Com. v. Cannon, R.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
RICK LAVAR CANNON :
:
Appellant : No. 855 MDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 9, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-38-CR-0000559-2014
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: DECEMBER 20, 2022
Appellant, Rick Lavar Cannon, appeals from the order entered in the
Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County dismissing his second petition filed
pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-
9546. In addition, appointed PCRA counsel has filed with this Court a petition
to withdraw his representation, as well as an accompanying brief pursuant to
Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 (1988), and
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc).
Because the PCRA court failed to issue notice of its intent to dismiss pursuant
to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1), and Appellant has objected, we vacate and remand.
Further, we deny counsel’s petition to withdraw.
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: On March 14,
2014, Appellant and his two co-conspirators robbed and shot two victims, one
of whom later died as a result of his wounds. Following a high-speed chase
from the police, Appellant was apprehended while in possession of cocaine
and firearms. The Commonwealth charged Appellant with numerous crimes,
including homicide.
On July 2, 2015, Appellant, who was represented by counsel, entered a
negotiated guilty plea as follows: “The plea deal is for 50 to 100 years in
prison, and he must cooperate as necessary with the District Attorney’s Office
regarding the two codefendants….” N.T., 7/2/15, at 3. Furthermore, Appellant
agreed that the plea was irrevocable. Id. at 12.
On August 26, 2015, Appellant appeared for his sentencing hearing, and
he made an oral motion to withdraw his plea. The trial court denied the motion
and sentenced Appellant pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement. N.T.,
8/26/15, at 5. Specifically, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 50 to 100
years in prison, as well as imposed fines. Appellant filed a timely direct appeal
wherein he presented the sole issue of whether he should have been permitted
to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing.
On June 5, 2017, finding no merit to Appellant’s claim, this Court
affirmed his judgment of sentence. See Commonwealth v. Cannon, No.
1680 MDA 2015, 2017 WL 2423120 (Pa.Super. filed 6/5/17) (unpublished
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memorandum). Appellant filed a timely petition for allowance of appeal, which
our Supreme Court denied on May 30, 2018. Appellant did not file a petition
for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.
On July 27, 2018, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition, and
counsel was appointed to represent him. On October 7, 2020, and November
12, 2020, counsel filed amended petitions on behalf of Appellant. The PCRA
court denied Appellant’s first PCRA petition, and he filed a timely, counseled
appeal to this Court.1 On August 13, 2021, this Court affirmed the PCRA
court’s order denying Appellant’s first PCRA petition. See Commonwealth
v. Cannon, 97 MDA 2021, 2021 WL 3579173 (Pa.Super. filed 8/13/21)
(unpublished memorandum).
On or about March 3, 2022, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition, and
counsel was appointed to represent him. On April 19, 2022, the
Commonwealth filed a response to Appellant’s PCRA petition. Without either
a hearing or Rule 907 notice, on May 9, 2022, the PCRA court entered an order
dismissing Appellant’s second PCRA petition. Specifically, the PCRA court
reasoned that Appellant’s PCRA petition was untimely filed and not subject to
any of the timeliness exceptions.
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1 On appeal, Appellant claimed his trial counsel was ineffective in advising him
to enter a nonrevocable guilty plea and failing to present Appellant’s polygraph
results to the prosecutor and lower court. Further, Appellant argued the lower
court erred in allowing him to enter his guilty plea and in imposing fines
without considering his financial resources.
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On June 3, 2022, Appellant filed a counseled notice of appeal to this
Court. The PCRA court directed Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement, and Appellant timely complied. Therein, Appellant averred, inter
alia, that the PCRA court erred in dismissing his PCRA petition without
providing him with notice of the court’s intent to dismiss as required by Rule
907. On August 30, 2022, PCRA counsel filed in this Court a petition for leave
to withdraw as counsel, as well as a supporting brief.
Prior to addressing the merits of Appellant’s claims on appeal, we must
first decide whether counsel has fulfilled the procedural requirements for
withdrawing his representation. Commonwealth v. Daniels, 947 A.2d 795,
797 (Pa.Super. 2008). This Court has listed the conditions counsel must meet
in seeking to withdraw in a collateral appeal as follows:
Counsel petitioning to withdraw from PCRA representation must
proceed...under [Turner, supra and Finley, supra and]...must
review the case zealously. Turner/Finley counsel must then
submit a no-merit letter to the trial court, or brief on appeal to
this Court, detailing the nature and extent of counsel’s diligent
review of the case, listing the issues which petitioner wants to
have reviewed, explaining why and how those issues lack merit,
and requesting permission to withdraw. Counsel must also send
to the petitioner: (1) a copy of the “no merit” letter/brief; (2) a
copy of counsel’s petition to withdraw; and (3) a statement
advising petitioner of the right to proceed pro se or by new
counsel.
***
[W]here counsel submits a petition and no-merit letter
that...satisfy the technical demands of Turner/Finley, the
court—trial court or this Court—must then conduct its own review
of the merits of the case. If the court agrees with counsel that
the claims are without merit, the court will permit counsel to
withdraw and deny relief.
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Commonwealth v. Doty, 48 A.3d 451, 454 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation
omitted).
Herein, PCRA counsel indicates he communicated with Appellant
concerning the instant appeal, independently and conscientiously reviewed
the record, conducted legal research, and ultimately concluded that the appeal
is wholly frivolous. Counsel also lists in the brief the issues Appellant wishes
to raise and explains why, in his view, Appellant is not entitled to relief.
In addition, PCRA counsel has attached to his petition to withdraw a
copy of the letter he sent to Appellant wherein counsel advised Appellant of
his right to proceed pro se or through private counsel. Counsel also affixed a
copy of his petition to withdraw and brief to the letter.2 Thus, we conclude
that PCRA counsel has substantially complied with the procedural
requirements of Turner and Finley. Therefore, we must proceed with an
independent review of this case. Doty, supra.On appeal, in the Turner/Finley brief, counsel sets forth the following
issues: (1) Whether the PCRA court erred in dismissing Appellant’s petition on
____________________________________________
2 In the Turner/Finley brief, counsel indicated that Appellant could proceed
pro se or with private counsel “[s]hould the Superior Court grant [counsel’s]
Application to Withdraw[.]” Turner/Finley Brief, filed 8/30/22, at 5. By order
entered on September 30, 2022, this Court directed counsel to provide
Appellant with a letter advising him of his immediate right to proceed pro se
or with private counsel. Counsel complied and provided this Court with a copy
of the revised letter on October 12, 2022.
We note Appellant has filed neither a pro se brief nor a brief with
privately retained counsel.
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the basis it was untimely filed; (2) Whether the PCRA court properly dismissed
Appellant’s petition without holding a hearing or providing notice under
Pa.R.Crim.P. 907; (3) Whether the PCRA court properly dismissed Appellant’s
petition on the basis it lacked merit.
Initially, we note “[o]ur standard of review for issues arising from the
denial of PCRA relief is well-settled. We must determine whether the PCRA
court’s ruling is supported by the record and free of legal
error.” Commonwealth v. Hand, 252 A.3d 1159, 1165 (Pa.Super.
2021) (citation omitted).
Here, we find Appellant’s second issue to be dispositive. Appellant
alleges the PCRA court erred in dismissing his PCRA petition without first
serving him with Rule 907 notice. In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the PCRA
court agrees that it did not provide notice of its intent to dismiss under Rule
907(1). PCRA Court Opinion, filed 6/30/22, at 3. However, the PCRA court
suggests that it was within its discretion to not provide such notice since it
deemed Appellant’s PCRA petition to be untimely. See id.In the Turner/Finley brief, PCRA counsel agrees with the PCRA court’s
analysis. Specifically, PCRA counsel indicates that “[w]hile the trial court did
not provide notice of intent to dismiss [Appellant’s] petition under Rule 907,
it was within [the trial court’s] discretion to not provide such notice.
Accordingly, this claim is without merit.” Turner/Finley Brief, filed 8/30/22,
at 3. Upon our independent review, we disagree.
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Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1) provides the following:
(1) [T]he judge shall promptly review the petition, any answer by
the attorney for the Commonwealth, and other matters of record
relating to the defendant’s claim(s). If the judge is satisfied from
this review that there are no genuine issues concerning any
material fact and that the defendant is not entitled to post-
conviction collateral relief, and no purpose would be served by any
further proceedings, the judge shall give notice to the parties
of the intention to dismiss the petition and shall state in the
notice the reasons for the dismissal. The defendant may respond
to the proposed dismissal within 20 days of the date of the notice.
The judge thereafter shall order the petition dismissed, grant
leave to file an amended petition, or direct that the proceedings
continue.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1) (bold added).
This Court has held that the notice requirement of Rule 907(1) is
mandatory. See Commonwealth v. Vo, 235 A.3d 365, 372 (Pa.Super.
2020). Thus, the PCRA court’s non-compliance with Rule 907(1) requires
vacatur of the order of dismissal, unless the petitioner waives the claim by
failing to raise it on appeal. See id.; Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d
462, 468 (Pa.Super. 2013). Here, as indicated supra, Appellant raised the
issue of the PCRA court’s non-compliance with Rule 907(1) in his Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) statement, and counsel raised the issue in the Turner/Finley brief.
As this Court has explained:
[T]he purpose of Rule 907 pre-dismissal notice is to allow a
petitioner an opportunity to seek leave to amend his petition and
correct any material defects, the ultimate goal being to permit
merits review by the PCRA court of potentially arguable claims.
The response to the Rule 907 notice is an opportunity for a
petitioner and/or his counsel to object to the dismissal and alert
the PCRA court of a perceived error, permitting the court to
discern the potential for amendment. The response is also the
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opportunity for the petitioner to object to counsel’s effectiveness
at the PCRA level. When a PCRA court properly issues Rule 907
notice in compliance with the rules of criminal procedure, an
appellant is deemed to have sufficient notice of dismissal.
Vo, 235 A.3d at 372 (citations, quotations, emphasis, and brackets omitted).
Here, there is no dispute the PCRA court failed to comply with Rule
907(1)’s notice requirement, and Appellant has objected. Accordingly, we
vacate the order dismissing Appellant’s second PCRA petition. See Vo, supra.
We remand for the PCRA court, if it intends to dismiss Appellant’s petition
without a hearing, to properly issue Rule 907(1) notice. See id. If the PCRA
court issues notice, Appellant, upon receipt, “may respond to the proposed
dismissal within 20 days of the date of the notice,” as provided in Rule 907(1).
Id. at 372-73.
Petition to withdraw denied. Order vacated. Case remanded with
instructions. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/20/2022
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