Com. v. Smith, F.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
FRANKLIN D. SMITH, JR., : No. 2975 EDA 2015
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, September 4, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Criminal Division at No. CP-23-CR-0002706-2015
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., STABILE AND MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 11, 2016
Franklin D. Smith, Jr., appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
on September 4, 2015, by the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
following his conviction in a waiver trial of driving under the influence of
alcohol or controlled substance (“DUI”), operation of vehicles without official
certificate of inspection, and restrictions on alcoholic beverages.1 We affirm.
The trial court set forth the following factual and procedural history:
Officer Matthew Liss is employed with the
Nether Providence Township Police Department and
has been so employed as a patrolman for the past
sixteen years. Over the course of his career as a
patrolman, Officer Liss has had the opportunity to
conduct hundreds of arrests for [DUI].
1
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1), 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4703(a), and 75 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 3809(a), respectively.
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On February 8, 2015, in his capacity as a
patrolman, Officer Liss was working the 7:00 a.m. []
to 7:00 pm.[] shift. Officer Liss was in uniform and
operating a marked patrol vehicle. Around
3:00 p.m., as Officer Liss was traveling eastbound on
Brookhaven Road approaching the intersection of
Rose Valley Road, he observed a blue colored pickup
truck traveling in the westbound direction on
Brookhaven Road. Officer Liss’s attention was drawn
to the vehicle because, based on his training and
experience, it appeared that the emission and
inspection stickers were fraudulent. Through his
training, Officer Liss knew that [the Pennsylvania
Department of Transportation (PennDOT)] uses
many anti-counterfeit measures when producing the
stickers; two of the biggest identifiers being the color
of the sticker and the texture of the paper. From his
vehicle, Officer Liss could clearly see the stickers in
the bottom left-hand portion of the truck[’]s
window[.] The color was his first indicator that they
were not valid. Typically, the sticker should be
orange in color; however, the truck’s stickers were
grayish in color.
Officer Liss turned his patrol vehicle around,
activated his emergency lights and siren, and
conducted a vehicle stop at the area of Moore Road
and Brookhaven Road. Officer Liss exited his patrol
vehicle and made contact with the driver of the
truck. The driver produced his license, registration,
and insurance, which identified him as [appellant].
There was also another male in the front passenger
seat.
As Officer Liss was speaking with [appellant],
he could detect an odor of alcohol emanating from
his breath and person. Officer Liss also observed
that [appellant’s] speech was slightly slurred and his
eyes were red and blurry. From his vantage point
outside the window of the vehicle, Officer Liss could
see that in the center of the vehicle, on the
transmission hump, there was an open 40[-ounce]
bottle of beer in a brown paper bag. Officer Liss
asked [appellant] if he had been drinking to which
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[appellant] responded that he had a shot and a beer
earlier in the day.
Officer Michael Markunas, of the Nether
Providence Township Police Department, arrived as
backup and the officers decided to ask [appellant] to
exit his vehicle in order to conduct sobriety tests.
With his twenty-four years as a patrolman,
Officer Markunas has been involved in approximately
500 arrests for DUI and has prior training in
conducting field sobriety tests.
Officer Markunas had [appellant] go over to
the shoulder area of the road because it was a flat
walking surface and had a straight line. Immediately
upon speaking with [appellant], Officer Markunas
detected an odor of alcohol emanating from
[appellant’s] person and that [appellant’s] eyes were
glassy and bloodshot.
Officer Markunas started with the horizontal
gaze nystagmus test. Officer Markunas instructed
[appellant] to stand with his feet together, hands at
his side, to not move his head, and to stay still while
following Officer Markunas’s pen with his eyes. As
soon as Officer Markunas began to move the pen,
[appellant] started turning his head; indicating to
Officer Markunas that [appellant] was unable to
follow simple instructions and that [appellant’s] eyes
showed nystagmus.
Next, Officer Markunas performed the lack of
convergence test. Typically, if the test is completed
without failure, a person’s eyes should cross;
[appellant’s] eyes stayed locked in the same
position.
Lastly, Officer Markunas asked [appellant] to
perform the walk and turn test. Officer Markunas
instructed [appellant] to keep his feet together,
hands at his side, and count out loud nine heel-to-
toe steps. Officer Markunas demonstrated the test
for [appellant]. [Appellant] did not step heel-to-toe;
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failed to keep his hands at his side; and did not turn
even remotely close to the proper way.
Based on [appellant’s] performance on all
three tests, Officer Markunas determined that
[appellant] was under the influence, most likely of
alcohol, and was incapable of safely [driving] a
motor vehicle on the roads of the Commonwealth.
Officer Markunas informed Officer Liss that
[appellant] failed all of the tests. Officer Liss placed
[appellant] under arrest for [DUI] and put
[appellant] in the back of his patrol vehicle, where
he read [appellant] the Pennsylvania implied consent
law and explained to him what the form meant.
After reading and explaining the form twice,
[appellant] refused to submit to any chemical
testing, stating that he was not “alley drunk.”[2]
...
On August 8, 2015, counsel for [a]ppellant
filed a motion to suppress alleging that the traffic
stop of [a]ppellant’s vehicle was unlawful. On
September 4, 2015, this Court held a suppression
hearing. Counsel for the Commonwealth and
counsel for [appellant] both agreed that testimony
would be presented on the suppression issues and,
depending on the outcome, a non-jury trial would be
conducted immediately thereafter.
The Commonwealth presented testimony from
Officer Liss and Officer Markunas who testified to the
facts outlined above. Officer Markunas was offered
and accepted as an expert in the field of sobriety
testing and [DUI] investigations. The
Commonwealth admitted two exhibits: C1 - Photo of
[appellant’s] emission and inspection stickers and
C2 [-] The Pennsylvania Implied Consent Form.
2
Officer Liss testified that after he read a refusal to submit to chemical
testing form to appellant and asked appellant to sign the form, appellant
refused and stated, “I’m not alley drunk.” Officer Liss further testified that
he did not know what appellant meant by that statement. (Notes of
testimony, 9/4/15 at 40-41.)
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After hearing the testimony, this Court
determined that the information provided by the
officers was credible and that Officer Liss had
reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop based
on a motor vehicle code violation. As such, this
Court denied the motion to suppress.
In regards to the non-jury trial, the
Commonwealth rested on the testimony provided at
the suppression hearing and the admitted exhibits.
Appellant presented Lavinia Beulah as a character
witness. Ms. B[eul]ah testified that she has known
[a]ppellant for forty years or more and that his
reputation in the community is nice, friendly, helpful,
honest, and of good moral character. Appellant also
elected to testify.
Appellant stated that on February 8, 2015, he
had two drinks, a shot and a beer, around noon.
Around 3:00 p.m., [a]ppellant was driving his pickup
truck with his friend in the front passenger seat and
that his passenger had an open 40[-ounce] beer.
Appellant stated [that] he felt confused by the
sobriety tests and that he was never shown the
implied consent form.
The Court found [a]ppellant guilty of Count 1:
DUI 1st offense; Count 2: Evidence of Emission
Inspection; and Count 3: Restrictions on Alcoholic
Beverages. Appellant was sentenced on Count 1 [to]
72 hours to 6 months in Delaware County Prison.
There was no further penalty for Count 2 or Count 3.
On October 2, 2015, [a]ppellant filed a notice
of appeal. On October 26, 2015, [a]ppellant filed a
1925(b) statement of matters complained of on
appeal.
Trial court opinion, 11/13/15 at 1-6 (footnotes and citations to notes of
testimony omitted).
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
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[1.] Did the trial court err when it denied
[appellant’s] motion to suppression [sic]
evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful
traffic stop leading to his arrest?
[2.] Was the evidence insufficient to sustain a
conviction of [DUI] because the
Commonwealth failed to prove that [appellant]
committed that offense beyond a reasonable
doubt?
Appellant’s brief at 5.
Our standard of review for challenges to the denial of a suppression
motion is as follows:
[We are] limited to determining whether the
suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn
from those facts are correct. Because the
Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression
court, we may consider only the evidence of the
Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the
defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the
context of the record as a whole. Where the
suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
the record, we are bound by these findings and may
reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are
erroneous. Where . . . the appeal of the
determination of the suppression court turns on
allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s
legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate
court, whose duty it is to determine if the
suppression court properly applied the law to the
facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts
below are subject to our plenary review.
Commonwealth v. McAdoo, 46 A.3d 781, 783-784 (Pa.Super. 2012),
appeal denied, 65 A.3d 413 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted).
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Whenever a police officer has reasonable suspicion that a violation of
the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 101, et seq., is occurring or has occurred,
he may stop a vehicle for the purpose of checking the vehicle’s registration,
proof of financial responsibility, vehicle identification number or engine
number or the driver’s license, “or to secure such other information as the
officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of
[the Vehicle Code].” Id. at § 6308(b). Section 6308(b) requires only
reasonable suspicion to support a vehicle stop for gathering information
necessary to enforce a Vehicle Code violation. A police officer must,
however, have probable cause to support a vehicle stop where the officer’s
investigation following the stop serves no “investigatory purpose relevant to
the suspected [Vehicle Code] violation.” Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10
A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa.Super. 2010) (en banc), appeal denied, 25 A.3d 327
(Pa. 2011). As explained by our supreme court:
Indeed, the language of § 6308 reflects this very
intent. Stops based on reasonable suspicion are
allowed for a stated investigatory purpose: “to
secure such other information as the officer may
reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the
provisions of this title.” 75 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6308(b).
This is conceptually equivalent to the purpose of a
Terry[3] stop. It does not allow all stops to be
based on the lower quantum--it merely allows this
for investigatory stops, consistent with the
requirements of both federal and state constitutions.
We interpret the legislature’s modification of § 6308
as merely eliminating the statutory requirement of a
greater level of information for a stop under the
3
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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Vehicle Code than is constitutionally required for all
other stops.
Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 116 (Pa. 2008). “[I]f the officer
has a legitimate expectation of investigatory results, the existence of
reasonable suspicion will allow the stop--if the officer has no such
expectations of learning additional relevant information concerning the
suspected criminal activity, the stop cannot be constitutionally permitted on
the basis of mere suspicion.” Id. at 115. Therefore, “when the existence of
reasonable suspicion combines with the expectation that the stop will allow
light to be shed on the relevant matters, the stop is not unconstitutional.”
Id.
Here, Officer Matthew Liss stopped appellant’s vehicle because he
observed that it appeared to have fraudulent inspection and emissions
stickers. (Notes of testimony, 9/4/15 at 11.) Officer Liss testified that
during the 16 years that he has been a police officer, he has come across
numerous fraudulent inspection and emissions stickers. (Id. at 9, 11-12.)
He stated that PennDOT uses many anti-counterfeit measures when it
produces inspection and emissions stickers, including the color of the sticker.
(Id. at 12.)
As appellant’s truck and Officer Liss’ patrol vehicle passed each other
while traveling in opposite directions, Officer Liss testified that he noticed
that the stickers on appellant’s truck were gray, as opposed to the
PennDOT-issued orange. (Id. at 13-16.) This observation gave rise to a
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suspected violation of the Vehicle Code provision requiring that vehicles have
current, valid inspection stickers. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4703(a). Under the
totality of the circumstances, then, Officer Liss’ initial observation that the
inspection and emissions stickers on appellant’s truck appeared to be
fraudulent gave Officer Liss reasonable suspicion to believe that appellant
was in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4703(a). Therefore, the subsequent traffic
stop to investigate the inspection and emissions stickers affixed to
appellant’s vehicle was supported by reasonable suspicion.
Appellant next complains that the Commonwealth failed to produce
sufficient evidence to sustain his DUI conviction.
Our standard of review for a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence is well settled. We must
view all the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict winner, giving that party the benefit of all
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.
Additionally, it is not the role of an appellate court to
weigh the evidence or to substitute our judgment for
that of the fact-finder.
Commonwealth v. Alford, 880 A.2d 666, 669-670 (Pa.Super. 2005),
appeal denied, 890 A.2d 1055 (Pa. 2005), quoting Commonwealth v.
Gruff, 822 A.2d 773, 775 (Pa.Super. 2003), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1143
(Pa. 2004) (citations omitted).
The Vehicle Code defines DUI as:
§ 3802. Driving under influence of alcohol or
controlled substance.
(a) General impairment.
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(1) An individual may not drive,
operate or be in actual physical
control of the movement of a
vehicle after imbibing a sufficient
amount of alcohol such that the
individual is rendered incapable of
safely driving, operating or being in
actual physical control of the
movement of the vehicle.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1).
In order to sustain a conviction under Section 3802(a)(1), the
Commonwealth must prove: (1) that defendant was operating a motor
vehicle, (2) after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the
individual is rendered incapable of safely driving. Commonwealth v.
Kerry, 906 A.2d 1237, 1241 (Pa.Super. 2006). To establish that one is
incapable of safe driving, the Commonwealth must prove that alcohol has
substantially impaired the normal mental and physical faculties required to
operate the vehicle safely. Id. “Substantial impairment” means a
diminution or enfeeblement in the ability to exercise judgment, to deliberate
or to react prudently to changing circumstances and conditions. Id. (citation
omitted). Section 3802(a)(1) “is a general provision and provides no
specific restraint upon the Commonwealth in the manner in which it may
prove that an accused operated a vehicle under the influence of alcohol to a
degree which rendered him incapable of safe driving.” Id. (citation
omitted).
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Here, Officer Liss testified that after he pulled appellant over, he
smelled alcohol on appellant’s breath; he noticed that appellant’s eyes were
red, watery, and bloodshot; and that when he spoke with appellant, he
detected a slight slur. (Notes of testimony, 9/4/15 at 17-18.) Officer Liss
also observed a partially consumed 40-ounce bottle of beer resting on the
truck’s console. (Id. at 18, 36.) When Officer Liss asked appellant if he had
been drinking alcohol, appellant stated that he had consumed “a shot and a
beer” earlier in the day. (Id. at 18.) At that point, Officer Michael Markunas
arrived on the scene as backup and performed field sobriety tests. (Id. at
19.)
Officer Markunas testified that when he began speaking with appellant,
he smelled alcohol emanating from appellant’s person and observed that
appellant’s eyes appeared glassy and bloodshot. (Id. at 51.) With respect
to field-sobriety testing, Officer Markunas first conducted horizontal gaze
nystagmus (“HGN”) testing, which is a vision test used to determine the
ability of the subject’s eyes to properly track and maintain focus on objects.
(Id. at 51-52.) Officer Markunas testified that appellant’s performance on
that test indicated that appellant was under the influence of “something.”
(Id. at 53.) Officer Markunas then performed a lack of convergence test
which expands upon HGN testing. (Id. at 53-55.) Appellant’s performance
on that test also indicated that appellant was under the influence of
“something.” (Id. at 55.) Officer Markunas then performed a walk-and-turn
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test. (Id.) At the conclusion of that test, Officer Markunas testified that he
was “relatively sure” that appellant was under the influence of alcohol, a
controlled substance, or both. (Id. at 55-56.) At that point, due to
appellant’s lack of cooperation, Officer Markunas terminated testing. (Id. at
56.) Officer Liss then placed appellant under arrest. (Id. at 20-21.)
Appellant refused chemical testing. (Id. at 21.)
Based on the record before us, and viewing the evidence, and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth as verdict winner, the Commonwealth produced sufficient
evidence to show that appellant was operating a motor vehicle after
consuming a sufficient amount of alcohol to render him incapable of safe
driving and, therefore, sustain his DUI conviction.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/11/2016
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