Com. v. Byrd, H.

J-S38042-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
HADDRICK BYRD :
:
Appellant : No. 1318 EDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 27, 2022,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0317152-1975.
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED JANUARY 24, 2023
Haddrick Byrd appeals from the order denying his petition for writ of
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum as an untimely-filed petition pursuant to the
Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. We affirm.
The pertinent facts and lengthy procedural history have been previously
summarized by this Court as follows:
[Byrd] was sentenced on January 12, 1976, to life
imprisonment for second-degree murder. [He] appealed directly
to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which affirmed his judgment
of sentence. See Commonwealth v. Byrd, 417 A.2d 173 (Pa.
1980). [Byrd] filed a petition for collateral relief in 1980 [pursuant
to the Post Conviction Hearing Act, the predecessor to the PCRA.]
We affirmed the denial of relief under that petition in 1988, and
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied [Byrd’s] petition for
review. See Commonwealth v. Byrd, No. 3024 PHL 1987 (Pa.
Super. May 26, 1988) (unpublished memorandum). [Byrd] filed
a second petition in 1994, we again affirmed the [PCRA] court’s
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denial of relief on that petition in 1996, and again the
[Pennsylvania] Supreme Court denied review. See
Commonwealth v. Byrd, No. 02795 PHL 94, (Pa. Super. Mar.
12, 1996) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 678 A.2d
824 (Pa. 1996).
Byrd’s [third] petition was filed pro se as a petition for writ
of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum in the Civil Division of the Court
of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in October 2013. In his
petition, [Byrd] claimed that no criminal complaint had been filed
at the inception of his case and that he had never been indicted
by a grand jury. According to [Byrd], because of these defects,
he never received formal notice of the charges against him in this
case; the trial court therefore lacked authority to sentence him;
his resulting judgment of sentence is null and void, and his
incarceration is unlawful.
***
The petition was transferred to the criminal division, which
received it on November 6, 2013. The PCRA court determined
that [Byrd’s] habeas corpus petition should be treated as a PCRA
petition, and that, as such, it was untimely. On August 21, 2015,
the PCRA court issued a notice of its intention to dismiss [Byrd]’s
petition without a hearing, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. [Byrd]
responded on September 1, 2015. The PCRA court dismissed
[Byrd’s] petition on June 13, 2016. [Byrd] thereafter filed a timely
appeal.
Commonwealth v. Byrd, 175 A.3d 379 (Pa. Super. 2017), non-precedential
decision at 1-3 (footnotes omitted).
In that appeal, Byrd contended that the PCRA court erred and abused
its discretion by: 1) treating his habeas corpus petition as a serial PCRA
petition, when his claim that his judgment of sentence was void and was not
cognizable under the PCRA; and 2) failing to address whether the district
attorney perpetuated a fraud on the court in proceeding to trial against him
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while knowing no formal charges were filed against him, thus violating his due
process rights.
We affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief on July 14, 2017. Byrd,
supra. By doing so, we agreed with the PCRA court that Byrd’s habeas corpus
petition was properly treated under the PCRA, that it was untimely, and that
Byrd failed to plead and prove a time-bar exception. See id. On February
14, 2018, our Supreme Court denied Byrd’s petition for allowance of appeal.
Commonwealth v. Byrd, 181 A.3d 1077 (Pa. 2018).
On August 22, 2019, Byrd filed another document pro se that he titled
“Petitioner’s Motion for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Subjiciendum Seeking
Clarification and/or Correction of Sentence.” The PCRA court determined that
the filing should be treated as Byrd’s fourth petition for post-conviction relief
and denied it as untimely. Therefore, the court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907
notice of its intent to dismiss Byrd’s petition without a hearing. Byrd filed a
response. By order entered April 27, 2022, the PCRA court denied Byrd’s
petition. This timely appeal followed. Both Byrd and the PCRA court have
complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Byrd raises the following three claims on appeal:
1. Did the trial court commit error and [abuse] its discretion
in dismissing [Byrd’s] habeas corpus petition under the
PCRA in contravention of [Brown v. Pennsylvania
Dept. of Corrections, 81 A.3d 814 (Pa. 2013) (per
curiam)], since a claim that a defendant’s sentence is
illegal due to the inability of the DOC to produce a written
sentencing order related to [his] judgment of sentence
constitutes a claim legitimately sounding in habeas
corpus?
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2. Did the trial court commit error and [abuse] its discretion
in dismissing [Byrd’s] fraud upon the court claim under
the PCRA in contravention of [Commonwealth v.
Heredia, 97 A.3d 392 (Pa. Super. 2014)], since the
alleged error is thought to be attributable to ambiguity in
the sentence imposed by the court, then a writ of habeas
corpus ad subjiciendum, lies to the trial court for
clarification and/or correction of the sentence imposed?
3. Did the trial court commit error and [abuse] its discretion
in contravention of [Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947
A.2d 714 (Pa. 2008)], since there were genuine issues of
material fact that the trial court failed to resolve at an
evidentiary hearing?
Byrd’s Brief at vi.
Using the applicable standard of review, we must determine whether
the ruling of the PCRA court is supported by the record and is free of legal
error. Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 749-50 (Pa. 2014)
(citations omitted). We apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s
legal conclusions. Id.In his first two issues, Byrd contends that his current claims should have
been considered outside of the PCRA because of the inability of the DOC to
produce a written sentencing order, and that missing documents from the
record and the use of incorrect docket numbers amount to the
Commonwealth’s perpetration of fraud upon the court. See Byrd’s Brief at 2.
These claims entitled him to no relief.
Section 6503 of the Judicial Code provides as follows:
§ 6503. Right to apply for writ
(a) General rule.—Except as provided in subsection
(b), an application for habeas corpus to inquire into
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the cause of determination may be brought by or on
behalf of a person restrained of his liberty within this
Commonwealth under any pretense whatsoever.
(b) Exception.—Where a person is restrained by virtue
of a sentence after conviction for a criminal offense,
the writ of habeas corpus shall not be available if a
remedy may be had by post-conviction hearing
proceedings authorized by law.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6503.
Byrd concedes that he currently is serving a sentence after being
convicted of second-degree murder. See Byrd’s Brief at 8. Section 9542 of
the PCRA provides that that statute shall be the sole means of obtaining
collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory
remedies for the same purpose . . . including habeas corpus[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9542. See also Commonwealth v. Thompson, 199 A.3d 889, 891 (Pa.
Super. 2018) (citing Commonwealth v. Hackett, 956 A.2d 978, 985-86
(2002) (reiterating that “both the PCRA and the state habeas corpus statute
contemplate that the PCRA subsumes the writ of habeas corpus in
circumstances where the PCRA provides a remedy for the claim”).
In arguing to the contrary, Byrd relies upon several decisions, including
this Court’s decision in Joseph v. Glunt, 96 A.3d 365 (Pa. Super. 2014). In
Joseph, the petitioner, a convicted murderer, filed a “Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus Ad Subjiciendum,” in which he argued that his sentence was
illegal and that his federal and state constitutional rights were violated
because the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) did not “possess
a lawful court order signed by [the sentencing court] authorizing any lawful
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restraint of [his] body. Joseph, 96 A.3d at 367. The trial court denied the
petition and Joseph appealed.
On appeal, this Court first concluded that Joseph’s petition would be
treated “as a petition for writ of habeas corpus instead of a petition under the
PCRA, which typically governs collateral claims implicating the legality of
sentence.” Joseph, 96 A.3d at 369. In reaching this conclusion, this Court
relied upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s per curiam decision in Brown
v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, 81 A.3d 814 (Pa. 2012). We
explained that Brown “held that a claim that a defendant’s sentence is illegal
due to the inability of the DOC to ‘produce a written sentencing order related
to [his] judgment of sentence’ constitutes a claim legitimately sounding in
habeas corpus.” Joseph, 96 A.3d at 368 (quoting Brown, 81 A.3d at 815).
Nevertheless, treating his petition as one for habeas corpus, this Court
found Joseph was not entitled to relief. We explained that the writ of habeas
corpus “lies to secure the immediate release of one who has been detained
unlawfully, in violation of due process. . . . Under Pennsylvania statute,
habeas corpus is a civil remedy [that] lies solely for commitments under the
criminal process.” Id. at 369 (citations omitted).
However, as this Court further explained in Joseph, habeas corpus relief
is rarely, if ever, available to one whose incarceration is based on a judgment
of sentence that was imposed following a trial and that has been upheld on
appeal. We stated:
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When a petitioner is in custody by virtue of a judgment
of sentence of a court of competent jurisdiction, the writ
generally will not lie. The rationale of this limitation is
the presumption of regularity which follows the
judgment. The writ, as stated above, is an extraordinary
remedy and, therefore, a judgment rendered in the
ordinary course is beyond the reach of habeas corpus.
That conviction cannot be put aside lightly, and it
becomes stronger the longer the judgment stands.
Consequently, habeas corpus generally is not available
to review a conviction which had been affirmed on
appeal.
Id. at 372 (citations omitted. Thus, Joseph was not entitled to relief because,
notwithstanding that the DOC did not possess a written sentencing order, the
court records confirmed “the imposition, and legitimacy of [his] sentence.”
Id.
Here, unlike the petitioner in Joseph, Byrd did not file his habeas corpus
petition in the civil court against the superintendent of the correctional
institution in which he is currently housed, but rather, filed it in the criminal
division. Moreover, in his multiple petitions as well as his appellate brief, Byrd
acknowledges that he was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced
to life imprisonment. Additionally, this Court affirmed his judgment of
sentence, and our Supreme Court denied his allocatur petition. Thus, because
the record shows that Byrd’s judgment of sentence has been affirmed on
appeal, there was no basis for the PCRA court to grant habeas corpus relief.
As such, the court properly treated Byrd’s latest filing as a serial PCRA petition.
Treating Byrd’s filing as a PCRA petition, we must next review the PCRA
court’s conclusion that his fourth PCRA petition was untimely filed, and that
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he failed to establish a time-bar exception. The timeliness of a post-conviction
petition is jurisdictional. Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651
(Pa. Super. 2013). Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA, including
a second or subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the
judgment becomes final unless the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves,
that an exception to the time for filing the petition is met.
The three narrow statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar are as
follows: “(1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the
claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional
right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii)). In addition, exceptions to the PCRA’s
time bar must be pled in the petition and may not be raised for the first time
on appeal. Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super.
2007); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the
lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).
Moreover, a PCRA petitioner must file his petition “within one year of date the
claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).
Finally, if a PCRA petition is untimely and the petitioner has not pled and
proven an exception “neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction
over the petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal
authority to address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v.
Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).
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Here, Byrd’s judgment of sentence became final decades ago. Because
Byrd filed the petition at issue in 2022, it is patently untimely unless he has
satisfied his burden of pleading and proving that one of the enumerated
exceptions applies. See Hernandez, supra. Byrd has not done so.
Therefore, the PCRA court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to
consider the merits of Byrd’s petition. Derrickson, supra. We therefore
affirm its order denying post-conviction relief.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/24/2023
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