Tomlinson-Ridgway, W. v. Ridgway, R.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
WENDY TOMLINSON-RIDGWAY : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
ROBERT GREGG RIDGWAY, : No. 547 MDA 2017
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Decree Entered March 9, 2017,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County
Civil Division at No. 2011-03676
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 28, 2017
Robert Gregg Ridgway (“Husband”) appeals from the March 9, 2017
decree entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County
following entry of the trial court’s order denying Husband’s petition for
declaratory judgment pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3306 and the trial court’s
order granting the petition to bifurcate divorce and economic claims filed by
Wendy Tomlinson-Ridgway (“Wife”). We affirm.
The record reflects that Wife filed a counseled complaint in divorce on
April 15, 2011, that alleged, among other things, that the parties married on
January 1, 1991. The complaint included a claim for alimony pendente lite
(“APL”). On April 20, 2011, the trial court entered an order directing the
parties and their respective counsel to appear on May 17, 2011, for a
conference regarding APL. On May 2, 2011, Husband accepted service of
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the complaint through his counsel. On May 26, 2011, the trial court entered
an order that APL would become final 20 days after mailing of the notice
unless either party filed a written demand with the prothonotary. (Order of
court, 5/26/11.) Neither party filed a written demand. We further note that
Husband never filed an answer to the complaint. Litigation ensued for more
than four years when, on October 29, 2015, Husband filed a petition for
declaratory judgment pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3306 seeking a declaration
of the invalidity of the parties’ common-law marriage. (Husband’s petition
for declaratory judgment pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3306, 10/29/15.) The
trial court denied Husband’s petition and thereafter denied Husband’s
request for reconsideration, as well as Husband’s subsequent request for a
hearing on the matter. Litigation then continued.
On June 3, 2016, Wife filed a petition to bifurcate divorce and
economic claims. Husband filed an answer alleging, among other things,
that the parties were never married. On August 18, 2016, the trial court
granted Wife’s bifurcation petition. More litigation ensued. On March 9,
2017, the trial court entered a divorce decree. Husband filed a timely notice
of appeal and, absent court order, a “statement of matters complained of on
appeal.” The trial court then filed an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)
opining that Husband’s claims were precluded by judicial estoppel.
Husband raises the following issues for our review:
[1.] Whether it was an abuse of discretion and/or
error of law to deny [Husband’s] petition for
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declaratory judgment without establishing a
record as to whether the parties ever entered
into a valid common law marriage?
[2.] Whether it was an abuse of discretion and/or
error of law to grant [Wife’s] petition for
bifurcation without establishing a record as to
whether the facts supported bifurcation?
Appellant’s brief at 4 (capitalization omitted).
“Our standard of review is to determine whether the trial court abused
its discretion.” Bienert v. Bienert, 168 A.3d 248, 253 (Pa.Super. 2017)
(citations omitted). “A finding of abuse of discretion ‘requires proof of more
than a mere error in judgment, but rather evidence that the law was
misapplied or overridden, or that the judgment was manifestly unreasonable
or based on bias, ill will, prejudice or partiality.’” Id. (citation omitted).
In Bienert, we recently explained the doctrine of judicial estoppel.
Under this doctrine, “a party to an action is estopped
from assuming a position inconsistent with his or her
assertion in a previous action, if his or her contention
was successfully maintained.” Black v. Labor
Ready, Inc., 995 A.2d 875, 878 (Pa.Super. 2010)
(citation omitted). Judicial estoppel “appl[ies] with
equal if not greater force when a party switches
positions within the same action.” Ligon v.
Middletown Area Sch. Dist., 584 A.2d 376, 380
(Pa.Cmwlth. 1990). The purpose of judicial estoppel
is “to uphold the integrity of the courts by preventing
parties from abusing the judicial process by changing
positions as the moment requires.” Gross v. City of
Pittsburgh, 686 A.2d 864, 867 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1996).
Id. at 255 (parallel citations and footnote omitted; brackets in original).
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In Bienert, wife appealed from the final divorce decree, specifically
challenging the order denying a petition that she filed to void the marital
property agreement (“MPA”) that she signed with her husband just before
the parties filed for divorce. (Id. at 250.) Approximately one week after
signing the MPA, husband filed a complaint in divorce, and the parties
simultaneously filed the MPA and requested that the trial court incorporate it
into the final divorce decree. Through counsel, wife filed a petition for APL
contending that the MPA did not bar her from receiving APL. Husband
maintained that the MPA was a complete and final settlement of the parties’
rights and obligations and wife was, therefore, barred from receiving APL.
Up to this point in the litigation, wife never challenged the validity of the
parties’ MPA. (Id.)
The trial court then denied wife’s petition for APL, wife’s counsel
withdrew his representation, and wife began to represent herself. (Id.)
Wife filed various petitions to enforce the MPA with respect to property
distribution. (Id. at 250-251.) Husband then filed a contempt petition
claiming that wife violated the MPA by failing to remove certain property
from the marital residence and by failing to effectuate a title transfer to
husband. (Id. at 251.) In response to the contempt petition, wife claimed
for the first time during the litigation that she was under duress when she
signed the MPA. Thereafter, wife attempted to void the terms of the MPA on
grounds of mistake, misrepresentation, or duress. The trial court held that it
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was too late for wife to challenge the MPA because it had already based
decisions in the case on the MPA, the validity of which had not been
previously challenged. (Id. at 252.)
Wife then retained new counsel and filed a petition to void the MPA
alleging that husband used duress, misrepresentation, and fraud to induce
her to execute the MPA. (Id.) The trial court denied the petition without a
hearing and found the MPA valid and enforceable. (Id. at 253.) The trial
court then entered a final divorce decree. Wife filed an appeal to this court
claiming that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her petition to
void the MPA without an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, this court found no
abuse of discretion due to the inconsistent positions wife had taken
regarding the validity of the MPA through the divorce litigation. (Id. at 255-
256.) This court also rejected wife’s argument that a hearing on the validity
of the MPA was required because wife could have raised the MPA’s validity in
earlier proceedings. (Id. at 256.)
Bienert is on-point and controls the outcome of this appeal. Like
wife’s failure to challenge the validity of the MPA in that case early on in the
proceedings, Husband never challenged the validity of the parties’
common-law marriage until four and one-half years into the litigation.
Husband never raised this challenge in answer to the divorce complaint.
Husband never filed a written demand in response to the trial court’s order
regarding APL. Husband never raised the challenge in any modification of
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APL order that he filed. Additionally, Husband never raised it during the
proceedings related to distribution of the marital assets. Consequently,
Husband is judicially estopped from changing positions now and challenging
the validity of the parties’ common-law marriage. See Bienert, 168 A.3d
248. Finally, Husband grounds his claim that the trial court abused its
discretion by granting Wife’s bifurcation petition without a hearing on his
challenge to the validity of the parties’ common-law marriage. Once again,
because Husband is judicially estopped from contesting the validity of the
marriage now, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Husband
a hearing.
Decree affirmed.
Shogan, J. joins this Memorandum.
Gantman, P.J. concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/28/2017
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