In the Interest of: M.L., a Minor Appeal of: D.L.

J-S58021-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: M.L., A MINOR, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
APPEAL OF: D.L., NATURAL FATHER
No. 747 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered April 13, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-01-DP-0000021-2015
IN THE INTEREST OF: M.L., A MINOR, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
APPEAL OF: D.L., NATURAL FATHER
No. 748 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered April 5, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County
Orphans' Court at No(s): RT-16-2016 (A)
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 06, 2017
Appellant, D.L. (“Father”), appeals from the trial court’s order entered
April 5, 2017, which granted the petition filed by Adams County Children and
Youth Services (“CYS”) to involuntarily terminate, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b), his parental rights to his daughter, M.L.
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(“Child”), born in August of 2015. Father also appeals from the order
entered April 13, 2017, changing Child’s permanency goal to adoption
pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351.1, 2 We affirm.
The trial court thoroughly summarized the relevant facts and
procedural history of this case, which the trial court read into the record in
open court on March 28, 2017, in pertinent part, as follows:
* * *
9. Prior to [Child’s] birth, Dauphin County Social Services
[(“Dauphin CYS”)] were concerned over the unborn child’s well-
being due to concerns expressed by prenatal providers
concerning [M]other’s low level of functioning and [F]ather’s
controlling behavior. Additionally, concerns were fueled by
Dauphin [CYS’s] interaction and experience with the family while
involved with family concerning the child, J.L.
10. At the birth of [Child], Lancaster Hospital officials contacted
Dauphin [CYS], who in turn responded to the hospital to take
custody of the newborn. At that time[, F]ather appeared to be
recording the interaction on his cell phone and expressed that
Dauphin [CYS] did not have jurisdiction as [M]other and [F]ather
had moved to Gettysburg.
* * *
14. Dauphin [CYS] took custody of [Child] and placed her in a
foster care home on August 14, 2015.
____________________________________________
1 The April 13, 2017 order also noted that B.L.’s (Mother’s) parental rights
had been involuntarily terminated with respect to Child. Mother did not file
a separate appeal, nor is Mother a party to the instant appeal.
2 Mother and Father have another child, J.L., who is not the subject of this
appeal. Mother’s parental rights to J.L. were involuntarily terminated and
Father’s parental rights were terminated by consent in the fall of 2015.
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15. On August 17, 2015, the Honorable John F. Cherry of the
Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas entered [an] emergency
shelter care order directing that [Child] remain in placement in
foster care.
16. On August 31, 2015, Judge Cherry transferred jurisdiction of
the matter involving [Child] to the Adams County Court of
Common Pleas, who in turn accepted jurisdiction by order dated
September 11, 2015.
17. On October 13, 2015, the Honorable Judge John Kuhn
adjudicated [Child] dependent and continued her placement in
foster care.
18. On November 9, 2015, at [a] dispositional hearing[,] the
[c]ourt established a goal of reunification with a concurrent goal
of adoption. [Child] remained in foster care with a plan to
transfer her to kinship care in the home of the biological aunt of
[F]ather[,] who at the time had an amicable relationship with
[F]ather.
19. At the November 9, 2015[] dispositional hearing[,] with
[F]ather’s agreement, he was ordered not to possess a firearm
except for employment purposes, in case [sic] firearm was not to
be kept at the family residence. Also at the dispositional
hearing, a plan accepted by all parties was adopted. The plan
included:
A. Parents to attend visits and medical
appointments of [Child], and confirm visits with
[Child] with the Adams [CYS] the day before the
scheduled visit.
B. Father addressed anger management with a
professional provider.
C. The parents will participate in out–patient
mental health counseling including medical
management and follow through with all treatment
recommendations.
D. The parents participate in intensive parenting
services.
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E. That the parents execute releases to [CYS] to
obtain appropriate relevant information.
F. That the parents verify employment and their
financial status with [CYS] and,
G. The parents would provide stable and save
[sic] residence for [Child], and demonstrate the
ability to provide appropriate and safe care for
[Child].
20. In developing a plan, [CYS] was aware of both parents
having a history of mental health issues and [M]other’s inability
to provide basic care for [Child].
21. Accordingly, those issues were of some primacy to [CYS] as
was expressed to the parties.
22. At a permanency review hearing, which was held on January
19, 2016, the [c]ourt found the parents’ compliance with the
plan to be minimal.
23. The parents did not attend medical appointments and visit
attendance with [Child] was sporadic although [F]ather claimed
difficulty due to work conflicts.
24. Father further advised the [c]ourt that he was participating
in anger management counseling and mental health counseling
with Well Span Health[,] but failed to provide verifiable proof.
Mother would not identify who any service providers were. The
parties failed to follow through with Justice Works, an in-home
service provider recommended by [CYS], and therefore, services
were terminated. The [c]ourt was further advised that neither
[F]ather [n]or [M]other provided employment or financial status
information. Although the parents were living with [F]ather’s
mother, [CYS] was advised that that living arrangement would
end in January of 2016, as [F]ather’s mother was unwilling to
further permit the parties to reside in her home.
25. During visits with [Child], [M]other continued to display an
inability to provide basic parenting skills. While [F]ather was
able to demonstrate simple care giving skills, he failed to
recognize [M]other’s shortcomings. Additionally, during this
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reporting period, [CYS] reported that [F]ather was often
argumentative, evasive, and manipulative in dealing with [CYS].
26. On February 25, 2016, [CYS] filed a motion seeking a finding
of aggravated circumstances against [M]other based upon the
prior involuntary termination of her parental rights to the child,
J.L.
27. A permanency review hearing was conducted on April 12,
2016, at which time it was discussed that visitation was still
sporadic, however, more consistent as [F]ather was providing
transportation for [Child] in his vehicle. Nevertheless, the
parents continued not to attend [Child’s] medical appointments.
28. It became more apparent that [M]other is incapable of
providing basic care to [Child] and [F]ather, who appeared
capable, was requested to develop a viable plan for [Child’s] care
when he was unavailable due to his work schedule. Father still
had difficulty accepting [M]other’s shortcomings in providing
child care.
29. His hostility with [CYS] continued to increase. Both parents
claimed to have been undergoing mental health counseling and
indicated that they requested verification of the records from the
service provider but those records had not yet been provided.
The parents had moved from [F]ather’s mother’s residence to an
apartment in Littlestown and both parents claimed they were
employed but did not yet provide verification or basic
information concerning their employment.
30. Following permanency review hearing, [Child] remained in
kinship foster care.
31. Following the permanency review hearing conducted on
February 25, 2016, the [c]ourt Ordered:
A. Father to undergo mental health evaluation,
comply with all treatment recommendations and
provide verification to [CYS].
B. Secondly, [F]ather present viable reunification
plan to the [c]ourt and [CYS] within 60 days of the
date of the Order.
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C. Father to attend and successfully complete
anger management counseling and provide
verification of the same and,
D. Father to verify his employment in a means
that [CYS] was able to ascertain the accuracy of the
employment representations.
32. [On] April 12, 2016, aggravating circumstances were found
to exist against [M]other.
33. [CYS] filed an emergency petition which was . . . held on
May 24, 2016. At that time [CYS] expressed concern over
[F]ather’s mental health, his lack of a valid driver’s license, and
failure to provide reunification plan. Additionally, sporadic
visitation was causing issues with the kinship providers in
providing for [Child’s] physical and emotional well-being.
34. [CYS] presented evidence of approximately 14 traffic
citations against [F]ather verifying that his license was
suspended while he was providing transportation of [Child] to
visitation. Information indicated that Father’s license had been
suspended in late 2015, and even as of this writing, remains
suspended. Mother does not drive.
35. As transportation for visitation was at issue as well as
[F]ather’s failure to obtain mental health evaluation, [CYS] was
seeking limitation on the parties’ visitation.
36. On July 20, 2016, [a] permanency review hearing was
conducted. Father and [M]other had not had visits with [Child]
since May 18, 2016, nor had [they] attended any medical visits
during the relevant reporting period. Father had provided
mental health records to [CYS] but all of those records predated
January 1, 2016. The records provided indicated that [F]ather
suffers from a diagnosis of depression and in the past has had
suicidal ideations. As of this reporting period, [F]ather has not
provided any other verification of his compliance with mental
health evaluation and treatment since January of 2016. Mother
had signed a mental health records release, however, no records
were found. Neither parent provided any employment
information.
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37. It was also discovered at hearing that [F]ather was
subsequently cited for driving under suspension and
impersonating an emergency service provider. Father’s
compliance with recommended service providers was
nonexistent causing service providers to cease termination of
their services. Contrary to the direction in the Order of February
25, 2016, [F]ather did not provide [CYS] or the [c]ourt with a
reunification plan. [Child] was Ordered to remain in kinship
foster care. As of the date of hearing, [Child] had been in care
of [CYS] for her entire life of approximately nine months.
38. After hearing testimony, the [c]ourt found there had been no
compliance by either [F]ather or [M]other with efforts to reunify
with [Child].
39. Due to the increasing concerns of the safety of [Child] when
in the presence of the parents, the [c]ourt suspended [F]ather’s
unsupervised visitation until mental health evaluation and
treatment compliance was verified to [CYS]. Additionally,
[F]ather was given a second opportunity and Ordered to provide
a reunification plan within 30 days. He was further directed to
execute releases to any anger management treatment or mental
health treatment which he was undergoing and provide
verification of stable housing and financial viability. Due to the
issues arising concerning visitation, [F]ather was again directed
to provide verifiable proof of his work schedule in order to permit
[CYS] to cooperate with that schedule in arranging visitation.
Although [F]ather’s unsupervised visits were restricted, in the
event he provided the mental health records and executed
appropriate releases, visitation would be permitted in the
presence of [CYS]. Father was directed to undergo mental
health evaluation as arranged by [CYS].
40. On August 22, 2016, after reasonable notice to [F]ather and
despite that reasonable notice, [F]ather failed to attend mental
health evaluation scheduled by [CYS]. The mental health
provider with whom the evaluation was scheduled . . . outside of
normal providers used by [CYS] in order to accommodate
[F]ather’s paranoia concerning interactions with [CYS].
41. On September 27, 2016, [a] permanency review hearing
was conducted by the [c]ourt. At that time it was discovered
that the parents had been evicted from the Littlestown property.
However, [F]ather indicated to the [c]ourt that he had not been
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so evicted. Father’s representation is contrary to the factual
record as determined by the [c]ourt. At the time of [the]
permanency hearing on September 27, 2016, [F]ather would not
release his address other than a statement concerning the status
of the Littlestown apartment and it was believed that the parents
were currently homeless.
42. During the relevant reporting period, supervised visits with
the parents were either canceled due to the parents[’] failure to
appear, the appointments which weren’t canceled were
shortened due to the parents habitually appearing late.
43. Neither [M]other nor [F]ather attended any medical
appointments of [Child] during the relevant reporting period. It
was discovered since last proceedings, [F]ather had been
arrested for impersonating a constable and felony burglary. It
was further discovered that when law enforcement officials
executed the search warrant at [F]ather’s residence, . . . he had
a loaded firearm on the property.
44. Father claimed that he was consulting with a mental health
provider in Hanover, and when directed by the [c]ourt to
execute a release to verify his representation to the [c]ourt, he
subsequently in meeting with [CYS] executed the release but
wrote on the release “under protest” which caused the service
provider not to honor it.
45. Father failed once again to provide proof of any anger
management treatment or counseling. Although he provided
some information in verification of his employment, that
verification indicated that he was only working 20 to 25 hours
per week. A reunification plan had still not been completed and
provided by father as directed on at least two prior occasions by
[c]ourt [o]rder. The [c]ourt found that there was no compliance
on the part of [F]ather or [M]other in making efforts towards
reunification. [CYS] advised that they would be proceeding with
involuntary termination of parental rights.
* * *
48. During the period of time from November 21, 2016 through
January 5, 2017, [F]ather was incarcerated at the Adams County
Prison as a result of conviction or convictions resulting from the
charges contained in the burglary complaint referenced above.
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During this relevant time period, [CYS] was unaware of
[M]other’s location, however, believed she had returned to an
address in Lebanon where she resided with her mother. There is
essentially no communication between parents and [CYS] since
the September 27, 2016, permanency review hearing.
* * *
50. The last mental health or psychiatric evaluation conducted
on [F]ather appears to be psychiatric evaluation conducted on
November 22, 2014, by Doctor Rosen. Doctor Rosen expressed
his concern in that evaluation that Father’s personality traits
indicated a high risk of future child abuse and neglect. Doctor
Rosen observed [F]ather to be defiant to authority, angry,
impulsive and reckless. [Doctor Rosen] recommended that
[F]ather participate in a child abuse prevention program. Doctor
Rosen at that same time conducted an evaluation of [M]other
and discovered that [M]other has mild intellectual disability with
an operating IQ of 54.
N.T., 3/28/17, at 2-14.
On December 28, 2016, CYS filed a petition to terminate Father’s
parental rights to Child. On January 17, 2017, CYS supplemented the
petition, and hearings were held on March 13, 2017, and March 23, 2017.
On March 28, 2017, the trial court orally delivered its order terminating
Father’s parental rights and changing Child’s permanency goal to adoption.
The trial court docketed its order terminating Father’s parental rights on
April 5, 2017. The trial court docketed its order changing Child’s
permanency goal to adoption on April 13, 2017. On April 28, 2017, Father
filed timely notices of appeal along with concise statements of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The
trial court filed its opinion on May 24, 2017. By motion dated June 13,
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2017, Father requested this Court to consolidate his appeals. We granted
the motion on June 14, 2017.
On appeal, Father raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and abused
its discretion to find [CYS] had met its burden in determining
that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Father’s
parental rights to [Child] pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §[ ]2511(a)(1),
(2), (5) and (8)?
2. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and therefore
abuse[d] its discretion in determining that, even if [CYS] had
met its burden under the plead subsections 23 Pa.C.S. § [ ]
2511(a), that it was in [Child’s] best interests under 23 Pa.C.S.
§[ ] 2511(b) to terminate parental rights, given the
acknowledgement during a time of regular visitation, Father was
the sole caregiver and enjoyed a parent-child relationship with
[Child], especially given the fact when the termination
proceeding followed a period of time where Father’s visitation
was suspended due to [CYS’s] perceived failures of Father to
comply with their guidelines, which had nothing to do with
[Child’s] safety, nor was Father’s contact with [Child] placing
[Child] at a grave risk of either emotional or physical harm?
3. Was trial court’s determination err [sic] as a matter of law and
abuse [of] its discretion finding that a goal change from
reunification to adoption was in the best interests of [Child]
where there was not clear and convincing evidence presented as
to the goal change being in the best interests of the child and
where [CYS] had not made reasonable efforts, specifically to
continue to facilitate and enrich the parent–child relationship, by
continually reducing and eventually suspending visitation as a
consequence and only granting minimal weekly contact, despite
visitation of a parent with their child being a right not a
privilege?
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Father’s Brief at 3-5.3
We review an appeal from the termination of parental rights in
accordance with the following standard:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely
because the record would support a different result. We have
previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often
have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple
hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).
When deciding a case falling under Section 2511, the trial court must
engage in a bifurcated process.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory
grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if
the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in
____________________________________________
3 While Father’s statement of questions involved indicates that he is raising
three separate issues, his brief contains only a single argument section
addressing all of his issues in one discussion. Thus, Father’s brief does not
comply with Rule 2119, which provides that “[t]he argument shall be divided
into as many parts as there are questions to be argued.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).
While this defect may be considered to be substantial, it does not preclude
our review of this matter.
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the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the
standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the
emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention
paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such
bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
“In termination cases, the burden is upon [the petitioner] to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that its asserted grounds for seeking the
termination of parental rights are valid.” In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276
(Pa. Super. 2009). We have explained that “[t]he standard of clear and
convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so ‘clear, direct, weighty
and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,
without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.’” Id. (quoting
In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)).
Father’s first issue challenges the termination of his parental rights
under Section 2511(a). Father contends that “he had resolved the issues
which not only led to [Child’s] placement but additional concerns noted
during the life of the case.” Father’s Brief at 37. In particular, Father
asserts that “[w]ithin weeks” of his release from prison in January 2017,
Father had obtained employment and provided CYS with his work schedule.
Id. at 34. “Father also provided a lease to [CYS] which showed a lease paid
through March 2017.” Id. Father also argues that he attempted to visit
Child, but “the difficulties in meeting all other requirements and being the
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primary financial income aside from Mother’s SSI and Mother’s primary care
giver along with transportation issues, made visitation difficult.” Id. at 34-
35.
We note that the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights to Child
pursuant to subsections (1), (2), (5) and (8) of Section 2511(a). “This Court
may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the termination of parental
rights with regard to any one subsection of Section 2511(a).” In re B.L.W.,
843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Accordingly, we focus our
analysis on Section 2511(a)(2).
To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(2), the moving party
must produce clear and convincing evidence that the following three
conditions are met: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be
without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his
physical or mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied. In re Adoption of
M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003); 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2).
The grounds for termination of parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2),
due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are not limited to
affirmative misconduct; to the contrary, those grounds may include acts of
refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re A.L.D., 797
A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002).
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In granting CYS’s petition for involuntary termination, the trial court
made the following determination:
[T]his record supports a finding of the repeated and continued
refusal of Father to take steps to provide the child essential
parental care necessary to her physical and mental well-being
which Father will not remedy. Father’s blatant disregard, after
numerous unequivocal requests, to comply with reasonable
safeguards aimed at establishing a reunification plan for a period
in excess of 12 months is indicative of Father’s unwillingness to
remedy the situation which caused initial placement.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/24/17, at 7 (citations omitted).
The certified record reveals that Father has caused Child to be without
essential parental care and Father will not remedy the conditions that caused
the incapacity within a reasonable time. CYS established the following
objectives for Father: attend visits and medical appointments of Child and
confirm visits with Child with CYS the day before the scheduled visit;
address anger management with a professional provider; participate in out-
patient mental health counseling and follow through with all treatment
recommendations; participate in intensive parenting services; execute
releases to CYS; verify employment and financial status; provide a stable
and safe residence for Child; and demonstrate the ability to provide
appropriate and safe care for Child. Findings of Fact, 4/5/17, at 4-5
(unpaginated).
Regarding Father’s objective to visit with Child and attend medical
appointments, Father’s compliance was minimal. In particular, CYS
caseworker, Kimberly Hernandez, testified that the majority of Father’s visits
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with Child occurred between birth and nine months. N.T., 3/13/17, at 39.
After CYS discovered that Father was driving with a suspended license, CYS
required that visits with Child occur at the agency as Father could no longer
transport Child to and from visits. Id. at 34-35. Thereafter, Father’s visits
with Child became sporadic; Father did not visit with Child from May of 2016
through July 20, 2016, September of 2016 through mid-October of 2016,
and November of 2016 through January of 2017. Id. at 51-55. Father
frequently failed to confirm his visits or would arrive late to visits. 4 Id. at
46-47.
Moreover, Child’s foster mother, Paternal Aunt, testified that she
attended every medical appointment and that Father failed to attend a single
appointment. N.T., 3/13/17, at 179-180. Paternal Aunt testified that
Father’s contact with Child was “sporadic” and that Father would go for two
to three months without contacting Child. Id. at 178-179.
With regard to his objective to participate in anger management and
parenting classes, Father, again, was minimally compliant. Notably,
Ms. Hernandez testified that CYS had no verification that Father participated
in anger management treatment. N.T., 3/13/17, at 59. Further,
Ms. Hernandez testified that Father was offered participation in the Nurturing
____________________________________________
4 Notably, Father arrived late to the termination hearing on March 13, 2017,
and failed to appear for the hearing on March 23, 2017. Consequently,
Father’s attorney was unable to call Father as a witness to testify in his own
behalf. N.T., 3/13/17, at 3-4, 27; N.T., 3/23/17, at 242-246.
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Parenting Program, but Father was discharged “due to noncompliance or no
contact with the program.” Id. at 40.
Similarly, Father failed to maintain stable housing. Father initially
obtained independent housing in February of 2016. Nevertheless, in
September of 2016, Father was evicted from this residence. N.T., 3/13/17,
at 46, 61. Father obtained new housing in February of 2017 and notified
CYS that his rent was paid in full until March of 2017. Id. at 61. However,
CYS noted its concern regarding Father’s ability to continue paying rent
based on his history of eviction and inability to provide documentation of
employment. Id. at 62. “[T]hroughout the life of the case, [CYS] only
received three weeks of work schedules, even though [CYS had] consistently
asked for a solid work schedule plan.” Id. at 51.
Based on the foregoing, we reject Father’s assertion that the trial court
erred in terminating his parental rights based on his efforts to fulfill the
objectives set forth by CYS. Therefore, we discern no abuse of discretion or
error of law in the trial court’s determination that termination was warranted
under Section 2511(a)(2).
In his second issue, Father argues the trial court erred in finding that
termination of his parental rights would best serve the developmental,
physical, and emotional needs and welfare of Child under Section 2511(b).
“Section 2511(b) ‘focuses on whether termination of parental rights would
best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of
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the child.’” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super.
2015) (quoting In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super.
2010)). “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are
involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In re
C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005). The trial court must also
“discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost
attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond.” Id.The mere finding of a parent-child bond does not preclude termination
of parental rights. Rather, the trial court must examine the status of the
bond to determine whether its termination “would destroy an existing,
necessary and beneficial relationship.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d
387, 397 (Pa. Super. 2003). “[A] court may properly terminate parental
bonds which exist in form but not in substance when preservation of the
parental bond would consign a child to an indefinite, unhappy, and unstable
future devoid of the irreducible minimum parental care to which that child is
entitled.” In re J.W., 578 A.2d 952, 958 (Pa. Super. 1990) (emphasis in
original).
In addressing the best interests and welfare of Child, the trial court
found:
Throughout the history of this proceeding, the record is
unequivocal that the kinship foster parents have essentially filled
the void created by the natural parents’ unwillingness to provide
parental care. While in kinship foster care, [Child’s] overall well-
being has been positive. [Child] perceives the kinship foster
family as family and refers to the foster parents as “Mom” and
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“Dad.” While with the kinship foster family, she has become
attached to three quasi-siblings who she treats as sisters. In
contrast, the only bond between [Father] and [Child] which
developed during sporadic visitations has been described as one
of “playmates.” There is no other evidence of record. As Father
has essentially not been actively involved in the 21[-]month old
child’s life since her birth, this Court shares in the opinion of the
kinship foster providers that [Child’s] well-being will only be
jeopardized by delay in arranging permanency for [Child].
[Child’s] guardian ad litem concurs in this conclusion.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/24/17, at 8-9.
Our review of the complete record supports the trial court’s finding
that Child’s primary bond is with her foster family rather than with Father.
Further, the record supports the trial court’s finding that Child will not suffer
irreparable harm if Father’s parental rights are terminated. It was within the
trial court’s discretion to accept the testimony of Ms. Hernandez and Paternal
Aunt, and to conclude that the benefits of a permanent home with Paternal
Aunt would outweigh any emotional distress Child might experience if
Father’s parental rights were terminated.
Based on the record before us, we discern no error or abuse of
discretion in the trial court’s conclusion regarding subsection (b) that Child’s
developmental, emotional, and physical needs and welfare are best met by
terminating Father’s parental rights. Where the trial court’s determination is
supported by the record, this Court must affirm. In re R.L.T.M., 860 A.2d
190, 191 (Pa. Super. 2004).
Finally, we address Father’s challenge to the order changing Child’s
permanency goal to adoption. Father argues that the trial court erred in
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changing Child’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption because
CYS created “severe obstacle[s] to the very foundation of a family’s
reunification.” Father’s Brief at 28. In particular, Father alleges that CYS
reduced or suspended his visitation with Child and, thus, prevented Father
from reunifying with Child. Id. at 25-30.
In cases involving a court’s order changing the placement goal .
. . to adoption, our standard of review is abuse of discretion. To
hold [that] the trial court abused its discretion, we must
determine that its judgment was manifestly unreasonable, that
the court disregarded the law, or that its action was a result of
partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will. While this Court is bound by
the facts determined in the trial court, we are not tied to the
court’s inferences, deductions and conclusions; we have a
responsibility to ensure that the record represents a
comprehensive inquiry and that the hearing judge has applied
the appropriate legal principles to that record. Therefore, our
scope of review is broad.
In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 977 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). However, we are mindful that, “[w]hen the trial
court’s findings are supported by competent evidence of record, we will
affirm ‘even if the record could also support an opposite result.’” In re N.C.,
909 A.2d 818, 823 (Pa. Super. 2006) (quoting In re Adoption of R.J.S.,
901 A.2d 502, 506 (Pa. Super. 2006)). Furthermore, this Court has stated:
Placement of and custody issues pertaining to dependent
children are controlled by the Juvenile Act [42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-
65], which was amended in 1998 to conform to the federal
Adoption and Safe Families Act (“ASFA”). The policy underlying
these statutes is to prevent children from languishing indefinitely
in foster care, with its inherent lack of permanency, normalcy,
and long-term parental commitment. Consistent with this
underlying policy, the 1998 amendments to the Juvenile Act, as
required by the ASFA, place the focus of dependency
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proceedings, including change of goal proceedings, on the child.
Safety, permanency, and well-being of the child must take
precedence over all other considerations, including the rights of
the parents.
Id. (internal citations and footnotes omitted).
When considering a petition for goal change for a dependent child, the
trial court considers:
the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the
placement; the extent of compliance with the service plan
developed for the child; the extent of progress made
towards alleviating the circumstances which necessitated
the original placement; the appropriateness and feasibility
of the current placement goal for the child; and, a likely
date by which the goal for the child might be achieved.
In re A.K., 936 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 6351(f)).
Additionally, Section 6351(f.1) requires the trial court to make a
determination regarding the child’s placement goal:
(f.1) Additional determination.—Based upon the
determinations made under subsection (f) and all relevant
evidence presented at the hearing, the court shall
determine one of the following:
* * *
(2) If and when the child will be placed for adoption,
and the county agency will file for termination of
parental rights in cases where return to the child’s
parent, guardian or custodian is not best suited to the
safety, protection and physical, mental and moral
welfare of the child.
42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f.1).
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“The trial court must focus on the child and determine the goal with
reference to the child’s best interests, not those of the parents.” In re S.B.,
943 A.2d at 978. As this Court has held, “[a] child’s life simply cannot be
put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon the ability to handle the
responsibilities of parenting.” In re N.C., 909 A.2d at 824 (quoting In re
Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1276 (Pa. Super. 2003)) (alteration in
original).
In this case, the trial court changed Child’s permanency goal to
adoption, finding as follows:
Father made absolutely no effort towards reunification other
than exceedingly sporadic visitation. His employment and
housing stability was either unverifiable or in constant
fluctuation. Most alarmingly, he failed to address potentially
dangerous mental health issues[,] which apparently were
diagnosed as early as 2014 and observed independently by both
Dauphin [CYS] and Adams [CYS]. The possession of a firearm
and nature of criminal charges instituted against Father, as well
as his flagrant disregard for the safety of [Child] by transporting
her while on a suspended license, evidenced the potential risk to
[Child]. As this history was consistent since [Child] was taken
into custody at her birth in August of 2015, there can be no
doubt that Father, by conduct continuing for a period of at least
six months, has refused or failed to perform parental duties.
Indeed, Father does not contest this finding in his Concise
Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/24/17, at 6-7.
The trial court specifically addressed Father’s allegation of “punitive
suspension of visitation” by CYS as follows:
Although the foregoing is sufficient to support the finding
for termination, this writer feels compelled to address a
reference in [Father’s] Concise Statement of Matters Complained
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of on Appeal which raises an implication of punitive suspension
of visitation between Father and [Child]. This implication is
simply contrary to the record. Throughout the history of this
matter, [CYS] made significant effort to increase Father’s
visitation with [Child] towards the goal of reunification. [CYS’s]
effort however was met by an attitude of inconsistency,
concealment, and defiance. For instance, Father was excessively
sporadic in exercising visitation at great inconvenience to the
kinship foster parents. Indeed, on occasion, Father did not even
attend court proceedings. In explaining these lapses, Father
regularly alluded to work obligations yet adamantly refused to
provide employment documentation for [CYS] to confirm his
representations or to permit accommodation. When initially
provided opportunity for unsupervised visitation, Father illegally
transported [Child] with a suspended license and failed to
disclose the same to [CYS]. While he has consistently
represented to [CYS] and [this c]ourt that his significant mental
health issues were being addressed, as of this writing, there is
no verification for the same. His interaction with service
providers was terminated by the providers due to non-
cooperation. Finally, he was regularly secretive about his living
arrangements and information relevant to his ability to care for
[Child]. All these actions were consistently repetitive under the
umbrella of a history of dangerous mental instability including:
(1) a depressive and suicidal psychiatric diagnosis; (2)
possession of a concealed firearm while interacting with in-home
service providers; (3) blatant disregard of court directives by
two prior judges prohibiting his possession of firearms; (4)
operating a motor vehicle while under suspension and in
possession of emergency lighting devices which he was not
qualified to use; (5) conviction of criminal charges wherein it is
alleged he impersonated a constable to assist in his commission
of burglary; (6) consistent misrepresentation to [CYS] and this
[c]ourt concerning his attendance at anger management and
mental health counseling; and (7) an attitude evidencing a
clearly open defiance to authority which was apparent at
numerous court proceedings. Despite this umbrella of concern,
[CYS] continued to make efforts and accommodations to arrange
visitation until it became clear that the Father simply had no
intention of addressing the issues which caused the original
placement. Indeed, this [c]ourt observed Father’s demeanor at
various proceedings and, in light of the history and record, has
no hesitancy in concluding that left untreated, Father presents a
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grave threat to both [Child] and social service providers.2
2 While it is true [CYS] did not arrange visitation
between the Father and [Child] while incarcerated,
for some period of time [CYS] was unaware of
Father’s residence or incarceration. On the other
hand, Father was continuously represented by
counsel and obviously aware of [CYS’s] involvement
however failed to take any act to alert [CYS] of his
location or request visitation contrary to his
obligation of affirmative performance in exercising
parental duties. In Re C.M.S., 832 A.2d 457, 462
(Pa. Super. 2003).
Trial Court Opinion, 5/24/17, at 9-10.
In this case, our review of the record compels us to conclude there is
ample support for the trial court’s conclusion that Father will not attain the
skills necessary to parent Child within a reasonable period of time, and that
requiring further reunification efforts would only serve to delay permanency
for Child. Father is minimally compliant with the objectives set forth by CYS.
Specifically, as previously discussed, Ms. Hernandez testified that Father is
consistently late for visits or fails to confirm his appointments; has not
verified his employment or provided CYS with a work schedule; has not
secured stable housing; and has failed to complete anger management and
parenting classes. Finally, Child is well-bonded to her foster family. Child’s
foster family meets all of her needs, and she is thriving in their care.
Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
changing Child’s permanency goal to adoption. The record confirms that
Father has made no progress since Child entered foster care and has
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actually regressed in his parenting abilities. Moreover, Child entered foster
care several days after her birth and has not resided with Father for any
significant period of time. Child is bonded with her foster family and is
thriving in their care. As this Court has explained in the context of
involuntary termination of parental rights proceedings, “a child’s life cannot
be held in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity
necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will
not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a
parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of
R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006). Accordingly, we discern no
abuse of the trial court’s discretion in its conclusion that a change in Child’s
permanency goal to adoption is in the best interest of Child. In Interest
of: L.Z., A Minor Child, 111 A.3d 1164, 1174 (Pa. 2015).
Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/6/2017
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