Datts, R. v. Little, A.

J-A26007-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
RICARDO T. DATTS, II : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ALEXANDER LITTLE :
:
Appellant : No. 1919 EDA 2021
Appeal from the Judgment Entered December 7, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
No(s): 171101814
BEFORE: BOWES, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 02, 2023
Alexander Little appeals from the judgment of $34,867 entered against
him and in favor of Ricardo T. Datts, II.1 We affirm.
The pertinent underlying facts are as follows. Mr. Datts and Mr. Little
are first cousins who entered into a landlord-tenant relationship in 2015.
Specifically, Mr. Datts and David Bradley, his business partner for a
documentary film, rented space in Mr. Little’s home for themselves and their
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Mr. Little purported to appeal from the September 13, 2021 order that
granted Mr. Datts’s motion to correct the record. However, no judgment had
been entered on the docket in accordance with that order prior to the filing of
the notice of appeal. Mr. Little subsequently filed a praecipe for judgment in
accordance with this Court’s order, and we have amended the caption
accordingly. See Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5) (“A notice of appeal filed after the
announcement of a determination but before the entry of an appealable order
shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof.”).
J-A26007-22
equipment. When Mr. Datts refused Mr. Little’s entreaties to be included in
the venture, Mr. Little attempted to raise the monthly rent and ultimately
locked Mr. Datts out of the residence and retained Mr. Datts’s equipment and
personal property. As the trial court explained, “[t]he saga has expanded out
to involve multiple family members and acquaintances[, including Mr. Datts’s
mother (“Mrs. Datts”)], and has resulted in several criminal prosecutions and
protection from abuse proceedings.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/27/21, at 3.
Mr. Datts initiated the instant action against Mr. Little and prevailed in
the Philadelphia Municipal Court. Mr. Little appealed, and Mr. Datts prevailed
before a panel of arbitrators. Mr. Little again appealed, and a trial de novo
was held before the trial court, resulting in another verdict in favor of Mr.
Datts. That verdict was vacated upon the grant of Mr. Little’s post-trial motion
and the case was tried anew before a different judge of the trial court. Over
the course of the two-day trial, at which both parties proceeded pro se, Mr.
Datts introduced an itemized list of equipment, clothing, and other items that
he contended were converted by Mr. Little, totaling $34,876. See N.T. Trial,
2/24/20 (Morning), at 28-29, Exhibit P-1. The court also heard evidence that
Mr. Little admitted to locking Mr. Datts out of the house and saw video of Mr.
Little and Mr. Bradley following and attacking Mr. Datts and Mrs. Datts
following one of the prior proceedings. At the conclusion of the proceedings,
the court announced its verdict as follows:
-2-
J-A26007-22
THE COURT: I will make a number of findings, factual findings that
usually are unnecessary, but they’re made necessary in this
instance.
Hopefully there won’t be a use for them in the future, but if there
is, I hope it helps. And also for Mr. Little’s edification.
This court finds that the evidence overwhelmingly and by the
defendant’s own admission, that the plaintiff was unlawfully
evicted, even if that admission waffles in the way that’s not at all
logical or persuasive. The record amply shows that he unlawfully
evicted Mr. Datts,
The court also finds that the record amply shows that the
defendant unlawfully retained possession of the plaintiffs
property.
I do give credence to the plaintiff’s testimony regarding both the
eviction and the property. I find in favor of plaintiff.
....
Overall, this Court finds that the defendant is utterly uncredible.
And this is based not only on his own contradictions here speaking
under oath, but also in light of other evidence and things that are
irreconcilable, no matter how hard we tried, with other things that
he’s saying.
I got to tell you, Mr. Little, it’s very disturbing that someone would
use misstatements to bring so much grief to anyone, let alone a
cousin. It’s really - it’s mind blowing. I hope you reconsider, I
hope you reconsider and you stop doing that.
MR. LITTLE: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: I will issue a stay away order enjoining you from
contacting directly or indirectly Mr. Datts or Mrs. Datts.
Unfortunately, I cannot issue an order enjoining you from making
a criminal complaint, but let me tell you, if somehow that gets into
court, you will have a lot of trouble.
Part of the reason that I’m making these specific findings is
because I want the world to know just how you have repeatedly
and blatantly misstated facts for your own use.
-3-
J-A26007-22
MR. LITTLE: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: It’s unkind and really, really troubling, and it’s illegal.
I really hope you stop.
N.T. Trial, 2/25/20, at 83-85 (cleaned up).
A February 25, 2020 docket entry reflects the verdict “in favor of [Mr.
Datts] and against [Mr. Little] entirely,” and an order prohibiting Mr. Little
from having any contact with Mr. Datts or Mrs. Datts. However, no amount
of damages was stated on the docket or the trial worksheet that was made
part of the record, and no judgment was entered on the verdict.
More than a year later, Mr. Datts filed a motion to correct the record to
include $34,867 as the amount of damages awarded to him. He also alleged
that Mr. Little had repeatedly violated the stay-away order. Mr. Little filed
responses denying the contempt allegations and suggesting that Mr. Datts’s
motion to correct the record be dismissed as an untimely post-trial motion,
and that the verdict should stand with no monetary damage award. The trial
court held a hearing on the matters on August 26, 2021, at the conclusion of
which it orally granted the motion to correct the record and denied the
contempt petition. Mr. Little filed a motion for reconsideration before the trial
court filed orders on September 13, 2021, denying contempt and granting the
correction of the record entering judgment in favor of Mr. Datts and against
Mr. Little in the amount of $34,867. Mr. Little filed a notice of appeal on
September 22, 2021. The following day, the trial court dismissed Mr. Little’s
-4-
J-A26007-22
reconsideration motion as prematurely filed, and Mr. Little filed a post-trial
motion. The court subsequently denied Mr. Little’s post-trial motion and
judgment was entered. Both Mr. Little and the trial court complied with
Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Mr. Little presents the following question for our consideration: “Does
the common pleas court trial division have jurisdiction over post trial motions
filed after the ten day limit established by Pennsylvania law[?]”2 Mr. Little’s
brief at 4 (cleaned up). Mr. Little’s argument, stated in an inartful and
repetitive fashion in his brief, boils down to this: because Mr. Datts did not
file his motion to correct the record within ten days of the trial court’s final
order stating a verdict for the plaintiff with no monetary award, the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to grant the motion and instead should have denied it as
an untimely post-trial motion. See id. at 5-11.
Mr. Little is correct that Pa.R.C.P. 227.1 provides that post-trial motions
must be filed within ten days of the filing of a non-jury decision. See Pa.R.C.P.
227.1(c)(2). However, “the timeliness provision of Rule 227.1 is not
jurisdictional in nature.” Linder v. City of Chester, 78 A.3d 694, 698
____________________________________________
2 In his Rule 1925(b) statement and at oral argument, Mr. Little also
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the amount of the trial
court’s award. By not including the issue in his appellate brief, however, Mr.
Little waived it. See, e.g., Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (“No question will be considered
unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested
thereby.”). In any event, we discern no error in the trial court’s explanation
that Mr. Datts’s evidence was sufficient to establish the amount of damages.
See Trial Court Opinion, 12/27/21, at 6-8.
-5-
J-A26007-22
(Pa.Cmwlth. 2013). Rather, “the trial court has the discretion to determine
whether it will consider the untimely post-trial motion.” Behar v. Frazier,
724 A.2d 943, 945 (Pa.Super. 1999).
The rule of law implicating the trial court’s jurisdiction to modify its
decision is 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505, which provides that such modification is
permissible up until the time an appeal has been filed or the thirty-day window
for appealing has lapsed. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505 (“Except as otherwise
provided or prescribed by law, a court upon notice to the parties may modify
or rescind any order within 30 days after its entry, notwithstanding the prior
termination of any term of court, if no appeal from such order has been taken
or allowed.”); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a) (providing the general rule that a
court may not proceed further on a matter after an appeal is taken).
After thirty days, a final trial court determination “can be opened or
vacated only upon a showing of extrinsic fraud, lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, a fatal defect apparent on the face of the record or some other
evidence of extraordinary cause justifying intervention by the court.”
Hayward v. Hayward, 808 A.2d 232, 235 (Pa.Super. 2002) (cleaned up).
Such extraordinary circumstances include “mistakes made by the court or its
officers.” Id. Stated differently, a trial court “has inherent powers to amend
its records, to correct mistakes of the clerk or other officer of the court,
inadvertencies of counsel, or supply defects or omissions in the record, even
after the lapse of the term.” In re K.R.B., 851 A.2d 914, 918 (Pa.Super.
-6-
J-A26007-22
2004) (cleaned up). Under these “limited circumstances, even where the
court would normally be divested of jurisdiction, a court may have the power
to correct patent and obvious mistakes.” Id. (cleaned up).
Here, the trial court indicated that the record clearly reflected that it
credited Mr. Datts’s evidence concerning the property that Mr. Little retained,
and that its verdict was expressly for Mr. Datts “entirely.” See Trial Court
Opinion, 12/27/21, at 7-8. The failure of the court to enter the amount of
damages reflected in Mr. Datts’s Exhibit P-1 was an oversight plain on the face
of the record. Id. at 9. Hence, it had the authority to correct the clerical error
and amend its verdict. Id. at 8 (citing Maize v. Atl. Ref. Co., 41 A.2d 850,
854 (Pa. 1945)3 (“Verdicts which are not technically correct in form but which
manifest a clear intent on the part of the factfinder may be corrected without
resort to the grant of a new trial.”)) (cleaned up).
Mr. Little offers no authority to counter the trial court’s reasoning.
Indeed, the trial court’s jurisdiction to correct the omission from its order long
after thirty days is supported by the case law. See, e.g., Hayward, supra
at 236 (holding extraordinary circumstances existed to modify a qualified
domestic relations order six years after its entry where the order’s indication
of an improper coverture fraction was apparent from the face of the record).
____________________________________________
3 The Maize Court in turn cited with approval Cohn v. Scheuer, 8 A. 421,
422 (Pa. 1887), in which our Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge’s
amendment of the verdict weeks after trial to add the amount awarded where
the failure to include it originally was a mistake on the part of the court crier.
-7-
J-A26007-22
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment entered upon the trial court’s September
13, 2021 order granting Mr. Datts’s motion to correct the record.
Judgment affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/2/2023
-8-