 p.m. (four minutes after the start of Ben-Hur),
[Shamberger] and Kendra Scott walked through the lobby of Fox
Berkshire moving from the direction of screens 3-8 toward
screening rooms 1 and 2. Around 4:15 p.m., a woman walked into
the showing of Ben-Hur and sat two or three seats away from Ms.
Grill in the same row. The woman left the room about 20 minutes
later and did not return.
A short time later, [Shamberger] drove a white Chevy
Impala, with Scott in the passenger seat, to a gas pump at the
“Friendly Foo Mart” Exxon gas station in Wyomissing. He got out
of the vehicle at Exxon. Scott did not exit the vehicle at Exxon.
Ms. Grill’s Bank of America (American Express) credit card was
used at Exxon to make a purchase in the amount of $34.00.
[Shamberger] got back into the vehicle and he and Scott left
Exxon.
At 5:23 p.m., Scott entered Best Buy in Wyomissing. Five
minutes later, at 5:28 p.m., [Shamberger] entered the same Best
Buy. At 5:32 p.m. Ms. Grill’s BB&T Bank (Visa) debit card was
used at Best Buy register 051 to purchase a MacBook Pro in the
amount of $2,151.78. Less than three minutes later, at 5:34 p.m.,
Ms. Grill’s Citibank (MasterCard) credit card was used at the same
register to purchase an iMac desktop computer in the amount of
$2,316.09. [Shamberger] exited the Best Buy after the iMac
desktop computer was purchased, and he did not return.
[Shamberger] carried two items as he exited Best Buy. At 5:47
p.m., Scott used Ms. Grill’s Bank of America (American Express)
credit card at Best Buy register 060 to purchase a Samsung
television in the amount of $1,483.99. Scott exited Best Buy with
the television at 5:48 p.m.
At 6:21 p.m., Scott used Ms. Grill’s BB&T Bank (Visa) debit
card at Target register 114 to purchase an iPad and protective
case in the amount of $826.78. A minute later, at 6:22 p.m., Scott
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used Ms. Grill’s Citibank (MasterCard) credit card at the same
register to purchase an iPad in the amount of $794.99.
Two days later, on August 24, 2016, [Shamberger] and
Scott were back at Fox Berkshire movie theater. At 7:09 p.m.,
Scott purchased tickets to see the movie Sausage Party, which
was again playing in one of the screening rooms 3-8. On that date,
Ben-Hur was again playing in screening room 2. A Fox Berkshire
employee recognized [Shamberger] and Scott and contacted
Wyomissing police after Scott purchased the tickets. Wyomissing
police arrived, reviewed surveillance video, and told the employee
to pull [Shamberger] and Scott out of Sausage Party. As the
employee and police exited the box office into the lobby at 7:31
p.m., they saw [Shamberger] and Scot entering the lobby through
the door for screening rooms 1 and 2. Officer Moyer of Wyomissing
Police and another officer approached [Shamberger] and Scott
and asked to talk.
[Shamberger] and Scott were separated and Officer Moyer
questioned [Shamberger]. [Shamberger] told Officer Moyer that
his name was Gregory Clemmens, and had an address on Jackson
Street in Philadelphia. Officer Moyer could not verify the
information provided by [Shamberger] and, at that time, Officer
Moyer placed [Shamberger] in handcuffs and informed him that
he was under official investigation. After informing [Shamberger]
that he was under investigation for theft, Officer Moyer asked
[Shamberger] for his name three or four times, and each time
[Shamberger] stated Gregory Clemmens. Wyomissing Police
proceeded to investigate the parking lot of Fox Berkshire and
observed the same white, Chevy impala seen on surveillance at
Exxon from August 22, 2016. A search of the vehicle revealed
official paperwork from the City of Philadelphia addressed to []
Shamberger inside the glove compartment.
Following a two-day jury trial (April 19-20, 2017),
[Shamberger] was convicted by a jury of three counts of access
device fraud, three counts of conspiracy to commit access device
fraud, and one count of false identification to law enforcement
authorities. On May 15, 2017, the court sentenced [Shamberger]
to, inter alia, an aggregate term of 42 to 120 months’
imprisonment (with 265 days’ credit for time served).
[Shamberger] filed a timely post-sentence motion on May 24,
201[7] requesting judgment of acquittal, arrest of judgment, a
new trial, and modification of his sentence. The post-sentence
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motion was denied by operation of law on October 16, 2017, and
this direct appeal followed.
Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), filed June 25, 2018, at 1-4 (citations to record
and footnotes omitted).
On appeal, Shamberger asks us to review the following issues:
1. Whether the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to sustain
the guilty verdict(s) for Access Device Fraud where the
Commonwealth failed to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that [Shamberger] had utilized the stolen credit cards thereby
committing the crime of Access Device Fraud.
2. Whether the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to sustain
the guilty verdict(s) for Access Device Fraud based on
accomplice liability where the Commonwealth failed to
establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [Shamberger] acted
with the intent to promote or facilitate the crime of Access
Device Fraud, that he agreed to aid in the commission of the
crime of Access Device Fraud, or that he did aid in the
commission of the crime of Access Device Fraud.
3. Whether the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to sustain
the guilty verdict(s) for Conspiracy to Commit Access Device
Fraud where the Commonwealth failed to establish, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that [Shamberger] entered into an
agreement with Kendra Scott to commit the crime of Access
Device Fraud.
4. Whether the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to sustain
the guilty verdict for False Identification to Law Enforcement
Authorities where the Commonwealth failed to establish,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that [Shamberger] was advised
that he was under investigation prior to providing information
to police.
5. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion by
allowing Sergeant Grim to testify about his recollection of the
contents of a Best Buy surveillance video, where that footage
was never provided to defense counsel and was not played for
the jury.
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6. Whether the trial court erred by imposing three separate
sentences for conspiracy where all the evidence related to a
single alleged conspiracy.
7. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing
[Shamberger] in the aggravated range for each of the first six
counts of the Information, without considering the requisite
sentencing factors and without noting aggravating factors on
the record.
Shamberger’s Br. at 2-3.
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask
“whether[,] viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most
favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-
finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 A.3d 544, 559 (Pa.Super. 2011) (en banc)
(citation omitted). Our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review
is plenary. See Commonwealth v. Neysmith, 192 A.3d 184, 189 (Pa.Super.
2018).
ACCESS DEVICE FRAUD
Shamberger maintains that there was insufficient evidence to sustain
his access device fraud conviction because (1) it only showed that he was
present or nearby when his co-conspirator was using the victim’s credit cards
and (2) there was no evidence of his intent to commit the crimes committed
by his co-conspirator. See Shamberger’s Br. at 15, 17.
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The Commonwealth sufficiently proves the crime of access device fraud
when it establishes that the defendant: “Use[d] an access device to obtain or
in an attempt to obtain property or services with knowledge that . . . the
access device was issued to another person who has not authorized its use.”
18 Pa.C.S.A. 4106(a)(1)(ii). An access device is defined as:
Any card, including but not limited to, a credit card, debit card and
automated teller machine card, plate, code, account number,
personal identification number or other means of account access
that can be used alone or in conjunction with another access
device to obtain money, goods, services or anything else of value
or that can be used to transfer funds.
18 Pa.C.S.A. 4106(d).
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as
verdict winner, the evidence established that a short time after the victim saw
a woman leave the theater room where she was watching a film:
[Shamberger] drove a white Chevy Impala, with Scott in the
passenger seat, to a gas pump at the “Friendly Food Mart” Exxon
gas station in Wyomissing. He got out of the vehicle at Exxon.
Scott did not exit the vehicle.
[Shamberger] used [the victim’s] Bank of America (American
Express) card to obtain only $34.00 worth of gas at Exxon and
that Scott used the same card to obtain $1,483.99 worth of
merchandise at Best Buy.
***
The Commonwealth produced direct video and documentary
evidence that [Shamberger] used the [victim’s] BB&T Bank (Visa)
debit card to obtain $2,151.78 in merchandise at Best Buy, and
the [victim’s] Citibank (Mastercard) credit card to obtain
$2,316.09 in merchandise at Best Buy.
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***
Evidence produced at trial further demonstrated that in each case
of access device fraud, [Shamberger] used the card first, and
thereafter, Scott used the card at a different location.
TCO at 2, 7-8. This evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction for access
device fraud because it showed that Shamberger used the victim’s debit and
credit cards to purchase merchandise and he was not authorized to do so.
ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY
Next, Shamberger maintains that “there was no evidence that [he] had
the specific intent to promote or facilitate the commission of any of the crimes
committed by Kendrea Scott, much less evidence relating [to] each and every
one.” Shamberger’s Br. at 17.
To satisfy its burden to prove the defendant guilty of being an
accomplice to the crime, the Commonwealth must show that: (1) “the
defendant intended to aid or promote the underlying offense” and (2) “the
defendant actively participated in the crime by soliciting, aiding, or agreeing
to aid the principal.” Commonwealth v. Murphy, 844 A.2d 1228, 1234 (Pa.
2004).
Here, Shamberger aided Scott in using the victim’s credit and debit
cards to purchase merchandise and gas for his vehicle. Following his purchase
of gas at the Exxon, he and Scott purchased items at the Best Buy including
a Samsung television and iMac desktop computer. The reasonable inference
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is that Shamberger used his vehicle to get to Best Buy and then stored those
purchases in that same vehicle, thereby actively participating and aiding in
the crime. This claim is meritless and no relief is due.
CONSPIRACY
Shamberger maintains that because there was no evidence “regarding
any agreement between [Shamberger] and his alleged co-conspirator,” the
evidence was insufficient to sustain the conspiracy conviction. Shamberger’s
Br. at 19
To prove a criminal conspiracy, the Commonwealth must establish that
the defendant: “(1) entered an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act
with another person or persons, (2) with a shared criminal intent and, (3) an
overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Commonwealth v.
Chambers, 188 A.3d 400, 410 (Pa. 2018) (citation omitted). “Once the
conspiracy is established beyond a reasonable doubt, a conspirator can be
convicted of both the conspiracy and the substantive offense that served as
the illicit objective of the conspiracy.” Id. The existence of an agreement is
“rarely proven with direct evidence.” Id. An agreement may be inferred from
many circumstances including but not limited to:
[T]he relation between the parties, knowledge of and participation
in the crime, and the circumstances and conduct of the parties
surrounding the criminal episode. These factors may coalesce to
establish a conspiratorial agreement beyond a reasonable doubt
where one fact alone might fail.
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Commonwealth v. Bricker, 882 A.2d 1008, 1017 (Pa.Super. 2005) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 121-22 (Pa.Super. 2005)).
Here, the evidence established that there was some form of relationship
between Shamberger and Scott as they were seen entering the theater
together on two separate occasions. Additionally, while there was no direct
testimony that Shamberger agreed to conspire with Scott, his actions are a
clear indication of his agreement to further the conspiracy. The facts in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner established that
after Scott stole the victim’s wallet, she and Shamberger proceeded to the
Exxon gas station where Shamberger used one of the victim’s cards that was
in her wallet. Additionally, when police approached Shamberger, he lied about
his name, his address, and about his mode of transportation to the theater
that day. All of these facts were sufficient to sustain his conviction for
conspiracy.
FALSE IDENTIFICATION TO LAW ENFORCEMENT
Shamberger maintains there is insufficient evidence to sustain the
conviction because Officer Moyer did not advise him that he was under
investigation prior to asking for his name and address. He maintains that
Commonwealth v. Kitchen, 181 A.3d 337, 345 (Pa.Super. 2018) (en banc),
requires us to vacate this conviction. We disagree. The Court in Kitchen held:
In order to sustain a conviction for False ID, the Commonwealth
must prove that the individual was told by police that he or she
was under investigation, and that must occur prior to the
individual’s presentment of false identity information.
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Kitchen, 181 A.3d at 345 (emphasis in original).
Officer Moyer did not initially inform Shamberger that he was the subject
of an investigation. However, when Officer Moyer informed Shamberger that
he was under investigation, Shamberger continued to provide the same false
name “three or four times.” TCO at 11. Thus, Shamberger “furnished law
enforcement authorities with false information after being informed by the law
enforcement officer that he was the subject of an official investigation of a
violation of law.” See In re D.S., 39 A.3d 968, 947 (Pa. 2012); contra.
Commonwealth v. Barnes, 14 A.3d 128, 131-32 (Pa.Super. 2011) (stating
it is not illegal to give false identification to law enforcement where officer
claimed the subject of the investigation was false identification to an officer
after defendant gave same false name multiple times to officer).
ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE
Next, Shamberger argues that “the Commonwealth should not have
been permitted to present evidence relating to video surveillance footage
allegedly from Best Buy” showing [Shamberger] “entering and then leaving
the store with items in his hands.” Shamberger’s Br. at 23. He maintains that
“[t]he officer’s attempt to testify about the contents of a video not produced
at trial was barred by the best evidence rule because ‘whatever knowledge he
possessed was gained form [sic] his viewing of the videotape. Thus, the
original video tape should have been produced.’” Id. at 24 (citing
Commonwealth v. Lewis, 623 A.2d 355, 358 (Pa.Super. 1993)).
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We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence for an
abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Belknap, 105 A.3d 7, 9-10
(Pa.Super. 2014). We give deference to the trial court’s decisions regarding
the admissibility of evidence. Id. An abuse of discretion is a ruling where there
is an “overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that
is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality,
as shown by the evidence of record.” Id. at 10.
The best evidence rule provides: “An original writing, recording, or
photograph is required in order to prove its content unless these rules, other
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court, or a statute provides otherwise.”
Pa.R.E. 1002. Rule 1002 however “is subject to the exceptions found in Rule
1004:”
Rule 1004. Admissibility of Other Evidence of Content:
An original is not required and other evidence of the content of a
writing, recording, or photograph is admissible if:
(a) all the originals are lost or destroyed, and not by the
proponent acting in bad faith;
(b) an original cannot be obtained by any available
judicial process;
(c) the party against whom the original would be offered
had control of the original; was at that time put on
notice, by pleadings or otherwise, that the original
would be a subject of proof at the trial or hearing; and
fails to produce it at the trial or hearing; or
(d) the writing, record, or photograph is not closely
related to a controlling issue.
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Commonwealth v. Green, 162 A.3d 509, 518 (Pa.Super. 2017).
Additionally, Rule 1002 only applies “if the Commonwealth must prove the
contents of the writing, recording, or photograph to establish the elements of
its case.” Id.
Here, the trial court concluded that “even without Sergeant Grim’s
testimony that he observed [Shamberger] entering and exiting Best Buy, the
Commonwealth produced ample evidence” to prove its case such as the
receipts from the Best Buy where the victim’s cards were used. TCO at 13.We
agree and conclude that the video surveillance was not essential to establish
the elements of the Commonwealth’s case. While there was no testimony
outside of the video that Shamberger was physically seen at the Best Buy, the
facts viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth give rise to the
inference that either Scott or Shamberger used the victim’s cards at the Best
Buy. Whether Shamberger or Scott used the credit cards to purchase the
merchandise, the act of purchasing those items is attributed to both of them
because of the charge of conspiracy. See Chambers, 188 A.3d at 410.
Therefore, we conclude that the best evidence rule did not apply in this case.
DISCRETIONARY ASPECTS OF SENTENCE
Shamberger also challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence.
Before we address the merits of this claim, we must engage in a four-factor
analysis to determine whether: (1) the appeal is timely; (2) the issues
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presented were properly preserved; (3) the brief satisfies Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f);1
and (4) a substantial question is presented. See Commonwealth v.
Radecki, 180 A.3d 441, 467 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citing Commonwealth v.
Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa.Super. 2010)).
Shamberger’s appeal is timely, he preserved the sentencing issue
presented, his brief complies with Rule 2119(f), and he presents a substantial
question. He maintains that the trial court imposed an aggravated sentence
“without enumerating aggravating factors on the record,” which raises a
substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Booze, 953 A.2d 1263, 1278
(Pa.Super. 2008).
The certified record belies Shamberger’s argument that the trial court
failed to place the aggravating factors of this case on the record. The court
stated:
[T]his [c]ourt noted, and stated on the record at the sentencing
hearing, that [Shamberger] has a 35-year history of committing
crimes against innocent victims. That history, as reflected in his
pre-sentence report, includes multiple criminal acts constituting
Access Device Fraud. Such behavior, despite previous stints in
prison and the birth of a child, demonstrate that society needs to
be protected from [Shamberger]. Therefore, a sentence was
imposed to protect the community from [Shamberger’s] criminal
behavior, as well as to protect [Shamberger] from his own self-
destructive behavior. Ultimately, incarceration is necessary for
____________________________________________
1 “An appellant who challenges the discretionary aspects of a sentence in a
criminal matter shall set forth in a separate section of the brief a concise
statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to
the discretionary aspects of a sentence.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f).
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[Shamberger] and is clearly warranted given his prior record score
of 5.
TCO at 17. The record before us supports the trial court’s decision to impose
an aggravated sentence and we conclude that it did not abuse its discretion.
IMPOSITION OF MULTIPLE SENTENCES FOR SINGLE ACT OF CONSPIRACY
Shamberger argues that if any conspiracy was established, it
“constitutes a single offense,” and therefore the trial court erred by imposing
sentence on three separate counts of conspiracy. We agree and the
Commonwealth as well the trial court concedes the same. The facts of this
case establish that Shamberger’s conduct was “the object of a ‘continuous
conspiratorial relationship.’” Commonwealth v. Davis, 704 A.2d 650, 654
(Pa.Super. 1997) (citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. 903(c)). Therefore, the court could not
impose a sentence for each count of conspiracy. Id. at 654-55. Thus, we
vacate two counts of the three counts of conspiracy. However, because the
trial court imposed a concurrent sentence for the conspiracy convictions,
remand is not necessary. See TCO at 16; (“the [c]ourt sentenced him to 21
months to 5 years for Count 4 (Conspiracy to Commit Access Device Fraud)
and ran the sentences for the two additional Conspiracy to Commit Access
Device Fraud counts”); see also Commonwealth v. Thur, 906 A.2d 552,
569 (Pa.Super. 2006) (“if our decision does not alter the overall [sentencing]
scheme, there is no need for a remand”).
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Judgment of sentence for conspiracy counts five and six vacated;
judgment of sentence for remaining count of conspiracy, all counts of access
device fraud, and false identification to law enforcement authorities affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 01/29/2019
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