Berthold, D. v. Berthold, K.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
DOUGLAS BERTHOLD, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
KELLY BERTHOLD,
Appellee No. 489 WDA 2017
Appeal from the Order March 3, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Family Court at No(s): FD-15-008544-008
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED JANUARY 3, 2018
Douglas Berthold (Father) appeals from the March 3, 2017 order that
dismissed his exceptions to the hearing officer’s recommendations and made
the temporary order of child support, dated October 7, 2016, a final order of
court. After review, we vacate in part and affirm in part.
The trial court provided the following factual and procedural history of
this matter, stating:
[Father and Kelly Berthold (Mother)] were still married at the
time of the October 3, 2016 hearing before the hearing officer.
The Parties have two children, 7 and 10 years old. Custody of
the younger Child is shared, while Father has primary custody of
the eldest Child. Father resides in the marital home.
On November 2, 2015, Father filed for child support and alimony
pendent lite (APL). At the time, the Parties shared custody of
their two boys. A Support Order was entered by consent at that
time, with Mother paying $894.00 per month, $400.00 of which
was APL. In May of 2016, by way of another consent order,
Father assumed sole physical custody of the older son, with
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custody of the younger boy remaining shared. In July of 2016,
Father filed for a modification of support as a result of this new
custody arrangement as well as his claim that he had to reduce
his employment hours, and consequently his income, due to the
change in custody.
Evidence was presented that Father, who had worked full time
for his family’s business for the past 20 years, had recently
reduced his hours from over 40 to only 30 hours per week. He
also testified that he had historically received bonuses of
between $10,000.00 and [$]20,000.00 per year but would now
not be entitled to a bonus due to his reduced work schedule.
Ultimately, the hearing officer determined that Father’s schedule
reduction at his father’s business was “suspect” and she held
Father to his previous income. She denied Father’s request for a
mortgage deviation. After holding Father to his previous income
and bonus income, and making all appropriate income and
expense adjustments, the Hearing Officer found the parties’
incomes to be substantially similar, making APL inappropriate.
She recommended a monthly child support obligation of $365.93
per month, plus arrears.
Father filed nine exceptions[,] which [the court] dismissed on
March 3, 2017 after argument. Father filed a timely appeal and,
in response to [the court’s] April 5, 2017 Order, filed a Concise
Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 6/9/17, at 1-2.
Now, on appeal, Father raises two issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by calculating
Appellee/Mother’s child support obligation pursuant to a
shared support calculation where the parties have two
children and Appellant/Father has sole custody of one of the
children?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in calculating
Appellee/Mother’s child support obligation by failing to award
Appellant/Father a mortgage deviation?
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Father’s brief at 4.1
Initially, we note that when reviewing a child support order, we are
guided by the following well-settled standard:
“When evaluating a support order, this Court may only reverse
the trial court’s determination where the order cannot be
sustained on any valid ground.” Calabrese v. Calabrese, 452
Pa. Super. 497, 682 A.2d 393, 395 (1996). We will not interfere
with the broad discretion afforded the trial court absent an abuse
of the discretion or insufficient evidence to sustain the support
order. Id. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of
judgment; if, in reaching a conclusion, the court overrides or
misapplies the law, or the judgment exercised is shown by the
record to be either manifestly unreasonable or the product of
partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, discretion has been abused.
Depp v. Holland, 431 Pa. Super. 209, 636 A.2d 204, 205-06
(1994). See also Funk v. Funk, 376 Pa. Super. 76, 545 A.2d
326, 329 (1988). In addition, we note that the duty to support
one’s child is absolute, and the purpose of child support is to
promote the child’s best interests. Depp, 636 A.2d at 206.
McClain v. McClain, 872 A.2d 856, 860 (Pa. Super. 2005) (quoting Samii
v. Samii, 847 A.2d 691, 694 (Pa. Super. 2004)).
In regard to his first issue, Father argues that the trial court erred
when it calculated Mother’s support obligation for their two children, in that
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1 We note that in addition to its discussion relating to the two issues Father
has raised in his appeal to this Court, the trial court also discussed its
determination that Father was held to his prior salary and bonus income,
i.e., his earning capacity - not his actual reduced income; that Mother’s
gross yearly income should not include a projected salary raise that she had
not yet received; and that the parties’ incomes were substantially equal,
making spousal support inappropriate.
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Father has sole custody of the older child. Specifically, he contends that the
court did not comply with Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-4(d)(2), which states:
(2) Varied Partial or Shared Custodial Schedules. When the
parties have more than one child and each child spends either
(a) different amounts of partial or shared custodial time with the
party with the higher income or (b) different amounts of partial
custodial time with the party with the lower income, the trier of
fact shall add the percentage of time each child spends with that
party and divide by the number of children to determine the
party’s percentage of custodial time. If the average percentage
of custodial time the children spend with the party is 40% or
more, the provisions of subdivision (c) apply.
Essentially, Father argues that pursuant to Rule 1910.16-4(d)(2),
Mother’s support obligation should be “calculated pursuant to the sole child
support guideline because her percentage of time with the children … is
25%: 50% for [younger child] + 0% for [older child] = 50% / 2 = 25%[.]”
Father’s brief at 11-12. In other words, Father asserts the court should
have calculated Mother’s support obligation based on Father’s having
custody of both children because Mother’s percentage of custodial time is
less than 40%, i.e., he claims that the support obligation was erroneous
because it was based on a shared 50/50 custody of both children. Id. at 12.
To further emphasize this point, Father contends that Mother’s support
obligation of $365.93 per month was arrived at by applying “a shared
custody deviation as well as an equalization of incomes, both of which fall
within Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-4(c)(2) regarding substantial or shared physical
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custody[,]” which is not the situation here. Id. at 12-13 (footnote
omitted).2 Father then sets forth charts, calculating the child support
obligation arrived at under both Rule (d)(2) and Rule (c)(2), contending that
pursuant to subsection (d)(2) he would be entitled to $956.74 per month
and under subsection (c)(2) he would only receive $365.93 per month,
which is the amount awarded to him.
The trial court explained the basis for its determination of Mother’s
support obligation as follows:
Father contends … that the hearing officer did not properly
adhere to Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-4(d)(2) regarding varying custodial
times in reaching her recommended obligation. The rule states:
“When the parties have more than one child and each child
spends different amounts of partial or shared custodial time with
the obligor, the trier of fact shall add the percentage of time
each child spends with the obligor and divide the number of
children to determine the obligor’s percentage of custodial time.
If the average percentage of time the children spend with the
obligor is 40% or more, the provisions of subdivision (c) above
apply.”
The Hearing Summary states: “Calculation includes the cost to
[Mother] for medical insurance for [Father] and the children, the
mortgage expense on the marital residence, and shared custody
of [younger child].” There is no indication that Mother was given
a deviation for shared custody. To the contrary, it indicates only
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2 Rule 1910.16-4(c)(2) states in pertinent part:
If the parties share custody equally and the support calculation
results in the obligee receiving a larger share of the parties’
combined income, then the court shall adjust the support
obligation so that the combined monthly net income is allocated
equally between the two households. In those cases, spousal
support or alimony pendent lite shall not be awarded.
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that the hearing officer considered that only custody of one child
was shared when making her calculation.
TCO at 4 (footnote omitted).
Before we respond to Father’s issues, we note that the certified record
does not contain a transcript; nor does it contain the hearing officer’s
decision. However, both the transcript of the hearing before the hearing
officer and the resulting order are contained in the reproduced record. “It is
well-established in this Commonwealth that it is ‘the appellant’s
responsibility to order the transcript required and ascertain its presence in
the record prior to certification for appeal.’” Commonwealth v. O’Black,
897 A.2d 1234, 1238 (Pa. Super. 2006). Nevertheless, because the
transcript and the hearing officer’s recommendation are contained in the
reproduced record and have not been disputed, we may consider them. See
Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 1139, 1145 n.4 (Pa. 2012).
We recognize that the trial court relied upon the hearing officer’s
recommendation to arrive at the amount of the support due.3 However, the
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3 The hearing officer’s recommendation, dated October 7, 2016, provides the
following in pertinent part:
CALCULATION INCLUDES THE COST TO [MOTHER] FOR MEDICAL
INSURANCE FOR [FATHER] AND THE CHILDREN, THE
MORTGAGE EXPENSE ON THE MARITAL RESIDENCE, AND
SHARED CUSTODY OF [YOUNGER CHILD]. THERE IS NO
INDICATION FOR SPOUSAL SUPPORT OR A MORTGAGE
DEVIATION AND INCOMES HAVE BEEN EQUALIZED. EFFECTIVE
7/5/16, [MOTHER] IS TO PAY $365.93 PER MONTH FOR THE
SUPPORT OF TWO CHILDREN, … PLUS $38 PER MONTH
ORDERED ON AMOUNT ON ANY ARREARS WHICH MAY
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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hearing officer’s recommendation does not specify which Rule was relied
upon and the trial court’s opinion does not clarify this point either. The
specific reference from the trial court’s opinion solely provides that “[t]here
(Footnote Continued) _______________________
HEREAFTER ACCRUE. OVERPAYMENT IS SET AT $499.34 AS OF
10/7/16. CASE IS REFERRED TO THE FINANCIAL GROUP TO
MOVE THE OVERPAYMENT ON THE SPA DEBT LINE TO THE CSA
LINES. SPOUSAL SUPPORT IS SUSPENDED EFFECTIVE 7/5/16.
[MOTHER] IS TO CONTINUE PROVIDING MEDICAL INSURANCE
FOR [FATHER] AND THE CHILDREN. UNREIMBU[R]SED
MEDICAL EXPENSES WHICH EXCEED THE FIRST $250 PER
CALENDAR YEAR PER [FATHER]/CHILD ARE TO BE PAID AS
FOLLOWS: 55% BY [MOTHER] AND 45% BY [FATHER].
[FATHER] SHALL TAKE [OLDER CHILD] ON HIS FEDERAL TAXES
AND [MOTHER] SHALL TAKE [YOUNGER CHILD] ON HER
FEDERAL TAXES AS DEPENDENCY EXEMPTIONS.
Explanation (if needed):
MOTHER EARNS $85,981.92 ANNUALLY WITH WOODLAND
HILLS. SHE PAYS $97.46 SEMI-MONTH[LY] FOR MEDICAL
INSURANCE FOR SELF/[HUSBAND]/2 CHILDREN. SHE
PAYS MANDATORY RETIREMENT OF $268.69 SEMI-
MONTHLY. FATHER IS EMPLOYED BY A FAMILY BUSINESS.
PER FATHER, HIS HOURS WERE REDUCED AND HE NOW
EARNS $1500 BI-WEEKLY. HE FURTHER CLAIMS HE WILL
NOT RECEIVE A BONUS THIS YEAR. THE BONUS WAS
$20,000 AND WAS REDUCED TO $10,000 WHEN THE
PARTIES SEPARATED. I FIND THE BONUS ISSUE TO BE
SUSPECT AND HAVE INCLUDED $10,000 IN MY
CALCULATION. I ALSO FIND THE REDUCTION IN HOURS
TO BE SUSPECT AND HAVE USED $2000 BI-WEEKLY (PER
2015 W-2 FATHER EARNED $60,000) FOR MY
CALCULATION. I FACTORED IN THE MORTGAGE BUT
USED $1559. PER MOTHER, THAT WAS THE AMOUNT OF
THE MORTGAGE WHEN SHE LEFT THE RESIDENCE.
SYSTEM EQUALIZED THE INCOME. I RAN BOTH
PARTIES[’] H/2.
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is no indication that Mother was given a deviation for shared custody. To
the contrary, it indicates that the hearing officer considered that only
custody of one child was shared….” TCO at 4. This is simply not enough of
an explanation to clarify which Rule was applied in light of the fact that
Father’s calculations suggest it was subsection (c)(2) and he claims it should
be subsection (d)(2). Accordingly, we conclude that we must vacate the
decision and remand the matter as to the amount of child support due to
allow the trial court to make adjustments to that figure, if necessary. As
part of the remand, the court should determine which Rule properly applies
and explain the basis for its utilization of that Rule under the circumstances
that exist in this case.
Father’s second issue centers on his claim that the court should have
awarded a mortgage deviation in the support calculation as provided for in
Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6(e). The trial court explained its reasons for refusing to
grant Father’s request for a mortgage deviation as follows:
Lastly, Father argues … that the mortgage on the marital home
should have been found to be $2,813.00, and, … that he should
have been entitled to a mortgage deviation. The hearing officer
indicated that she took the mortgage into consideration but used
$1,559.99, the amount of the mortgage payment obligation
when Mother left the marital home. Using this amount and
putting Father at his previous full time salary plus bonus, Father
is not entitled to a mortgage deviation pursuant to Pa.R.C.P.
1910.16-6(e) as the monthly obligation does not meet the
required threshold.
Moreover, Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6 is not mandatory. It begins:
“The trier of fact may allocate between the parties the additional
expenses identified in subdivisions (a) - (e). If under the facts
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of the case an order for basic support is not appropriate, the
trier of fact may allocate between the parties the additional
expenses.” (emphasis[] added)
With regard to the mortgage on the marital home, [] Rule
[1910.16-6(e)] states:
(e) Mortgage Payment. The guidelines assume
that the spouse occupying the marital residence will
be solely responsible for the mortgage payment, real
estate taxes, and homeowners’ insurance. Similarly,
the court will assume that the party occupying the
marital residence will be paying the items listed
unless the recommendation specifically provides
otherwise. If the obligee is living in the marital
residence and the mortgage payment exceeds 25%
of the obligee’s net income (including amounts of
spousal support, alimony pendente lite and child
support), the court may direct the obligor to assume
up to 50% of the excess amount as part of the total
support award....[][(Emphasis added)]
Applying a mortgage deviation is clearly within the discretion of
the court and dependent not just on the amount of the mortgage
obligation but on other facts of the case. Here, [the court] found
that Father has not done anything to try and reduce the amount
of the mortgage, despite Mother’s offers to attempt to refinance
with him, while at the same time voluntarily reducing his income
by almost 50%.
The mortgage payment spiked dramatically after Mother left the
home. It apparently was Mother’s mistaken belief that this
increase was due to Father’s failure to make payments. It
appears that, instead, it was a new tax assessment that caused
at least a portion of the increase. (The mortgage obligation has
since decreased approximately by $600.00 per month.)
Regardless of the cause of the increase in the monthly mortgage
obligation on the marital residence, [the court] find[s] that
Father is not entitled to a deviation when held to his earning
capacity and when his failure to mitigate is considered.
TCO at 7-8 (emphasis added by trial court).
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In support of this issue, Father sets forth various proposed calculations
of an amount for a mortgage deviation because he claims that the mortgage
payment is over 25% of his net income and meets the requirements set
forth in Rule 1910.16-6(e). He does note that granting a mortgage
deviation is within the trial court’s discretion. However, he takes issue with
the trial court’s reasoning, claiming that refinancing of the mortgage as
suggested by Mother is irrelevant because the main purpose of the deviation
is to support the parties’ children, one of which resides in the home 100% of
the time.
In Woskob v. Woskob, 843 A.2d 1247 (Pa. Super. 2004), this Court
reviewed a case in which the mother as obligee resided in the marital home
that had a mortgage that greatly exceeded her net monthly income.
Following separation, the father had custody of three of the parties’ four
children during various periods. One of his arguments centered on his
custody obligation and the application of Rule 1910.16-6(e) to the mother’s
request for a mortgage enhancement. The mother countered this argument
by claiming that “it is irrelevant whether she had custody of all of the
children or a single child as long as she was an obligee in possession of the
marital home.” Id. at 1257. This Court found the mother’s argument
persuasive, noting that “the trial court may apply the enhancement where a
support obligee resides in the marital home and the mortgage on that
property exceeds one-quarter of the obligee’s net income. Hence, Rule
1910.16[-6(e)] does not contain any custody requirements beyond
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satisfying the status of a support obligee.” Id. at 1257-58. This Court
recognized that prior to the Woskob decision, no precedent existed, just the
Rule itself. Thus, this Court declined to create an exception to the Rule and
relied on the trial court’s reasoning to affirm the court’s decision granting the
mortgage enhancement. Here, we likewise rely on the trial court’s reasoning
and affirm its determination that a mortgage enhancement is not
appropriate under the circumstances of this case.4
Order vacated in part and affirmed in part. Case remanded for further
proceedings. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/3/2018
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4 In the portion of his brief entitled “Conclusion,” Father requests that the
trial court order an award to him of arrears retroactive to July 5, 2016
through July of 2017, which he calculates to total $15,737.99. This total
appears to be based on an amount of support he believes he is owed plus an
amount of a mortgage deviation minus the amount he was actually paid.
This request for arrears was not raised in Father’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement of errors complained of on appeal and, thus, has been waived.
See Dubose v. Quinlan, 125 A.3d 1231 (Pa. Super. 2015) (stating that
when a claim is not raised in the appellant’s statement of errors complained
of on appeal, the claim is waived).
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