Com. v. Williams, E.

J. S47045/17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
ERIC R. WILLIAMS, : No. 310 EDA 2017
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the PCRA Order, January 4, 2017,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Criminal Division at No. CP-23-CR-0001773-2014
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MOULTON, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 18, 2017
Eric R. Williams appeals, pro se, from the order of January 4, 2017,
dismissing his PCRA1 petition without a hearing. We affirm.
The PCRA court has set forth the factual and procedural history of this
case as follows:
On November 24, 2014, a Stipulated Non-Jury
Trial commenced. On November 25, 2014, the court
found the Appellant Guilty of Possession of a Firearm
Prohibited[Footnote 1], [and] Firearms Not to be
Carried Without a License.[Footnote 2] In summary,
the facts consist of the following: Appellant was
arrested on December 24, 2013 at approximately
8:00 p.m. by Trooper Sergio Colon of the
Pennsylvania State Police. The Appellant was
arraigned in the Court of Common Pleas, Delaware
County, Pennsylvania on April 16, 2014. On May 19,
2014, Appellant, through counsel, filed an “Omnibus
Pre-trial Motion,” seeking to suppress all evidence
1
Post-Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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seized prior to the Appellant’s arrest. A Suppression
Hearing was held on July 25, 2014 and September
16, 2014. Trooper Sergio Colon, a four-and-a-half-
year Patrol Trooper for Troop K Media Barracks of
the Pennsylvania State Police, testified at the
Suppression Hearing. Trooper Colon testified that he
has received approximately 100 hours of formalized
training in the interdiction of drugs. Trooper Colon
testified to conducting numerous stops on interstates
that have led to drug arrests. On December 24,
2013, Trooper Colon was in full police uniform and
driving a marked patrol unit, which was equipped
with an audio and video motor vehicle recording
system (MVR). At the Suppression Hearing, the
Commonwealth played the video of the MVR for the
Court.
[Footnote 1] 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6105(a)(1)[.]
[Footnote 2] 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6106(a)(1)[.]
Trooper Colon testified that, at approximately
8:00 p.m. on Christmas Eve, he was on duty alone
travelling on I-95 southbound. Trooper Colon
observed a burgundy Chevrolet Suburban SUV also
travelling southbound. After running a registration
check on NCIC, Trooper Colon testified that the
check showed the registration on the SUV was
expired. Trooper Colon then initiated a traffic stop,
pulling the Appellant over on the right side of the
Exit 8 ramp of I-95 southbound. Trooper Colon
approached the vehicle from the passenger side, and
observed that the Appellant was the driver of the
vehicle and the sole occupant. As the Appellant was
handing over documents, Trooper Colon noticed that
the Appellant was visibly nervous and his hands were
shaking. The Trooper noted: “His nervousness
continued throughout our conversation and his
demeanor was one as I mentioned earlier of which
he wanted to get away and leave . . .”
Further, Trooper Colon noted that throughout
their interaction, the Appellant continued to give the
Trooper unsolicited information. The Appellant
provided him with unsolicited information about the
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dog food in the back of the vehicle. The Appellant
also gave Trooper Colon information about where he
lived and why it was different from the address on
his license. The Appellant also stated that he was
unaware that his registration for the vehicle was
expired. During their exchange, the Appellant asked
Trooper Colon if he could light a cigarette;
Trooper Colon permitted the Appellant to do so.
[Trooper] Colon observed this behavior as another
sign that the Appellant was nervous.
Upon returning to his patrol car, Trooper Colon
ran a check of the Appellant’s license. The query
showed that the Appellant was driving with a
suspended driver’s license. Further, the vehicle was
not registered to the Appellant. Trooper Colon also
discovered that the Appellant had an extensive
criminal history. Trooper Colon testified that he
observed on the criminal history, inter alia,
numerous Possession with Intent to Deliver charges,
a Robbery charge, and several gun charges, etc.
[Trooper] Colon was preparing a citation for
driving with an expired inspection and a warning for
the expired registration while conducting a criminal
history check of the Appellant. While he was writing
out the citation and the warning in his patrol vehicle,
Trooper Colon noticed that the Appellant was
continuously staring back at him in the driver’s-side
rearview mirror and the interior rearview mirror.
Trooper Colon believed that this was another event
that raised his suspicion. Trooper Colon, as per
standard practice, requested the Appellant to exit his
vehicle and meet him at the front of the patrol car,
so that Trooper Colon could issue the Appellant his
citation for an expired inspection and a warning for
an expired registration. Trooper Colon conducted an
officer safety pat-down of the Appellant to make sure
he was not armed. Trooper Colon then began a
conversation with the Appellant.
The Appellant asked Trooper Colon several
questions regarding how to remedy the expired
registration and where to take the citation, and how
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to take care of paying for it. The Appellant also told
Trooper Colon that he was on a payment plan, and
that is why his license was suspended, which
conflicted with what the Appellant had said earlier in
the encounter about not knowing about the
suspension. Trooper Colon found all of the
unsolicited information that the Appellant provided
about how and why he was going to pay for the
citation and the payment plan to get his license back
as odd and suspicious.
Trooper Colon then issued the Appellant his
citation and warning, and the two men shook hands.
Trooper Colon told the Appellant he was free to go,
and both men began to walk back to their respective
vehicles. Before either man reached their vehicle,
Trooper Colon re-engaged the Appellant, and asked
the [Appellant] about his travel plans for the day.
Trooper Colon also asked the Appellant, “to come
back to where [Trooper Colon] was and [the
Appellant] freely and voluntarily did.”
Trooper Colon then asked the Appellant if he
had ever been arrested before. The Appellant gave
an answer that was inconsistent with what his
criminal history had revealed to Trooper Colon. The
Appellant told Trooper Colon that he had been
arrested in 2008 arising from a domestic incident in
which he had been shot five times. Trooper Colon
indicated that this story was another sign of
suspicion. The Trooper testified:
He contradicted what was revealed to me
on the earlier query of his RAP sheet by
relating that he had only been -- his
most recent arrest was in 2008, which as
we saw earlier was not true. In fact[,] I
believe his most recent arrest had been
2012. I’m not exactly sure.
Furthermore, he related that arrest
specifically in 2008 was for a domestic
charge, to -- which again contradicted
what was revealed in that query.
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Trooper Colon asked the Appellant if there
were any guns or drugs in the vehicle, to which the
Appellant answered in the negative. Trooper Colon
asked the Appellant verbally if he would consent to a
search of the vehicle. The Appellant verbally
consented. Trooper Colon then gave the Appellant a
written Waiver of Rights Form that provided
Trooper Colon written permission to search the
vehicle. The Appellant signed the waiver.
The Trooper’s search of the vehicle yielded a
Glock .40 caliber magazine containing eleven rounds
of .40 caliber ammunition underneath the driver’s
seat. In the center console, Trooper Colon found a
black Glock .40 caliber semi-automatic handgun, in
addition to an extended magazine containing thirty
rounds of .40 caliber ammunition.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Appellant was arrested on December 24, 2013
after a motor vehicle stop conducted by the
Pennsylvania State Police. The Appellant was
arraigned in the Court of Common Pleas, Delaware
County, Pennsylvania on April 16, 2014 and charged
with the aforementioned crimes.
On May 19, 2014, Michael J. Malloy, Esquire
entered his appearance on behalf of the Appellant.
Also on May 19, 2014, Appellant, through counsel,
filed an “Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion[,”] seeking to
suppress all physical evidence seized. A Suppression
Hearing was held on July 25, 2014 and
September 16, 2014. On October 15, 2014, an
Order denying Appellant’s Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion
was filed with detailed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.
On November 24, 2014, a Stipulated Non-Jury
Trial commenced and on November 25, 2014, the
court found the Appellant Guilty of Possession of a
Firearm Prohibited, [and] Firearms Not to be Carried
Without a License. On November 25, 2014, the
Appellant was sentenced to: Count 1, Persons
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Prohibited from Possessing a Firearm, 5 to 10 years
SCI, no [R]RRI eligibility, provide a DNA sample,
credit for the time period from 12/25/13 to
11/25/14, SCI Chester is recommended, payment of
court costs, forfeit the weapon for destruction;
Count 2, Firearms Carried Without a License, 7
years[’] state probation consecutive to Count 1 and
payment of court costs. On December 4, 2014, the
Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal.
On December 22, 2015, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court affirmed the trial court in a
Non-Precedential Decision docketed at No. 3495 EDA
2014. There was no further appeal.
On January 19, 2016, the [Appellant] filed a
pro se PCRA Petition. On January 21, 2016 it was
dismissed, without prejudice, the court concluding
that it was prematurely filed as Appellant’s direct
appeal was still pending. Appellant filed his second,
timely pro se PCRA petition on February 1, 2016.
Mr. Scott Galloway, Esquire was appointed to
represent the Appellant. On October 6, 2016,
Mr. Galloway, Esquire, filed a “No Merit” Letter
pursuant to Finley and Turner, infra.[2] On or
about October 7, 2016, the court entered an Order
permitting Mr. Galloway, Esquire, to withdraw from
the case.
On October 19, 2016, the court issued a
“Notice of Intent to Dismiss PCRA Petition without a
Hearing.” On October 21, 2016, the pro se
[Appellant] filed a Response to Counsel’s Finley
Letter, and on November 7, 2016 filed a pro se
response to the court’s Notice of Intention to
Dismiss. On January 4, 2017, the court issued an
Order denying PCRA relief.
On January 17, 2017, the Appellant filed a
timely Notice of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior
2
Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth
v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc).
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Court. The undersigned did not desire clarification of
the errors complained of on appeal and as such, no
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) order was entered. See
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
PCRA court opinion, 3/9/17 at 1-7 (citations to record omitted) (additional
footnotes omitted).
Appellant has raised the following issues for this court’s review:
A. Whether Appellant’s constitutional right to due
process was violated when the PCRA court
dismissed his petition as untimely filed?
B. Whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing
to protect Appellant’s jury trial rights?
C. Whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing
to file [a] Post Sentence Motion to reconsider
the sentence?
D. Whether Appellant[’s] counsel was ineffective
for failing to challenge the sufficiency of
firearm possession?
E. Whether Appellant[’s] counsel was ineffective
by filing an inadequate brief?
F. Whether PCRA counsel was ineffective in filing
a no-merit letter when the pro se claims
possessed merit?
G. Whether PCRA counsel was ineffective in failing
to investigate fraud on the Court?
Appellant’s brief at 3 (emphasis added).
“When reviewing an order [granting or] denying PCRA relief, we must
determine whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the
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record and is free from legal error.” Commonwealth v. Poplawski, 852
A.2d 323, 327 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted).
[T]he right to an evidentiary hearing on a
post-conviction petition is not absolute.
Commonwealth v. Jordan, 772 A.2d 1011, 1014
(Pa.Super. 2001). It is within the PCRA court’s
discretion to decline to hold a hearing if the
petitioner’s claim is patently frivolous and has no
support either in the record or other evidence. Id.
It is the responsibility of the reviewing court on
appeal to examine each issue raised in the PCRA
petition in light of the record certified before it in
order to determine if the PCRA court erred in its
determination that there were no genuine issues of
material fact in controversy and in denying relief
without conducting an evidentiary hearing.
Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, 549 Pa. 450, 454,
701 A.2d 541, 542-543 (1997).
Commonwealth v. Turetsky, 925 A.2d 876, 882 (Pa.Super. 2007),
appeal denied, 940 A.2d 365 (Pa. 2007), quoting Commonwealth v.
Khalifah, 852 A.2d 1238, 1239-1240 (Pa.Super. 2004).
To prevail on a claim that counsel was
constitutionally ineffective, the appellant must
overcome the presumption of competence by
showing that: (1) his underlying claim is of arguable
merit; (2) the particular course of conduct pursued
by counsel did not have some reasonable basis
designed to effectuate his interests; and (3) but for
counsel’s ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the challenged
proceeding would have been different. A failure to
satisfy any prong of the test for ineffectiveness will
require rejection of the claim.
Commonwealth v. Malloy, 856 A.2d 767, 781 (Pa. 2004) (citations
omitted). “We presume counsel is effective and place upon Appellant the
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burden of proving otherwise. Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing
to pursue a baseless or meritless claim.” Poplawski, 852 A.2d at 327
(citations omitted).
In his first issue on appeal, appellant claims that the PCRA court erred
in dismissing his January 19, 2016 petition as untimely. (Appellant’s brief at
8-9.) Appellant’s January 19, 2016 petition was not dismissed as untimely;
rather, it was dismissed without prejudice as prematurely filed because the
30-day period in which to file a petition for allowance of appeal with the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court from this court’s December 22, 2015 decision
affirming the judgment of sentence had not yet expired. Subsequently,
appellant filed a “petition to reinstate pro se PCRA petition” on February 1,
2016, which was granted and counsel was appointed. (PCRA court opinion,
3/9/17 at 6-7.)
In his second issue on appeal, appellant claims that trial counsel,
Michael Malloy, Esq., was ineffective for failing to protect his right to a jury
trial. According to appellant, Attorney Malloy did not properly advise him in
connection with his waiver of his right to a jury trial. (Appellant’s brief at
9-10.) Appellant argues that his jury waiver was invalid. (Id.) The record
belies appellant’s claim.
On November 24, 2014, the trial court conducted an extensive waiver
colloquy during which appellant repeatedly expressed his desire to waive his
right to a jury trial and proceed with a stipulated non-jury trial. (Notes of
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testimony, 11/24/14 at 4-28.) Appellant testified that Attorney Malloy had
answered all of his questions and that the decision was his own. (Id. at
26-27.) Appellant testified that he had thoroughly discussed the issue with
Attorney Malloy and required no further consultation with counsel. (Id. at 5,
25.) Appellant also executed a written jury waiver form which he reviewed
with Attorney Malloy. (Id. at 19-20.) Appellant testified that no one had
coerced or threatened him in any way. (Id. at 27.)
This issue is patently meritless. Appellant is bound by the statements
he made during his waiver colloquy and cannot now obtain relief by
contradicting those same statements. Commonwealth v. Barnes, 687
A.2d 1163, 1167 (Pa.Super. 1996), appeal denied, 693 A.2d 585 (Pa.
1997); see also Commonwealth v. Bishop, 645 A.2d 274, 277 (Pa.Super.
1994) (holding an appellant cannot obtain relief by claiming he lied during
his waiver colloquy); Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d 378, 384
(Pa.Super. 2002) (holding an appellant was not entitled to relief based on
the claim that his attorney coerced him to plead guilty when he stated in his
plea colloquy that he was not being forced or threatened).
Next, appellant argues that Attorney Malloy was ineffective for failing
to file a post-sentence motion for reconsideration of sentence. Appellant
contends that the 5 to 10-year sentence imposed on Count 1, possession of
firearms prohibited, was excessive and unduly harsh and that
Attorney Malloy disregarded his request to file a motion for reconsideration.
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(Appellant’s brief at 11-12.) As the PCRA court observed, the sentencing
transcript indicates that the issue of filing a timely appeal was raised and
Attorney Malloy stated that he would file an appeal on appellant’s behalf if
appellant did not have other counsel within the 30-day appeal deadline.
(PCRA court opinion, 3/9/17 at 12; notes of testimony, sentencing, 11/25/14
at 16-17.) There is no record of any request by appellant to file a
post-sentence motion for reconsideration. (Id.)3
Furthermore, appellant cannot show how he was prejudiced by trial
counsel’s alleged deficient performance. In Commonwealth v. Reaves,
923 A.2d 1119, 1128-1129 (Pa. 2007), our supreme court held that
counsel’s failure to file post-sentence motions at most “narrowed the ambit”
of the subsequent appeal and did not constitute prejudice per se.
Cf. Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564 (Pa. 1999) (failing to file a
requested direct appeal denies the accused the assistance of counsel and the
constitutional right to a direct appeal, and the accused is entitled to
reinstatement of his direct appeal rights). Rather, the petitioner must
satisfy the three-prong actual prejudice standard. Reaves, 923 A.2d at
1129.
Whether VOP [(violation of probation)] counsel can
be deemed ineffective, then, depends upon whether
appellee has proven that a motion to reconsider
3
We acknowledge that appellant did file an untimely pro se motion for
sentencing reconsideration which was denied on December 10, 2014, on the
basis of untimeliness and also because appellant had counsel. (Docket
#27.)
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sentence, if filed . . . would have led to a different
and more favorable outcome at VOP sentencing. In
this context, the only way the proceeding would have
been more favorable would be if counsel’s objection
secured a reduction in the sentence.
Id. at 1131-1132. Ultimately, the Reaves court found that the petitioner
failed to prove actual prejudice where the PCRA judge, who was the same
judge who initially sentenced the petitioner and then revoked probation and
imposed the VOP sentence, made clear during PCRA proceedings that he
would have imposed the same sentence. Id. at 1132.
Here, there is nothing to support a contention that filing a motion for
reconsideration would have resulted in a reduced sentence. Appellant
received a probationary sentence on Count 2, firearms not to be carried
without a license, and his sentence on Count 1, possession of firearms
prohibited, appeared to be a guideline sentence. (Notes of testimony,
11/25/14 at 11-13.) Therefore, appellant has failed to demonstrate actual
prejudice.
In his fourth issue on appeal, appellant claims that direct appeal
counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
to support the firearms convictions. (Appellant’s brief at 13-19.) However,
appellant’s entire argument relates to the suppression issue. (Id.)
Appellant argues that Trooper Colon did not have reasonable suspicion for an
investigative detention or articulable suspicion that appellant was armed and
dangerous justifying a search. (Id.) In fact, the suppression issue was fully
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litigated in the court below, and this court addressed it on appeal. This
claim fails.
Next, appellant complains that direct appeal counsel filed an
inadequate brief, resulting in waiver of certain issues. (Id. at 19.)
However, appellant does not set forth what particular issues were waived or
why they had merit and would have compelled a different result on appeal.
(Id.) From our review of this court’s December 22, 2015 memorandum, the
only issue that was waived was issue three. Commonwealth v. Williams,
No. 3495 EDA 2014, unpublished memorandum at 5 n.6 (Pa.Super. filed
Dec. 22, 2015).4 This issue was not addressed in appellant’s brief and was
deemed to have been abandoned on appeal. Id. However, appellant did
not contest the validity of the initial traffic stop where his registration was
expired and it was undisputed that appellant gave Trooper Colon both verbal
and written consent to search his vehicle. Although this court did note that
appellant failed to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), we still addressed the
primary issues on appeal on the merits, i.e., whether Trooper Colon had
reasonable suspicion to warrant further investigation and re-engage
appellant after the initial encounter had concluded, and whether he was
illegally detained after having been told he was free to leave. Id. at 5 n.7.
A unanimous panel of this court concluded that based upon the totality of
4
“Did [sic] trial court err in denying [Appellant’s] Motion to Suppress when
after an illegal and unlawful seizure and detention of [A]ppellant, [A]ppellant
was searched?” Id. at 5 (brackets in original).
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the circumstances, Trooper Colon had reasonable suspicion to justify the
search of appellant’s vehicle. Id. at 12-13. Therefore, appellant has failed
to show how he was prejudiced by direct appeal counsel’s allegedly
inadequate brief. See Commonwealth v. Reed, 971 A.2d 1216, 1226 (Pa.
2009) (“the filing of an appellate brief, deficient in some aspect or another,
does not constitute a complete failure to function as a client’s advocate so as
to warrant a presumption of prejudice under [U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648
(1984)].”).
Next, appellant complains that PCRA counsel, Attorney Galloway, was
ineffective for filing a petition to withdraw and Turner/Finley no-merit letter
instead of an amended PCRA petition on appellant’s behalf. (Appellant’s
brief at 20-23.) Appellant insists that the issues raised in his petition had
merit and warranted PCRA relief. (Id.)5 For the reasons already discussed
supra, we disagree. In petitioning to withdraw, Attorney Galloway complied
with Turner/Finley practice, and the issues raised in appellant’s pro se
PCRA petition were entirely frivolous and without merit. Counsel complied
with the requirements for withdrawal as set forth in Turner/Finley, and the
PCRA court determined that there were no potentially meritorious issues
5
This allegation of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness was raised in appellant’s
pro se response to Rule 907 notice. As such, it is preserved for appeal.
(“Answer to court’s notice of intention to dismiss,” 11/7/16 at 9-10; Docket
#11.) Cf. Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875 (Pa. 2009) (an appellant
cannot raise allegations of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness for the first time on
appeal and is required to raise them within 20 days following Rule 907
notice).
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which could be raised in a counseled amended PCRA petition. (See
“application to withdraw appearance,” 10/6/16, Docket #8; Rule 907 notice,
10/19/16, Docket #10.)
Finally, appellant argues that Attorney Malloy perpetrated a “fraud on
the court” when he conceded that the vehicle stop and subsequent search
were lawful. (Appellant’s brief at 25.) Appellant then argues that the
prosecuting attorney also “lied by omission to the Court” when he failed to
correct Attorney Malloy’s purported misrepresentations. (Id. at 25-26.)
Appellant also claims that a video of the traffic stop would have revealed
that a second trooper, not Trooper Colon, discovered the firearm. (Id. at
26.) In his brief, appellant couches this issue in terms of PCRA counsel’s
ineffectiveness for failing to investigate the claim. (Id. at 23.)
It is difficult to discern the nature of appellant’s argument. First, it
does not appear that this argument was raised in appellant’s pro se petition
and therefore it is waived. See Commonwealth v. Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238,
1242 (Pa.Super. 2011) (“It is well-settled that issues not raised in a PCRA
petition cannot be considered on appeal.” (quotation marks and citations
omitted)); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b). While appellant did raise it in his pro se
response to Rule 907 notice, he did not request to amend his petition to
include the issue. (Docket #11, “Answer to court’s notice of intention to
dismiss,” 11/7/16 at 6-7.) Appellant only requested an evidentiary hearing.
See Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080, 1085 (Pa.Super. 2014)
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(“Where the petitioner does not seek leave to amend his petition after
counsel has filed a Turner/Finley no-merit letter, the PCRA court is under
no obligation to address new issues.”), citing Commonwealth v. Rykard,
55 A.3d 1177, 1192 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 64 A.3d 631 (Pa.
2013) (a petitioner must request leave to amend his petition in his Rule 907
response to raise new trial counsel ineffectiveness claims); Commonwealth
v. Williams, 732 A.2d 1167, 1191 (Pa. 1999) (a response to Rule 907
notice is not, itself, considered a serial petition and the raising of a new
(non-PCRA counsel ineffectiveness) claim after the PCRA court has issued
notice of dismissal still requires a PCRA court to grant the petitioner leave to
amend his petition). Since appellant did not seek permission to amend his
petition to raise this new claim, the PCRA court was not required to address
the issue and it did not. Therefore, appellant's final claim does not entitle
him to relief. Rykard, 55 A.3d at 1192.6
Order affirmed.
6
To the extent appellant attempted to layer the issue as a PCRA counsel
ineffectiveness claim for failure to raise it in an amended petition, it clearly
lacks merit. The suppression matter was fully litigated. As discussed above,
there was no dispute that the initial traffic stop was lawful and that appellant
gave both verbal and written consent to search his vehicle. The only issue
was whether Trooper Colon had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity,
after the initial investigation into the Vehicle Code violations was concluded
and appellant was told he was free to leave, to re-engage appellant and
detain him for further questioning. In addition, the MVR of Trooper Colon’s
interaction with appellant was played for the trial court, and appellant
presents no evidence that a different trooper recovered the firearm. (Notes
of testimony, 7/25/14 at 21-34; Commonwealth Exhibit CS-1.)
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/18/2017
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