Com. v. Crosley, J.

J-S03042-18
2018 PA Super 43COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JERMAINE DALTON CROSLEY,
Appellant No. 2049 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 23, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0002462-2016
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, J. and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
CONCURRING OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 28, 2018
I agree with the Majority that the trial court erred by admitting the
evidence of Appellant’s prior conviction for the purpose of rebutting
Appellant’s testimony about the victim’s prior acts of violence. I also agree
with the Majority that, despite this error by the trial court, Appellant is not
entitled to a new trial. However, I base my decision on a different rationale
than the Majority. Therefore, I respectfully concur.
Preliminarily, I take issue with the Majority’s concluding, sua sponte,
that the evidence of Appellant’s prior conviction could have properly been
admitted to rebut his “unsolicited testimony of his good character.” Majority
Opinion at 14. This was not the basis stated by the trial court for admitting
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S03042-18
the at-issue evidence and, therefore, it is outside our scope of review. See
Commonwealth v. Weakley, 972 A.2d 1182, 1189 (Pa. Super. 2009)
(“When a trial court indicates its reasons for its ruling, ‘our scope of review is
limited to an examination of that stated reason.’”) (citation omitted).
In any event, I also disagree with the Majority that Appellant’s testimony
that he never carries a weapon permitted the Commonwealth to introduce the
evidence of his prior conviction for aggravated assault, because Appellant
allegedly committed that crime “while holding a sharp object.” Majority
Opinion at 14. The general allegation that Appellant was holding an
unidentified, ‘sharp object’ during his assault of the security guard does not
demonstrate that he was carrying a weapon prior to that incident.
Thus, I would hold that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
the evidence of Appellant’s prior conviction on the basis espoused by the
Commonwealth and explicitly accepted by the court, and I would end my
analysis of the admissibility of that evidence there.
Nevertheless, I agree with the Majority that Appellant is not entitled to
a new trial. The Commonwealth presented overwhelming evidence of
Appellant’s guilt, as aptly discussed by the Majority in assessing his
sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim. The prejudicial effect of Appellant’s prior
conviction was so insignificant by comparison that I am convinced, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that it could not have contributed to the trial court’s verdict.
See Commonwealth v. Jacoby, 170 A.3d 1065, 1085–86 (Pa. 2017)
(“Harmless error exists where: (1) the error did not prejudice the defendant
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J-S03042-18
or the prejudice was de minimis; (2) the erroneously admitted evidence was
merely cumulative of other untainted evidence which was substantially similar
to the erroneously admitted evidence; or (3) the properly admitted and
uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so overwhelming and the prejudicial
effect of the error was so insignificant by comparison that the error could not
have contributed to the verdict.”) (citations omitted).
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