Myron R. Haydt Development v. 1691 Bethlehem Pike

J-A28040-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
MYRON R. HAYDT DEVELOPMENT, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
INC. : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
v. :
:
:
1691 BETHLEHEM PIKE LP :
: No. 188 EDA 2017
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment Entered December 16, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s): No.
2014-80163
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and DUBOW, J.
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 09, 2018
Appellant, 1691 Bethlehem Pike LP, appeals from the December 16,
2016 Judgment entered in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas in favor
of Appellee, Myron R. Haydt Development, Inc., in accordance with a verdict
rendered after a non-jury trial. After careful review, we affirm.
Appellant, a strip mall owner, and Appellee, a contractor, entered into
a written construction contract.1 The construction contract provided that
Appellee would perform façade renovation and site improvement services at
Appellant’s strip mall located in Hatfield Township, Montgomery County, at a
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1 Appellant’s general partner, Scott Hartzell, and Appellee’s principal, Myron
R. Haydt, signed the contract on behalf of their respective businesses.
Although they are not individually named as parties, to facilitate our
discussion we herein refer to them as Appellant and Appellee, respectively.
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cost of $573,000, to be paid by Appellant. The contract included, inter alia,
a “no oral modifications” clause. It also initially provided 120 days for
completion of the project2 and that Appellee would not receive final payment
until it delivered subcontractor lien waivers to Appellant.
It is undisputed that Appellee did not complete work on the project
because Appellant asked it to leave the job site. However, at the time
Appellant terminated Appellee, Appellee had substantially completed work
on the underlying contract and only minor punch-list tasks remained
unfinished.
Following Appellee’s termination, Appellee demanded payment from
Appellant, but Appellant refused to pay. Thus, on October 29, 2014,
Appellee filed a Mechanics’ Lien claim. Further, on December 11, 2014,
Appellee filed a Complaint against Appellant, raising two claims: violation of
the Contractor and Subcontractor Payment Act (“CSPA”), 73 P.S. § 501 et
seq., and Breach of Contract.
On December 19, 2014, Appellant filed an Answer and New Matter and
Counterclaim. Appellee filed an Answer to Appellant’s New Matter and
Counterclaim on January 7, 2015.
The court held a bench trial on June 29, 2016, and June 30, 2016.
The trial court made extensive findings of fact in its Opinion, which we adopt
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2 The parties later agreed in writing to extend this deadline.
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herein. See Trial Ct. Op., 12/13/16, at 1-8 (unpaginated). We summarize
the following germane evidence and findings of fact.
Initially, the contract between the parties provided that Appellee would
use wood for framing. However, when the Township reviewed the
renovation plans, it indicated that it preferred Appellee to use steel instead
of wood. Id. at 25. The parties thereafter had many discussions regarding
the design change from wood to steel and, in reliance on Appellant’s oral
representations, Appellee executed the revised design. Id. at ¶¶ 32, 36.
The court specifically found that Appellant told Appellee after the parties
signed the contract that Appellant would pay Appellee for the design change
at the end of the project. Id. at ¶ 39. Moreover, Appellant assured
Appellee that Appellant “would make good on his promise to pay[.]” Id.
The trial court found that, notwithstanding that the parties’ contract
required change orders to be in writing, the parties agreed orally to change
the plans from wood to steel. Id. at ¶¶ 28, 30-32.3
Further, the court found credible testimony that Appellee had informed
Appellant that the cost of the change in materials from wood to steel was
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3 At trial, Appellee had testified regarding other terms in the original contract
that the parties either agreed orally to modify or remove. For example, the
contract originally provided for the installation of two sidewalk curb ramps,
but ultimately, pursuant to the parties’ oral agreement, Appellee installed
four sidewalk curb ramps. N.T., 6/29/16, at 65-66. Likewise, although
required by the contract, pursuant to a subsequent design change and oral
agreement, Appellee did not install a drive-through window and two patios.
Id. at 67-70.
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“only slightly more expensive,” but the labor cost change was “extremely
expensive,” and that using steel extended the time the project would take to
complete. Id. at 45, 46. The trial court found that the increase in cost as a
result of the change from wood to steel construction totaled $28,047. Id. at
¶ 49.
The trial court also found that “[Appellee] had every subcontractor
sign a writing confirming that they had been paid in full,” and that Appellee
had provided Appellant with all of the subcontractors’ signed writings. Id. at
74.
Following the trial,4 on July 20, 2016, the court entered a verdict for
Appellee in the amount of $107,145.00.5 On July 28, 2016, Appellant filed a
Post-Trial Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (“JNOV”). In its
Motion, Appellant: (1) challenged the court’s conclusion that Appellee’s claim
satisfied the requirements of the CSPA; (2) challenged the court’s conclusion
that Appellee presented “clear, precise and convincing” evidence that the
parties mutually agreed to waive the no-oral-modifications clause in their
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4 At the close of Appellee’s case-in-chief, Appellant did not move for a non-
suit pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. No. 226, or a directed verdict pursuant to
Pa.R.C.P. No. 227.1.
5 The verdict is comprised of two parts: $79,098.00 due under the base
contract and $28,047.00 due for the steel frame labor. Appellee prevailed
on both his Breach of Contract claim and his CSPA claim, although the trial
court did not award Appellee statutory damages under the CSPA for the
reasons explained infra. See n.6.
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contract; (3) alleged that the court erred in not performing a full cost
accounting of the project; and (4) alleged that the court erred in not limiting
Appellee’s damages to the project cost set forth in the written contract.
Post-Trial Motion, 7/28/16, at 9, 16, 20-21, 28, 34. The trial court denied
the Motion for JNOV on December 13, 2016, and entered Judgment in
Appellee’s favor on December 16, 2016.6 This timely appeal followed.
Appellant raises the following three issues on appeal:
1. When a [p]laintiff’s claim is based on an alleged oral
amendment to a written contract [that] prohibits them, the
[p]laintiff offers inconsistent evidence of an agreement to
waive this prohibition, and only uncorroborated testimony of
specific terms of the alleged amendment, has that party failed
to meet the applicable “clear, precise and convincing”
standard of proof?
2. When an assessment of damages is premised upon an
interpretation of a written agreement that omits and
effectively annuls portions of the agreement, should the
assessment be remanded to the trial court for further
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6 The court entered Judgment in the same amount as the verdict because it
denied Appellee’s request for statutory damages, interest, and attorney’s
fees under the CSPA based on its finding that Appellant “did not withhold
payment in bad faith, and [Appellee] did not ‘substantially prevail’ in the
matter.” Trial Ct. Op. at 11 (unpaginated). See 73 P.S. § 512(a) (“An
amount shall not be deemed to have been wrongfully withheld to the extent
it bears a reasonable relation to the value of any claim held in good faith by
the owner, contractor or subcontractor against whom the contractor or
subcontractor is seeking to recover payment.”); Waller Corp. v. Warren
Plaza, Inc., 95 A.3d 313, 319 (Pa. Super. 2014) (a “substantially prevailing
party” is one who recovers all compensatory damages in the suit.);
Zimmerman v. Harrisburg Fudd I, L.P., 984 A.2d 497, 503 (Pa. Super.
2002) (a party may also substantially prevail if it recovers all damages
claimed and the opposing party withheld payment in bad faith).
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proceedings in which effect is given to the omitted cost
accounting requirements?
3. Even assuming a contractor’s valid common law breach of
contract claim, when a contractor’s claim does not comport
with the strict requirements of the [CSPA], and the owner has
proven a complete defense to the statutory claim, should
judgment be entered in favor of [the] owner?
Appellant’s Brief at 2.
This Court will only reverse a trial court’s denial of Judgment N.O.V. if
the trial court committed an error of law that controlled the case or, if the
court, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict-
winner and giving the verdict-winner the benefit of all inferences, abused its
discretion:
Appellate review of a denial of JNOV is quite narrow. We may
reverse only in the event the trial court abused its discretion or
committed an error of law that controlled the outcome of the
case. Abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court renders a
judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious; that fails to apply the law; or that is motivated by
partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will. When reviewing an appeal
from the denial of a request for JNOV, the appellate court must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict-
winner and give him or her the benefit of every reasonable
inference arising therefrom while rejecting all unfavorable
testimony and inferences. . . . Thus, the grant of JNOV should
only be entered in a clear case and any doubts must be resolved
in favor of the verdict-winner[.]
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. 69th Street Retail Mall, L.P., 126 A.3d 959,
967 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
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Appellant’s first and second issues implicate the sufficiency of
Appellee’s evidence at trial.7 Specifically, Appellant first argues that
Appellee produced “no . . . evidence of a waiver [of] the ‘no oral
modifications’ term[]” and, thus, Appellee’s “allegation of the existence of an
oral agreement at or near the commencement of the project . . . fails to
meet the ‘clear, precise, and convincing’ standard of proof as a matter of
law.” Appellant’s Brief at 12-13, citing Gloeckner v. School District of
Baldwin Twp., 175 A.2d 73, 75 (Pa. 1961). Appellant avers in its second
issue that Appellee did not offer any evidence of “any alleged amendment to
Article 16 generally, or specifically to § 16.2 of the Agreement[,]” and, thus,
the court must conduct a full cost accounting of the Project.8 Appellant’s
Brief at 16.
Before addressing the merits of Appellant’s sufficiency claim, we first
consider whether Appellant has preserved it. Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. No.
227.1, “after trial and upon the written Motion for Post–Trial Relief,” a trial
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7 Appellant attempts to frame his second issue as a challenge to the court’s
interpretation of the parties’ contract, but bases his argument on an
assumption that Appellee presented insufficient evidence to show their
agreement to permit oral modifications to the contract.
8 Article 16, “Termination of the Contract,” sets forth the circumstances
under which either party may terminate their Agreement. Agreement,
undated, at 9-10. Article 16.2.2 provides that, when any of the
circumstances giving rise to termination for cause, pursuant to Article 16.2,
exists, Appellant may “take possession of the site and of all materials
thereon owned by [Appellee], and finish the [w]ork by whatever reasonable
method [Appellant] may deem expedient.” Id. at § 16.2.2.
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court may, inter alia, “direct the entry of [J]udgment in favor of any
party[.]” Pa.R.C.P. No. 227.1(a)(2). However, a trial court may only grant
such relief if the “grounds therefor ... were raised in pre-trial proceedings or
by motion, objection, point for charge, request for findings of fact or
conclusions of law, offer of proof or other appropriate method at trial.”
Pa.R.C.P. No. 227.1(b)(1) (emphasis added). In order to preserve a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, a defendant is required, at the
close of the plaintiff’s case, to move for a nonsuit or a directed verdict on the
basis that the plaintiff has not established a right to relief. Haan v. Wells,
103 A.3d 60, 67 (Pa. Super. 2014). Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. No. 226, “[a]t
the close of all the evidence, the trial judge may direct a verdict upon
the oral or written motion of any party.” Pa.R.C.P. No 226(b) (emphasis
added). The failure to make such a motion waives an appellant’s sufficiency
challenge. See Haan, 103 A.3d at 67 (citing, Bennyhoff v. Pappert, 790
A.2d 313, 317 (Pa. Super. 2001)).
Our review of the record reveals that Appellant did not file a Motion for
a Directed Verdict or Nonsuit at trial raising any challenges to the sufficiency
of Appellee’s evidence.9 As a result, Appellant waived his sufficiency
claims.10, 11
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9 To the extent that Appellant’s claims challenge the weight given to the
testimony, we decline to disturb the trial court’s credibility determinations.
Karch v. Karch, 885 A.2d 535, 537 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted)
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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In its final issue, Appellant claims that, because the trial court found
that Appellant had withheld payment in “good faith,” the trial court erred in
finding Appellee entitled to any payment under the CSPA. Appellant’s Brief
at 18. Appellant argues that “good faith withholding” is a complete statutory
defense to a CSPA claim. Id. Appellant has not developed this argument,
nor has he cited any statutory authority case law in support of this assertion.
It is long-settled that failure to argue and to cite any authority
supporting an argument constitutes a waiver of the issue on appeal. Jones
v. Jones, 878 A.2d 86, 90 (Pa. Super. 2005). This Court will not act as
counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant. Bombar
v. West American Insurance Company, 932 A.2d 78, 93 (Pa. Super.
2007). When deficiencies in a brief hinder our ability to conduct meaningful
appellate review, we can dismiss the appeal entirely or find certain issues to
(Footnote Continued) _______________________
(”This [C]ourt defers to the credibility determinations of the trial court as to
witnesses who appeared before it.”).
10 Because Appellant waived these issues, we affirm the trial court’s
determination that the parties agreed to permit oral modifications of the
terms of the Agreement. Accordingly, Appellant’s issue as it pertains to the
court’s accounting also fails because the success of this claim was contingent
upon this Court concluding that the trial court erred in finding that the
parties did not orally modify their Agreement.
11Even if Appellant had not waived this issue, it would not merit relief. Our
review of the record indicates that the trial court’s findings of fact amply
support its conclusion that Appellee presented sufficient evidence of the
parties’ intent to waive the “no oral modifications” clause in their contract.
See Trial Ct. Op., at 12-14 (unpaginated).
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be waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101. Because Appellant has failed to develop
this issue, he waived it.12 See id. See also Bombar, supra at 95; Jones,
supra at 90.
Judgment affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/9/18
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12 Moreover, even if Appellant had not waived this issue, it would not be
entitled to relief. In this issue, Appellant mischaracterizes the “good faith
withholding” exception in the CSPA. Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, the
“good faith withholding” exception set forth in 73 P.S. § 512(a), does not
extinguish a plaintiff’s right to payment under the terms of the contract;
rather it insulates a defendant only from the imposition of statutory
damages. See Zimmerman, 784 A.2d at 502.
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