O'Connor, R. v. O'Connor, J.

J-A20014-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
ROBERT O'CONNOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
JANICE O'CONNOR :
:
Appellee : No. 1666 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Decree Entered September 12, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
Civil Division at No(s): 2014-0011
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED NOVEMBER 21, 2017
Appellant, Robert O’Connor (“Husband”), appeals from the divorce
decree entered in the Centre County Court of Common Pleas, specifically
challenging the order granting the petition of Appellee, Janice O’Connor
(“Wife”), to enforce a property settlement agreement. We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
The parties were married on July 1, 1978. The parties’ primary marital
residence was in Boalsburg, Pennsylvania. Husband, however, has not
resided full-time at the marital residence since 2001. Since approximately
2009, Husband has lived at the parties’ condominium in Arlington, Virginia.
Husband works at the National Science Foundation (“NSF”), a federal agency
in Washington, D.C.
On December 22, 2013, Husband informed Wife he wanted a divorce.
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The following day, December 23, 2013, Husband provided Wife with a
document labeled “Divorce Ideas/Proposal,” which generally set forth
Husband’s suggestions and questions about alimony and dividing the parties’
assets. Husband retained counsel and filed a divorce complaint on January
2, 2014. Wife subsequently retained counsel.
On April 15, 2014, the parties met without counsel and discussed a
property settlement agreement (“PSA”) Wife had drafted herself. The PSA
stated Wife would, as alimony, receive sixty-six percent (66%) of Husband’s
income and sixty percent (60%) of Husband’s consulting income. The PSA
provided the parties would later specify whether Wife would receive a
percentage of Husband’s gross or net income. The PSA specified Wife would
receive sixty-six percent (66%) of Husband’s retirement income and
required Husband to work until age 74. During the April 15th meeting, the
parties executed the PSA. Husband did not consult with counsel before
signing the agreement. Later on April 15, 2014, Husband sent Wife an e-
mail asking her to reduce the percentage of income Husband owed Wife as
alimony under the PSA.
On June 13, 2014, Wife filed a Petition to Enforce Property Settlement
Agreement. Husband filed an answer on July 29, 2014. Husband asserted
no new matter with affirmative defenses in response to Wife’s petition. The
court conducted hearings on Wife’s petition on July 29, 2014, and on August
13, 2014, during which Husband and Wife testified.
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On July 29, 2014, Wife testified she drafted the PSA based on
Husband’s “Divorce Ideas/Proposals” document. Wife stated the parties
discussed economic settlement conditions from December 23, 2013, until
April 15, 2014. Wife said when she met with Husband on April 15, 2014,
she told him she had given to her counsel an envelope containing
information disparaging to Husband. Wife noted if Husband caused anything
to happen to her, she intended counsel to give the envelope to the police,
Husband’s girlfriend, and Husband’s employer. Wife also stated she believed
she was entitled to sixty-six percent (66%) of Husband’s gross salary.
On August 13, 2014, Husband testified when he drafted the “Divorce
Ideas/Proposals” document, he believed Pennsylvania had no alimony
requirement and Wife would receive fifty percent (50%) of his retirement
funds and income. Husband said he did not threaten Wife and there was no
history of domestic violence incidents between the parties.
Husband explained Wife told him on April 15, 2014, she intended to
use information she had found on a computer at the marital residence to
blackmail Husband. Husband said Wife told him she had provided several
blackmail documents to her attorney. Husband testified Wife claimed she
had obtained an e-mail Husband wrote ridiculing a United States Senator, a
leader of critics of the NSF. Husband added Wife said she found e-mails
demonstrating Husband used his NSF e-mail address to participate in a
NCAA men’s basketball pool and send personal correspondence to his
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girlfriend. Husband stated Wife also claimed she had obtained gay club
entrance passes and a parking pass to a nude beach from the 1990’s.
Husband testified Wife gave him 24 hours to review and sign the PSA.
Husband added Wife told him not to discuss the PSA with counsel or the
April 15th meeting. Husband explained he signed the PSA for several
reasons: he feared Wife would make good on her threats to blackmail him if
he did not sign the PSA; he hoped the language in the PSA was so vague the
agreement would be unenforceable; and he believed the PSA terms were so
unfair as to render the PSA unenforceable.
Husband testified he contacted his attorney about the PSA after he had
signed the agreement. Husband stated his attorney later contacted Wife’s
attorney to rescind his signature on the PSA. Husband said he believed Wife
was entitled to sixty-six percent (66%) of his net income under the PSA.
Husband explained if Wife received sixty-six percent (66%) of his gross
income, Husband would receive only $347 per month in income. Both
parties testified they were aware on April 15, 2014, that the appraisal for the
marital residence had not yet been completed.
On October 22, 2014, the trial court granted Wife’s Petition to Enforce
Property Settlement Agreement. Husband filed a motion for reconsideration
and a petition to stay enforcement of the PSA pending appeal on November
20, 2014. On March 24, 2015, the court denied Husband’s reconsideration
motion and granted Husband’s petition to stay enforcement of the PSA. On
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October 16, 2015, Wife filed an answer and new matter to the divorce
complaint.1 The court entered a divorce decree on September 12, 2016. On
October 5, 2016, Husband filed a timely notice of appeal and a voluntary
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
Husband raises three issues for our review:
WAS THE APRIL 15, 2014 TWO-PAGE DOCUMENT WITH
SOME OF ITS TERMS HANDWRITTEN SO VAGUE THAT NO
MEETING OF THE MINDS OCCURRED BETWEEN
[HUSBAND] AND [WIFE], AND THUS NO ENFORCEABLE
CONTRACT EXISTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES?
WAS A FULL AND FAIR DISCLOSURE OF THE PARTIES’
FINANCIAL POSITIONS EVER MADE, AS IS REQUIRED FOR
ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA?
DID [HUSBAND] SIGN THE TWO-PAGE DOCUMENT UNDER
DURESS, RENDING THE EXECUTED DOCUMENT
UNENFORCEABLE?
(Husband’s Brief at 4).
Our review of a marital settlement agreement implicates the following
principles:
A settlement agreement between spouses is governed by
the law of contracts unless the agreement provides
otherwise.
____________________________________________
1We observe the trial court entered an order on November 9, 2015, allowing
Husband to appeal from the October 22, 2014 order enforcing the PSA. On
December 8, 2015, Husband filed a notice of appeal from the October 22,
2014. On February 5, 2016, this Court sua sponte quashed Husband’s
December 8, 2015 appeal as interlocutory, because the trial court had not
yet entered a divorce decree and the November 9, 2015 order failed to
comply with Pa.R.A.P. 341(c).
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* * *
Because contract interpretation is a question of law,
this Court is not bound by the trial court’s
interpretation. Our standard of review over
questions of law is de novo and to the extent
necessary, the scope of our review is plenary as the
appellate court may review the entire record in
making its decision. However, we are bound by the
trial court’s credibility determinations.
* * *
When interpreting a marital settlement agreement,
the trial court is the sole determiner of facts and
absent an abuse of discretion, we will not usurp the
trial court’s fact-finding function. On appeal from an
order interpreting a marital settlement agreement,
we must decide whether the trial court committed an
error of law or abused its discretion.
[Stamerro v. Stamerro, 889 A.2d 1251, 1257-58
(Pa.Super. 2005)].
Kraisinger v. Kraisinger, 928 A.2d 333, 339 (Pa.Super. 2007) (some
internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
[U]nder the law of contracts, the court must ascertain the
intent of the parties when interpreting a contractual
agreement. The standard of enforceability of a contractual
agreement is also clear: absent fraud, misrepresentation,
or duress, spouses should be bound by the terms of their
agreements. As such, a trial court may interpret a
property settlement agreement as it would a contract, but
it has neither the power nor the authority to modify or
vary the decree unless there is conclusive proof of fraud or
mistake. Moreover, the long-standing law of this
Commonwealth is that property settlement agreements are
presumed to be valid and binding upon the parties.
When construing agreements involving clear and
unambiguous terms, a trial court need only examine the
writing itself to give effect to the parties’ understanding. A
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court may not modify the plain meaning of the words
under the guise of interpretation. In addition, this Court
must consider such contracts without reference to matters
outside of the document, and we must ascertain the
parties’ intentions when entering into the contract from the
entire instrument. Also, the parties are bound without
regard to whether the terms were read and fully
understood and irrespective of whether the agreements
embodied reasonable or good bargains.
Crispo v. Crispo, 909 A.2d 308, 313 (Pa.Super. 2006) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted).
Generally, a contract is enforceable if its terms are “certain and
explicit, not vague or indefinite.” Potter v. Leitenberger Mach. Co., 70
A.2d 390, 392 (Pa.Super. 1950). The language of a contract “should be
interpreted in the light of the subject matter, the apparent object or purpose
of the parties and the conditions existing when it was executed.” Hart v.
Arnold, 884 A.2d 316, 333 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, 587 Pa. 695,
897 A.2d 458 (2006). “When the words of a contract are clear and
unambiguous, the meaning of the contract is ascertained from the contents
alone.” Chen v. Chen, 586 Pa. 297, 307, 893 A.2d 87, 93 (2006). “If left
undefined, the words of a contract are to be given their ordinary meaning.”
Kripp v. Kripp, 578 Pa. 82, 90, 849 A.2d 1159, 1163 (2004). “In the
absence of an ambiguity, the plain meaning of the agreement will be
enforced.” Murphy v. Duquesne University Of The Holy Ghost, 565 Pa.
571, 591, 777 A.2d 418, 430 (2001). “The meaning of an unambiguous
written instrument presents a question of law for resolution by the court.”
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Id.“Before a court will interpret a provision in…a contract in such a way
as to lead to an absurdity or make the…contract ineffective to accomplish its
purpose, it will endeavor to find an interpretation which will effectuate the
reasonable result intended.” Pocono Manor Ass’n v. Allen, 337 Pa. 442,
446-47, 12 A.2d 32, 35 (1940). An agreement is valid “if the parties
intended to form a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving
an appropriate remedy.” Jeannette Paper Co. v. Longview Fibre Co.,
548 A.2d 319, 324 (Pa.Super. 1988), appeal denied, 522 Pa. 577, 559 A.2d
38 (1989). Furthermore, if the “vagueness as to some terms was not so
overwhelming that it voided the basic understanding which was found to
exist between the parties” the contract is valid. Id. at 325.
A postnuptial agreement requires a “full and fair disclosure of the
parties’ financial positions.” Stoner v. Stoner, 572 Pa. 665, 671, 819 A.2d
529, 532 (2003). The disclosure need not be precise, as long as it is “full
and fair.” Simeone v. Simeone, 525 Pa. 392, 403, 581 A.2d 162, 167
(1990). Full and fair economic disclosure can be waived and such waiver is
enforceable absent a showing of “fraud, misrepresentation, or duress.”
Lugg v. Lugg, 64 A.3d 1109, 1113 (Pa.Super. 2013).
“Economic duress renders a contract voidable.” Nat’l Auto Brokers
Corp. v. Aleeda Dev. Corp., 364 A.2d 470, 473 (Pa.Super. 1976). “[T]he
elements in the applicability of the doctrine of economic duress or business
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compulsion are that (1) there exists such pressure of circumstances which
compels the injured party to involuntarily or against his will execute an
agreement which results in economic loss, and (2) the injured party does not
have an immediate legal remedy.” Id. at 474. (citations omitted). “[T]here
can be no duress where the contracting party is free to come and go and to
consult with counsel before assuming…contractual obligations,” even if the
contracting party was surprised by negotiations and pressured into accepting
contractual obligations. Degenhardt v. Dillon Co., 543 Pa. 146, 155 n.4,
669 A.2d 946, 951 n.4 (1996). See also Simeone, supra, at 404, 581
A.2d at 167 (holding no duress existed when plaintiff was able to consult
with legal counsel); Adams v. Adams, 848 A.2d 991, 994 (Pa.Super. 2004)
(holding divorce settlement agreement was valid, because no duress existed
when wife had opportunity to consult with counsel even though wife
experienced stress and anxiety during divorce process).
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1030 provides as follows:
Rule 1030. New Matter
(a) Except as provided by subdivision (b), all affirmative
defenses including but not limited to the defenses of
accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, consent,
discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of
consideration, fair comment, fraud, illegality, immunity
from suit, impossibility of performance, justification,
laches, license, payment, privilege, release, res judicata,
statute of frauds, statute of limitations, truth and waiver
shall be pleaded in a responsive pleading under the
heading “New Matter”. A party may set forth as new
matter any other material facts which are not merely
denials of the averments of the preceding pleading.
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(b) The affirmative defenses of assumption of the risk,
comparative negligence and contributory negligence need
not be pleaded.
Pa.R.C.P. 1030. Rule 1032 reads in part:
Rule 1032. Waiver of Defenses. Exceptions.
Suggestion of Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction or
Failure to Join Indispensable Party
(a) A party waives all defenses and objections which are
not presented either by preliminary objection, answer or
reply, except a defense which is not required to be pleaded
under Rule 1030(b), the defense of failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to
join an indispensable party, the objection of failure to state
a legal defense to a claim and any other nonwaivable
defense or objection.
Pa.R.C.P. 1032(a). Importantly, the list of affirmative defenses contained in
Pa.R.C.P. 1030(a) is not exclusive. Falcione v. Cornell School District,
557 A.2d 425, 428 (Pa.Super. 1989). “An affirmative defense is
distinguished from a denial of facts which make up a plaintiff’s cause of
action in that a[n affirmative] defense will require the averment of facts
extrinsic to the plaintiff’s claim for relief.” Id. at 428-29. “Failure to plead
an affirmative defense in compliance with [Pa.R.C.P.] 1030 results in waiver
of the defense.” Werner v. Werner, 573 A.2d 1119, 1121 (Pa.Super.
1990), appeal denied, 527 Pa. 668, 593 A.2d 843 (1991); Pa.R.C.P.
1032(a).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinions of the Honorable Pamela A.
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Ruest, we conclude Husband’s issues merit no relief. The trial court opinions
comprehensively discuss and properly dispose of the questions presented.
(See Rule 1925(a) Opinion, filed October 17, 2016, at 1 unpaginated; Trial
Court Opinion, filed October 22, 2014, at 2-5) (finding: (1) parties
negotiated settlement of their marital estate from December 2013, when
Husband informed Wife he wanted to divorce, until April 2014; parties
intended PSA to settle their marital estate amicably; PSA specifies allocation
of real estate, alimony, retirement money, joint financial accounts, vehicles,
jewelry, family antiques, and inherited possessions; under circumstances,
parties’ intent was clear; (2) Husband waived full economic disclosure,
because he knew when he entered into PSA that appraisal of marital
residence was not complete; court will not question reasonableness of
Husband’s negotiation of agreement; (3) Wife’s purported actions do not
amount to economic duress; Husband testified Wife offered him 24 hours to
consult with counsel before signing agreement; Wife’s alleged conduct also
does not constitute traditional duress, because Husband alleged no threat of
physical harm; further, purported threats Wife made to Husband were not
impending; rather, Wife provided Husband 24 hours to discuss PSA with his
attorney; further, Husband signed PSA on same day; therefore, Husband
was not under “duress” to sign agreement). The record supports the trial
court’s rationale.
With respect to Husband’s specific complaints about the PSA, Husband
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failed to raise any affirmative defenses to Wife’s petition to enforce the PSA,
such as ambiguity, lack of full and fair disclosure, and duress. These claims
are affirmative defenses, which required Husband to aver facts extrinsic to
Wife’s petition in order to prevent enforcement of the PSA. See Falcione,
supra. Husband averred in his answer to Wife’s petition that the PSA was
ambiguous but did not explain what terms of the PSA were vague. See id.Because Husband failed to raise his affirmative defenses in response to
Wife’s petition to enforce the PSA, the defenses are waived. See Werner,
supra. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinions.
Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/21/2017
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